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In memory of Yakov Yehuda ben Pinchas Wallach
and Miriam Wallach bat Tzvi Donner

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Yeshivat Har Etzion in Israel joins the American Jewish Community in mourning
the tragic untimely passing of YC student David Rottenstreich Z"L.

PARASHAT SHEMINI

KASHRUT AND UNDERSTANDING – Part One

By Rabbi Yaakov Beasley

A.     INTRODUCTION

Our parasha begins with the Torah’s description of the completion of the week-long sacrificial ceremonies of the dedication of the Mishkan, the Tabernacle.  During the final day of the dedication, Aharon’s two eldest sons present an unauthorized offering of incense before God and are killed for their offense.[1] This leads to injunctions that forbid the consumption of intoxicating beverages by the ministering kohanim and the outlining of details of sacrificial law that are suddenly made pertinent by Aharon’s state of mourning.  The Torah then interrupts the discussion of the service of the Mishkan for five chapters before returning to it in Chapter 16, wherein it concludes with the laws of the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur.  In the interim, the Torah outlines the rules of taharah and tumah – colloquially understood as the laws of purity and impurity.

Rabbi Menachem Leibtag explains this digression as follows:

Now that we have established that chapters 11-15 form a distinct unit which discusses the laws of tumah and tahara, we can return to our original question - Why does this unit interrupt the natural flow from Parashat Shmini (chapter 10) to Parashat Acharei Mot (chapter 16)? The concluding pesukim of this unit can provide us with a possible explanation.

As we have noted in our outline, this entire unit contains an important finale pasuk:

        “Ve-hizhartem et Bnei Yisrael mi-tumatam…,” “And you shall put Bnei Yisrael on guard against their tumah, LEST THEY DIE through their tumah by defiling my Mishkan that is among them” (15:31).

This pasuk connects the laws of tumah and taharah to the laws of the Mishkan. Bnei Yisrael must be careful that they not enter the Mishkan if they become tamei, impure.  In fact, the primary consequence for one who has become tamei is the prohibition that he cannot enter the Mikdash complex. There is no prohibition against becoming tamei, but only a prohibition against entering the Mishkan should one become tamei.[2]

        In other words, the primary purpose of the laws of taharah and tumah are to distinguish between those permitted to enter the Mishkan (tahorim) and those to whom entry is forbidden (tame’im).  The importance of these laws at this point in the narrative was amply demonstrated by the sudden deaths of Nadav and Avihu.  Only after the necessary safeguards are taught to the people can the Torah continue with its original discussion of the Mishkan.    

The first of the laws of taharah and tumah are the dietary laws in the closing chapter of this week’s parasha.  The Torah introduces the laws of permitted animals, birds, and fish, and concludes with a discussion of how the carcasses of various clean and unclean animals transmit tumah (11:1-47).  At the conclusion of the detailed presentation of what one may and may not eat, the Torah offers a rationale for the command. In 11:45, Hashem states that we should keep kosher, “because I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt to be your God.” In addition, “You be holy, because I am holy.” The Torah does not explain how observance of these laws helps to achieve holiness, nor the particular connection between leaving Egypt with the fact that God wants us to be holy because He is holy.  This week, we will begin analyzing the various rationales suggested by Jewish thinkers for the laws of kashrut, and use them as a springboard to attempt to answer the questions we’ve raised above.

B.    IS UNDERSTANDING DESIRABLE?

Discussion to the purpose and rationale behind any of the Torah’s laws traditionally begins with two disclaimers.  First, we are concerned that one might base the authority of a commandment on his comprehension of its rationale.  The point that the understanding a law cannot be linked to its observance was forcefully expressed by R. Samson Raphael Hirsch in the foreword to his magnum opus, Horev:

Even, therefore, if every Divine precept were a riddle to us and presented us with a thousand unsolved and insoluble problems, the obligatory character of the commandments would not in the slightest degree be impaired by this. Whatever command or prohibition of God it may be that prompts one to ask why one should do this and not do that, there is but one answer: Because it is the will of God...[3]

Rabbi Michael Hattin ably reiterated this point in his discussion of the laws of kashrut in this forum several years ago:

Although many streams in our tradition encourage the exercise of human intelligence and wisdom in the worthy attempt to plumb the profundity of the Divine laws of the Torah, none of them make one’s OBSERVANCE of the laws conditional upon one’s UNDERSTANDING of the laws.  Observance is a function of one’s spiritual commitment to God’s commands that ultimately stands independent of any humanly assigned rational content.[4]

Even if we can distinguish between the attempt to explain a given law with unreserved observance of that law, we must still grapple with several additional questions.  The first question is a more general issue – by what right can a person assign rationales for what are ultimaly Divine decrees?  Is it not arrogant to suggest knowing the will of the Divine?  Would it not be more beneficial to invest one’s efforts in other endeavors, and simply accept the commandments without question?    Second, regarding the specific issue of kashrut, it seems that the Torah provided no clear basis or rationale for the law; is it possible that an explanation does not exist?  Traditional Jewish philosophy divides the 613 mitzvot into two groups - laws that have a rational explanation (mishpatim) and those that do not (chukim).  Some scholars have held that the dietary laws should be categorized with the group of laws that are considered irrational because there is no particular explanation for their existence. Some of God’s regulations for mankind are beyond the comprehension of the human mind. Perhaps the dietary laws were given as a demonstration of God’s authority, and man should obey them without asking for a reason.   

The suggestion that attempting to ascertain the rationales behind the laws of kashrut may not be beneficial is first alluded to in the Rambam in the introduction to his commentary on Ethics of the Fathers (Shemonah Perakim, Chapter 6). The Rambam discusses which person demonstrates the higher level of morality –one who conquers his evil inclination or one who has no evil inclination at all. The Rambam maintains that the latter is a pious person (chasid); his desire is to do only good and he finds evil instinctively abhorrent. The Rambam brings support for this idea from the earlier philosophers and from verses in Mishlei (“The soul of the evil person desires evil” (21:10), “The righteous person rejoices in acting justly” (21:15)).  However, the Rambam then quotes a number of statements from rabbinic thought that seem to contradict this idea, implying instead that the highest level of piety is achieved through conquering the desire for evil. The Sifra on Parashat Kedoshim, for example, quotes R. Shimon ben Gamliel as saying, “A person should not say, ‘I do not like meat and milk mixtures’... rather, he should say, ‘I would like it, but what can I do? My Father in Heaven has decreed upon me (not to partake of it).’”

To resolve the apparent contradiction, the Rambam suggests that the answer lies in the type of commandment under discussion – whether it is a law with a rational explanation (mishpat) or one that does not have a rational explanation (chok). “Regarding the evils that the philosophers agree are evil, the Sages said that one who does not desire them at all is greater than one who conquers his desire... such as murder and theft... But regarding those evils that would be acceptable had the Torah not forbidden them, the Sages said that one should desire them and refrain from transgression only because of the Torah's prohibition.”  Accordingly, when dealing with mishpatim, commandments whose rationale are apparent, it is clearly desirable that a person incorporate certain qualities into his character so that his performance of commandments (or his refraining from transgression) do not result from internal struggle, but are rather the natural consequences of his personality. This is not true, however, with regard to chukim.  With these laws, obedience to God should be the only motivation in their fulfillment.  Notably, the example given by the Sifra is the quintessential law of kashrut proscribing the consumption of milk and meat together. 

C.    UNDERSTANDING THE INCOMPREHENSIBLE

Despite this, however, Jewish commentators and philosophers, including the Rambam himself, did not refrain from attempting to ascertain the underlying rationale for the laws of kashrut, in addition to other chukim.   In the introduction to his commentary to the Torah, the Ibn Ezra writes that “The foundation of everything is the exercise of reason, for the Torah was not given to one who does not possess intelligence.  The emissary between a man and his Lord is his intellect…”  Therefore, it behooves us to contemplate the rationales behind the commandments, despite our apparent inability to do so. 

In fact, several commentators suggest that if a person were to achieve a certain level of understanding, even the rationales behind the chukim would become clear.  The Ramban, when discussing the rationale behind the commandment to send a mother bird away from a nest before taking the eggs, states that all commandments, even chukim, have reasons and that “the absence of reasons for the Torah [that we can understand] is a result of our own intellectual blindness” (commentary to Devarim 22:6).  He brings as proof the rabbinic statement (Midrash Rabbah, Bamidbar 19:3-4) that God revealed the reasoning behind the laws of the parah adumah (red heifer) to Moshe; this is the archetypal statute, as its ashes purify the defiled, yet defile the pure.

 Similarly, the Rambam in the Moreh Nevuchim (3:31) maintains that all the commandments have reasons.[5] “Every commandment of the 613 commandments imparts to us a true philosophy, eradicates a false philosophy, enforces a rule of social justice, nullifies injustice, bestows noble character traits, or warns against evil traits.” However, he does add a qualification to this broad, sweeping generalization. This is only true of the commandment’s broad outlines; no human has any hope of understanding the reasons behind the details of a commandment (ibid., 3:26). “In my opinion, one who engages in creating reasons for the details of a commandment is acting under the influence of a major delusion.” (In contrast, both Kabbalists and R. S. R. Hirsch attempt to give reasons for even the most minute details of the commandments.)

Since rationales exist, the Rambam in several places directs us to investigate all of the commandments and to uncover as much of their reasoning as possible. In Hilchot Me’ilah (8:8), “It is correct for a person to investigate the laws of the Holy Torah and to know their purpose to the best of his abilities. If he does not find a reason or purpose in something, it should not be light in his eyes... He should not reject the commandments because he does not know their reasons, and he should not attribute false ideas to God or think about them as of profane matters...” Similarly, the Rambam writes in Hilchot Temurah (4:13), “Even though all the chukim of the Torah are decrees, as we explained at the end of Hilchot Me’eilah, it is correct to contemplate them and to offer reasons wherever possible.”

In conclusion, although the Torah does not explicitly give the rationale behind the laws of kashrut, among other chukim, it was always considered prasieworthy, if not essential, for a person to investigate the underlying rationale for these commands.  Even though these reasons remain concealed and beyond the grasp of the human mind, it is clear that the Torah’s authority does not depend upon our understanding of it.  In fact, one could argue that even regarding the chukim, knowledge of the rationale for the command is essential for incorporating it into one’s personality and for the shaping of a Jewish instinct, beyond the basic purpose of instilling a rote sense of loyalty and obedience to God. The prophets heavily criticized the Jewish people when they reduced the performance of the commandments to a dry, mechanical practice, without “taste.”  Indeed, the term used by the Talmud for the reasons of the commandments, “ta’amei ha-mitzvot,” can also be interpreted as “the taste of the commandments.” The primary purpose of eating food is to survive, but we nevertheless enjoy the variety of tastes and textures as a pleasant side benefit of eating. Similarly, Hashem made the commandments with varied “tastes.” We fulfill the commandments because they are the will of God and they are His instructions for living, but investment in understanding the commandments also pays dividends, as explained in the literature of ta’amei ha-mitzvot.

Next week, we will delve into the specific reasons for kashrut as suggested by Jewish thinkers throughout the ages, and we will return to the questions that we raised at the beginning of our study this week – the connection between the laws of kashrut, yetziat Mitzrayim, and the imperative of holiness.