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PARASHAT NASO

By Rav David Silverberg

            Parashat Naso records God's command that the teme'im – those with a status of ritual impurity – be barred from entering the camp (5:1-3).  Rashi, based on the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Pesachim (67a-b), explains that this prohibition establishes three distinct classes of tum'a.  Teme'ei meit – those who became tamei through contact with a dead body – are barred only from the machaneh Shekhina, the area of the Mishkan itself.  Those who became tamei as a result of bodily emissions (ba'al keri, zav and zava) must also keep away from the camp of the Leviyim, who resided around the area of the Mishkan.  Finally, those stricken with tzara'at must leave the Israelite camp entirely.

            These three gradations applied later, as well, during the times of the Beit Ha-mikdash (and, according to most opinions, remain in effect even today).  Teme'ei meit are allowed in Jerusalem and even on the Temple Mount, but may not enter the azara (courtyard) of the Beit Ha-mikdash.  People who became tamei through bodily emissions are barred even from Temple Mount, and metzora'im may not enter the city of Jerusalem or any other walled city throughout Eretz Yisrael.

            A number of Acharonim addressed the question of how to classify the halakha barring a metzora fro entering walled cities.  Namely, does this halakha fall under the general prohibition forbidding somebody who is tamei from entering certain domains, or should we view this halakha as a separate prohibition relevant to the laws of tzara'at?  A metzora is subject to a number of exceptional halakhot, such as an obligation to wear rent garments and let his hair grow (Vayikra 13:45).  Should we classify the prohibition against his entry into walled cities under this category of laws, or under the broader category of shilu'ach temei'im – the requirement for temei'im to stay away from certain areas?

            This issue appears to be subject to a dispute among the Rishonim.  Rashi, in Masekhet Pesachim (67a s.v. lifnim), writes explicitly that the general prohibition of ve-lo yetame'u et machaneihem (Bamidbar 5:3), which forbids temei'im from entering the specified domains, includes even the barring of metzora'im from walled cities.  In his view, then, this halakha is clearly associated with the prohibitions relevant to all temei'im, rather than the specific framework of the laws of tzara'at.  The Rambam, by contrast, draws a clear distinction between the metzora's barred entry from walled cities and the restrictions imposed on other temei'im.  In Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash (3:8), the Rambam writes that a metzora who enters Jerusalem is liable to malkot (lashes), just like other temei'im who enter a forbidden domain, but a metzora who enters a different walled city is not subject to corporal punishment.  The Rambam explains that a metzora who enters another walled city violates only the mitzvat asei (affirmative command) that requires metzora'im to reside outside walled cities ("badad yeisheiv" – Vayikra 13:46).  Since malkot are not administered for violations of a mitzvat asei, a metzora is not liable to malkot if he enters a walled city other than Jerusalem.

            Clearly, then, the Rambam maintained – in contrast to Rashi – that the prohibition forbidding a metzora from entering a walled city stands separate and apart from the general halakha restricting temei'im from certain areas.  The reason for this distinction, it would seem, relates to the unique status of kedushat Mikdash – the sanctity associated with the Beit Ha-mikdash.  The areas of the azara, the Temple Mount, and the city of Jerusalem are all endowed with a certain level of kedushat Mikdash, which applies in greater intensity as one moves closer to the actual site of the Temple.  Hence, we can speak of a single prohibition barring entry to these areas, as these restrictions all stem from the status of kedushat Mikdash.  Walled cities, by contrast, do not – at least in the Rambam's view – possess any status of kedusha associated with the Temple.  As such, we cannot classify the halakha forbidding a metzora's entry into such cities as part of the framework of restrictions relating to the status of kedushat Mikdash.

            Tomorrow we will iy"H discuss this issue further.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the prohibition introduced in Parashat Naso of shilu'ach temei'm, which forbids temei'im – individuals with a status of ritual impurity – from entering certain areas ("ve-lo yetame'u et machaneihem" – 5:3).  As we saw, Rashi and the Rambam appear to take different approaches in classifying the specific halakha requiring a metzora (person stricken with tzara'at) to remain outside all walled cities in Eretz Yisrael.  According to the Rambam (Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash 3:8), a metzora who enters a walled city (other than Jerusalem) violates only the affirmative command requiring metzora'im to live in isolation ("badad yeisheiv" – Vayikra 13:46); he does not transgress the general prohibition against entering certain areas in a state of impurity.  Rashi (Pesachim 67a), by contrast, indicates that the general prohibition of shilu'ach temei'im applies even to a metzora's barred entry into walled cities.  According to Rashi, a metzora who enters a walled city would be liable to the same punishment as he would if he – or any of the temei'im – entered the Temple.

            Underlying this debate between Rashi and the Rambam, it would seem, is the question of whether or not the prohibition against a metzora's entering walled cities reflects a certain status of kedusha ascribed to walled cities.  As we discussed yesterday, the prohibition introduced in Parashat Naso appears to relate specifically to kedushat Mikdash, the status of sanctity associated with the Temple, which affects the domain of the Temple, the Temple Mount and the city of Jerusalem.  Other walled cities, however, according to the Rambam, do not possess this quality of kedushat Mikdash, and thus the halakha barring a metzora's entry into these cities belongs to a different halakhic framework, and does not relate to the laws governing temei'im generally.  Rashi, by contrast, seems to have held that even other walled cities, due to their being in Eretz Yisrael, are endowed with a degree of kedushat Mikdash, and are thus off-limits to metzora'im.  In his view, it appears, the fact that a metzora is barred from Jerusalem as well as other walled cities reflects a certain status of kedusha that all walled cities share with Jerusalem.  Hence, the same prohibition that forbids a metzora from entering the Temple and Jerusalem also bars him from entering any walled city.

            Presumably, this debate would affect the status of walled cities with respect to other halakhot, as well.  If Rashi viewed walled cities as endowed with a certain kedusha status similar to Jerusalem, then perhaps other halakhot associated with that status would likewise apply to walled cities.  Thus, for example, the Kiryat Sefer (Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira, chapter 7) proposed a theory that it would be permissible, at least theoretically, to partake of certain kinds of sacrificial meat in walled cities besides Jerusalem.  In his view, the meat of kodashim kalim, which Halakha allows eating throughout the city of Jerusalem (as opposed to kodashei kodashim, which must be eaten in the Temple courtyard), is permissible even in other walled cities.  Since all walled cities have a certain kedusha status similar to Jerusalem, as evidenced by the prohibition against a metzora's entry into these cities, they are suitable as locations for the consumption of kodashim kalim meat.

(The Kiryat Sefer notes that practically speaking, one cannot partake of kodashim kalim anywhere outside Jerusalem, even in walled cities, because sacrificial meat becomes disqualified for consumption the moment it leaves the area within which is must be eaten.  The meat would thus become disqualified before it reaches the walled city, as soon as it leaves Jerusalem.  Still, as the Kiryat Sefer writes, this theory would have had application had a walled city been situated immediately adjacent to Jerusalem.)

            Rav Menachem Zemba Hy"d, in Zera Avraham (8:19), notes that the Rambam would likely not accept this theory.  The Rambam viewed the prohibition against a metzora's entering a walled city as simply part of the unique laws of tzara'at, such that it does not reflect any special status of walled cities.  Therefore, this prohibition will have no effect upon the status of walled cities with respect to sacrificial meat.  As far as sacrifices are concerned, walled cities are no different from any other area outside Jerusalem, and it would thus be forbidden to partake of kodashim kalim meat in these cities.

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            In our previous two editions of S.A.L.T., we discussed a debate among the Rishonim concerning the prohibition that forbids a metzora from entering walled cities in Eretz Yisrael.  Rashi, in Masekhet Pesachim (67a), indicates that this halakha falls under the general prohibition of shilu'ach temei'im, which the Torah introduces in Parashat Naso (5:2-3) and forbids all people with a status of tum'a from entering certain areas.  Depending on the particular kind of tum'a, the individual is barred from either the Temple courtyard, the Temple Mount, or even the entire city of Jerusalem.  According to Rashi, this same prohibition forbids a metzora from entering any walled city in Eretz Yisrael.  The Rambam (Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash 3:8), however, held that the law concerning a metzora stands separate and apart from the general prohibition of shilu'ach temei'im.  In his view, a metzora who enters a walled city transgresses a separate mitzva, and not the law that bar temei'im from certain areas.

            Today we will see how this debate may affect our understanding of a comment in Masekhet Berakhot (5b) that touches upon the status of walled cities in Talmudic times.  The Gemara cites seemingly conflicting sources regarding the question of whether or not tzara'at qualifies as yisurin shel ahava – literally, "suffering of love."  The context is a discussion of certain kinds of suffering that God will visit upon an individual out of love, rather than out of anger.  (Quite obviously, the precise definition of this term is unclear and relates to several complex philosophical issues that are beyond both the scope of this discussion and the scholarly credentials of this author.)  The Gemara resolves this apparent contradiction by stating, "Ha lan ve-ha lehu," which means that we must distinguish between "us" – the Jews of Babylonia – and "them" – the Jews of Eretz Yisrael.  Rashi explains that for the Jews of Eretz Yisrael, the onset of tzara'at results in considerable inconvenience, as it bars the individual from walled cities.  In Babylonia, however, a person stricken with tzara'at is free to go and live wherever he wishes, and thus for Babylonian Jews we may rightfully classify tzara'at as yisurin shel ahava.

            As Tosefot note, Rashi here makes the assumption that the law forbidding a metzora from entering walled cities applied even during Talmudic times.  After all, the Gemara speaks of "us" and "them," clearly applying this discussion to its own time.  Tosefot question this assumption in light of the fact that the laws of yovel (the jubilee year) did not apply during the time of the Talmud, and thus, by extension, the special laws pertaining to the sale of homes in walled cities likewise did not apply.  According to Tosefot, the barring of a metzora's entry into a walled city also depends on the applicability of yovel, and they thus dismiss the possibility that this prohibition was in effect in Talmudic times.  Tosefot are therefore compelled to suggest a different reading of this passage.

            The Tzelach (Tziyon Le-nefesh Chaya by Rav Yechezkel Landau, author of the Noda Bi-yehuda) defends Rashi's position by noting that metzora'im are barred from the city of Jerusalem irrespective of the yovel.  The status of the yovel affects other walled cities, but not Jerusalem, where metzora'im may not enter even in periods when the jubilee laws do not obtain.  Therefore, since tzara'at in Eretz Yisrael results in the barring of entry into Jerusalem, it cannot qualify as yisurin shel ahava in the Land of Israel.

            In light of what we have seen earlier this week, however, a much simpler explanation of Rashi's position emerges.  As we saw, Rashi maintains that all walled cities in Eretz Yisrael have a status of kedushat Mikdash – sanctity associated with the Mikdash – similar to the status of Jerusalem, as least in certain respects.  In his view, the prohibition against a metzora entering a walled city belongs to the general framework of shilu'ach temei'im, which requires barring temei'im from areas associated with the Mikdash.  Accordingly, Rashi would certainly maintain that this prohibition applies irrespective of the jubilee year.  Just as temei'im may not tread upon the site of the Temple at any time, even centuries after the Temple's destruction, so may a metzora not enter a walled city at any time.  Hence, this prohibition was in effect even during Talmudic times, as it does not depend on the yovel or any other factor.  Rashi's explanation of the Gemara's comment in Berakhot is thus consistent with his remarks in Masekhet Pesachim ("Rashi le-shitato").

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            Parashat Naso describes the procedure performed in the case of a sota, a woman whose husband legitimately suspects her of infidelity.  The husband and wife would come to the Beit Ha-mikdash, where the kohen would perform a special ritual whereby the woman's innocence or guilt would be determined.

            One stage of this process was the offering of a mincha (meal) sacrifice brought by the husband.  The Torah establishes that unlike other mincha offerings, the minchat sota offering was brought alone, without any oil or spices.  The reason, the Torah explains, is that "it is a mincha of jealousy, a mincha of remembrance that recalls sin" (5:15).  As this offering is brought on the occasion of determining guilt for adultery, it is not worthy of the flavoring that usually accompanies other mincha offerings.

            The obvious question arises as to why, already at this stage, the Torah labels the minchat sota as "a mincha of remembrance that recalls sin."  The sota ritual serves to determine whether or not the woman indeed committed the offense of which she is suspected, a question that is not conclusively resolved until the procedure's completion.  Why, then, does the minchat sota have an immediate, definitive association with "sin" as soon as the husband and wife come to the Mikdash?

            Instinctively, perhaps, we might explain that the "sin" spoken of here is not the sin of adultery, but rather that of arousing suspicion.  The sota ritual is conducted only if the husband has a legitimate basis for his suspicion, namely, that he specifically warned his wife not to seclude herself with the person in question, and witnesses testify to their subsequent seclusion.  Thus, even if no adulterous act was committed, the woman is nevertheless guilty of acting in an improper manner that aroused suspicion, on account of which, perhaps, the minchat sota indeed deserves the label "mazkeret avon" ("that recalls sin") regardless of the ritual's outcome.

            Chizkuni, however, suggests a different explanation, claiming that if the woman is indeed innocent, then the husband bears guilt.  The sota ritual establishes either the woman's guilt of unfaithfulness, or the husband's guilt of wrongful suspicion.  Already at the outset of the procedure, we know that one of the two parties sinned: either the woman betrayed her husband through an illicit relationship, or the husband betrayed his wife by wrongly suspecting her of infidelity.

            This interpretation, of course, emphasizes the importance of refraining from casting judgment, and giving the benefit of the doubt.  Even in the case of a sota, where, as mentioned, the husband has valid reason to suspect his wife, the Torah deems his suspicion sinful if the wife's innocence is established.  Certainly, then, under more standard circumstances, one must resist the tendency to hurl unsubstantiated accusations and presume guilt rather than innocence.

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            Among the topics introduced in Parashat Naso is that of the nazir, an individual who takes the nazirite vow which imposes a number of restrictions upon him, including a prohibition against contracting tum'at meit.  The Torah (6:6-7) forbids a nazir from coming in contact with any human corpse, including the remains of his relatives.  Even in the case of an immediate family member's death, a nazir may not become tamei.

            In introducing this law, the Torah writes that a nazir may not become tamei even "for his father and his mother, for his brother and his sister" (6:7).  This verse brings to mind the converse halakha presented in the context of a kohen, who is similarly forbidden from becoming tamei, but is allowed to become tamei for an immediate relative: "…with the exception of his close relative: for his mother and his father, for his son, his daughter and his brother, and for his unmarried sister…" (Vayikra 21:2-3).  When comparing these two verses, one immediately notices that in the context of the nazir, the Torah makes no mention of children.  Whereas regarding the kohen the Torah mentions his parents, siblings and children, in discussing the nazir it speaks only of parents and siblings.  We should also note that the Sages understood the phrase "his close relative" ("she'eiro ha-karov eilav") in the context of the kohen as a reference to the kohen's wife.  Of course, no such phrase appears with regard to the nazir.

            This discrepancy led Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky (in his Emet Le-Yaakov) to speculate that generally speaking, it was unmarried people who would take the nazirite vow.  This is similarly implied by the verse in Sefer Amos (2:11), "I raised some of your sons as prophets, and some of your young men as nazirites…"  The prophet speaks of the nazirites as coming from the bachurim, the bachelors.  Hence, the Torah, which speaks of the more common instance of the nazirite vow, mentions the case of the death of a nazir's parent or sibling, but not of his wife or child.

            The reason, Rav Yaakov added, why the nazirite vow was more common among the unmarried population relates to the greater degree of flexibility that often characterizes youth.  Older people have usually already established certain patterns and habits and would thus find it more difficult to undertake a life-altering measure such as nezirut.  It was therefore usually the younger members of Benei Yisrael who would be more inclined to accept nezirut as part of their quest for spiritual improvement.

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            The Torah presents in Parashat Naso the laws relevant to one who takes the nazirite vow, which forbids him from, among other things, coming in contact with tum'at meit – ritual impurity transmitted by a dead body.  In this context the Torah addresses a case where a nazir happens to be in a room with somebody who suddenly dies, such that he becomes tamei.  If this occurs, the nazir must bring special offerings – an ola offering and a chatat offering – after completing his purification process, and then begin his term of nezirut anew.

            The Sifrei, cited by Rashi (6:11), addresses the question of why a nazir must bring a chatat (sin offering), of which the Torah explicitly speaks in terms of earning atonement for the nazir.  For what sin, the Sifrei asks, must the nazir achieve atonement?  The first view, as Rashi cites, claims that the nazir must bring a sin offering "because he was not careful to avoid tum'at meit."  According to this view, the nazir bears guilt for his failure to ensure to avoid contact with a corpse.

            The obvious question arises as to why the Torah would hold the nazir accountable for this failure.  As mentioned, the case addressed by the Torah involves a nazir who happens to be in a room with somebody who suddenly dies ("ve-khi yamut meit alav be-feta pit'om").  In fact, the Sifrei itself writes explicitly that this halakha includes even situations of oness, circumstances entirely beyond the nazir's control.  Why, then, would any atonement be necessary, if the encounter with tum'a transpired under circumstances that the nazir could not possibly control?

            The Panim Yafot suggests answering this question based on the principle mentioned in the Gemara (Chulin 5b) that the Almighty protects the righteous from mishaps.  If a nazir came upon a situation where he contracted tum'a, then this must reflect a certain spiritual flaw that rendered him unworthy of the special protection that God affords the righteous.  It is for this imperfection that the nazir is required to bring a sin offering.

            Rav Avraham Yitzchak Sorotzkin, in his Rinat Yitzchak, rejects this explanation of the Panim Yafot.  For one thing, Tosefot in a number of contexts limit the aforementioned principle to violations involving ma'akhalot asurot (forbidden foods); God does not guarantee to protect the righteous from other forms of violations.  More importantly, however, the Rambam, in his commentary to the Mishna (end of Yoma), writes explicitly that no repentance is necessary for violations committed in situations of oness.  Likewise, in the opening passage of Hilkhot Teshuva, the Rambam writes that one must repent for all sins committed be-meizid (intentionally) and be-shogeg (by mistake), but makes no mention of the category of oness, to which the obligation of teshuva does not apply.

            The Rinat Yitzchak therefore suggests a different explanation of this comment of the Sifrei, namely, that the nazir bears guilt for putting himself in this situation in the first place.  The Rambam, in a famous ruling in Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah (5:4), writes that a person is held accountable for a situation of oness that he had the option to avoid.  He describes a case of a person who voluntarily chooses to remain in a country where Jews are subjected to religious persecution.  Normally, according to the Rambam, a person who commits a sin to save his life – even in situations where Halakha requires martyrdom – is not liable to punishment, due to the extenuating circumstances surrounding the forbidden act.  If, however, the individual had the option of avoiding persecution but nevertheless chose to remain, then he is indeed held accountable for whatever sins he commits, even if he commits them to save his life.

            The Rinat Yitzchak applies this principle to the context of a nazir.  A person who accepts upon himself the status of nezirut does so with the understanding that this vow could be violated due to circumstances beyond his control, as in the situation described in the Torah.  Thus, he indeed bears a degree of accountability even if a person dies suddenly, as he had voluntarily placed himself in this situation to begin with.

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            In Parashat Naso the Torah presents the mitzva of birkat kohanim, the blessing with which the kohanim are to bless the rest of the nation.  The text of the berakha, as formulated in this parasha, concludes with the blessing, "The Lord shall show you favor and grant you peace" (6:26).

            The Gemara in Masekhet Berakhot (20b) records an intriguing "exchange" that took place between God and the angels concerning this berakha.  A verse in Sefer Devarim (10:17) describes one of the attributes of God as "asher lo yisa fanim" – He does not show favor to one person over the next.  Yet, in the priestly blessing, the kohanim wish the rest of the nation that they should be the recipients of God's special favor – "Yisa Hashem panav elekha."  God responded to the angels, "Should I not show favor to Israel?  I wrote for them in the Torah, 'You shall eat and be satiated, and you shall [thereupon] bless the Lord your God' (Devarim 8:10), yet they are exact with themselves even for a ke-zayit and for a ke-beitza!"  Benei Yisrael are deserving of God's special favor because of the special stringency they collectively accepted to recite birkat ha-mazon upon partaking of a ke-zayit of bread.  The Torah requires reciting birkat ha-mazon only after eating bread to satiation, but we observe the extension of this obligation enacted by the Sages to recite birkat ha-mazon even if one eats only the volume of a ke-zayit.

            To explain this enigmatic passage, Rav Menachem Bentzion Zaks, in his Menachem Tziyon, takes note of the Gemara's expression, "they are exact with themselves" ("ve-hem medakdekim al atzmam").  The Gemara perhaps emphasizes that Benei Yisrael's "exactness" is applied only with regard to oneself, and not toward others.  God applauds Benei Yisrael not merely for feeling gratified and appreciative for small amounts of food, but also for not imposing this standard upon others.  When assisting those in need or hosting guests, Benei Yisrael give generously, in abundance, without expecting the beneficiaries to feel content with a minimal amount.  Although "they are exact with themselves" and feel grateful and contented with whatever little they have, for others they follow a higher standard and strive to offer complete satisfaction.

            Accordingly, the Almighty is prepared to show Benei Yisrael favor, and repay them in kind for their generosity.  Although He – more than anybody – knows that a person can easily subsist with even limited resources, He is nevertheless willing to give His nation far more than the minimal standard, to reward them for meeting the highest expectations when giving, while settling on lower standards when taking for themselves.