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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT NASO

Rav David Silverberg

            Parashat Naso tells of the gifts brought by the nesi'im, the twelve tribal leaders, on the day of the Mishkan's consecration.  The gifts included wagons and cattle for the transportation of the Mishkan during travel, as well as animals, flour and incense brought as a special offering to God.

The Panim Yafot (by Rav Pinchas Horowitz, the "Ba'al Hafla'a") addresses the question of why the nesi'im made a point of bringing these gifts immediately on the day of the Mishkan's inauguration.  He first suggests a halakhic explanation, noting the potential dilemma the nesi'im faced regarding the cattle they donated for transporting the Mishkan.  The Talmud (Menachot 101a) establishes that a person may not donate to bedek ha-bayit, the Temple treasury, animals that are suitable as a sacrificial offering.  If an animal meets the strict qualifications for suitability as a sacrifice, one who wishes to consecrate it must consecrate it as a sacrifice, rather than as a financial donation to the treasury.  Thus, the nesi'im, who wished to donate cattle to the Mishkan for the purpose of transportation, faced a halakhic dilemma.  If they donated unblemished cattle, they would be in violation of this halakha, which forbids consecrating suitable animals for purposes other than a sacrifice.  On the other hand, donating blemished animals would constitute a sign of disrespect for God and His Mishkan.

For this reason, the Panim Yafot suggests, the nesi'im presented this gift immediately on the day of the Mishkan's inauguration, before the altar was formally consecrated for use.  Since the altar had yet to be consecrated, the animals in any event could not as yet be offered as sacrifices.  The tribal leaders were therefore allowed to designate them for purposes other than sacrifices, despite the fact that their physical properties met Halakha's credentials for an animal sacrifice.

The Panim Yafot then suggests a second possibility.  As Rashi (7:1) cites from the Midrash, Benei Yisrael on the day of the Mishkan's inauguration were likened to a bride walking to the canopy.  The Mishkan, the site where God and Benei Yisrael encountered one another, so-to-speak, is comparable to a chupa where a bride and groom enter into the covenant of marriage.  The Panim Yafot contends, however, that this marked only the first stage of the wedding process.  As we know from common custom, the halakhic process of marriage requires that the couple both stand under the chupa and then enter a private room together.  Similarly, the Panim Yafot writes, the "marriage" relationship between God and Israel began with the "chupa," the Mishkan, but was not concluded until Benei Yisrael's entry into the Land of Israel.  That final stage, which corresponds to the yichud (seclusion) of a bride and groom, finalized the process of Benei Yisrael's "marriage" to the Almighty.

The nesi'im's gift was intended to bridge between these two stages of the "wedding" process.  Immediately upon the Mishkan's inauguration, the nesi'im brought wagons with which the Mishkan would be transported to Eretz Yisrael.  (Recall that Benei Yisrael were to have entered the Land of Israel after just a few days of travel from Sinai.)  This would establish the necessary link between the first stage of the "marriage" – the inauguration of the Mishkan – and the final stage – the nation's arrival in their land.

We might develop this symbolic approach to the nesi'im's gifts a bit further.  The occasion of the Mishkan's inauguration was obviously a moment of immense joy and celebration for Benei Yisrael, the culmination of a process that began with the Exodus.  The nesi'im, as the nation's leaders, found it necessary to remind the people that this was not the final stage in their relationship with God; the wilderness of Sinai is not the last stop.  Right on this day, during the festivities surrounding the Mishkan's inauguration, the nesi'im brought wagons as a reminder that the Mishkan will not remain there in Sinai forever, that the nation had yet to reach their final destination.  As significant as this moment was, it was never intended as Benei Yisrael's permanent condition.  The wagons served to symbolize the temporary nature of their current state, the fact that the momentous occasion of the Mishkan's inauguration was but the first stage of the process which would reach its culmination only with Benei Yisrael's entry into their homeland.

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            We find in Parashat Naso the ambiguous comment (5:9), "And every teruma [donation]…that they offer to the kohen shall be his."  The Sifrei cites a debate between Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi Yishmael in interpreting this verse.  According to Rabbi Akiva, the Torah refers here to actual teruma, the annual donation of produce given to the kohen, and it instructs that the farmer has the right to choose the kohen to whom to give his teruma.  The phrase "shall be his" indicates that the farmer retains full ownership and control over the teruma until he hands it to a kohen, and therefore no kohen can come and seize a portion of a farmer's produce.

            Rabbi Yishmael, by contrast, explains this verse as referring to bikkurim, the first fruits of one's crop which the Torah (Shemot 23:19 and elsewhere) requires bringing to the Beit Ha-mikdash.  Nowhere does the Torah instruct as to what should be done with the fruits brought to the Temple, whether the farmer himself eats the fruits or if he must donate them.  In this verse, Rabbi Yishmael claims, the Torah teaches that the fruits are given to the kohen.  The Ramban, in discussing Rabbi Yishmael view's, remarks that the Torah here requires giving bikkurim to the kohanim of the current mishmar, or rotation, in the Beit Ha-mikdash.  Unlike teruma, which may be given to any kohen one chooses, bikkurim are given specifically to the kohanim serving in the Temple when the fruits are brought.

            In truth, this issue is subject to a debate recorded in the Mishna in Masekhet Bikkurim (3:12).  The majority view of the Chakhamim, as the Mishna cites, indeed maintains that the bikkurim are given to and eaten by the kohanim currently on-duty in the Beit Ha-mikdash.  Rabbi Yehuda, however, maintains that the farmer may choose to which kohen to give his bikkurim, like teruma (as long as the kohen is proficient in the laws of ritual purity).  It appears that Rabbi Yishmael – at least as the Ramban understood his view – followed the majority position, that the farmer must give the bikkurim to the kohanim serving in the Mikdash on the day he brings them.

            Rav Chayim of Brisk, in his work on the Rambam's Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Arakhin 6:16), comments that this issue underlies another debate, which is recorded in the Mishna at the end of Masekhet Shekalim.  The Mishna there cites two views concerning a case of a farmer who designates his bikkurim as hekdesh – consecrated for the Temple treasury.  One view maintains that the designation is effective in conferring hekdesh status upon the fruits, whereas the other view claims that this designation is meaningless.  Rav Chayim contended that this issue hinges on the aforementioned debate as to whether bikkurim are given to whichever kohen one chooses, or specifically to the kohanim on duty in the Mikdash.  According to the former view, the fruits remain in the possession of the farmer until he gives it to the kohen of his choice.  As the owner over the fruits, he has the authority to assign them to hekdesh.  If, however, the owner is not authorized to choose the kohen who will receive the bikkurim, then the fruits essentially are out of his possession.  He therefore does not have the authority to designate them as hekdesh.

            The Chazon Ish (Zera'im – likkutim 8:4) disputes Rav Chayim's analysis.  According to the Chazon Ish, even the Chakhamim agree that the Torah allows a farmer to choose the kohen to whom to give the bikkurim.  In their view, the Sages ordained that one should give the bikkurim specifically to the kohanim serving on that day in the Mikdash; according to Torah law, however, the Chakhamim concede that a farmer can choose a kohen to receive his bikkurim.  Thus, if we apply Rav Chayim's rationale, it would emerge that according to all views a farmer can consecrate his bikkurim as hekdesh, since all views agree that on the level of Torah law he is authorized to give the fruits to whichever kohen he chooses.  The Chazon Ish therefore dismisses Rav Chayim's claim and sees no connection between the debate regarding the consecration of one's bikkurim and the dispute as to whether one must give his bikkurim to the kohanim serving that day in the Mikdash.

            Rav Moshe Mordechai Shulsinger, in his work Mishmar Ha-levi (Berakhot, 126), notes that the aforementioned comments of the Ramban appear to disprove the Chazon Ish's contention.  As we saw, the Ramban presents Rabbi Yishmael's view in interpreting the verse in Parashat Naso and explains that he requires the farmer to give his bikkurim specifically to the kohanim on duty in the Temple.  The Ramban made this comment in reference to the meaning of this verse, and thus quite clearly felt that Rabbi Yishmael approached this requirement as a Torah obligation.  Rav Shulsinger has no explanation for why the Chazon Ish denied the possibility of a Tanna viewing this halakha as Torah law, when this possibility is stated and upheld explicitly by the Ramban in his commentary to Parashat Naso.

MONDAY

            The Torah writes in Parashat Naso (5:10), "Ve-ish et kodashav lo yiheyeh" – "The kodashim of each person shall be his."  The Sifrei, commenting on this verse, cites one view which explains it as a reference to neta revai, produce of a tree grown during the fourth year since its planting.  In Sefer Vayikra (19:24), the Torah requires treating these fruits as kodesh hilulim le'Hashem, a phrase that is understood as mandating that the fruits be brought to Jerusalem.  This phrase does not, however, indicate what should be done with the fruits once they are in Jerusalem.  Therefore, according to one view in the Sifrei, the Torah here in Parashat Naso clarifies that a person's kodashim, the "sacred" fruits of the fourth year (which are described as kodesh hilulim), are "his," they are eaten by the farmer.  One might have assumed that the fruits should be transferred to a kohen; the Torah therefore instructs that the fruit's owner himself partakes of this produce.

            The background of the Sifrei's discussion is a debate between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel recorded in Masekhet Kiddushin (54b).  According to Beit Hillel, the Torah's description of neta revai as "kodesh" ("sacred") is intended to draw an equation between this produce and ma'aser sheni, the tithe separated every first, second, fourth and fifth years of the seven-year agricultural cycle.  In Beit Hillel's view, all the halakhot governing the handling of ma'aser sheni apply equally to neta reva'i.  Thus, for example, if the farmer chooses to exchange his neta revai for money and bring the money to Jerusalem, rather than bring the fruits themselves, he must add 20% of their value – just as the Torah requires with regard to ma'aser sheni (Vayikra 27:31).  Furthermore, just as the Torah requires consuming or destroying all remaining ma'aser sheni in the third and sixth years of the agricultural cycle (Devarim 26:12), so must one consume all remaining neta revai.

            Beit Shammai, however, reject this association between neta revai and ma'aser sheni, and thus the aforementioned halakhot that pertain to ma'aser sheni do not apply to neta revai.

            The Talmud Yerushalmi (Ma'aser Sheni 5:2) discusses Beit Shammai's position and offers clearer insight into how Beit Shammai's perceived the halakhic status of neta revai.  The Yerushalmi writes that according to Beit Shammai, the description of neta revai as "kodesh hilulim" is intended not as a reference to ma'aser sheni, but rather to mean, in the Yerushalmi's words, "ke-kodesh she-korin alav et ha-hallel" – "like the sacred [produce] upon which hallel is recited."  The Vilna Gaon explained this to mean that in Beit Shammai's view, the Torah equates neta revai with bikkurim – the first fruits brought to the Temple amidst song and praise to the Almighty.  Thus, whereas Beit Hillel associates neta revai with ma'aser sheni, Beit Shammai associates it with bikkurim.

            Beit Shammai's position sheds light on the aforementioned passage in the Sifrei, which considers the possibility of requiring one to give his neta revai to a kohen.  If we accept the premise that neta revai follows the model of bikkurim, then we would certainly assume that it, like bikkurim, must be given to a kohen.  Rav Shlomo Wahrman, in his She'eirit Yosef (3:26), suggests that even Beit Hillel acknowledges an association between neta revai and bikkurim.  In their view, neta revai is endowed with a dual status, featuring properties of both ma'aser sheni and bikkurim.  Hence, the Sifrei was initially unsure whether neta revai should be eaten by the farmer – as is the case with ma'aser sheni – or must be given to a kohen, like bikkurim.  It deduces from this verse that in this respect neta revai more closely resembles ma'aser sheni and is partaken of by the owner himself.

            Interestingly enough, as Rav Wahrman notes, both Ibn Ezra and Abarbanel, in their respective commentaries to Sefer Vayikra (19:24), mention that neta revai is given to a kohen.  Apparently, they believed that the possibility raised and subsequently rejected by the Sifrei, that neta revai is eaten specifically by the kohanim, is actually the straightforward implication of the verse in Sefer Vayikra.

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The opening verse of Megilat Rut informs us that the events recorded in the megila occurred "during the days when the judges judged."  Chazal (as cited by Malbim and others) famously suggested a homiletic reading of this phrase ("bi-mei shefot ha-shofetim"), whereby it means, "during the days when the judges were judged."  This verse thus alludes to the fact that during this period, the masses did not afford respect to authority figures and refused to comply with their instructions and guidance.  Rather than accepting the "judgments" of their leaders, they took the liberty to "judge" them and decide matters on their own.

This attitude, of "judging the judges," could result from one of two sources.  Firstly, it could originate from sheer arrogance, a person's stubborn conviction that he is correct and others are wrong, regardless of their level of knowledge and expertise.  Alternatively, however, if we interpret the term shofetim in its narrowest sense, as a reference to judges on civil courts, we might point to a different root of this problem.  It is possible that the people simply felt that the shofetim had no jurisdiction over civil matters, that their rulings, opinions and instruction regarding interpersonal disputes are irrelevant.  The people insisted that the halakhic scholars' authority extended only over the realm of ritual law and the like, and bore no application to civil life.

This understanding of shefot ha-shofetim may perhaps shed light on a comment by Malbim in his commentary to a verse later in the megila (2:4), which tells of Boaz's arrival in his fields during the harvest.  The megila finds it necessary to report that Boaz greeted his workers with the words "Hashem imakhem" ("The Lord is with you"), and that they responded, "Yevarekhekha Hashem" ("The Lord shall bless you").  Malbim cites Chazal's explanation that Boaz, the leading halakhic authority at the time, had that day enacted a formal provision requiring that people greet one another with God's Name.  This was done, Malbim explains, as part of Boaz's campaign to combat the spiritual lethargy and indifference that had taken hold of the people.  Malbim points to a number of different purposes served by making reference to God when greeting other people, including the fact that "they will place God in front of them at all times, even in matters between them and their fellows and inquiring into their well-being and happiness."  By invoking God when greeting one another, the people will remind themselves of God's authority over all earthly matters, including day-to-day interpersonal relationships.

Possibly, Boaz's enactment served as a response to the phenomenon of shefot ha-shofetim, the people's denial of the rabbinical courts' authority over civil matters.  Boaz sought to stress to the nation that avodat Hashem is not restricted to ritual observances, and rather applies to the entire range of human activity, all of which must be conducted in accordance with His laws.  In an effort to reaffirm the authority of Halakha over all areas of life, Boaz legislated that people should speak in religious terms even during simple social encounters, thereby emphasizing the relevance of divine law to each and every facet of the human experience.

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            The final section of Parashat Naso tells of the gifts brought by the nesi'im, the twelve tribal leaders, upon the inauguration of the Mishkan.  Besides the special offerings and sacrifices brought each day by a different tribal leader during the twelve-day inauguration period, the nesi'im collectively donated cattle and wagons for transporting the Mishkan during travel.  The Torah tells (7:3) that each tribal leader donated an ox, for a total of twelve oxen, and every pair of nesi'im donated a wagon, for a total of six wagons.

            One might, at first glance, question why the nesi'im chose such an arrangement.  Seemingly, it would have simpler to have six nesi'im donate six wagons, one apiece, with the other six donating two oxen apiece.  This would yield the same result of twelve oxen and six wagons, without requiring each nasi to pair with another nasi to purchase a wagon.

            Seforno explains that the nesi'im chose this arrangement "as a sign of brotherhood between them, through which they would be deserving of having the Shekhina reside among them."  This arrangement required every nasi to cooperate with a fellow nasi and together purchase a wagon.  The nesi'im thereby sought to demonstrate the sense of camaraderie and cooperation that prevailed among the nation's leadership, in merit of which Benei Yisrael were deserving of the Almighty's presence in the newly-constructed Mishkan.

            Rav Chayim Efrayim Zeitchik, in the Otzerot Yerushalayim journal (vol. 35, 449; cited in Pardes Yosef He-chadash), comments that the nesi'im's cooperation should serve as an example for all Jewish leadership figures to follow.  All too often, different leaders and organizations compete with one another in their efforts to serve their communities or the Jewish people at large.  It would be far more effective for leaders driven by similar goals to set aside their differences and pool resources for the sake of the common good, to forego on distinction and notoriety in order to maximize the benefits yielded by their efforts.  When public officials look beyond the distracting lure of pride and fame, and instead display a humble willingness to team together with others committed towards the same objective, then Am Yisrael will be truly worthy of hashra'at ha-Shekhina, of having the Almighty once again take residence in our midst.

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            We read in Parashat Naso of the gifts brought by the nesi'im, the twelve tribal leaders, in honor of the Mishkan's inauguration, gifts that included wagons to assist the Levi'im in transporting the Mishkan.  God ordered Moshe to distribute the wagons among the Levite families of Gershon and Merari.  The third Levite family, Kehat, which was charged with transporting the most sacred articles (the ark, altars, shulchan and menora), were not given wagons, as they were required to transport their assigned articles specifically by shoulder (7:9).

            The Mishna in Masekhet Shabbat (92a) refers to the job assigned to the family of Kehat as the source for the prohibition against carrying objects on one's shoulder on Shabbat.  As the work in the Mishkan forms the basis of the Shabbat prohibitions, the work of the Kehatites – carrying sacred articles on their shoulders – establishes that carrying objects on one's shoulders violates the Torah prohibition against carrying in a public domain on Shabbat.  The Mishna lists in this context other forms of carrying, as well: carrying with either one's right hand or left hand, and carrying in one's lap.  In all these cases, the Mishna asserts, one violates the Torah prohibition against carrying on Shabbat.

            Curiously, the Mishna gives no explanation for the inclusion of these other forms of carrying under the Torah prohibition.  With regard to carrying on one's shoulder, the Mishna explains the ruling by making reference to the Kehatites, who carried on their shoulders.  The other cases – carrying in one's weaker hand, or in one's lap – are mentioned without explanation.

            Rashi writes that these cases require no explanation because they represent standard modes of carrying.  Since transporting items constitutes one of the categories of activity performed in the Mishkan, any usual mode of carrying falls under this prohibition.  Transporting by shoulder, however, deviates from the standard mode of carrying, and therefore the Mishna must draw upon the precedent of the Kehatites as the basis for prohibiting this form of carrying.  Although it does not constitute a normal way of carrying, it is nevertheless included under the Shabbat prohibition of carrying since this is how the Kehatites transported the sacred articles of the Mishkan.

            The Penei Yehoshua, commenting on this Mishna, seeks to reconcile Rashi's remarks with a theory postulated by Tosefot that an activity performed in the Mishkan is forbidden on Shabbat only if there is some rational basis for designating it as a formal melakha (constructive activity).  Seemingly, since people do not normally carry items by shoulder, the fact that such carrying occurred in the Mishkan should not necessarily mandate that this be forbidden on Shabbat.  On what basis, then, does the Mishna determine that carrying by shoulder is forbidden on Shabbat?

            The Penei Yehoshua answers that the Mishna forbade carrying in this manner because the Torah refers to this mode of carrying with the term melakha (4:3).  The designation of this type of carrying as melakha – "work" – indicates that despite the fact that people do not normally transport items in this manner, it nevertheless qualifies as "carrying" with respect to the Shabbat prohibitions. 

In truth, the Penei Yehoshua's analysis has origins in the Rambam's commentary to the Mishna.  The Rambam comments that the Kehatites would transport the Mishkan's articles by shoulder, adding, "and the Torah called it avoda," citing the aforementioned verse from Parashat Naso ("ki avodat ha-kodesh aleihem ba-katef yisa'u" – 7:9).  It appears that the fact that the Kehatites carried in such a fashion would not suffice to include it under the prohibition of carrying, because the abnormality of this means of carrying would warrant its exclusion from the category of carrying.  The Rambam therefore emphasized that only due to the Torah's description of this form of transport as avoda does it earn inclusion under the prohibition of carrying, despite the fact that it constitutes a deviation from the normal mode of transport.

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            Parashat Naso includes the mitzva of birkat kohanim – the "priestly blessing" – with which the kohanim are to bless Benei Yisrael.  A common halakhic question that arises with regard to this mitzva (at least in communities where birkat kohanim is conducted each day) concerns a situation where a person in the synagogue has yet to complete the amida as the kohanim begin birkat kohanim.  Must the individual pause and concentrate on birkat kohanim, or may he continue reciting the amida without paying attention to birkat kohanim?

            This issue is subject to a debate among recent and contemporary authorities.  Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, vol. 4, 21:2) and Rav Shemuel Wosner (Shevet Ha-levi 3:15) require that one stop praying and listen silently to birkat kohanim, whereas Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv is cited as allowing one to continue the amida during birkat kohanim.  Rav Elyashiv argued that a person reciting the amida in the synagogue has the status of am she-ba-sadot, those who are unable to stand before the kohanim to receive the berakha.  The Shulchan Arukh rules (O.C. 128:24) that such people are included in the kohanim's blessing, despite their absence from the synagogue.  This halakha is known as am she-ba-sadot – "the people in the fields" – because its primary application relates to people who cannot take time from their responsibilities to the landowners for whom they work.  Similarly, Rav Elyashiv contended, a person reciting the amida may be considered included in the kohanim's blessing despite the fact that he pays no attention to it.  Just as workers are allowed to be included due to their responsibilities to their employers, so should a person during prayer be included even as he completes his obligation to recite the amida.

            Rav Asher Zelig Weiss, in his Minchat Asher (Parashat Naso), notes that one might dispute Rav Elyashiv's rationale in light of the famous position of the Sefer Ha-chareidim cited in the Bei'ur Halakha (beginning of 128).  The Sefer Ha-chareidim contended that the Torah obligation of birkat kohanim is directed towards both the kohanim and the rest of Benei Yisrael.  Just as the kohanim are required by this mitzva to administer the berakha, so are the rest of the people required to be blessed.  (This theory is commonly known as the view of the Sefer Ha-makneh, in Masekhet Ketubot 24b.)  Rav Weiss explores several different approaches to understanding this position, and ultimately concludes that a distinction must be drawn between inclusion in the berakha, and the fulfillment of the mitzva.  Meaning, although people who could not attend the synagogue are nevertheless included in the berakha, they certainly do not fulfill the mitzva as defined by the Sefer Ha-chareidim.  The mitzva requires one to receive the kohanim's blessing by standing in front of them (or to the side) and listening to the berakha.  Even if the berakha's effects are extended even to those who are unable to participate, it cannot be said that fulfill their mitzva without involving themselves on any level in birkat kohanim.  One might argue, therefore, that, according to the Sefer Ha-chareidim, the mitzva to listen to birkat kohanim overrides the halakha forbidding the interruption of the amida, such that a person should remain silent during the amida in order to hear the kohanim's blessing.