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  A TORAH PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATUS OF SECULAR JEWS TODAY (1) 

                     By Harav Yehuda Amital



	Let us open with the famous question that has been 
occupying the State of Israel, and the Jewish world as a whole, 
for many years: Who is a Jew?  The answer seems obvious, at 
least to Jews guided by Halakhah:  a Jew is a person born to a 
Jewish mother.  This answer is certainly correct halakhically 
speaking, but as a definition of a Jew's Jewishness it is surely 
inadequate.  Any definition that does not embrace a person's 
affinity to Torah cannot be complete.  The problem is to find a 
definition that on the one hand covers this affinity, and on the 
other hand does not exclude Jews who have forsaken Torah - 
including those who regard themselves as secularists and to whom 
Jewish tradition says nothing at all.
	The full answer and the correct definition were given by 
Rav Sa'adiah Gaon and, later, Rambam.  There is Rav Sa'adiah 
Gaon's famous definition:  "...since our Israelite nation is a 
nation only by virtue of its Torah."(2) 
	Careful examination of this statement in its original 
context shows that it has quite a different meaning from the one 
usually assigned to it. Rav Sa'adiah is generally understood to 
be saying that the Jews are a people only if we strictly observe 
the Torah; failure to do so means the end of peoplehood, or 
failure of the individual Jew to do so means that he has cut 
himself off from the Jewish people.  That is not what Rav 
Saadiah had in mind at all.  Jews remain Jews and the Jewish 
people remains the Jewish people even when they fail to observe 
the Torah. 
	Let us examine Rav Sa'adiah's statement in context.  He 
speaks of the eternity of the Torah, and raises the question:  
Does the Torah given to us at Sinai obligate us for all time, or 
will there come a time, as the Christians contend, when this 
Torah will no longer be binding and will be replaced by another 
one?  And he shows that the present Torah is eternal:

"Since our Israelite nation is a nation only by virtue of its 
Torah, and since the Creator said that His nation would endure 
like heaven and earth, then most certainly its Torah will 
endure like heaven and earth. As we read (Yirmiyahu 31:35-36) 
"These are the words of God, Who appointed the sun to light by 
day, the moon and stars to light by night, Who stirred the sea 
so its waves roared, Lord of Hosts is His name:  'Only if 
these statutes vanish from My sight,' declares God, 'will the 
seed of Israel cease forever to be a nation before Me.'" 
 
	That is, what makes the Jews a special nation is their 
being commanded to observe the Torah.  And the Jewish people 
will cease to be the Jewish people only when the Torah ceases to 
be valid, and is no longer binding on them. 
	Rambam, too, writes about this issue in the Guide to the 
Perplexed (II:29), commenting on Yeshayahu 66:22, "'For as the 
new heaven and the new earth I am making will endure in My 
presence,' says God, 'so shall your seed and name endure.'" 
Rambam remarks:

"Sometimes the "seed" remains, and not the "name," as you find 
in the instance of  many nations, about whom there is no doubt 
that they are of Persian or Greek stock, but are today no 
longer known by their original names; rather they bear the 
names of the other nations of which they are now a part.  In 
my view, we have here a prophecy that our Torah by virtue of 
which we possess our special "name" will endure forever."

	We see, then, that according to Rav Saadiah Gaon's and 
Rambam's definitions a Jew is one who is commanded by Torah.  
The mere fact of his being commanded makes him a Jew, even if he 
does not observe.  But his failure to observe makes him subject 
to judgment by temporal or Divine court.  This is not the case 
with Gentiles:  the most complete and scrupulous observance of 
Torah does not turn a Gentile into a Jew, since Gentiles are not 
under the command.
	This raises the question:  How can there be proselytes to 
Judaism? For if a Jew is only one who is commanded in the first 
instance, the Torah having been originally given to the Jewish 
people - "The Torah that Moses commanded us, a legacy for the 
community of Jacob" (Devarim 33:4) - how can an outsider's later 
voluntary submission to the command transform him into a Jew?  
Indeed,this is a unique feature of Jewish peoplehood:  by 
becoming a proselyte and joining the Jewish faith community, a 
Gentile also becomes a member of the Jewish people, the people 
that is obligated by the Torah.  There is no other religion or 
nation with such an integral link between these two elements. 
	As Rambam writes in Hilkhot Issurei Bi'ah (14:1-2):

"How are true proselytes admitted ? When a heathen comes to be 
converted to Judaism, he is investigated. When no special 
reason is found to disqualify him, he is told:  "Why have you 
come to convert?  Don't you know how much humiliation and 
suffering the Jewish people is undergoing?"  If he says, "I 
know and I am unworthy," he is promptly accepted...  And he is 
taught the tenets of the religion, which are the oneness of 
God and the prohibition of idolatry."

	In my opinion, this is the root meaning of Ruth's 
declaration to Naomi, "Your people shall be my people and your 
God shall be my God" (Ruth 1:16).  First comes the peoplehood 
affiliation, then the religious one, for "your God is my God" 
only when "your people are my people."
	Is it possible to resign from this obligation and all that 
it implores in the sphere of reward and punishment?  Rambam says 
in his Iggeret Teiman (ed.  Mossad Harav Kook, p.  136):

"Not a single person of the seed of Jacob can ever escape from 
this Torah - neither he, nor his children, nor his children's 
children, neither if he seeks to renounce it voluntarily nor 
if he does so under compulsion.  He is punished for every 
single mitzvah he violates... And let him not imagine that 
having committed violations for which he is liable to severe 
punishment, he will escape punishment for minor infractions, 
and therefore may become careless about mitzvot carrying 
lighter penalties. For Yerovam the son of Nevat... was 
punished for committing idolatry and leading the rest of 
Israel into idolatry, and punished also for postponing the 
observance  of Sukkot for no good reason...  This is a 
fundamental principle of the Torah and of our faith."

	So a Jew can define himself as secularist, a Jew can 
define himself as non-religious, a Jew can even change his 
religion - for all that he remains a Jew.
	To repeat, a Jew is defined as a Jew by mere virtue of the 
fact that he is obligated by the Torah - even if he does not 
observe it.  This definition has halakhic ramifications in the 
area of personal status, regarding such matters as marriage and 
divorce.  This is the basis for the halakhic application to an 
apostate of the principle, "Even though he sinned, he is a Jew" 
(Sanhedrin 44a), although the direct reference of the statement 
is to Akhan ben Karmi (Yehoshua' 7:11) and not to an utter 
apostate.(3) 
	In sum, I allow myself to assert:  A complete Jew is one 
who is commanded and observes the commandments.  A conscious Jew 
is one who, even though he does not observe the Torah, is 
conscious of its existence and feels the confrontation with it. 
And all those commanded by the Torah are Jews, even if they are 
not conscious of its existence.
	Hence no Jew can be stripped of his Jewishness, regardless 
of his deeds or opinions.  But the halakhah draws additional 
distinctions: righteous person and wicked person; sinner on a 
single matter and sinner regarding the entire Torah; brother in 
Torah and observance of the commandments and brother, but not in 
Torah and observance.  And the halakhah relates to each of these 
categories differently.  Now what is the attitude to halakhah to 
one who does not accept or believe in the Torah and considers 
himself a secularist? 
	We have to concede that in principle, halakhah is harsh 
towards and intolerant of those who violate it.  Here is what 
Rav Abraham Isaac ha-Kohen Kook had to say:(4) 

"And the fiercest of the nations (the Jews:  see Beitzah 25b; 
Shemot Rabbah 42:9) is a jealous and vengeful one.  It wreaks 
hellish vengeance on those who muddy up its life. It does not 
tolerate those who do so, be they even brother or son.  In its 
heart there continues to reverberate the proclamation of its 
first shepherd (Moshe, during the episode of the Golden Calf; 
Shemot 32:27), "These are the words of the Lord, God of 
Israel:  'Let each of you take up his sword and go through the 
camp from gate to gate, and slay brother, neighbor and kin.'"

	 This attitude is primarily one of principle, and there is 
a vast difference between  halakhic principle and practice in 
this respect. There are halakhic matters concerning which we are 
told halakhah ve'ein morin ken - "the action, if performed, is 
correct under the law, but is not prescribed a priori."  Between 
the proclamation in principle and the implementation there is a 
great distance.  However the assertion in the principle is 
important in itself and as an edifying factor.  An example of 
this is a certain blatant difference between the Written and 
Oral Torah. In the former we often find the expression "mot 
yumat," the perpetrator of such-and-such an offense "shall 
surely be put to death."  A literal reading of Scripture might 
make one think that one is reading the minutes of a "stoning 
Sanhedrin."  On the other hand, there is the famous statement in 
Mishnah Makkot 1:10:  "A Sanhedrin that carries out one death 
sentence in seven years is called murderous.  Rabbi Elazar ben 
Azariah says, 'Once in seventy years.'  Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi 
Akiva say, 'If we were on the Sanhedrin, no-one would ever be 
executed.'"  According to the Oral Torah, the possibility of 
sentencing an offender to death is extremely remote, virtually 
non-existent. Halakhah(5)  requires prior warning in the 
presence of two witnesses; the offender must also have been told 
precisely how he would be executed; and he must have declared, 
"I know, and I am committing the sin nevertheless."  If he only 
said "I know" without declaring that he intended to commit the 
offense, he is not considered to have been properly forewarned, 
as the warning must be issued when he is clearly showing his 
criminal intent.  Altogether, a most far-fetched possibility. 
Nevertheless, the radical disapproval expressed by the Torah's 
prescription of the death sentence has tremendous educational 
value. Rav Kook remarked that the Kabbalah designates the 
Written Torah as "Father" and the Oral Torah as "Mother."  
Father and mother both pursue the same aims in the education of 
their children; only the father does it in his manner, and the 
mother in hers.  And both manners are needed if the child's 
education is to be complete.  Sometimes the child needs the 
father's stern reprimand that does not consider extenuating 
circumstances, and at the same time needs motherly tenderness, 
mercy, and understanding. 
	The question is asked:  If, as the Oral Torah says, "An 
eye for an eye" means " Money for an eye," why does the Written 
Torah say, "An eye for an eye" rather than "Money for an eye?"  
The answer is: The Written Torah is the father sternly 
declaring, "An eye for an eye!"  Then along comes the Oral Torah 
as a clement mother, saying, "It isn't that simple; it isn't 
really an eye for an eye; actually it means money for an eye." 
Revulsion at causing bodily harm is generated precisely by the 
Written Torah's harsh prescription.  There is educational value 
to the Torah's emphatic repetition, "An eye for an eye! A tooth 
for a tooth! A foot for a foot!"
	The same applies to the matter we are discussing - the 
stringent attitude to sinners, reflecting the attitude we are 
expected to take to the sin itself.
	In dealing with the practical implications of the Torah's 
attitude to sinners, we have to concentrate on our attitude to 
sinners in our time. Here the central question is:  Are those 
stringent statements of the Sages regarding sinners and heretics 
applicable today?  We have to treat this question from two 
standpoints: 

	1.  The character and gravity of the sins:  Do the various 
sins carry the same weight today as they did in the times of the 
Sages?
	2.  The quantity of sinners:  When the Sages spoke of 
sinners as "fence-breachers," Jewish society as a whole was 
observant and loyal to the tenets of Judaism.  Does the halakhic 
attitude of the Sages apply in our time, when the  totality of 
Jewish society cannot be defined as observant? 

	Before answering all these questions, let us briefly 
review the Sages' attitude to sinners.  There are various 
degrees of sinners, and here I will refer only to the attitude 
toward the lowest and highest.  The lowest degree concerns one 
who commits a solitary transgression in the presence of another 
Jew, is reproved by him and continues to transgress in spite of 
the reproach.(6)   The highest degree concerns apostates, 
heretics, those who reject the entire Torah, and those who 
transgress out of spite.
	Regarding the lowest degree of sinner, the Gemara(7)  says:

"Rabbi Shemuel bar Rav Yitzchak said in Rav's name: "It is 
permitted to hate him, as said (Shemot 23:5) 'When you see 
your enemy's ass lying helpless under his load.'  Who is this 
enemy?  If you say that the reference is to a Gentile, we have 
already been taught (Bava Metzi'a 32b) that a Jew is meant, 
and not a Gentile, and the reference here is clearly to a 
Jewish enemy.  In that case, is it permitted to hate him?  
Aren't we taught (Vayikra 19:16), 'You shall not hate your 
brother in your heart?'  Rather, there are witnesses that he 
committed a transgression, so it is permitted to hate him.  If 
so, why is he called the enemy of an individual?  The whole 
world ought to hate him as well!  It must be that the 
individual alone saw him sin."

In other words, to one who saw the sin, the sinner is 
considered an "enemy," and the witness is permitted to hate 
him.  And,

"Rabbi Nahman bar Yitzchak said:  "It is a mitzvah to hate 
him, as said (Mishlei 8:13), `Godfearingness means hating  
evil.'"

	As to the highest degree of sinner, Rambam says(8) 

"The heretics - that is, idolaters, or one who transgresses 
out of spite... or those who deny the Torah and prophecy -  it 
is a mitzvah to kill them.  If one has the possibility of 
killing them with a sword in public, one does so; if not, one 
uses various stratagems to bring about their death. How?  If 
one sees such a person fall into a well and there is a ladder 
in the well, one takes the ladder and says, "As soon as I get 
my son down off the roof, I'll give it back to you."  And so 
on."

This, then, is the Halakhah's theoretical position on the 
highest degree of sinner:  moridim velo ma'alin - "one helps to 
bring about their downfall; one does not help them up."
	Now, what of the practice?  Regarding the lowest degree of 
sinner, whom it is a mitzvah to hate, we should bear in mind the 
words of the Tosafot in Pesachim 113b.  There is a mitzvah to 
help another person unload a burden from his fallen animal and 
to help him raise the animal and reload or readjust the 
burden.(9)   One aspect of the unloading mitzvah is preventing 
cruelty to animals.  This is not involved in the reloading 
mitzvah, which is solely a matter of helping the beast's owner.  
The Gemara (Bava Metzi'a 32b) tells us:  If you simultaneously 
encounter a situation involving unloading and one involving 
loading, you deal with the former first, because that is also a 
matter of preventing cruelty to animals. But if the person 
requiring help in loading is an enemy, then you are to deal with 
him first, in order to force a change in your attitude.  The 
Tosafot ask, "What is this business of forcing a change in 
attitude, considering that it is a mitzvah to hate the owner?" 
And they reply:  Since the loader hates the owner, then surely 
the loader's fellows also hate him, as it is written (Mishlei 
27:19), "As a face opposite water reflects another face, so do 
people reflect each other's hearts."  This would lead to total 
hatred.  As the Torah vigorously combats total hatred, each 
person must coerce his attitude and overcome his hatred.  If 
that is the case, how does one simultaneously overcome one's 
hatred and exercise what the Gemara says is one's right - even 
duty - to hate?  On this the Tanya (32) says:  Even those who 
ignore reproof and whom it is a mitzvah to hate -  it is also a 
mitzvah to love them: hate the evil in them, and love the good 
in them. 
	Such, then, is the nature of that precept to hate.  
	It is worthwhile recalling what the Tanya says about those 
who have become so alienated from things Jewish that one is not 
even required to reprove them, since the commandment to do so 
applies only to "your fellow" in Torah and observance, and not 
merely to any neighbor of countryman.  Hating people who are so 
alienated is forbidden.  As the Tanya says:

"Concerning one who is not your comrade, one with whom you are 
not close - it is concerning relations with such people  that 
Hillel the Elder has said (Avot 1:12): "Be of the disciples of 
Aaron, loving peace and pursuing peace, loving the beriyyot 
(creatures) and bringing them close to the Torah."  Hillel's 
use of the term "creatures" rather than "people" indicates 
that he is referring to those who are far removed  from Torah; 
you must draw them closer with bonds of love - to the point 
where they are brought into the study of Torah and service of 
God, and at the same time you earn reward for having observed 
the precept of loving your fellow."

	Let us return to the case of those who have ignored 
reproval and whom it is apparently a mitzvah to hate.  To 
hate, of course, does not mean to hate totally; it should be 
hatred blended with love.  And in the light of the Tanya's 
statement, the question arises whether in our time - even in 
the time of Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva - hatred of such 
people is commanded, or even sanctioned.  This hatred is 
permitted only after we have observed the mitzvah to reprove.  
And this precept is not all that simple, is not within the 
capacity of everyone and anyone to perform at will.  The 
Gemara tells us ('Arakhin 16b):  "We are taught:  Rabbi Tarfon 
said, 'I doubt that there is anyone in this generation who 
accepts reproach...  Tell someone, "Remove the splinter from 
between your teeth," and he will retort, "Remove the beam from 
between your eyes." Rabbi Elazar ben Azariah said, 'I doubt 
that there is anyone in this generation who knows how to give 
reproach.'" And since sanction of hatred presupposes 
observance of the mitzvah to reprove, which we are incompetent 
to fulfill, then the sanction to hate is null and void.  So 
the Chafetz Chayyim ruled, and in his wake, the Chazon Ish.  
Here is what the Chazon Ish writes (in his commentary on 
Hilkhot De'ot):

"At the end of his book Ahavat Chesed, the Chafetz Chayyim 
wrote in the name of the Maharil that it is a mitzvah to love 
the wicked...for we are bidden first to reprove, and since we 
do not know how to reprove, they are considered as sinners out 
of ignorance or under coercion.  Incidentally, regarding the 
law of moridin velo ma'alin the Chazon Ish writes:  "A sinner 
is not to be put down before efforts have been made to set him 
aright by speaking with him."  So we see that there is a vast 
gap between the Halakhah's trenchantly stated mitzvah to hate 
sinners and its implementation."

	Now let us examine the views of the posekim regarding the 
practice towards sinners of the highest degree:  those who deny 
Torah and Prophecy and transgress out of spite, concerning whom 
we are told that it is a mitzvah to kill them, and to expedite 
their downfall, and not to aid their comeback.  First we have to 
ascertain the source of this law, according to which it is 
permitted to kill or cause the death of a heretical or 
spitefully sinning Jew.  Does the commandment against murder not 
apply to such a Jew?  The answer is that this law stems from the 
authority vested in the Sages to go beyond the law and sanction 
capital punishment in special instances involving maintenance of 
the social order.(10) 
	From this we must conclude that if the sole purpose is to 
prevent or mend a breach in the Jewish social order, then in our 
time, when killing will clearly not achieve this purpose, the 
prohibition on killing surely remains in force.  Indeed, in the 
view of the Chazon Ish, the principle of moridin velo ma'alin 
will be applicable only in the messianic era, as he limits its 
validity to a very special period in which such punishment will 
have deterrent and mending force.  Here is what the Chazon Ish 
writes:(11) 

"It seems to me that the principle of moridin applies only 
when the intervention of Divine Providence is manifest to all.  
For when the times were such, the extirpation of the wicked 
was clearly seen as the removal of an immediate threat to 
humanity, everyone knowing that it was the incitement and bad 
example of the wicked that caused pestilence, war and famine.  
But in a time of eclipse, when the people are cut off from 
faith, expediting the downfall of sinners does not serve to 
mend the breach, but only widens it.  Therefore, the law does 
not apply, and we must do our utmost to bring them back with 
bonds of love."

	The question remains whether there is a significant 
difference between those whom the talmudic Sages refer to as 
heretics - koferim - and those defined as such in our time, a 
difference dictating a different attitude.  Here it is 
worthwhile to see what Rambam says in his commentary on the 
first mishnah in Chullin:

"Know that the tradition we have from our forebears that ours 
is an epoch of Exile when the capital code does not apply 
refers only to Jews who have committed capital offenses.  As 
to the minim, Sadducees and Boethusians, however - those who 
initiate any of those deviant systems are to be executed, to 
prevent them from leading Jews astray and undermining the 
faith; this has already been done in many cases in the Maghreb 
(North Africa).  But those born to those ideas and raised on 
them are to regarded as innocents who do not know any better - 
unlike those who conceived those ideas, who are willful 
sinners."

	Rambam expresses the same idea:(12) 

"The foregoing applies to those who deny the Oral Torah and do 
as they please, like Zadok and Boethus and their followers.  
But the children and grandchildren of those deviants, who were 
born among the Karaites and raised according to that ideology 
- they are to be considered as unwitting offenders, who do not 
know what is a mitzvah and what a transgression.  Even if such 
people afterwards learn that they are Jews and they see Jews 
and the practice of Judaism, they are still regarded as 
innocents, for they were raised on error... Peaceable methods 
should be used to bring them back to the correct and solid way 
of the Torah."

	Let us consider the status of heretics in our own time in 
the light of the Rambam's judgement.  Many Torah greats of our 
era, including Rav Kook, dealt with this question.  They 
declared that heretics today are to be regarded as innocents 
"coerced" by the prevailing cultural and general atmosphere.  
And not only their children are to be regarded as "infants who 
were kidnapped and raised by Gentiles," but also those who grew 
up in a religious milieu and forsook that way of life.  Here is 
what Rav Kook wrote in one of his letters:(13) 

"But if you think that it is fitting to ignore all those young 
people who have been swept from the path of Torah and faith by 
the raging torrent of our time, then I declare unequivocally 
that that is not the way that God desires. Just as Tosafot in 
Sanhedrin 5b, s.v. hechashud, say that one suspected of 
adultery should not be disqualified as a witness, because he 
should be regarded as having been coerced by his passions, and 
as Tosafot in Gittin 41b, s.v. kofin, say that they are 
regarded as "coerced" because the maidservant seduced them, so 
should the torrent of our time be regarded as a wicked 
maidservant whom Heaven has given a last spell of free rein 
before she vanishes, and who is using all her many allures to 
seduce our young people to whore after her.  They are 
misguided innocents, and Heaven forfend that we should adjudge 
them willful sinners."

	Let it be borne in mind that the above was said before the 
Holocaust.  What shall we say after the Holocaust? Are we 
permitted to condemn people who find it difficult to have faith 
after all that the Holocaust did to Jewish souls?  If Rav Kook 
and the Chazon Ish spoke of "coerced innocents" before the 
Holocaust, what shall we say today?
	Furthermore, does the halakhic definition of heresy apply 
to what is today called heresy?  According to present-day 
epistemology and conventional thinking, one can at most be a 
skeptic; it is not possible to be a heretic, for that requires 
categorical assertions in the metaphysical sphere - a sphere to 
which human cognition has no access.  An unequivocal heretic 
places himself in the "religious" category of faith along with 
the religious person.  One can say that he does not believe in 
prophecy or a revealed Torah because it has not been proven to 
him.  But only a person who thinks on a primitive level can 
categorically state that there is no prophecy or revealed Torah. 
Consequently, we have to define the present-day heretic as a 
skeptic.  
	Now the question arises: What is the status of the skeptic 
- that is, the person who has no faith but is not committed to 
heresy?
	In tractate Shabbat 31a, we are told the story of the 
heathen who asked Hillel to convert him, saying that he believed 
in the written Torah but not in the Oral one, and that Hillel 
converted him.  Rashi explains that Hillel assumed that he would 
eventually be able to persuade the heathen, for the man had not 
rejected the Oral Torah, but had only said that he did not 
believe it was of Divine origin.  Rashi is suggesting that there 
is a difference between a non-believer and a heretic.  According 
to Halakhah, then, a heretic is one who categorically rejects.  
As Rambam says (Hilkhot Teshuvah 3:7):

"Five are called minim; one who says that there is no God and 
the world has no leader; one who says that the world has a 
leader but that there are two or more... Migdal Oz comments on 
this:  There are many who do not know enough to form a clear 
opinion and they express themselves confusedly.  Minim, on the 
other hand, say exactly what they mean, in no uncertain 
terms."

	Ramban, in his Hassagot (Dissents) on Rambam's Sefer 
Hamitzvot, indeed speaks of a prohibition on skepticism.  Now 
the skeptic may be violating a ban, or he may be psychologically 
ill, but it is questionable whether he can be described as a 
min.  Rav Kook wrote in one of his letters that "we have not 
heard that the talmudic Sages treat as an apikoros anyone but 
those who deny outright." 
	I once heard Rav Elimelekh Bar-Shaul declare that a 
skeptic is not to be treated as a heretic.  He based himself on 
Ramabam, Hilkhot Avodat Kokhavim 2:3:

"If every person follows his whims, he is apt to destroy the 
world out of ignorance.  How?  Sometimes he will be drawn to 
idolatry, and sometimes he will wonder about the oneness of 
the Creator, either it is true or not; will speculate on what 
is Above and what is Below, what Before and what After; will 
sometimes waver between belief and unbelief in the truth of 
prophecy, between belief and doubt as to whither the Torah is 
from Heaven; he simply does not know by which criteria to let 
himself be guided, and ends up tending towards minut."

	Note that Rambam does not flatly state that he has become 
a min; he says that the man "tends towards minut," is in a state 
of doubt. It is most doubtful, then, whether the so-called 
"heretics" of our time are heretics according to Halakhah.  In 
any event, it is hard to classify a person who thinks in modern 
categories as a "heretic." 
	Now to the question whether the attitude to transgressors 
ought to be different in a period when most Jews are defined as 
such.  The Torah literature does not explicitly treat this 
question.  I have a powerful feeling, however, that apart from 
the reasons I have stated above for not categorizing them as 
transgressors in the classical sense, the mere fact that so many 
Jews have forsaken God calls for a more lenient attitude to them 
and a special effort to find the good points in them and plead 
in their defense.  This feeling is bolstered by quite a few 
dicta of the Sages emphasizing the good points of the Jewish 
people in times when idolatry was rampant among them.  One of 
the most powerful such pleas appears in Midrash Tanchuma,(14) 

"Rabbi Joshua of Sikhnin said in Rabbi Levi's name: "In 
David's (i.e., Saul's) time, the children, who were not even 
old enough to sin, already knew enough Torah to adduce 49 
reasons to declare something impure and 49 reasons to declare 
the same thing pure.  And David would pray for them, as is 
written (Tehillim 12:8), 'You, God, preserve' the Torah in 
their hearts, and guard them from a generation doomed to 
extinction."

	After all that praise, the Midrash continues,

"So many of them fell in war (i.e., the wars led by Saul) on 
account of the talebearers and slanderers among them. This is 
what David had in mind when he said (Tehillim 57:5), "I lie 
down among lions" - that refers to Abner and Amasa, who were 
lions in Torah; "ravenous beasts" - that refers to Doeg and 
Ahitophel, who were ravenous for slander; "men whose teeth are 
spears and arrows" - that refers to the people of Ke'ilah, as 
is written (Shemu'el 23:12-13), "David asked, `Will the 
citizens of Ke'ilah surrender me and my men to Saul?'  And God 
said, 'They will'":  "whose tongues are sharp swords" - that 
refers to the people of Ziph, as written (Tehillim 54:2), 
"When the Ziphites came to Saul and told him, 'Why, David is 
hiding among us.'" At this point David said (Tehillim 57:6), 
"Raise Yourself, God, above the heavens" - that is, remove 
Your Presence from them. 

On the other hand, Ahab's generation was idolatrous through 
and through.  Yet because there were no talebearers among 
them, they won their wars.  We know this from Ovadiah's 
statement to Eliyahu (Melakhim 18:13), "Have you not been 
told, my Lord, what I did when Jezebel was killing off God's 
Prophets - how I hid 100 of them, 50 to a cave, and provided 
them with food and water?"...  And then Eliyahu proclaims at 
Mt. Carmel (Melakhim 1 18:23), "I am the only prophet of God 
still left"!  The entire nation knew [that, because of 
Ovadiah's act, Eliyahu was not the only true Prophet left], 
but no one had told Achav."

	Thus the Midrashim.  
	Now, if the Sages make every effort to find worthy 
features in a generation that was " idolatrous through and 
through," how much more so does it behoove us to do likewise in 
our generation, about whom the least one can say is what the 
Sages said (Kiddushin 40a), "Rejection of idolatry is tantamount 
to acknowledgment of the entire Torah."  It is incumbent upon us 
to find as many good points in this generation as possible.  For 
we have a situation today that, to the best of my knowledge, did 
not exist in olden days.  In talmudic times, people who 
desecrated the Sabbath were also suspect regarding theft and 
robbery. Today high ethical and moral standards can be found. 
	But I wish to raise two additional considerations.  First, 
there was a time when the Jews were hated for being the bearers 
of the Torah.  As soon as a Jew stopped living according to his 
religion and accepted the religion of his Gentile milieu, the 
hatred ceased.  This is no longer true. Contemporary Jew-hatred 
is racial, directed against people in whose veins Jewish blood 
flows, irrespective of whether they live by the Torah or have 
had themselves baptized.  When Jew-hatred is aimed at a person 
solely because he is a Jew, regardless of his opinions and 
actions, so should ahavat Yisra'el - love of fellow Jews - also 
be directed at every Jew solely because he is a Jew, regardless 
of his opinions and actions.  Let no one entertain the notion 
that someone treated as a Jew by the antisemites is going to be 
treated by us as an outsider.  Even in the Halakhah we find that 
although we are not required to bewail the death of an apostate, 
we do mourn over him if he is killed by Gentiles because of his 
Jewish origins.  In Auschwitz the Germans did not check Jews for 
their opinions or degrees of observance.  Are we going to do so 
as a preliminary to observing the mitzvot of "You shall love 
your fellow as yourself" and "Your brother shall live with you"?
	The second consideration concerns mainly the State of 
Israel, with ramifications pertaining to pikkuach nefesh - the 
saving of life.  If we believe that the State of Israel is a 
haven for millions of Jews, and that the survival of those Jews 
hinges on peace for Israel and the Jewish state's capacity to 
withstand its many enemies; and if we believe that the 
reestablishment of the Jewish state and its survival constitute 
Kiddush Hashem - sanctification and glorification of God's name; 
if the State of Israel is precious to us; if we have not yet 
been infected by the "Charedi heresy," which excludes God from 
the history of the reestablishment of Jewish statehood and 
regards it as a purely human act - then we had better realize 
that the State of Israel is not going to endure if cordial 
relations do not prevail between all sectors of the nation.  
Only if Jews relate to each other as brothers, irrespective of 
ideology, can we maintain this state. Otherwise, we live under a 
threat of destruction.
	I do not have to adduce any source texts to support these 
latter two considerations.  Concerning such instances, the Sages 
have already said, "Why do I need a quotation from Scripture?  
It stands to reason." 



1. 	In honor of Rav Amital's talmidim who fell in Operation 
Shalom HaGalil, David Ben Aviezer Cohen HY"D and Daniel Ben 
Moshe Mushitz HY"D. Translated by Moshe Kohn.  A Hebrew 
version of this paper was presented to an assembly of 
Yeshiva University in Jerusalem, and appears in Mamlekhet 
Kohanim Vegoy Kadosh, ed. Rav Yehuda. Shaviv.  This article 
was originally published in English in Tradition 1988.
2. 	Emunot Vede'ot, ed.  Kappah, III:132.
3. 	See also Maharsha's Chiddushei Aggadot and Rashbam's 
Responsa, Even Ha'ezer 10.
4. 	Ma'amarei Re'AYaH, p.  91.
5. 	See Rambam, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 12:2.
6. 	See Pesachim 113b and Rambam, Hilkhot De'ot 6:8.
7. 	Pesachim 113b.
8. 	Hilkhot Rotzeach 4:10.
9. 	Shemot 23:5; Devarim 22:4; Rambam, Sefer Hamitzvot, 
Positive Commandments 80 and 540.
10. 	See Sanhedrin 46a and Rambam, Hilkhot Sanhedrin 24:4.
11. 	Yoreh De'ah 13,100:16.
12. 	Hilkhot Mamrim 3:3.
13. 	Iggerot Re'AYaH, I:171.
14. 	Chukkat (ed.  Buber, p.  71a and with slight variations in 
Vayikra Rabbah 20:2, Bemidbar Rabbah 19:2 and Pesikta Derav 
Kahana, Parashat Parah.


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