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Among the topics discussed in Parashat Naso is asham gezeilot – the guilt offering required of a thief who falsely denies his crime on oath and ultimately confesses (5:5-8). Upon confessing his guilt, the criminal must repay the stolen sum plus a fine of one-fifth the amount, and bring a sacrifice to atone for his misdeed. As Rashi (5:6) notes, the Torah had already discussed these laws in Parashat Vayikra (end of chapter 5). They are repeated here, Rashi explains, in order to address the special situation of gezel ha-ger – where one steals from a convert, who dies before the thief's confession. Since Halakha considers a convert a "newborn child" upon his conversion such that he loses all familial relationships, it is possible for a convert to leave no heirs to receive the compensation. In such a situation, the thief pays the sum to the kohen on-duty in the Mikdash on the day he comes forth to bring his sacrifice. (See 5:8 and Rashi.)

In explaining the meaning behind this mitzva, the Sefer Ha-chinukh (129) writes that the guilt offering brought by the criminal underscores the fact that monetary compensation alone does not earn one expiation for his wrong. Even after repaying the stolen money, the thief must earn atonement from the Almighty through offering a sacrifice. For in a certain sense, any crime committed against one's fellow constitutes an offense against the Almighty, as well. Therefore, even after compensating the victim, a criminal must appeal to God for forgiveness.

On this basis, Rav Moshe Leib Shachor, in his Avnei Shoham, questions a surprising theory he cites from a work entitled She'eilat Shemuel, regarding the process of teshuva for a thief. In introducing the mitzva of viduy (verbal confession), the Rambam (Hilkhot Teshuva 1:1) writes that one who inflicts bodily harm upon another or damages his property does not earn atonement even after he pays compensation, until he performs teshuva and verbally confesses. Interestingly, the Rambam here speaks only of situations of bodily or property damage, but not theft. The She'eilat Shemuel argues that when it comes to theft, one achieves complete atonement once he returns the stolen property and asks the victim for forgiveness (as Halakha requires – see Hilkhot Teshuva 2:9), even without the process of teshuva. The She'eilat Shemuel explains that once the victim grants the offender forgiveness, we may then consider the victim as having initially allowed the thief to take his property. Since a person reserves the right to give his property to whomever he wishes, it turns out that no crime has been committed at all. Hence, the She'eilat Shemuel reasons, compensation and receiving forgiveness suffice to earn a thief atonement, even without the normally required process of teshuva.

One may dispute this argument on several counts, including, as the Avnei Shoham notes, the fact that it appears to run in direct opposition to the underlying theme of asham gezeilot, as developed by the Sefer Ha-chinukh. The Torah seeks to impress upon us the need to earn God's forgiveness even after we have settled our accounts with those to whom we are indebted. The central message conveyed through this halakha, as we mentioned, is that a crime against one's fellow automatically amounts to an offense against the Almighty Himself. Thus, even after complete reconciliation has been achieved between culprit and victim, the thief must still work to earn God's forgiveness – an endeavor which clearly requires the usual process of repentance and return.

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For the haftara for Parashat Naso, we read the narrative in Sefer Shoftim (chapter 13) regarding the birth of Shimshon. We are told that Manoach – Shimshon's father – and his wife were unable to have children, until an angel appeared to Manoach's wife and informed her that she will conceive. The angel instructed Manoach's wife that she may not drink any wine during her pregnancy, for her child, who will save Benei Yisrael from the oppression of the Pelishtim, must be consecrated as a nazir. It will be forbidden for him to drink wine, and he must not cut his hair his entire life. This narrative relates to Parashat Naso in that Parashat Naso deals with (among other topics) the laws of the nazir.

The Midrash (Bamidbar Rabba 10:5) tells that Manoach and his wife had, until this point, been arguing as to who bears responsibility, so-to-speak, for the inability of Manoach's wife to conceive. Manoach claimed that she was infertile, whereas she insisted that his sterility was to blame. Once the angel appeared to Manoach's wife and said, "Behold, you are barren and have not borne a child" (13:3), this argument was settled. The Midrash concludes, "From here you learn that Manoach's wife was a righteous woman, for she earned the privilege of having an angel speak with her and make peace between her and her husband, to inform her that she was barren, and she – not her husband – was the cause of her inability to conceive. For this reason he [the angel] spoke with her." According to the Midrash, the angel was sent to Manoach's wife for the specific purpose of settling the argument between her and her husband, which had, undoubtedly, generated much friction and tension between them. The fact that the couple earned this privilege, of having an angel sent to resolve their conflict, was testament to Manoach's wife's piety. In her merit, God dispatched an angel to, once and for all, settle the ongoing disagreement that had generated considerable domestic strife.

Rav Chayim Kanievsky, in his Ta'ama Di-kra, extracts from this incident a very simple and useful piece of advice in handling situations of conflict. To end the dispute, the angel appeared specifically to Manoach's wife to inform her that she had been mistaken. This was a far better means of restoring peaceful relations between them then had he first approached Manoach to tell him that his was the correct stance. When two people quarrel and one party is finally proven correct, his natural instinct is to celebrate his triumph with an outburst of "I told you so," which obviously has the disastrous effect of fueling the flames of tension and hard feelings between the parties. It is therefore far more desirable, Rav Kanievsky observes, for the third party to first inform the one who was in error of his mistake. This way, the wrong party will approach his disputant and humbly confess his error, which will likely spare him further humiliation and help the two rebuild their friendship and mutual respect.

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Parashat Naso outlines the procedure for the sota ritual, the supernatural system ordained by the Torah for determining the guilt of a woman whose conduct has aroused her husband's suspicions of infidelity (5:11-31). This process includes having the suspected woman drink the "bitter waters" prepared by the kohen for this purpose. The Torah instructs the kohen to take water from the kiyor (faucet in the Temple courtyard) and add some dirt (5:17). Then, he is to write the verses in the Torah that dictate the warning he is to give the woman before drinking the water, and then erase the writing into the water. The woman would then drink from the water, which would kill her if she had indeed betrayed her husband.

The Yerushalmi in Masekhet Sota (2:2) deduces from the Torah's description of the "bitter waters" that they must, on the one hand, retain the general appearance and consistency of water, while on the other hand, the ink added to the waters must be visible. In other words, the amount of ink in the water must be large enough for the ink to be discernible, but small enough that the water still appears as water. The Yerushalmi calculates that to achieve this result, a half of a log of water was required.

Surprisingly, however, Rashi, in his commentary to Masekhet Menachot (88a), in addressing the requirement for a half-log of water for the sota ritual, comments, "Hilkheta gemiri la." This expression is normally used in reference to a halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai – an oral tradition with no clear Scriptural basis, transmitted to Moshe at Sinai. Similarly, the Rambam, in his commentary to the Mishna in Masekhet Menachot, writes that this required amount originates from divrei kabbala – oral tradition. Seemingly, Rashi and the Rambam choose to ignore the Yerushalmi's discussion, according to which we arrive at the half-log requirement based on the need to maintain the water's general appearance while ensuring that the ink is visible. According to Rashi and the Rambam, this quantity appears to constitute an objective requirement, rather than the practical measure necessary to ensure the proper appearance and consistency of the "bitter waters."

Rav Avraham Yitzchak Sorotzkin, in his Rinat Yitzchak, suggests that Rashi and Rambam may have inferred their position from a comment of the Sifrei Zuta (on the verse describing the water's preparation – 5:17): "ve-shi'uro chatzi log." The Sifrei Zuta here describes the half-log amount as the shiur – the prerequisite quantity. Generally, this term is used when the amount is required as an objective, independent prerequisite for the fulfillment of the given mitzva. For example, each of the four species taken on Sukkot must be a certain size; kiddush must be recited over a certain quantity of wine. This term leaves us with the impression that the half-log of the sota waters is necessary not to facilitate some other requirement, but rather as an independent requirement of its own. On this basis, perhaps, Rashi and the Rambam attributed this halakha to an oral tradition. If it were based only on the concern mentioned by the Yerushalmi, the Sifrei Zuta would not have referred to the half-log quantity as a "shiur."

The practical ramification of this perspective, Rav Sorotzkin suggests, can perhaps be extracted from a comment of the Rambam in Hilkhot Sota (3:9). In describing the preparation of the sota waters, the Rambam mentions that the kohen must measure a half-log of water in the official measuring utensil used in the Beit Ha-mikdash. This appears to stem from the understanding that the half-log constitutes an independent, objective prerequisite. Had the half-log quantity been necessary only for the practical purpose of ensuring the water's proper consistency and appearance, it is unlikely that we would require the kohen to measure a precise half-log through this formal procedure. Quite possibly, this requirement reflects the Rambam's position viewing the half-log requirement as an objectively required shiur, rather than as serving but a means to preparing water with the necessary physical properties.

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Among the topics discussed in Parashat Naso is birkat kohanim – the "priestly blessing" with which the kohanim were enjoined to bless Benei Yisrael (6:23-27). The Mishna in Masekhet Sota (7:6) enumerates several differences between the procedure for birkat kohanim followed in the Beit Ha-mikdash, and the way it was conducted elsewhere. The most telling distinction involved the articulation of the Shem Ha-meforash, the ineffable Name of God. The kohanim would employ this Name when administering birkat kohanim in the Temple, whereas in other locations, the standard divine Name was used.

This distinction should, seemingly, yield yet another difference between the Mikdash and other locations with regard to birkat kohanim. The Gemara states in Masekhet Chagiga (16a), "One who looks upon the kohanim at the time when the Temple stood, when they would stand on their podium and bless Israel with the Shem Ha-meforash" – his vision would be impaired. The clear implication of this Gemara is that only in the Temple, when the kohanim blessed with the ineffable Name, did gazing at the kohanim pose the risk of blindness. Elsewhere, there was no such concern. Seemingly, this is due to the fact that in the Temple, the kohanim's blessing was accompanied by giluy Shekhina – a revelation of the divine presence, upon which it is forbidden to gaze. (See, for example, Rashi to Shemot 24:11, where he writes that the nation's elders were punished for irreverently gazing at the revelation of God's presence at Mount Sinai.)

Nevertheless, the Mishna in Masekhet Megila (24b) forbids a kohen with a visible physical defect from participating in birkat kohanim, the reason obviously being to prevent curious Israelites from gazing at him during the blessing. This Mishna draws no distinction whatsoever between the Temple and other locations, clearly indicating that wherever birkat kohanim is conducted, one may not gaze at the kohanim during the blessing. Why is it forbidden to look upon the kohanim outside the Temple, where there was no revelation of the Shekhina?

Tosefot in Masekhet Chagiga answer that the Mishna in Megila addresses a different issue entirely – that of concentration. The Israelites receiving the priestly blessing are to focus their attention on the blessing, and to that end, Chazal sought to avoid distractions as much as possible. Halakha mandates that kohanim with curiosity-arousing features may not join in the priestly blessing in order to help ensure that the blessing's recipients focus their attention properly, not to prevent them from gazing at the Shekhina's revelation.

Rashi, however, takes a much different approach. Commenting on the Mishna in Megila, Rashi writes explicitly that one may not look upon the kohanim during birkat kohanim because of the Shekhina's revelation. Tosefot understandably dismiss this approach, noting that it stands in direct opposition to the Gemara in Chagiga, which explicitly limits the blinding effect of gazing at the kohanim to the Temple, where the kohanim invoked the Shem Ha-meforash in their blessing.

The solution to this difficulty is suggested implicitly by the Tosefot Ha-Rosh in Masekhet Megila. The Tosefot Ha-Rosh claims that although vision impairment would occur only in the Temple, because of the divine revelation that accompanied the priestly blessing, nevertheless, outside the Mikdash, God "peers," so-to-speak, through the kohanim's fingertips as they administer their blessing. Therefore, one may not look at the kohanim's hands during the priestly blessing out of respect for this "second degree" revelation, if you will. Although there is no direct revelation of the Shekhina, and thus looking upon the kohanim will have no effect upon one's vision, one nevertheless must refrain from looking out of deference for the divine presence, which emerges on some minimal level during birkat kohanim. (Professor Yaakov Spiegel – www.biu.ac.il/JH/Parasha/naso/shp.html – noted that this concept of God "peering" through the kohanim's fingers is taken from the Pesikta De-Rav Kahana, Parashat Ha-chodesh 8.)

Thus, the divine presence indeed accompanies the priestly blessing in all locations, even outside the precincts of the Beit Ha-mikdash. However, in the Temple the Shekhina's presence is evident and unmistakable, a situation that poses great danger to those who lack the required sense of reverence and awe. Outside the Temple, however, God indeed accompanies the kohanim and it is only through Him and with His consent that their blessing takes effect, but His presence is far less direct. One must therefore refrain from gazing so as to acknowledge and show deference to the divine presence, but the indirect nature of this revelation eliminates the risk that otherwise presents itself when one looks upon the Shekhina.

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Yesterday, we discussed the halakha mentioned in Masekhet Megila (24b) forbidding kohanim with visible, peculiar features from participating in birkat kohanim (the "priestly blessing"), presumably so as not to attract attention. This halakha clearly indicates that the Israelites receiving the blessing may not look upon the kohanim. Rashi explains that the Shekhina accompanies the kohanim as they administer the blessing, and for this reason one may not look upon them. Tosefot (Chagiga 16a), however, note that from the Gemara's discussion (there in Chagiga) it clearly emerges that the Shekhina is present during birkat kohanim only in the Beit Ha-mikdash; elsewhere, however, the Shekhina does not accompany the priestly blessing. Thus, Tosefot attribute the ruling in Maskehet Megila to a different factor, namely, the concern to maintain the people's focus and attention on the blessing. In order to avoid distraction, Halakha forbids kohanim with curiosity-arousing features from administering the blessing. As we saw, the Tosefot Ha-Rosh appear to resolve Rashi's view, by noting that even outside the Temple, God's presence accompanies the priestly blessing, only in less direct fashion, "peering in" through the kohanim's fingertips. Therefore, even outside the Mikdash one may not look upon the kohanim during the blessing.

Might there be any practical, halakhic difference between these two positions, of Rashi and Tosefot, or does their argument relate only to the underlying reason, without any bearing on normative practice?

The Magen Avraham (O.C. 128:35) writes that according to the view of Tosefot, Halakha permits quickly glancing at the kohanim. Since this prohibition stems from the concern for distraction, it applies only to a fixed gaze, but not to a brief glimpse. According to Rashi, however, even a brief glance would be forbidden, since the concern here is for looking upon the Shekhina. Accordingly, the Magen Avraham rules that strictly speaking, it would appear that one may glance at the kohanim. After all, the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 128:23) appears to accept Tosefot's explanation, that one may not look upon the kohanim due to the concern for distraction. It should follow, therefore, that one may briefly glance at the kohanim. Nevertheless, as the Magen Avraham observes, common practice is to avoid looking upon the kohanim altogether. He speculatively attributes this practice to zekher le-Mikdash – the interest in commemorating the procedure of birkat kohanim in the Temple, where it was indeed forbidden to even look very briefly at the kohanim during the blessing. Of course, one might argue that this practice stemmed from the interest in satisfying Rashi's position, as well, according to which even a brief glimpse is forbidden.

Common practice nowadays is for the kohanim to cover their hands with their tallitot throughout the recitation of birkat kohanim. This practice is recorded by the Rema (O.C. 128:23), who explains that kohanim cover their hands because they, too, may not look upon their hands during birkat kohanim. Why would it be forbidden for the kohanim to look at their hands? The Mishna Berura suggests that just as the recipients of the blessing must focus their attention on the berakha, so must the kohanim concentrate as they conduct the recitation. By extension, then, they may not look upon their hands just as the congregation is forbidden from doing so. Once again, however, one might prefer attributing this practice to the concern for Rashi's position, which forbids looking upon the kohanim's hands because of the Shekhina's presence behind the kohanim's fingers. Accordingly, the kohanim, too, must refrain from looking upon their hands. (See Professor Yaakov Spiegel's article on this topic, at www.biu.ac.il/JH/Parasha/naso/shp.html.)

The widespread acceptance of this practice, that the kohanim cover their hands during the priestly blessing, has resulted in yet another restriction: a kohen may not participate in the birkat kohanim if he does not have a tallit to wear. Once it has become accepted for all kohanim to don a tallit during this ritual, the participation of a kohen without a tallit would arouse curiosity, and must therefore be avoided. (This halakha is cited in the work Piskei Teshuvot in the name of several poskim.) Today, of course, single kohanim who do not normally wear a tallit simply borrow one for birkat kohanim. (In such a case, the kohen does not recite the berakha when donning the tallit. When one uses a tallit belonging to the synagogue, then strictly speaking he should recite a berakha, yet common practice is not to recite the berakha, and this practice has been upheld by many poskim.)

This custom that the kohanim cover their hands during the blessing raises the question of whether or not there remains a prohibition to look upon them. Since their hands are covered in any event, perhaps nowadays we may permit looking upon them during birkat kohanim. This may, indeed, be our conclusion were we to definitively accept Rashi's position, that the prohibition against looking upon the kohanim stems from the presence of Shekhina behind their hands, so-to-speak. However, since, as we have seen, the Shulchan Arukh appears to follow Tosefot's position, attributing this halakha to the concern for distraction, one should not look at the kohanim – or anywhere – during the priestly blessing, and should instead keep his eyes closed or turned downward, so that he can focus his attention on the berakha he receives.

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Over the last two days we have discussed the mitzva of birkat kohanim – the priestly blessing – which the Torah introduces in Parashat Naso (6:23-27). The Torah clearly charges this obligation specifically upon the kohanim; only they bear the responsibility of proclaiming the blessing dictated in the Torah to the rest of the nation. The Gemara (Ketubot 24b) asserts that non-kohanim are not only exempt from this obligation, but are in fact forbidden from reciting this blessing. Since the Torah assigned this obligation specifically to the kohanim, a non-kohen who usurps this role transgresses this Biblical ordinance. This ruling is codified by the Rema, in his glosses to the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 128:1).

The Mishna Berura cites from earlier Acharonim two qualifications of this prohibition. Firstly, the Bach contends that a non-kohen violates this law only if he administers the blessing with his hands outstretched, the way the kohanim perform the birkat kohanim ritual. However, as the Mishna Berura cites, the Peri Megadim appears to forbid reciting the birkat kohanim even without outstretching one's hands. Secondly, the Mishna Berura brings from a work entitled Magen Giborim that the prohibition applies only if the non-kohen administers the blessing with the intention of fulfilling the obligation of birkat kohanim; only in such a case has one overstepped his bounds in an attempt to assume the kohen's role. But if a person administers the blessing without such intent, no violation has occurred.

The Mishna Berura, however, hinges this qualification on the famous debate as to whether mitzvot tzerikhot kavana – mitzva fulfillment requires specific intent during the performance of the mitzva act. Only if mitzva fulfillment indeed demands intent may we permit a non-kohen without such intent to administer the berakha. Since his recitation lacks a basic prerequisite for the satisfactory performance of this ritual, it does not constitute an attempt to usurp the kohanim's role. If, however, mitzva fulfillment does not require specific intent, then even if one recites birkat kohanim without intending it to serve the formal function of the priestly blessing, it is nevertheless considered a ritual recitation by a non-kohen, and thus violates this prohibition. The Mishna Berura concedes that even according to this view, if one specifically intends not to fulfill the mitzva of birkat kohanim, he does not violate the prohibition.

The Mishnah Berura elaborates on these points in his Bei'ur Halakha, where he questions the common practice observed by many – kohanim and non-kohanim alike – to confer the priestly blessing to others on various occasions. Most commonly, of course, many parents administer this blessing to their children on Shabbat eve and/or before Yom Kippur. At first glance, this practice violates the prohibition established in the Gemara, forbidding non-kohanim from conferring this berakha. The Bei'ur Halakha suggests that we perhaps rely on the Bach's position, that no violation is committed when one recites this berakha without spreading one's hands. According to this reason, however, parents should perhaps refrain from placing their hands on their children's heads while administering this berakha, as doing so resembles the formal procedure of birkat kohanim. Indeed, Rav Barukh Halevi Epstein, in his Torah Temima (Bamidbar 6:23), cites testimony that the Vilna Gaon once blessed a groom at his wedding and made a point of placing only one of his two hands on the groom's head. Needless to say, however, common custom is to place two hands on the children's heads; in fact, Rav Yaakov Emden (She'eilat Yabetz 2:125) upholds this custom and records that his father, the esteemed Chakham Tzvi, would place both hands on those to whom he administered this blessing.

Apparently, it was felt that a recitation of birkat kohanim loses all formal standing when conducted outside the framework of the prayer service. Once Chazal ordained that birkat kohanim occur specifically within the context of tefila, any recitation of the blessing outside this context cannot constitute an attempt at formal birkat kohanim. The Torah Temima raises and dismisses this argument (calling it "far-fetched"), but the Bei'ur Halakha appears to accept it as a reasonable justification of this practice.

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The lengthy, final section of Parashat Naso (chapter 7) tells of the gift brought by the nesi'im, the twelve tribal leaders, in honor of the Mishkan's inauguration. First, the nesi'im brought wagons and cattle to assist the Levi'im in transporting the Mishkan during travel (7:3). In addition, each nasi brought an individual offering of sacrifices and incense in expensive containers.

Upon reading the first subsection of this narrative (7:1-11), we are struck by Moshe's implicit hesitation towards the nesi'im's initiative. After the nesi'im come forward to donate the cattle and wagons for transport, God appears to Moshe and instructs him, "Kach mei-itam" – "Take it from them" (7:4) – clearly implying that Moshe would have otherwise not done so. Likewise, Moshe appears unresponsive to the tribal leaders' sacrificial offering; once again, God must speak to Moshe to outline the procedure for this offering (7:10-11). Indeed, Rashi, based on the Midrash, writes explicitly that Moshe did not accept the leaders' offering until receiving God's consent. How might we explain Moshe's hesitation?

On one level, this response reflects Judaism's general ambivalence towards religious initiative. A Jew's primary responsibility is to observe the Torah's dictates, rather than initiate his own path of avodat Hashem. Interestingly, this issue arises earlier in Parashat Naso, as well, with regard to the nazir (6:1-21), who takes upon himself additional strictures, beyond the standard laws of the Torah. Different rabbinic sources express differing attitudes towards the nazir, reflecting the tension between healthy spiritual enthusiasm on the one hand, and the importance of prioritizing one's primary and basic responsibilities, on the other. Understandably, then, Moshe responded ambivalently to the nesi'im's innovative gesture, until it received explicit divine approval.

The Netziv, in his Ha'amek Davar, points to a specific halakhic issue that arose. The second offering of the nesi'im – the private sacrifices – featured, among other things, ketoret (incense) and a korban chatat (sin-offering), both of which are never offered voluntarily. One brings a sin-offering only in very specific instances of Torah violations, and ketoret is offered by the kohen each day and on Yom Kippur, never by individuals. Moshe thus naturally refused to accept this most unusual offering until God instructed him to do so. Of course, this explanation does not account for Moshe's ambivalence in response to the initial gift, the wagons and cattle.

Rav Amnon Bazak (in the weekly Shabbat Be'shabbato, 5764) raised a different factor that perhaps contributed to Moshe's hesitation. Until now, virtually every aspect of the Mishkan's operation excluded Benei Yisrael from direct involvement. Although it was they who donated the materials for the Mishkan's construction, once it was erected God establishes a very definite barrier between Levi and the other tribes in terms of direct involvement in the Mishkan. In fact, on several occasions earlier in Sefer Bamidbar, God emphasizes that the other tribes were denied access to the sacred precinct, a restriction the Levi'im were to enforce (1:53, 3:10; granted, these instructions were likely given after the nesi'im's offering, despite the reversed sequence of presentation.) The nesi'im's initiative marked the first attempt by members of the other tribes to take an active role in the Mishkan's operation. (In fact, the Torah appears to emphasize that the nesi'im stood "before the altar" – 7:10.) Moshe therefore wondered whether or not the Mishkan's guidelines allowed for this degree of participation on the part of the rest of the nation.

God thus instructed Moshe, "Kach mei-itam" – indeed, the rest of the nation, too, as represented by the tribal leaders, may and perhaps must involve themselves in the service of God in the Mishkan. Despite the strict rules and restrictions imposed on Benei Yisrael's access to the Mishkan, which serve to maintain a sense of awe and reverence towards the sacred site, Benei Yisrael must see themselves as active partners in this system. Herein, perhaps, lies the critical message of this narrative of the nesi'im: the need for all members of the nation to foster a personal relationship with the Mikdash, notwithstanding the designation of the Levi'im to serve as the permanent attendants at the holy site.