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The Israel
Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash
Parashat Hashavua This
parasha series is dedicated ******************************************************** PARASHAT
TAZRIA-METZORA *********************************************************
The Torah
Prohibitions Concerning Impurity By Rav
Yehuda Rock The main laws concerning ritual
purity and impurity appear in the parashot of Shemini,
Tazria, and Metzora, and we encounter a consistent contradiction
between the literal reading of these texts and halakha as we know
it. From the verses here (and
elsewhere) it appears that a person is forbidden to become ritually impure: one
who is pure is forbidden to become impure, and one who is impure is obligated to
undergo purification. We shall review, in order, the verses that underlie this
principle (see also Yochanan Breuer's article on the subject in Megadim
2): a. In chapter 5 of
Vayikra, the Torah lists three sins that require a sacrifice of
adjustable value (based on economic means). The first and the third are an oath
of testimony and an oath of expression, respectively. The second is: "Or if a
person touches anything that is impure – whether the carcass of an impure beast,
or the carcass of an impure animal, or the carcass of an impure creeping
creature – and it is hidden from him, such that he is impure an guilty; or if he
touches the impurity of man – of any sort of impurity that may defile him – and
it is hidden from him, and he comes to know of it, and is guilty…" (5:2-3). This
would suggest that defilement is a transgression, which, if committed by
mistake, requires a sacrifice of adjustable value. b. In Parashat
Shemini we read: "But these you shall not eat… you shall not eat of their
flesh, nor shall you touch their carcass; they are impure for you" (11:4-8).
This tells us explicitly that one is forbidden to touch the carcass of an impure
animal, because of its impurity. These verses are reiterated in Parashat
Re'ei (Devarim 14:3-8). c. Throughout the
parashot that address the various forms of impurity, we find the
corresponding laws of purification. For example, in Parashat Shemini we
find the following: (11:25) "…Anyone who bears any part of their carcass shall
wash his clothes…"; (32) "… it must be placed in water…"; (15:5) "Anyone who
touches [that person's] bed shall wash his clothes and bathe in water…"; etc.
The Torah does not describe these actions as a mere precondition for
purification; the literal meaning of the text suggests that a person who is
rendered ritually impure is obligated to perform these actions and thereby to
purify himself. In one place this is explicit (17:15-16): "… And he shall wash
his clothes and bathe in water, and he shall be impure until the evening, and
then he shall be pure. But if he does not wash [his clothing] and does not
bathe, then he shall bear his sin." d. At the end of our
parasha, after the Torah lists the various types of emissions that render
one impure, we read: "You shall separate (ve-hizartem) Bnei Yisrael from
their impurity, so that they do not die in their impurity when they defile My
Sanctuary which is in their midst." The word "warn" is derived from the root
n-z-r, meaning separation. This verse tells us, then, that it is
necessary to keep separate from impurity and to maintain purity; one who fails
to guard himself against impurity incurs death. e. In the unit addressing
the impurity incurred through contact with a dead body (Bamidbar
19:10-22), we read: "Anyone who touches the dead body of a person who has died,
and does not purify himself – he defiles the Sanctuary of God, and that soul
shall be cut off from Israel" (verse 13). Further on (verse 20), we find: "A
person who is defiled and does not purify himself – that soul shall be cut off
from the congregation, for he has defiled God's
Sanctuary." In contrast to all of the above,
the Oral Law paints a completely different picture. According to halakha, there
is no prohibition related to the state of impurity; there are only prohibitions
that apply to a person in that state in the context of the Temple, its
sacrifices, and the foods that may be eaten only in its precincts (such as
teruma). There is, admittedly, an opinion among the Tannaim (that of R.
Yossi, which is not accepted as normative halakha) maintaining that "immersion
at the proper time represents a commandment." There is also a law deduced by
Chazal requiring a state of purity during pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and
another law that they deduce which requires that even non-sanctified foods be
eaten in a state of purity. (For an overview of the subject in general, see
Mishneh Le-melekh on Hilkhot Tum'at Okhlin 16:10) But these
points, even if they are to be considered as binding halakha, are of secondary
status, with limited scope, representing at most a positive obligation. They can
under no circumstances be regarded as falling under the category of "bearing
sin," of negative and positive commandments associated with a punishment of
karet, as the literal verses suggest. Halakha interprets the verses as
applying to different situations: a. Concerning the
sacrifice of adjustable value, Chazal interpret the expression "it is
hidden" (ve-ne'elam) as an indication that the Torah is talking about
impurity related to the Sanctuary and its sacrifices. I.e., the situation here
concerns a person who becomes impure, but forgets this and afterwards comes into
contact with the Temple and/or its sacrifices (Torat Kohanim chapter
12,7; Beraita in Shevuot 14b). But these verses make no mention of the
Temple or its sacrifices. Ramban comments that the context is obvious, and there
is therefore no reason for the Torah to mention it. Rashi suggests that the
contact with the Temple and its sacrifices is hinted to in the word
"ve-ashem" ("and he is guilty"). These opinions notwithstanding, it is
difficult to accept the assumption that the Torah leaves such an important point
to the reader's understanding. b. Concerning the
prohibition, "nor shall you touch their carcass," Chazal offer two
interpretations. One (Torat Kohanim chapter 4,9; Beraita in Rosh
Ha-shana 16b) focuses this prohibition on the pilgrim festivals (without
making clear whether the prohibition is to be considered biblical in origin or
not; see Ramban ad loc and the above Mishneh Le-melekh). Clearly, this
has no basis in the literal text. A second interpretation (Torat
Kohanim
ibid. 10) views the contact with a
carcass as something "voluntary." It is possible that what the Torah means to
convey here is a negative moral consideration, which is not binding (see the
first chapter of Shi'urei ha-Rav Aharon Lichtenstein on Taharot).
But this explanation is likewise far removed from the literal meaning of the
text, which adopts the imperative case – as in all other prohibitions in the
Torah. Rashbam proposes that the text refers to the context of the sacrifices in
the Temple; Ramban explains that the Torah is describing the means for
maintaining ritual purity, for one wishing to do so. Only Ibn Ezra adheres to
the literal meaning: that the Torah is prohibiting contact with the carcass.
This brings us back to the same problem: this conclusion runs counter to
halakha. c. The verses at the end
of chapter d. Chazal interpret
the injunction, "You shall separate Bnei Yisrael from their impurity" as
referring to separation from their wives close to the time of their menstruation
(Nidda 63b). The literal meaning of the text, however, as we have noted,
is that a person must separate himself from impurity and maintain a state of
purity. Someone who does not guard himself from impurity incurs the death
sentence. Elsewhere, Chazal deduce from this verse that a grave should be
marked as such (Moed Katan 5a). Obviously, this, too, has no basis in the
literal text. In Torat Kohanim (chapter 9,7) Chazal connect the
prohibition of "you shall separate" with the death sentence that appears in the
continuation of the verse – as the literal reading undoubtedly demands.
Accordingly, this Beraita in Torat Kohanim does not interpret the verse
as referring to separation in anticipation of a woman's menstruation, nor to the
marking of graves, but rather as a prohibition involving the death sentence –
apparently, defilement of the Temple and its sacrifices (see Rashi). In this
verse, in contrast to the previous ones that we discussed, we do actually find
language referring to defilement of the Sanctuary: "You shall separate Bnei
Yisrael from their impurity, that they not die in their impurity when they
defile My Sanctuary which it in their midst." However, the defilement of the
Sanctuary appears here as the reason for the punishment, rather than as a
condition in committing the transgression; hence, it would seem that the
transgression and the punishment are not mutually
dependent. e. In the Sifri
(Bamidbar, piska 129) the verses in the unit discussing impurity
caused by a dead body are interpreted as applying in the context of defilement
of the Sanctuary. Here, too, there is mention of defilement of the Sanctuary,
but once again it is as a result, in the wake of the sin, rather than as a
condition in committing the sin. How, then, are we to explain the
discrepancy between the literal indications of the Written Law and the normative
halakha of the Oral Law? Sanctity of the
Camps To solve the problem we need to
look at another source – the discussion of those removed from the various camps,
in Parashat Naso (Bamidbar 5:1-4): "God spoke to Moshe,
saying: Command Bnei Yisrael, that they
should send out of the camp anyone with tzara'at, and anyone who has
experienced an issue, and anyone who is impure through contact with the dead;
whether male or female you shall send them, to outside of the camp shall you
send them, so that they do not defile their camps in whose midst I
reside. And Bnei Yisrael did so, and
they sent them to outside of the camp. As God spoke to Moshe, so Bnei Yisrael
did." This parasha represents a
source for the law of "removal from the camps" – the prohibition of anyone who
is impure approaching the Sanctuary. The "camp" mentioned in the verses is
applied, in practice, to the area of Jerusalem and the Temple (Sifri Bamidbar
piska 1; Tosefta Kelim Bava Kama 1,12; Zevachim 116b; Rambam
Bi'at Ha-Mikdash chapter 3). However, the Torah does not seem to be
directly formulating a law for all future generations; rather, it is narrating
an event that took place. Proof of this is to be found in the concluding words:
"Bnei Yisrael did so." The Torah does not conclude every halakhic discussion
with these words, and the meaning here is obviously not that throughout the
generations Bnei Yisrael observed this law – nor even that they began to observe
it. What the expression means is that Bnei Yisrael carried out an instruction
that Moshe conveyed to them for that particular time. In other words, this text
is not coming to establish a law of "removal from the camp," but rather to
recount how God commanded, at that time, that anyone who was ritually impure had
to be removed from the camp, and how Bnei Yisrael fulfilled this instruction and
did indeed, at that time, remove all those who were impure from the
camp. Why was it specifically at that
time that Bnei Yisrael were required to remove those who were impure, rather
than at some earlier stage? This parasha appears after all the
arrangement of the camps in the parashot of Bamidbar-Naso. Rashbam
comments on the connection: "After the order of the camps and their encampments
had been arranged and established, it was necessary [for God] to mention the
removal of the impure from the camps." Ramban concurs: "Once the Mishkan had
been established, [God] commanded the removal of the impure from the camp, so
that the camp would be holy and worthy of having the Divine Presence rest there.
This was a commandment that applied both with immediate effect and for all
generations." Rashbam and Ramban view the
context of the arrangement of the camp merely as the reason for the law being
given here. It would seem, however, that we may say more: that the very
existence of the camp, with all of its arrangement and order, necessitates the
removal of the impure. The prohibitions of impurity that are recorded in
Sefer Vayikra, which are related to the sanctity of the camp of Israel as
the encampment surrounding the Divine Presence, are dependent upon the actual
arrangement of the camps around the Mishkan. For this reason it is only
now, following the arrangement of the camps, that these prohibitions become
applicable. The same conclusion is supported
by the Tosefta (Kelim Bava Kama 1:12): "During the journeys the camps
have no status of sanctity, and one is not then punishable for matters of
impurity" (see also Rashi on Gittin 60a). In other words, the
prohibitions are dependent on the arrangement of the camps; when the camps break
up [in order to journey onward], the prohibitions fall
away. Following the entry into the
land, Bnei Yisrael no longer encamped around the Mishkan. There is a
fundamental halakhic difference between the status of the place of encampment,
and the status of the place of Israelite encampment in their land for all
generations. The most obvious illustration of this difference concerns the
license to eat "meat of desire." In the desert, while Bnei Yisrael encamped
around the Mishkan, any consumption of meat required bringing the animal
to the Mishkan as a sacrifice (Vayikra 17, and Ramban on verse 2).
Only in preparation for entering the land were they permitted to eat "profane"
meat (Devarim 12:15-22). This, then, would seem to
explain the discrepancy between the laws of impurity applicable to the
generation of the desert, and the laws for future generations. The unit
concerning the removal of the impure from the camp, based on the assumption that
prior to the arrangement of the camps there was no such requirement, establishes
that the problem of impurity arises only in the context of the encounter with
the Sanctuary and its sacrifices. Only in the desert did the structure of the
camps define the status of Bnei Yisrael as existing in a continuous encounter
with the Sanctuary. The camp of Israel itself reflected, on a certain level, the
sanctity of the Sanctuary. According to the above
explanation, the formulations in Vayikra and Bamidbar which
express an absolute prohibition concerning impurity, and which make mention of
the Sanctuary – if at all – only as a reason for a law or for a punishment,
refer to the reality of the desert; a reality of the Israelite encampment around
the Mishkan. Indeed, the parashot in Sefer Vayikra, which
were given at the Ohel Mo'ed, make explicit mention of the reality of the
encampment. For example, Vayikra 4:12 – "He shall carry the whole ox
outside of the camp…"; Vayikra 17:3 – "Any man of the house of Israel who
slaughters an ox…in the camp, or who slaughters it outside of the camp…,"
etc. It was clear that the
prohibitions were related to and dependent upon the arrangement of the
encampment (and for this reason the impure were not removed from the camp until
after the encampment had actually been set up). Hence, when the Torah defines
the settlement of Bnei Yisrael in their land, in Devarim 12, as a
settlement of "distance" from the Temple, it thereby establishes that the
applicability of the original halakha to the new reality is limited to a
situation where an individual enters the Sanctuary in a state of impurity.
Expressions such as, "He has defiled God's Sanctuary," are thus transformed from
underlying assumptions to necessary conditions for the application of the
law. The Sanctity of Israel The explanation that we
developed above provides a good solution to four out of the five examples of
impurity that we examined at the beginning of the shiur. However, it is
of no value with regard to the prohibition of contact with the carcass of an
impure animal (example b. above). As noted, in Parashat Shemini we
are told (11:4-8): "But these you shall not eat… you shall not eat of their
flesh, nor shall you touch their carcass; they are impure for you." The Torah
states explicitly that it is forbidden to touch the carcass of an impure animal
because of its impurity. Here we cannot claim that the prohibition is dependent
on the arrangement of the camps. As we shall see, this prohibition is not
dependent on the concept of "sanctity of space" at all. Chapter The reason for this is that the
text here presents two types of laws; some of the laws appear twice – one
appearance of each type of law. One type of law suffices with the establishment
of impurity as a fact. These laws, obviously, have ramifications for the
encounter with the Sanctuary and the sacrifices. Thus, the laws of the impurity
of animals that appear in verses 26-28 suffice with the assertion of impurity:
"The carcass of any beast that has a parted hoof but which is not cloven-footed,
or which does not chews the cud, is impure to you; anyone who touches them will
be defiled. And whatever goes about on paws, of all the beasts that go about on
four legs – they are impure to you; anyone who touches them is impure until the
evening, and one who bears the carcass of them shall wash his clothes and be
impure until the evening; they are impure to you." The laws of the "creeping
things" in verses 29-38 likewise belong to this type of
law. In contrast, other laws
establish absolute prohibitions. This category includes the laws of impurity of
animals in verses 2-8: "… These are the animals that you may eat, of all the
beasts that are upon the earth – all that have parted hoofs and are
cloven-footed and chew the cud, among the animals, those you may eat… but these
you shall not eat… you shall not eat of their flesh, nor shall you touch their
carcass; they are impure for you." This group of laws includes those addressing
the "creeping things of the earth" in verses 41-43: "And every creeping thing
that creeps upon the earth is abominable; it shall not be eaten… you shall not
eat of them, for they are an abomination…." The explanation for the prohibitions
of this type appears in the concluding words of this unit, which follow on the
laws of the "creeping things" (11:43-47): "You shall not make yourselves
abominable with any creeping thing that creeps, nor shall you make yourselves
unclean with them, so as to be defiled by them. For I am the Lord your God;
therefore you shall sanctify yourselves and be holy, for I am holy. Nor shall
you defile yourselves with any creeping thing that creeps upon the earth, for I
am the Lord Who brings you out of the land of Egypt, to be your God; therefore
you shall be holy, for I am holy. This is the teaching of the beasts and of the
birds and of every living creature that moves in the waters, and every creature
that creeps upon the earth: to distinguish between the impure and the pure, and
between the animal that may be eaten and the animal that may not be
eaten." The Torah explains that the
prohibitions concerning impurity here arise from the sanctity of Israel. Just as
the sanctity of the Sanctuary and its sacrifices entails prohibitions of
impurity, so likewise the sanctity of Israel. But since these are different
types of sanctity, therefore the substance of the prohibitions against impurity
are accordingly different. For instance, every type of creeping creature that
creeps upon the earth is forbidden as food (sanctity of Israel), but only eight
types of creeping creatures represent impurity with regard to the sanctity of
the Sanctuary and its sacrifices. Impure animals are likewise included in both
categories, and the prohibitions of impure animals also include the prohibition
of touching their carcasses. What we deduce from this is that
the prohibition of becoming defiled through touching the carcass of an impure
animal – which appears along with the prohibition of eating the carcass of a
pure animal (that was not slaughtered according to halakha) – arises as a result
of the sanctity of Israel. This being the case, it cannot be dependent on the
arrangement of the camps; it must apply for future generations, too – even when
Bnei Yisrael are no longer living in camps around the
Mishkan. We must therefore seek some
other explanation for why the prohibition of touching the carcass of an impure
animal is not practiced as halakha. Let us turn our attention to the unit in
Sefer Devarim that parallels Parashat
Shemini: "You are the children of the
Lord your God. You shall not gash yourselves… for you are a holy nation unto the
Lord your God, and God chose you to be His special nation of all the nations
that are upon the earth. You shall not eat any abominable
thing. These are the animals which you may eat… And any animal that has a parted
hoof and is cloven-footed and chews the cud, of the animals – you may eat
it. But these you shall not eat…
they are impure to you... you shall not eat of their flesh, nor shall you touch
their carcass… You shall not eat any thing that
dies of itself; you shall give it to the stranger who is in your gates as food,
or sell it to a foreigner. For you are a holy nation unto
the Lord your God…." (Devarim 14:1-21) In terms of both language and
substance, it is clear that this unit is built on the unit in Vayikra 11.
For the purposes of our discussion, too, the prohibitions of impurity are based
upon the sanctity of Israel, and here, too, we find the prohibition of contact
with the carcass of an impure animal. Here, however, we find an
additional detail concerning the carcass of a pure animal: the Torah explicitly
permits giving the carcass to a non-Jew (a ger toshav), or selling it to
him. This, appears, is the key to solving our problem. If it were forbidden to
touch the carcass of a pure animal, it would be impossible to handle it and
transfer it to a non-Jew. The practical significance of this would be that a Jew
could enjoy no monetary or other benefit from the carcass. Hence there is a
practical contradiction between the prohibition of touching the carcass of a
pure animal – which would entail the nullification of the monetary value of the
carcass, and an actual loss of money to the owner of the carcass – and the
license to sell it to a non-Jew, representing the Torah's consideration of this
monetary loss, and its recognition of the financial need to handle the corpse.
The unit in Vayikra presents only the prohibition of contact with the
corpse, while the unit in Devarim (chapter 14) includes both sides of
this contradiction. The inclusion of both within the same unit means that there
is a difference between the ideal, preferred situation, and the Torah's actual,
practical recognition of human needs. The Oral Law confirms that the practical
result of the contradiction is that the end of the unit (verse 21) prevails over
the first part (verse 8), and the sole prohibition concerns eating, while in
terms of normative halakhic practice, there is no prohibition involved in
touching or handling the carcass. Sanctity and
Mercy Let us summarize the two main
points that we have addressed, and then consider what is common to
them. We saw, in the beginning, that
the parshiyot of Sefer Vayikra and Sefer Bamidbar, conveyed
at the Ohel Mo'ed, are formulated on the basis of the reality of the
Israelite encampment around the Mishkan. This reality involves the
"sanctity of space" that applies to the entire camp, and this point has two
halakhic ramifications: the first concerns the obligation of bringing any animal
that is to be slaughtered for food, to the Ohel Mo'ed first as a
sacrifice (prohibition of "meat of desire"); the other entails certain
prohibitions of impurity (or obligation to purify oneself from impurity). Only
in Sefer Devarim does the Torah announce that the reality in Eretz
Yisrael will be different: it will be a reality of "distance" from the
Sanctuary, such that the sanctity of the Divine Presence – insofar as it
requires purification of the body and prohibits profane meat – is limited to the
Temple precincts. Thereafter we saw that the unit
discussing the sanctity of Israel, in Parashat Shemini, requires in
principle that a person refrain from contact with the carcass of a pure animal;
only in Sefer Devarim is there an easing of this requirement, based on
consideration of monetary loss. In both cases we observe the
Torah's approach with regard to sanctity: on one hand, it presents – in
principle - a high standard of sanctity and purity; only afterwards are some of
the requirements eased so as to enable the reasonable existence of Israelite
society in their land. This has dual significance for
us. Firstly, we learn about God's
mercy. He gives us a Torah of mercy, a Torah that includes the attribute of
mercy and seeks normal, reasonable social interaction. Secondly, we learn the extent of
God's desire for us to draw close to Him, the level of sanctity that Bnei
Yisrael are worthy of attaining, and how important it is for their dwelling
place to be holy. This conveys a message of aspiration towards purity and
sanctity even beyond the formal requirements of the law, even in the domain of
that which is "voluntary": "Sanctify yourself [even] with regard to that which
is permitted to you." Translated by Kaeren
Fish
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