PARASHAT KORACH

By Rav David Silverberg

            The final section of Parashat Korach lists the matenot kehuna – the “gifts” that Benei Yisrael are required to give to the kohanim.  This list includes the obligation of pidyon ha-ben, the five silver coins that a father must give to a kohen upon the birth of a firstborn son (18:15-16).

            The Mishna in Masekhet Bekhorot (48a) addresses the case of a woman whose first pregnancy results in the birth of twins.  Quite obviously, if the older twin is male, the father would be required to perform a pidyon ha-ben for that infant, who has the status of a bekhor (firstborn).  And even if the parents cannot ascertain which of two male twins exited the womb first (such as when the parents could not tell their identical twins apart from one another), the father would still pay the required sum to the kohen, since one of the two twins is a bekhor requiring a pidyon.  A more complicated situation, however, arises in a tragic case when one of the two indistinguishable twins dies within the first month after birth.  As the pidyon ha-ben obligation takes effect only when the firstborn infant reaches his thirty-first day, this mitzva is not performed if the bekhor dies before that thirty-first day.  In the case described, then, the father does not know whether he must pay the pidyon money to the kohen.  If the deceased infant was the bekhor, then the father does not owe the money, since the firstborn child died before the pidyon ha-ben obligation took effect.  If, however, the deceased child was the younger twin, then the father indeed bears an obligation to pay the pidyon ha-ben money to a kohen for the bekhor, who survived the first month of life. 

            In such a case, the Mishna rules, the father is exempt from paying, as we apply here the rule of “ha-motzi mei-chaveiro alav ha-re’aya” – the litigant who seeks to extract payment bears the burden of proof.  Any kohen who would demand that the father pay the required sum of pidyon ha-ben must supply proof that the surviving infant is the older twin, such that the father bears the obligation to pay the pidyon.  Since no kohen is in a position to bring proof to this effect, the father is exempt from paying.  Interestingly, the Pitchei Teshuva (Y.D. 305:31) cites a ruling from the Tiferet Le-Moshe that if the father in such a case, for whatever reason, paid the money to a kohen (such as if he had been unaware of this halakha), then the kohen keeps the money, and the father cannot demand that it be returned.

(Incidentally, if the father of a bekhor did not perform a pidyon ha-ben on the child’s thirty-first day, and the child dies at some point thereafter without having received a pidyon ha-ben, the father must give the money to a kohen.  Even though the child is no longer living, the father bears the obligation to pay since the mitzva had already taken effect during the bekhor’s lifetime.)

            The Mishna then proceeds to present a similar case where a woman’s first pregnancy resulted in the birth of twins of different genders, but the parents do not remember which was born first.  Once again, the kohanim would, in principle, bear the burden of proof to show that the male twin was born first, thus requiring the father to pay the pidyon ha-ben.  Since no such proof is available, the father is exempt from paying, just as in the case described above where one of two indistinguishable male twins died in the first month of life.

            Both these halakhot are codified in the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 305:25).

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            As mentioned yesterday, toward the end of Parashat Korach (18:15-16) the Torah presents the mitzva of pidyon ha-ben, which requires a father to pay a kohen the amount of five sela’im (coins) upon the birth of a firstborn son, once the boy reaches the age of thirty days.  We saw that this obligation applies only if the infant reaches that age, and not if he dies prior to becoming one month old.  We also noted that in the case of firstborn twin boys, if one twin dies within the first month and the parents cannot determine whether the deceased infant was the older or younger twin, they are exempt from paying the pidyon ha-ben, since any kohen seeking payment bears the burden of proof that the surviving twin is the firstborn.

            The Ben Ish Chai (Rabbi Yosef Chayim ben Eliyahu of Baghdad, 1833-1909), in his work of responsa Torah Lishmah (248), describes an incident that took place in his community that is relevant to these halakhot.  He had instituted a policy in Baghdad whereby a randomly sequenced list of all the city’s kohanim was compiled.  Each time a firstborn boy was born, the next kohen on the list was entitled to receive the pidyon ha-ben payment from the infant’s father.  The Ben Ish Chai hoped in this way to avoid contention and jealousy among the kohanim vying to participate in this mitzva – and earn some money at the same time.  The randomly generated list provided a fixed, fair and objective system that guaranteed each kohen the opportunity to receive pidyon ha-ben money when his turn came.

            Unfortunately, this seemingly simple arrangement got off to an inauspicious start.  The first Jewish bekhor (firstborn male) born in Baghdad after the new system was implemented was a twin, and the parents could not determine which was born first.  Tragically, one of the twins passed away shortly after birth, within the first month.  As we saw, in such a case the father is, as a practical matter, exempt from pidyon ha-ben, since it cannot be proven that the surviving child is the bekhor.

            Sometime later, another bekhor was born in Baghdad’s Jewish community.  The father, a shrewd and wily man, was a close friend of a kohen to whom he wished to give the pidyon ha-ben money, but that kohen’s name appeared toward the bottom of the Ben Ish Chai’s list of kohanim.  Not wanting to flagrantly violate the community’s newly-accepted pidyon ha-ben arrangement, he devised a scheme in the hope of “beating the system” so that he could give the money to his close friend.  When the first kohen on the list approached him, informing him that he rightfully deserves the money, the new father noted that this was untrue.

            “I claim,” the father said, “that the surviving twin in the previous family is the older of the two twins.  Therefore, you, as the first kohen on the list, should be receiving the pidyon ha-ben money from that family, not from me.”  The father thus refused to give the money to the first kohen, claiming that his turn is with the other family, whose surviving son may likely be the firstborn child.

            Naturally, the second kohen on the list then came to the father, noting that according to the father’s contention, he rightfully deserves the pidyon ha-ben money, because his son is the second bekhor born in the community.

            But the father had his response prepared: “Can you prove that the surviving twin in the other family is the older twin?  Maybe he’s the younger twin, in which case you don’t deserve the money – the first kohen on the list deserves the money, since mine is the first pidyon ha-ben in the community!”

            Thus, the father refused to give the money to the first or the second kohanim, as each could not prove that he deserved the money, given the uncertainty was to whether his child is the first or second bekhor requiring a pidyon ha-ben.  His intention, as stated, was to reserve for himself the right to choose the kohen, so that he could give the money to his friend.

            The case came before the Ben Ish Chai, who proposed a surprisingly simple solution to force the new father to follow the system, a solution that appears in the Gemara (Masekhet Ketubot 94b) concerning a somewhat similar situation.  The Ben Ish Chai instructed the first kohen on the list to write a harsha’a, a document granting “power of attorney” to the second kohen on the list.  This document authorized the second kohen to collect any funds owed to the first kohen.  When the second kohen approached the father to demand the pidyon ha-ben payment with the harsha’a document in hand, the father had no choice but to give him the funds.  Regardless of whether the money was owed to the first kohen or to the second kohen, it had to be handed to the second kohen, as he was authorized to collect both for himself and on behalf of the first kohen.  The second kohen then gave the money to the first kohen, who, as the first kohen on the list, was entitled to the funds given the impossibility of collecting from the father of the twins born earlier.

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            In Parashat Korach the Torah tells of Korach’s ill-fated revolt against the authority of Moshe and Aharon.  In the wake of this tragedy, God instructed to Moshe to prove Aharon’s designation for the high priesthood by collecting the staffs of all the nation’s tribal leaders.  Moshe placed the staffs near the ark in the Mishkan, and the following day, it was discovered that blossoms had begun to sprout from Aharon’s staff.  God commanded Moshe to keep Aharon’s staff in front of the ark for all time, as eternal evidence to the special designation of Aharon and the Levite tribe.

            The Gemara in Masekhet Horiyot (12a) relates that when the ark was buried underneath the Beit Ha-mikdash toward the end of the First Commonwealth, a number of other “artifacts” were buried along with it, including Aharon’s staff.  Rav Moshe Leib Shachor, in his Avnei Shoham, comments that Aharon’s staff was perhaps buried underground to dispel the misconception that it was endowed with some kind of intrinsic, mystical powers.  Rav Shachor compares Aharon’s staff to the nechash ha-nechoshet, the copper snake that Moshe fashioned as a cure for those among Benei Yisrael who were bitten by poisonous snakes, as described in Parashat Chukat (21:9).  The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (56a) tells that King Chizkiyahu dismantled the copper snake because it was seen as a kind of idol or magical charm with supernatural powers.  Similarly, Rav Shachor speculates, there may have been concern that Aharon’s staff would be regarded as possessing mystical powers of one sort or another, and it was therefore hidden together with the aron.

            Interestingly, this concern arose only when the time came to bury the ark underground (to protect it from the foreign invaders).  It seems that so long as the staff was positioned in front of the aron, which contained the tablets received at Sinai and the Torah, the people would understand that the miracle of the blossoms was brought about by the Almighty and resulted from the nation’s covenant with Him.  The ark, which is commonly referred to as “the ark of the covenant,” represents the mutual obligations that Benei Yisrael and the Almighty have to one another, whereby we observe His commands and in exchange He grants us protection and blessing.  In the presence of the ark, the miraculous artifact represented God’s unlimited power and ability to sustain Benei Yisrael when we remain loyal to the covenant.  Once the ark is removed, however, the danger arises that Benei Yisrael would ascribe independent powers to the staff, and lose sight of the fact that the miracle was brought about by the Almighty.  The people might then acknowledge the existence of self-sufficient mystical forces that do not relate to or depend upon our relationship with God, symbolized by the aron.  It was therefore only once the ark was buried underground that Aharon’s staff was seen as a threat to the true Torah faith, according to which we can earn supernatural protection only through our commitment to the Torah, and not by trying to access some kind of independent mystical forces.

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            Parashat Korach tells of the tragic incident of the revolt instigated by Korach, a cousin of Moshe and Aharon, who challenged his cousins’ rights to the religious and political leadership over Benei Yisrael.

            In a famous passage in his Torah commentary, the Ramban raises the question of why Korach launched this campaign only now.  Moshe had led the nation since before the Exodus, and Aharon had been designated as kohen gadol many months before Korach’s revolt.  Why was it only at this point that Korach decided to openly challenge Moshe and Aharon’s authority?  The Ramban explains, quite simply, that Korach realized he would be unable to garner support for his campaign until now.  The people were unwaveringly loyal to Moshe, particularly in the wake of the sin of the golden calf, when God decreed the nation’s annihilation and then repealed the decree in response to Moshe’s prayer.  In the Ramban’s words, Benei Yisrael “loved him like their own souls and obeyed him, and had somebody rebelled against Moshe at that time, they would have stoned him.”  Korach therefore had no choice but to wait until the people’s loyalty to Moshe began to decline.  This occurred as a result of the sin of the spies, to which God responded by decreeing death upon that entire generation.  Although Moshe had successfully prayed on the nation’s behalf to have God repeal the initial decree, which called for the annihilation of Benei Yisrael, he did not intervene when God announced that the entire generation would die in the wilderness and only the offspring would enter Eretz Yisrael.  The people – or at least some of the people – saw this as a failure of leadership, and Korach seized the opportunity to launch his revolt against Moshe and Aharon’s authority.

            Rav Yerucham Lebovitz noted the sheer audacity inherent in the people’s resentment toward Moshe.  They, not Moshe, were clearly to blame for this debacle.  As we read in Sefer Devarim (1:29-33), Moshe pleaded with the people after the scouts’ return to trust in God’s ability to help them conquer the land.  He tried to avert the catastrophe, but they stubbornly refused to listen.  Yet, even when the dust had settled, they pointed the accusing finger at Moshe, rather than at themselves.  Rav Yerucham compares the people in this regard to an ill patient who failed to take the medication prescribed by his physician, and as he was dying placed the blame for his death on the doctor.  Tragically, Benei Yisrael chose to blame Moshe for their failure in the incident of the cheit ha-meragelim.  The result was yet another sorrowful chapter in the history of Benei Yisrael’s sojourn through the wilderness – the ill-fated rebellion against Moshe and Aharon, which was borne out of the feelings of resentment and discontent that surfaced as a result of cheit ha-meragelim.

            Rav Yerucham concludes his discussion of the Ramban’s comments by lamenting, “Zo ra’at ha-adam” (“This is the evil of man!”).  What causes the human being’s downfall is, in many instances, not the person’s mistakes, but rather the refusal to take responsibility for those mistakes.  When people never accept blame and accountability, and instead find others on whom to pin the blame, they are unlikely to ever improve or grow.  The first stage of growth is recognizing the need to grow, which requires the willingness to admit to failures and character flaws.  The background to the story of Korach, as presented by the Ramban, should alert us to the dangers of the stubborn refusal to accept blame.  We must all be willing to admit to and take full responsibility for our mistakes, and transform those mistakes into valuable and meaningful opportunities for personal growth.

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            Toward the end of Parashat Korach, the Torah presents the list of matenot kehuna, the mandatory “gifts” that Benei Yisrael must give to the kohanim.  These gifts include teruma, the requirement to give a kohen some of one’s produce after it is harvested.  The Torah refers to teruma with the term, “mishmeret terumotai” (18:8), which literally means “the guard of My teruma.”  Rashi, both in his commentary to this verse as well in his commentary to Masekhet Sukka (35b), interprets this phrase as introducing a prohibition against causing teruma to become tamei.  The Torah here speaks of the “guard” of teruma, referring to the obligation to preserve its status of ritual impurity, and not do anything that causes it to lose that status.

            From Rashi’s comments in Masekhet Sukka, it is clear that he viewed this prohibition as including wasting teruma (“hefsed”), as well.  The Gemara there offers two possible reasons for why Halakha forbids using an etrog from teruma on Sukkot, the second of which explains that handling an etrog soils the outermost layer, making that layer inedible.  Rashi comments that the prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai” forbids wasting even a small amount of teruma, and for this reason an etrog of teruma may not be used for the mitzva.  Tosefot in Masekhet Pesachim (13a), by contrast, express some uncertainty on the matter.  In the context of the halakha requiring burning chametz of teruma on Erev Pesach, Tosefot write, “Even if we say that it is forbidden to burn pure [teruma] because it is written, ‘et mishmeret terumotai,’ just as it is forbidden to render it impure, in this instance it is permissible…”  Tosefot present this halakha as a possibility, rather than as an established, definitive rule.

            Rav Asher Zelig Weiss, in his Minchat Asher, explains Tosefot’s hesitation in light of a fundamental question that arises concerning the law of “mishmeret terumotai,” whether it should be viewed narrowly or as a reflection of a broader halakhic concern.  On the one hand, we might view this provision as a narrowly defined law requiring that teruma’s state of ritual purity be preserved, in which case we have no reason to extend it to wasting teruma.  Alternatively, however, one might argue that the Torah here establishes a general rule requiring that we allow teruma to serve its intended purpose, which is to benefit the kohanim.  This verse establishes not a specific prohibition against causing tum’a, but rather a broader halakha calling upon Benei Yisrael to do their part to ensure that all teruma reaches its destination, so-to-speak, which is to serve as food for the kohanim.  Anything done to prevent teruma food from achieving this goal violates the prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai.”  According to this more liberal approach to this halakha, we would certainly include wasting teruma under this prohibition, as Rashi assumes in his commentary to Masekhet Sukka.

            Rav Weiss noted that this issue might also affect the possibility of a minimum quantity of affected teruma that is required for one to violate this prohibition.  The Ritva in Masekhet Shabbat (91b) raises the question of whether we require a minimum quantity of a ke-zayit (the volume of an olive), or if perhaps there is no minimum quantity.  If we define the prohibition in terms of ensuring that teruma reaches its intended goal, of being eaten by a kohen, then we might conclude that it applies only to a ke-zayit, the minimum required amount of eating in regard to mitzvot.  Since the kohen fulfills the mitzva of eating teruma only through the consumption of a ke-zayit (Rav Weiss elaborates a bit on the question of whether this assumption is indeed correct), it stands to reason that one violates this prohibition only by disqualifying a ke-zayit of teruma.  If, however, we view this prohibition from a narrower perspective, as a specific law forbidding causing teruma to become tamei, then there seems to be no reason to designate any minimum quantity.  If the Torah simply forbids rendering tum’a impure, this prohibition would seemingly apply regardless of the quantity of teruma affected.

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            Yesterday, we noted the phrase “mishmeret terumotai” with which the Torah in Parashat Korach (18:8) refers to the obligation of teruma – the crops given to a kohen from one’s harvested field.  As we saw, this phrase is seen as the Biblical source for the prohibition against causing teruma to become tamei (ritually impure), a status which renders it unfit for consumption.  We mentioned as well the question raised by Tosefot in Masekhet Pesachim (13a) as to whether or not this prohibition also includes rendering teruma unfit for consumption in other ways, such as by soiling or discarding edible teruma.  Rashi in Masekhet Sukka (35b) writes explicitly that even wasting edible teruma falls under this prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai.”

            A surprising extension of this principle appears in the Avnei Milu’im (responsum 18), in regards to the prohibition of ein mevatelin issur le-khatechila.  This law establishes that one may not intentionally mix a small amount of forbidden food with a larger amount of permissible food in order to achieve bittul – the “nullification” of the forbidden food.  When a small amount of forbidden food happens to mix with permissible foods, then, depending on the precise circumstances and proportions, the forbidden food can be considered as having lost its identity to the majority food, and thus the whole mixture becomes permissible.  The rule of ein mevatelin issur le-khatechila forbids bringing about this result intentionally, by mixing forbidden food with permissible food so that it loses its identity.  The Rishonim debate the question of whether this prohibition constitutes a Torah law, or was enacted later by the Sages.

            The Avnei Milu’im contends that when it comes to teruma, all authorities would agree that intentionally mixing teruma with ordinary food to effectuate bittul would constitute a Torah violation.  Just as the Torah forbids wasting teruma, the Avnei Milu’im claims, it also forbids intentionally divesting teruma of its status and transforming it into chulin (ordinary food).  As teruma is intended to be eaten by a kohen, changing its status to chulin would amount to diverting it from its intended destination, and is thus prohibited.  Handling teruma food in a manner that results in its dissolution among chulin is therefore forbidden on the level of Torah law according to all views, insofar as it violates the prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai.”

The Avnei Milu’im invokes this theory to explain a passage in the Gemara (Yoma 83a) discussing the situation of a dangerously ill patient who must immediately be fed to survive, but the only foods available are tevel (food that has not been tithed) and teruma (which may be eaten only by a kohen).  In the case described, if the required teruma and tithes would be separated from the tevel, the remaining food would not suffice to properly nourish the patient, and a decision must therefore be made whether to feed the patient tevel or teruma.  The Avnei Milu’im cites the Parashat Derakhim as questioning why the Gemara did not propose the solution of separating the teruma and tithes from the tevel and then mixing the foods back together.  The forbidden foods would be “nullified” in the mixture, thus rendering the entire mixture permissible for consumption.  This solution would seemingly allow the patient to survive without any violation of Halakha.  The Avnei Milu’im answers based on his theory, that intentionally divesting teruma of its identity through the process of bittul violates the Torah prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai.”  It would therefore be forbidden for the person treating the patient to commit this violation so that the patient can avoid eating forbidden food.  For this reason, the Gemara does not entertain this option, and instead discusses the question of whether the patient should be fed the tevel or the teruma (an issue that is subject to debate among the Tanna’im).

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            In the last two editions of “S.A.L.T.” we discussed the halakha of “mishmeret terumotai,” which the Torah introduces in Parashat Korach (18:8) and requires the “preservation” of teruma – the portion of crop given as a gift to a kohen.  It is forbidden to cause teruma to become tamei, and, according to many opinions, it is likewise forbidden to waste edible teruma by discarding it or soiling it.  Yesterday, we presented the theory proposed by the Avnei Milu’im that extends this prohibition to “bittul” – intentionally mixing teruma with ordinary food, so that it would become “nullified” by the majority component in the mixture.  According to the Avnei Milu’im, divesting teruma of its formal status through “bittul” is no different in this respect from rendering it inedible.  In both cases, one diverts the teruma from its intended purpose of benefiting a kohen.

            Rav Yosef Engel, in his work Atvun De-orayta (15), extends the Avnei Milu’im’s theory even further, claiming that it would be forbidden to retract one’s designation of food as teruma.  Generally, when a person verbally assigns a halakhic status to an item, such as if he states a neder (vow) designating an item as forbidden, or consecrates an item to the Temple treasury, he can attempt to rescind his designation.  If the court can establish that the designation was made under some kind of faulty assumption, it can declare the designation null and void.  Rav Engel contends that seeking the revocation of one’s designation of a certain food as teruma would violate the prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai.”  Here, too, one prevents the teruma from realizing its goal and purpose by divesting it of its status.  Just as, according to the Avnei Milu’im, one violates this prohibition by causing the “bittul” of teruma among ordinary food, similarly, one transgresses “mishmeret terumotai” by revoking teruma’s status and transforming it back into ordinary food.  For this reason, Rav Yosef Engel suggests, the Mishnayot that discuss situations of teruma mixing with ordinary food do not offer the solution of revoking the initial designation, which would then save the mixture from becoming teruma.  Since revoking the designation of food as teruma violates the prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai,” it is not presented as a viable option.

            Rav Asher Zelig Weiss, however, in his Minchat Asher (Parashat Korach), notes the clear distinction that could be drawn between these two cases, of “bittul” and revoking one’s designation.  When one mixes a small amount of teruma food with large amounts of ordinary food, the provision of “bittul” establishes that the teruma loses its status of teruma and assumes the status of ordinary food.  In such a case, one has indeed actively divested the teruma of its status, which, according to the Avnei Milu’im, transgresses the prohibition of “mishmeret terumotai.”  In the case discussed by Rav Yosef Engel, however, one does not seek to divest teruma of its status.  Rather, he retroactively annuls his initial designation, such that the food is considered as never having become teruma in the first place.  He thus does not prevent teruma from reaching its intended purpose; he instead establishes that this food has all along been regular food, and not teruma.  Hence, revoking the designation of food teruma would not appear to violate the law of “mishmeret terumotai.”