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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
The Kuzari
Shiur #11:
Rejection of Islam Rav
The principles that we saw in R. Yehuda Halevi's rejection of
Christianity appear again in his rejection of Islam, with even greater clarity
and with the addition of another principle.
Like the Christian, the Moslem opens with a declaration of the
fundamentals of his faith: 1)
The unity and
eternity of God.[1] 2)
The creation
of the world and the stories appearing in the beginning of the book of
Bereishit (Adam and Noach). 3)
Rejection of
the personification of God.[2] 4)
The Koran as
the word of God – as is proven by the miraculous nature of the
book. 5)
Mohammed as
the seal of the prophets and his abrogation of all previous Divine
law. 6)
The Moslem
Garden of Eden.[3] Rihal
sharpens the point that we have already seen in connection with the Christian
regarding the issue of the personification of God. In a methodical manner, he
even brings the Moslem himself to admit to a certain conclusion that he seeks,
this time on the objective plane. The Khazar
king challenges the Moslem with the principle that we saw earlier: the attempt
to verify a belief or an event that clashes with the idea of the
non-personification of God, or the attempt to reconcile the two, is legitimate
only when the belief or event has been proven in some irrefutable manner. Here,
for the first time, Rihal defines the main criterion for turning an event into
an irrefutable occurrence, a criterion that Rihal will return to in many places
in the book (as we have already seen): But the human mind cannot believe that
God has intercourse with man, except by a miracle which changes the nature of
things. He then recognizes that to do so He alone is capable who created them
from nought. It must also have taken place in the presence of great multitudes,
who saw it distinctly, and did not learn it from reports and traditions. Even
then they must examine the matter carefully and repeatedly, so that no suspicion
of imagination or magic can enter their minds. (I, 8)[4]
These words lead the Moslem to admit the undeniable truth of Judaism, the
goal toward which Rihal is headed, as was noted at the beginning of the previous
lecture. This admission comes when the Moslem mentions the exodus from Egypt and
the miracles that accompanied it, the revelation at Sinai, and the miracles that
were performed in the wilderness, as an appropriate fulfillment of the criterion
established by the Khazar king. It is not by chance that the Moslem stops at
this point. As we have already seen, the next stage is the point at which Islam
(as well as Christianity) broke off from Judaism. This is a stage that lacks the
decisive proof that exists with respect to the earlier events that had taken
place in the presence of great multitudes.[5]
The conclusion that follows from these words is that the other two
religions' break from Judaism lacks sufficient proof to justify it. This
conclusion, even before we get into the details of the substantive differences
between the three religions, removes the other two religions from the agenda.
The Khazar king also arrives at this conclusion: Indeed, I see myself compelled to ask the
Jews, because they are the relic of the Children of Israel. For I see that they
constitute in themselves the evidence for the divine law on earth. (I,
10)
Here ends the main course of Rihal's rejection of Christianity and Islam.
In essence, both the Christian sage and his Moslem counterpart admit the truth
of Judaism until the point of the breakaway. The Moslem sage goes even further
when he uses the miracles of Judaism to prove the truth of his own
religion.
R. Yehuda Halevi,
in his methodical manner, presents this absurdity that should lead any thinking
person (and, in this case, not only a Jew) to the conclusion that one seeking
the certainty of revelation, and thus the certainty of religious belief, has
nowhere to turn but to Judaism – the source of all revealed
religions. THE KORAN
Another element in Rihal's rejection of Islam seizes a less important,
but still significant place: Although your book may be a miracle, as
long as it is written in Arabic, a non-Arab, as I am, cannot perceive its
miraculous character; and even if it were read to me, I could not distinguish
between it and any other book written in the Arabic language. (I,
6)
What does this mean? Once again Rihal shifts the discussion from the
objective plain that applies to all people, to the personal plain of the Khazar
king. Had the Khazar king happened to know Arabic, would he have been convinced
of the Koran's miraculous character?
It seems to me that here Rihal is not only speaking to the heart of his
Jewish reader, but he is rather putting forward a fundamental argument, one that
can be formulated in two ways.
One way is based on the conclusion that Rihal wishes to reach, namely,
that the attempt to prove the truth and Divine authorship of a particular book
from its contents is illegitimate. The certainty of Israel's Torah does not
follow from its exalted contents, but from the event of its giving. As we have
already seen, Rihal repeatedly returns to the idea that inasmuch as the Torah
was given by way of manifest miracles in the presence of the entire nation,
logic dictates that it is Divine in origin and that its contents are true. For
this reason, Rihal does not try to prove the truths of the contents of the Torah
in and of themselves (and when he so, as was noted in previous lectures, he does
it as a matter of second choice and accompanied by apologies), but based on the
circumstances in which it had been given.[6]
The second way - and it seems to me that this is what the Khazar king
means - is based on another dialogue found elsewhere in the
book: Had he [Moses] said: 'I was sent to guide
the whole world in the right path,' and would only have partially fulfilled his
task, his message would have been deficient, since the divine will would not
have been carried out completely. The perfection of his work was marred by the
fact that his book was written in Hebrew, which made it unintelligible to the
peoples of Sind, India, and Khazar. They would, therefore, be unable to practice
his laws till some centuries had elapsed, or they had been prepared for it by
changes of conquest, or alliance, but not through the revelation of that prophet
himself, or of another who would stand up for him, and testify to his law. (I,
100)
The Khazar king asserts, based on his own logical reasoning, that if a
prophet is sent to guide all the people on earth, but his words reach only part
of them, his prophecy and especially his prophetic mission enter the realm of
uncertainty. The Khazar king lists the factors that might prevent the words of a
prophet from reaching the entire world, at the top of which is the language in
which his words are formulated. It is impossible, argues the Khazar king, that
words that were meant for the entire world should be delivered in a language
that is understood only by some, and a very small number at that. On the
surface, the Khazar king is attacking Judaism, and the prophet to whom he refers
is Moshe, but in fact his words are directed at Islam and not at Judaism. The
Rabbi immediately points out to him that his assertion that the prophet (in this
case, Moshe) wanted to guide the entire world is founded on
error: The Rabbi: Moses invited only his
people and those of his own tongue to accept his law, while God promised that
there should at all times be prophets to expound His law. This He did so long as
they found favor in His sight, and His presence was with them. (I,
101)
The Khazar king is right, according to the Rabbi, that the Torah and its
prophets must direct themselves to the audience which they wish to guide.[7]
In the case of Judaism, the target audience of Moshe and his Torah was the
Jewish people alone, and therefore the Torah was composed in their
language.
This is not true of the Koran and its prophet Mohammed, as is testified
by the Moslem himself: Our prophet is the Seal of the prophets,
who abrogated every previous law, and invited all nations to embrace Islam. (I,
5)[8]
It turns out, then, that the words of the Khazar king against Judaism
with respect to the language in which the Torah had been given are an attack not
against Judaism, but rather against Islam and the Koran.[9]
This is what the Khazar king means when he says that he does not understand the
language of the Koran and therefore he cannot be impressed by its miraculous
character.
A fitting summary of Rihal's attitude toward Christianity and Islam is
found in a dialogue concerning the establishment of
religion: The Khazar king: Let us now return to our
subject, and explain to me how your belief grew, how it spread and became
general, how opinions became united after having differed, and how long it took
for the faith to lay its foundation, and to be built up into a strong and
complete structure. The first element of religion appeared, no doubt, among
single individuals, who supported one another in upholding the faith which it
pleased God should be promulgated. Their number increases continually, they grow
more powerful, or a king arises and assists them, also compels his subjects to
adopt the same creed. The Rabbi: In this way only rational
religions, of human origin, can arise. When a man succeeds and attains an
exalted position, it is said that he is supported by God, who inspired him, etc.
A religion of divine origin arises suddenly. It is bidden to arise, and it is
there, like the creation of the world. (I, 80-81)
In these words, Rihal outlines the fundamentals of his understanding of
the difference between Judaism and the other two
religions.
Christianity and Islam are religions based on the intellect and founded
by human beings. Through the power of persuasion and the charisma of their
founders, they spread further and further, and with help of leaders with
military forces at his disposal, they captured the world. Their size, strength
and distribution, however, cannot hide the fact that they are a human
product. This is not the case with Judaism. The
aforementioned sociological analysis cannot explain the moment that Judaism
broke forth into the world - in a single moment, and not in a gradual process.
This moment that was based not on persuasion, not on charisma, and not on
military power. "Because He said, and it was." The difference between that moment – the
revelation at Sinai – and the process through which the other religions came
into being, is similar to the difference between the creation of the world by
the word of God and Darwin's theory of evolution. And just as the difference between
Darwinism and the story of creation is the difference between a natural, orderly
process and a Divine, miraculous process, so, too, the difference between the
other two religions and Judaism is the difference between a Divine, miraculous
religion, and a natural religion. "Blessed be our God who has created us for His
glory, and has separated us from those who go astray; who has given us the Torah
of truth and planted eternal life in our midst." (Translated by David Strauss)
[1] Some suggest that with this statement,
Rihal sharpens the first difference between Christianity and Islam – the unity
of God. The Christian Trinity is the main reason that most halakhic authorities
regarded Christianity as idol worship, which was not the case regarding Islam.
The passage cited in the previous lecture (IV, 13), however, contradicts this
suggestion, for Rihal groups the two religions together, as being closer to
Judaism than the sect of Jeroboam in that they rejected images. Their distance
from Judaism relates primarily to their abrogation of the received mitzvot.
It follows from this that Rihal, as opposed to the aforementioned position,
did not see Christianity (and certainly not Islam) as an idolatrous
religion. [2] It stands to reason that here Rihal
wishes to sharpen the difference between Christianity and Islam on the issue of
God's embodiment in a human body. This argument is strengthened by the fact that
the rejection of God's personification advocated by the Moslem is not
philosophy's rejection of personification; the Moslem also believes, as we shall
see, in all of the revelations described in the Torah and by the prophets. The
emphasis placed here on the care taken by Islam on the issue of personification
must therefore be understood as directed at the words of the
Christian. It should be noted that this remark does
not contradict the one in the previous note. In my opinion, Rihal sees the issue
of God's embodiment in flesh and blood as distinguishing between Christianity
and Islam. Whereas my first comment dealt with the issue of God's unity, my
second remark deals with the issue of His embodiment in flesh and blood – the
acceptance of which does not necessarily cast the religion into the category of
idol worship. [3] Rihal's reservations about and critique
of these descriptions of the Garden of Eden and Islam's understanding of reward
and punishment appear later in the book (I, 106-109; III, 20-21). It is not on
this basis that he chooses to reject Islam. Once again, Rihal adopts the method
of choosing to distinguish between arguments against another religion that
remove them from the agenda, and those arguments that are true, but not acute;
the latter are not mentioned at the beginning of the book, when the other
religions are pushed aside in favor of Judaism. [4] An allusion to this is found in the
words of the Christian, as well: "Signs which cannot possibly be disputed,
because they are generally known as lasting, and have been revealed before a
vast multitude" (I, 4). [5] It should be noted that Rihal opened
with the same approach regarding Christianity, but in the end veered from it in
favor of the personal position of the Khazar king; here, Rihal sticks to his
approach to the end, where an objective conclusion is stated that is not
dependent upon the subjective position of the Khazar king or the Jewish reader
of the book. Two explanations of this distinction may
be offered. First, it may be argued that the
alienation from Christianity allows Rihal to create in the reader the feeling
suggested above regarding the absurdity of forsaking Judaism in favor of foreign
religions that offer no philosophical advantage over Judaism; he can suffice
with this to reject it. However, the greater intimacy of the people of his time
and place with Islam and its sages forces Rihal to reject it in a more objective
manner. Second, the rejection of Islam may be
seen as applying to Christianity as well. The similarity between the
formulations regarding the clash between rational speculation and religion
allows us to cast the words of the Khazar king against the Moslem also upon the
Christian. Questioning the point of breakaway from Judaism owing to the absence
of proof applies to both the Moslem break and the Christian
break. [6] The following is exceptional: "The
details of these regulations would fill volumes. He who studies them carefully
will see that they are not of human origin. Praised be He who has contrived
them: 'He has not dealt so with any nation; they are judgments which they knew
not' (Tehillim 147:20)" (II, 56). "I perceive that your law comprises all
sorts of profound and strange sciences, not to be found in other codes" (II,
63). Here too, however, Rihal does not say
these things as a condition for accepting the principle of "Torah from Heaven,"
but merely as support for it. It is unnecessary to note what Rihal
would say about certain modern tendencies to find signs in the patterns of the
letters of the Torah, in gematriyot, in the initial letters of series of
words, and the like. It is quite possible that Rihal would be impressed by these
things, and cry out, "Praised be He who has contrived them," but he would
certainly not lend support to those circles for whom such techniques are used to
prove the Divine authorship of the Torah. [7] It should be noted that this assumption
proposed by the Khazar king and accepted by the Rabbi is based on Rihal's
fundamental assumption, common, according to him, to all the revealed religions,
and against the view of the philosophers, that obligation to God can only grow
out of God's revelation to man. Let us recall the Khazar king's first question,
in the wake of the parable of the king of India: "If this be so, then your
belief is confined to yourselves?" (I, 26). This question was posed after the
Rabbi had established that religious obligation results from revelation. One who
has not merited revelation is not obligated. Now the Khazar king adopts this
position, and even expands it beyond the very fact of revelation to the language
in which the revelation occurred. [8] The Christian espouses similar
sentiments, and over the course of history, Christianity, even more so than
Islam, was a missionary religion, which tried to bring the entire world under
its wings. [9] The argument that the Khazar king's
words are actually directed by Rihal at Islam is supported by what he says at
the end. He notes that the acceptance of the Torah by nations that did not
understand its language – whether by force, following defeat in war, or
willingly, as a result of an alliance – was not through the revelation of the
prophet himself. To the best of my knowledge, no nation ever adopted Judaism as
a result of defeat in war, and not even as a result of an alliance. Hence, what
is stated here appears to be directed at Islam and its wars during the days of
Rihal. |