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MODERN RABBINIC
THOUGHT
By Rav
Yitzchak
Blau
Shiur #13: The Netziv on the Dangers of Legitimate
Violence
R. Berlin was
concerned with the impact of violence – even when religiously legitimated – upon
society and upon the personalities of those who commit it. Noting that the biblical Pinchas
received “a covenant of peace” after running through the sinners Zimri and Kozbi
with a spear, Netziv asks why this covenant was an appropriate reward. Netziv explains that, in the nature of
things, aggressive acts leave a lasting impression on a human being. Pinchas might grow accustomed to
violence. Due to his acting purely
for the sake of heaven, Pinchas receives the reward of an untainted personality
still yearning for peace. According to R. Berlin, authorized
violence remains perilous, but those with the purest of motivations and no
self-interest avoid the peril.
In a later passage,
Netziv lists a variety of dangers inherent in violence. The law of ir ha-nidachat
mandates that a city full of Israelite idolaters be put to death. R. Berlin mentions three potential types
of negative fallout. First, those
carrying out the killing may turn cruel.
Given the scope of the operation, this is a greater problem here than
when carrying out other halakhic punishments. Usually, the courts have their agents
put criminals to death, but wiping out a city demands a much larger work
force. Thus, the character of more
people may become adversely affected.
Secondly, many Jews from other areas will have lost relatives in the
destroyed town. Their resentment
will lead to growing enmity amongst the Jewish people. Finally, the sheer diminution of the
number of Jews hurts our people.
In a very clever
interpretation of the penultimate verse of the ir ha-nidachat section,
Netziv argues that the Torah addresses all three concerns. “And nothing of the banned thing
shall cling to your hand, that God may turn from the fierceness of His anger,
and show you mercy, and have compassion upon you, and multiply you, as He swore
to your fathers” (Devarim 13:18).
This verse addresses each of the three concerns. The promise that “God may … show you
mercy” indicates that those that carry out the punishment will remain merciful.
The clause “and have
compassion upon you” means that others will love you – namely, the punishment
will not spawn deep ill will between different sections of the nation. The reference to multiplication counters
the fear of dwindling numbers.
Netziv reiterates his
contention that the blessing preventing any negative effects depends upon purity
of motivation in those who perform the violent acts. The above verse with the three-part
blessing begins with a prohibition on taking the spoils of the destroyed
city. If so, the verse reads
beautifully. Not taking spoils
reveals a purity of motivation that enables the blessings in the rest of the
verse to follow.
The theme of pure
motivation has further impact in Netziv’s thought. When Moshe seeks individuals to punish
the golden calf worshippers, he calls out: “Whoever is for God, let him come to
me” (Shemot 32:26). R.
Berlin explains the specific nature of Moshe’s call. A degree of danger exists for all who
engage in violence; even violence committed in the fulfillment of a mitzva
provides no guarantee of physical safety.
However, Netziv posits, if the person performing the mitzva has the most
idealistic motivations, he receives an assurance that he will not come to
harm. Moshe seeks the most nobly
motivated to put the idolaters to death, because they will remain safe.
At first, it seems
that Netziv refers only to a special form of divine protection. He later adds that the pure motivation
impacts on the communal reaction.
Those who punished the golden calf revelers harmed their very own
relatives (Shemot 32:26). R.
Berlin contends that this shows the absence of ulterior motives. When it is clear that those punishing
are not in it for themselves, opposition is less likely to arise. Thus, noble motivations provide greater
safety in multiple ways.
A footnote in the
Harchev Davar adds one last theme.
Netziv mentions another reason why punishment of the wicked should not be
carried out by their personal enemies.
As already noted, the lack of pure motivations endangers them, since they
have no protection from the danger of physical harm inherent in all such
confrontations. Additionally,
enjoyment of inflicting punishment is a religious flaw worthy of
punishment. A midrash (Bereishit
Rabba 67:4) says that Ya’akov was punished for the cry of Esav after Esav
discovered that Ya’akov had taken his father’s blessing. If Ya’akov deserves blame for the
episode, why is he punished for the cry of Esav but not for the distress he
caused his own father Yitzchak?
Netziv explains that Ya’akov received no joy from his father’s pain, but
he did enjoy his brother’s anguish.
For this, he deserved punishment.
This idea enables R.
Berlin to elucidate another midrash.
A verse in Kohelet (3:15) says that “God will seek out the one
pursued” (to redress his suffering).
The midrash (Vayikra Rabba 27:5) adds that God will help the one
pursued even when a tzaddik pursues a rasha. Why should God aid the wicked just
because he is being pursued? Netziv
explains that when the righteous person derives pleasure from the pursuit, then
God wants to punish him. Apparently, enjoying inflicting
punishment represents a serious character flaw.
Netziv offers several
reasons to worry about legitimate use of violence. Such acts may corrupt people, they may
prove dangerous, and they may be religiously objectionable if they engender evil
pleasure. Purity of motivation
solves these problems, but such purity is not easily achieved. Of course, these concerns do not mean
that R. Berlin was a pacifist. He
derives from the mention of “brothers” in the murder prohibition (Bereishit
9:5) that the prohibition exists only during times of brotherhood but not
during wartime. For Netziv, the
ability to shoot at an opposing army does not stem from the normal principles of
“rodef” or “ha-ba le-horgekha” (forms of self-defense), but rather
from war representing a totally different legal reality. At the same time, legitimating certain
instances of the use of violence does not contradict fears about that very
violence. Netziv thought that Jews
sometimes have to fight wars and to punish transgressors, but the various
potential practical and spiritual pitfalls of such operations must be kept in
mind and combated.
Until now, we have
discussed the dangers of halakhically permissible violence. But, at times, we must question the very
legitimacy of the violence. In one
responsum, R. Berlin contrasts the justified zealotry of Pinchas with the
problematic violence of his forefather Levi. Both risked their lives to stamp
out sexual immorality, but one received great reward and the other received his
father’s censure. Only a highly
discerning wisdom can distinguish between these types of cases.
His commentary on the
Torah adds further depth to the analysis of the Levi example. Levi and his brother Shimon avenge the
rape of their sister Dina by wiping out the town of Shekhem. Ya’akov offers an immediate pragmatic
critique of their actions (Bereishit 34:30), but seems to state a deeper
critique when he speaks to all his children toward the end of his life
(Bereishit 49: 5-7).
Commentaries engage in a well-known debate over the evaluation of Shimon
and Levi’s aggression.
R. Berlin notes that the
Torah describes how “shenei benei Ya’akov” (two sons of Ya’akov) took
their swords (Bereishit 34:25), in contrast to a later episode where the
Torah refers to Nadav and Avihu as “benei Aharon” (sons of Aharon)
without adding the word “shenei” (two). This extra word indicates a duality in
the thinking of the two perpetrators of the massacre of Shekhem. One son, Shimon, was motivated by the
“foreign fire” of defending family honor, while the other, Levi, was genuinely
zealous for God without a personal stake in the endeavor. The first type of motivation has
no place in our tradition, and even the second can be utilized only with great
caution.
Yaakov’s final
message to Shimon and Levi also distinguishes between the two sons. “Let my soul not come into their secret
or my honor into their assembly” (Bereishit 49:6). R. Berlin argues that these are not two
identical clauses. The first refers
to the “sod Hashem” (secret of God) of a person motivated by godly
concerns. Ya’akov would not find it
dishonorable to be in such a group, but he still keeps his soul from joining due
to his concern that zeal for God causes wild actions beyond what is truly
necessary. The second clause,
referring to the “assembly,” speaks of those gathered for the mundane task of
defending honor, a cause for which it would be forbidden to engage in dangerous
activity. Regarding this latter
group, Ya’akov does not consider it honorable to be listed among them.
The final verse
brings Ya’akov’s solution to the fore.
“I will divide them in Ya’akov and scatter them in Israel”
(Bereishit 49:7). Netziv
sees this not only as punishment but as a proper channeling of zealotry. Sometimes, the community needs a few
hotheads, but too many of them in one area creates a conflagration waiting to
explode. Scattering them around the
country solves this problem.
In any given place, some individuals will stand ready to zealously
protest immorality, but no city will consist mostly of zealots.
In last week’
shiur, we noted Netziv’s concerns about the potentially antinomian quest
for the religious experience of cleaving to God. This week, we have noted the dangers of
religiously legitimated violence.
One final element will complete the portrait of the dangers of religious
passion. Netziv also expresses
concern about overly aggressive dealing with those who differ from you on
religious issues. In one of
his most famous passages, his introduction to Sefer Bereishit, Netziv
sets forth this problem and blames it for the destruction of the Second Temple.
Before analyzing the
passage, we must mention Gil Perl’s article, which shows that R. Berlin was
hardly an advocate of contemporary pluralism. Perl cites numerous examples of Netziv’s
willingness to endorse religious coercion and of his negative opinions regarding
various groups of heretics. Nonetheless, this illuminating context
does not diminish the force of Netizv’s introduction to
Bereishit.
Netziv argues that
the word yashar always refers to interpersonal decency. This assumption enables his
interpretation of Devarim 32:6, which speaks of the righteousness of
God’s judgment and concludes “tzaddik ve-yashar Hu.” R. Berlin understands this verse to be a
justification for God bringing about the destruction of the two Temples. Since God is a “tzaddik,” He
could not tolerate the sexual immorality present during the period of the
First
Temple. Since God is a “yashar,” He could
not stand the corrupt interpersonal behavior of the Second Temple period.
Because of the
groundless hatred in their hearts, they suspected anyone with a different
religious practice of being a Sadducee or heretic. Due to this, they came to extreme
bloodshed and to other evils until the Temple was destroyed. Regarding this came the justification of
the divine judgment, because the Holy One, blessed be He, is a yashar,
and He cannot tolerate righteous people like this unless they also function with
decency in their dealings with the world. (Introduction to
Bereishit)
As Perl points out,
this passage should not be extended too far. Netziv certainly did not believe that
all versions of Judaism deserve legitimacy. Yet Netziv’s fiery exhortation still
inspires us. There must be some
groups with whom we significantly differ regarding religious issues, yet whom we
have no right to exclude from Torah-true Judaism. Furthermore, we must be wary of making
poor judgments due to “the groundless hatred” in our own hearts. Here, R. Berlin’s concerns with purity
of motivation returns. If excluding
heretics stems from a less than noble place, it can ultimately lead to calamity,
including murder and the destruction of the Temple.
Passion for religion
and its ideals is a good thing that we do not want to stifle. Yet positive
things also create certain hazards.
In a host of passages, Netziv reminds us of the dangers of various kinds
of religious passion and of the need to look out for impure motivations.
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