PARASHAT NASO

by Rav David Silverberg

            In discussing the laws of the nazir in Parashat Naso, the Torah (6:3) specifies that a nazir may not drink "yayin" or "sheikhar." "Yayin," of course, always means wine. But what does the Torah mean by the term "sheikhar"? Rashi, based on Targum Onkelos, explains that "yayin" means fresh wine, while "sheikhar" denotes wine that had been aged. Thus, the Torah here forbids the nazir from drinking all wine, regardless of its age. The Sifrei, by contrast, cites the view of Rabbi Elazar ha-Kappar who explains differently. He claims that "sheikhar," as opposed to "yayin," refers to undiluted wine, straight from the press ("yayin chai"). He draws proof to this from the Torah's use of the term "sheikhar" later in Sefer Bemidbar (28:7) in the context of the "nesakhim" (libations on the altar). As diluted wine may not be used for the nesakhim, "sheikhar" must refer specifically to undiluted wine. "Yayin," by contrast, means drinkable, diluted wine.

            All this calls into question the Rambam's definition of these two terms in his Hilkhot Nezirut (5:1). There he defines "sheikhar" as a mixture containing wine and other liquids. Whereas the Sifrei interpreted "sheikhar" specifically as fresh, undiluted wine, the Rambam defines it as wine that had been diluted with other substances. The Keren Ora (Nazir 38b) claims that the Rambam accepted the Sifrei's interpretation, only in his text the words "yayin" and "sheikhar" were reversed. Hence, he arrived at the opposite conclusion.

            More likely, however, is the contention of the Netziv (Eimek ha-Netziv, Naso, p.96), that the Rambam did not accept this explanation of Sifrei as authoritative. In fact, we must accept this premise in light of the simple fact, as the Netziv notes, that the Rambam never disqualifies diluted wine from serving as nesakhim - the very presumption on which the Sifrei's approach to our verse is based. But then a very simple question arises: on what basis did the Rambam reject the Sifrei's explanation?

            The Netziv suggests a very simple source. The mishna in Masekhet Sukka (58a-b) describes the procedure of the "nissukh ha-mayim," the water libation conducted on Sukkot in addition to the standard wine libations on the altar. The mishna informs us that both libations were poured simultaneously, from the same utensil, each down its specially designated hole. The mishna then says, "If he [the kohen] poured the water through that [hole] which is meant for wine… [or vice-versa] he has fulfilled the obligation." Meaning, if the kohen poured one of the liquids through the wrong hole, the ritual is nonetheless valid. The Rambam, however (in Hilkhot Temidin U-musafin 10:7), apparently had before him a different text of the mishna, by which this clause validates the libations even if the water and wine were mixed together. Quite clearly, then, this mishna in Sukka, as the Rambam read it, does not accept the Sifrei's disqualification of diluted wine for use as nesakhim. Based on the mishna, then, the Rambam ruled against the Sifrei, and thus interpreted "sheikhar" as wine mixed with other beverages.

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            The concept of "nezirut," introduced in Parashat Naso, falls under the more general category of nedarim, voluntary, personal measures taken upon oneself as a vow or oath. In general, the rules of nezirut are consistent with the general guidelines of this area of Jewish law, often referred to as "hafla'a," and it shares the properties of other personal vows only with some unique features of its own. For example, unlike other voluntary obligations, nezirut requires a specific procedure involving sacrifices and the like upon the successful completion of the nazir's term. Likewise, the nazir must bring certain offerings should he inadvertently violate the conditions of his nezirut.

            One type of nezirut, however, stands completely apart from the standard rubric of hafla'a. If one takes upon himself "nezirut Shimshon," the nezirut observed by Shimshon, as detailed in Sefer Shoftim, in the section selected as the haftara for Parashat Naso, he must abide by a series of laws that do not accommodate the standard system of nezirut. Instead, he must follow the rules by which Shimshon himself was bound. Namely, he may not cut his hair or drink wine, like all nezirim, but, on the other hand, he may come in contact with dead bodies, something forbidden for a standard nazir. But far more surprisingly, as explicitly indicated in Masekhet Makkot 22a, a nazir of this type has no option of "she'eila," or revocation of his vow. Generally speaking, one who takes on a vow can, in most cases, have the vow annulled through the procedure known as "hatarat nedarim." By detecting a basis for assuming that the individual would not have taken the vow had he been aware of its effects and the like, a competent scholar can render the vow null and void. Nezirut Shimshon, however, has no possibility of annulment. Why is this so? Rashi (there in Makkot) explains that as Shimshon did not voluntarily take on his nezirut, but was rather compelled to do so by the angel who visited his parents before his birth (see Shoftim 13), one who takes on this form of nezirut is subject to these same terms. Just as Shimshon had no option of annulment, given that he had never taken a vow that could be annulled, so is this individual denied this right. (See also the Rambam, Hilkhot Nezirut 3:14.)

            Several Acharonim, however, have questioned the viability of this approach. After all, even if Shimshon himself had no option of "hatara," why should this option be denied to the individual who voluntarily took upon himself the status of Shimshon? The acceptance of this status should itself allow for the possibility of annulment, just as any other neder, regardless of the terms to which Shimshon himself was subject.

            Tomorrow iy"H we will look at some of the answers suggested.

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            Yesterday we introduced the concept of "nezirut Shimshon," a unique form of nezirut which, unlike virtually all other vows, has no possibility of retroactive annulment. Rashi and the Rambam explained this provision as predicated on the fact that Shimshon himself, who never accepted his nezirut but was rather "born into it" by force of an angel's decree, had no option of revocation. (The annulment of vows works on the basis of a faulty initial acceptance; such an acceptance is thus a prerequisite for annulment.) We concluded yesterday's discussion with a powerful question raised by several Acharonim: why should the impossibility of Shimshon's revocation of his vow affect an individual's acceptance of "nezirut Shimshon"? Why can't someone seek "hatara" (as the annulment of vows is called) for his having taken upon himself the status of Shimshon?

            Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l (Iggerot Moshe, Even ha-Ezer 14) suggests that this halakha involves the important distinction between two types of vows: those based on a "davar ha-nadur," and those based on a "davar ha-assur." For one to turn a given item into a forbidden object for him, he must do what we call "hatpasa," namely, he must declare that as far as he is concerned, this item is to be equivalent to a prohibited object, such as a korban. Generally, the object to which the item in question is compared must be a "davar ha-nadur," an object that itself became forbidden as a result of human initiative. Thus, for example, one who declares that apples are for him like a korban has effectively rendered all apples forbidden for him. By contrast, if one states that he considers all apples like non-kosher meat, his vow does not take effect. Since the object he invoked is a "davar ha-assur," something prohibited automatically by Torah law, without any human initiative, the neder is not valid.

            Nezirut Shimshon, Rav Moshe explains, marks an exception to this fundamental rule. One accepts this form of nezirut by declaring, "I am like Shims." Shimshon, however, did not become a nazir as a result of his own vow; the prohibitions against haircutting and wine took effect immediately upon his birth (or, more accurately, even earlier; his mother was to refrain from wine during pregnancy). Thus, nezirut Shimshon is actually an instance of a neder based on a "davar ha-assur," something forbidden without any human initiative. Therefore, this form of neder need not follow the standard guidelines governing the laws of nedarim; it is entirely independent of familiar halakhic principles relevant to vows and oaths. We thus need not wonder as to why no possibility for annulment exists.

            Much earlier, the Chavot Ya'ir (Rav Yair Chaim Bachrach, 17^th century Germany; in siman 15) offered a different explanation. After first expressing his bewilderment at this halakha and emphasizing just how surprising it is that nezirut Shimshon is not subject to hatara, the Chavot Yair proceeds to suggest (albeit with considerable skepticism) a possible theory. He speculates that fundamentally, one in fact can seek hatara for nezirut Shimshon. It is rabbinic law, rather than Torah law, that denies the individual the possibility of revocation. Chazal instituted this provision out of concern that an individual who observed nezirut Shimshon for a certain amount of time and then had the vow annulled would be viewed by others as having observed a period of standard nezirut (which generally spans a limited time period). This erroneous assumption will mislead those observers into thinking that a nazir may come in contact with a dead body. After all, nezirut Shimshon does not forbid such contact; one who takes upon this nezirut but seeks annulment sometime thereafter thus gives the impression that any nazir may come in contact with the dead. Chazal therefore decreed that nezirut Shimshon is not subject to hatara, so that this form of nezirut will always clearly stand separate and apart from the standard nezirut.

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            Among the different topics covered in Parashat Naso is that of "gezel ha-ger," the laws concerning theft from a convert. Already in Parashat Vayikra (5:20-26), the Torah establishes that one who falsely denies on oath having stolen property of another must, after confessing his crime, return the sum in question - with an additional penalty - to the owner. In addition, he must bring a guilt offering to earn expiation for his sin. In Parashat Naso (5:5-8), the Torah repeats these very same rules. Chazal explain that these laws are repeated here to introduce the unique case of "If the man has no kinsman [i.e. heir] to whom restitution can be made… " (5:8). Generally, if the theft victim has already passed before the thief comes forward, the stolen money is returned to the legal heir. The Torah here addresses a situation where no such heir exists. Chazal explain that this is the case of a victimized convert, as upon converting to Judaism, one loses all familial ties with respect to all halakhic matters. The Torah here mandates that in such a case, the stolen money is returned to the kohen.

            One powerful lesson emerging from this halakha can be appreciated by considering the two individuals involved: the proselyte and the kohen. The former generally lives along the social periphery, often exposed to the oppression and abuse of less-than-sympathetic natives. It is specifically the kohanim, the religious leaders and servants of God in His Mishkan, who represent the childless convert to collect compensation for the crime committed against him. Even when, shamefully enough, society does not respect the rights of the underprivileged, God does; He sends His personal attendants, the kohanim, to represent him.

            The Midrash, however, appears to take a different direction in assessing the religious significance of this halakha. In Bemidbar Rabba 8:3, the Midrash views this section as drawing a contrast between the law of gezel ha-ger and the immediately preceding section, which introduced the law of "shilu'ach ha-temei'im" (5:1-4). All those who had contracted "tum'a" (ritual impurity) were to be expelled from the camp. Chazal identify these people as the participants of chet ha-egel, the sin of the golden calf. God punished them with tzara'at and other forms of ritual impurity, thus requiring their expulsion from the camp. By contrast, the proselytes are warmly welcomed into the camp and the Torah looks after their special needs and concerns. The juxtaposition of these two sections, the laws regarding the sinners and the converts, is intended to underscore the distinction between God's treatment of these groups of people.

            Thus, the section of "gezel ha-ger" teaches not a moral or ethical lesson regarding the concern for the welfare of the underprivileged, but rather a theological lesson. Having been present at Sinai and having declared, "We will do and we will hear" does not guarantee one a ticket to the machaneh Shekhina (divine camp), it does not automatically translate into an invitation to experience the Presence of God. Conversely, one's absence from Matan Torah does not preclude the possibility of such an encounter. This privilege is open to, and reserved for, those who sincerely and genuinely submit themselves to divine authority and commit themselves to God's will. According to Rashi and other commentators, the Mishkan served to atone for the golden calf. Those who failed to repent for this misdeed were denied entry into the camp that hosted the Shekhina's Presence in the Mishkan. By contrast, the Mishkan's doors fling open to welcome the convert, the former pagan, who has come to revoke his past loyalties and accept God and His Torah.

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            As we've discussed earlier in our series on Parashat Naso, a nazir is bound by three restrictions. He may not drink wine, come in contact with a dead body (including relatives), or cut his hair.

            Interestingly, the first two of these prohibitions are familiar to us from what seems to be a much different context: the kohanim, or, particularly, the kohen gadol. Towards the beginning of Parashat Emor, the Torah explicitly prohibits a kohen from coming in contact with ritual impurity (see Vayikra 21:1). However, while kohanim in general are permitted to contract ritual impurity when tending to the needs of their immediate relatives (Vayikra 21:2-3), the kohen gadol is forbidden from contact even with family members (Vayikra 21:11). In this respect, the nazir resembles the high priest; he may not come in contact with even deceased relatives (see Bemidbar 6:6-7).

            The second prohibition mentioned also brings to mind the kohanim. Though no general prohibition against alcohol applies to the kohanim, in Parashat Shemini (Vayikra 10:9) the Torah forbids the kohanim from drinking before entering the Mishkan to perform the service.

            We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the institution of nezirut is meant to afford the non-kohen a unique opportunity to experience the sanctity of priesthood in the Mishkan. Even those living far from the sacred chamber and who may not perform the rituals reserved for the kohanim are granted the opportunity of attaining this level of sanctity.

            We must, of course, address the third prohibition, which the kohen does not share with the nazir. Besides the fact that kohanim may cut their hair, the Torah specifically forbids the kohen gadol from growing his hair long in response to personal tragedy (see Vayikra 21:10). Does this prohibition of the nazir also involve his status as a "quasi-kohen," or does it point to a different feature of the nazir?

            A careful reading of the verses both here in Parashat Naso and in Parashat Emor reveals that indeed the hair growth, too, relates to this parallel between the nazir and the kohen gadol. The Torah offers the following reason for the prohibition against the nazir's coming in contact with the dead, including relatives: "ki nezer Elo-hav al rosho" - "for his Lord's crown is upon his head" (Bemidbar 6:7). Sure enough, a similar expression is used in reference to the law forbidding the kohen gadol from leaving the Mishkan to mourn for a deceased relativ: "He shall not go outside the sanctuary… for the crown of the anointing oil of his God is upon him… " (Vayikra 21:12; see Rashi there who explains this verse as referring to mourning). Both the nazir and the kohen gadol wear crowns: the kohen gadol's crown is the anointing oil poured over his head at his appointment to the post, whereas the nazir's crown is his uncut hair.    

            How does this distinction relate to the association we have drawn between the nazir and the kohen gadol?

            The anointing oil was used not only for the consecration of the kohen gadol, but for the consecration of all the other accessories of the Mishkan, as well (see Shemot 30:22-30). Consecration with the anointing oil designates the given object (we refer here to the kohanim as "objects," too) as exclusively dedicated to God. It bestows upon the object a status of objective sanctity, by which it is consecrated entirely for the service of the Almighty. A nazir clearly cannot be anointed with this oil, for such a status cannot be attained voluntarily, nor can it apply on a temporary basis. Instead, the nazir symbolizes his aspirations for this total sanctity by donning his own crown, the symbolic expression of his withdrawal from mundane pursuits and his intensive spiritual yearnings.

            In any event, the institution of nezirut demonstrates that kedusha is not reserved for those serving formally in the capacity of spiritual leadership. One need not work in the Mishkan to experience the sanctity of the Mishkan. By setting limits on one's involvement in the mundane world and focusing on more spiritual pursuits, one can indeed turn himself into a "kohen" of sorts, and bring the sacred aura of the Mishkan into his home and every facet of daily life.

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            Yesterday we saw that the institution of nezirut may be viewed as a form of kehuna. Namely, it affords any individual the opportunity to attain the sanctity of the kohanim, and even that of the kohen gadol, and for this reason the prohibitions that apply to the nazir parallel the special rules of the kohanim.

            A striking application of this thesis appears in the Netziv's commentary, "He'amek Davar" to Parashat Naso (6:19). Upon the completion of his term of nezirut, the nazir must come to the Mikdash and bring a series of sacrifices, including the special "eil nazir," a ram brought as a "shelamim" offering. Like all "shelamim" sacrifices, this ram is divided among the altar, the kohen tending to the korban, and the individual who brings the offering. Generally, the fats of the animal are placed on the altar, the "chazeh" and "shok" (breast and thigh) are consumed by the kohen, and the rest of the animal is eaten by the individual. In the case of the "eil nazir," however, the kohen earns an additional portion, known as the "zero'a besheila," or the "boiled shoulder." The Torah refers to this shoulder as the "boiled shoulder" because it is cooked together with the rest of the ram.

            However, cooking the shoulder together with the rest of the ram gives rise to an interesting problem relating to "kashrut." As the meat of the shoulder is reserved for the kohen, its consumption by non-kohanim is- by definition - prohibited. With respect to the nazir offering the sacrifice, then, cooking the entire animal together with the shoulder - the kohen's portion - is equivalent to boiling kosher and non-kosher meat in the same pot. Of course, as anyone who uses a kosher kitchen knows, the kosher meat becomes forbidden as it absorbs the taste of the non-kosher meat. (The well-known principle of "ta'am ke-ikar" establishes that taste of forbidden food is likewise forbidden.) How, then, may the nazir partake of the meat which has the taste of the kohen's portion?

            The Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (98) notes that for this reason, we may perhaps view the "eil nazir" as a Biblical source for the famous halakha of "bittul." Namely, when the forbidden food within a mixture constitutes small enough a percentage of the mixture (generally 1/60^th), it is deemed "nullified" by the kosher majority. Therefore, the rest of the sacrifice effectively nullifies the forbidden portion (that of the kohen), and the nazir may therefore partake of the animal's meat.

            However, the Netziv notes, one halakhic problem remains, and that is the principle of "ein mevatlin issur le-chatekhila." Although the mechanism of bittul is halakhically sound, it may not be premeditatedly implemented. Only when forbidden food happens to mix with kosher food may we, after the fact, render the small quantity of forbidden food as negated by the majority. Here, however, the Torah requires that the shoulder be boiled together with the rest of the animal, thus necessitating the bittul mechanism. (We should mention that according to many views, "ein mevatlin issur le-chatekhila" constitutes a rabbinic prohibition, and was thus instituted after the Torah was given. At least in this context, the Netziv does not make this point.)

            To explain why this is so, the Netziv invokes the nazir-kohen equation. Since, in one sense, the nazir assumes the status of a kohen, we cannot consider the shoulder, the portion reserved for the kohen, as actually forbidden to the nazir. The Torah therefore permits the cooking of the entire ram together despite the fact that this necessitates the implementation of bittul. As the nazir is, to some extent, a kohen, this process does not, strictly speaking, entail the premeditated nullification of forbidden food.

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            In describing the procedure required of a nazir upon the completion of his term of nezirut, the Torah writes that the nazir must come to the Mishkan (6:13). However, the Torah chooses a peculiar manner in which to present this imperative: "yavi oto el petach Ohel Mo'ed," literally, "he must bring him to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting." The Sifrei, cited by Rashi, explains that although the verse seems to imply the involvement of an anonymous second party, who brings the nazerite to the Mishkan, this is not the case. Rather, the subject - "HE must bring" - is the same individual as the object - "bring HIM… " In other words, the nazir must bring himself to the Mishkan.

            The obvious question, however, is why the Torah does not simply write that the nazir comes to the Ohel Mo'ed.

            Rav Meir Simcha ha-Kohen of Dvinsk offers a beautiful explanation in his Meshekh Chokhma. Let us first look at this verse in its entirety: "This is the ritual for the nazerite: on the day that his term as nazerite is completed, he must bring himself to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting." The verse - as well as this entire section - omits one critical piece of information: when is "his term as nezerite" completed? When may a nazir conclude his period of nezirut and resume normal life? After one month? Two? A year? Ten years? The answer, of course, is that a nazir himself determines the length of his term when he initially takes on the rules of nezirut. Although, as Chazal tell us, unless stipulated otherwise the nezirut lasts for thirty days, Rav Meir Simcha notes that the Torah deliberately omits any explicit reference to this provision. He claims that the Torah wishes to emphasizes the flexibility of the period of nezirut, that its duration depends upon the individual's acceptance. Why would the Torah emphasize this particular feature of nezirut, that the Torah does not govern its time-frame?

            Rav Meir Simcha explains that this detail reveals the personal nature and function of nezirut. Though in general Chazal frown upon excessive asceticism, they view nezirut as a laudatory measure meant to help one overcome his tendency to physical indulgence. A person decides to accept nezirut because he figures it will assist him in withdrawing somewhat from physical life to focus more on spirituality. As such, only he can determine how long his nezirut should last, depending on his particular situation, inclinations, and weaknesses.

            For this reason, Rav Meir Simcha explains, the Torah describes the completion of nezirut by referring to the nazir as a second party. In order to make this determination, the nazir must assess himself wtotal objectivity, without his own, egotistical interests in mind. He must examine himself as if he were someone else in order to get as accurate and honest an assessment as he can. Only when he can study his own character with pure objectivity can he determine how long or short a term of nezirut he should observe. In effect, then, it is a second party that brings the nazir to the Ohel Mo'ed, as he assumes the role of another person is assessing his particular needs.