The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

by Rav David Silverberg

After Korach's followers perish, God orders that the burnt incense pans used by the rebellious sect be fashioned into a covering for the alter. This covering was to serve as an everlasting reminder of the consequences of rebelling against God-given authority: "… so that no outsider… presume to offer incense before God, that no one be like Korach and his following, as God ordered him through Moshe."

Rashi cites an interesting Midrashic interpretation to this verse that focuses on the expression "beyad Moshe" - literally, "through the hand of Moshe." The Midrash states that herein lies an allusion to the fact that one who protests against the institution of the priesthood - as Korach did - is stricken by the Biblical skin-disease, "tzora'at," just as Moshe's hand became leprous when God urged him to lead the people from Egypt. The appropriateness of such a punishment is clear. The individual in question unlawfully sought the highest leadership position, the privilege of serving as high priest. He must therefore suffer the repercussions of "tzora'at," which requires banishment from the city. The one who set his eyes upon leadership and prestige is now expelled from society and forced to live in solitude.

However, a further dimension of this punishment may emerge from the source of this derivation. From Chazal's homiletic analysis, it seems that some parallel exists between Moshe's leprous hand before his return to Egypt to free Benei Yisrael, and the leprosy suffered as a punishment for contesting the priesthood. A closer look at Moshe's leprosy may reveal that this incident is the direct opposite to that of the potential dissenter. Recall that Moshe pleaded with the Almighty not to send him to free Benei Yisrael. At one point in his deliberation, he expresses concern that Benei Yisrael will not believe him when comes to deliver God's promise of redemption. In response, God equips Moshe with three miraculous signs that will clearly demonstrate his prophetic powers. The second of these signs is the sudden affliction of "tzora'at" upon his hand. Chazal already note that this sign served as a punishment of sorts to Moshe for his mistrust of Benei Yisrael, a suspicion that led him to refuse assuming the responsibility with which he was charged.

If so, then Moshe and the dissident vying for the priesthood stand at opposite poles. Moshe suspected the people and thus shied away from leadership. The dissident does precisely the opposite - he seeks a leadership position that is reserved for someone else. He suspects the establishment of nepotism and favoritism, if not prejudice, and therefore demands that he be granted the coveted title.

It may be that "tzora'at" serves as appropriate punitive means for both crimes. These two individuals - the one who refuses leadership and he who lustfully pursues it - must be temporarily excluded from social life. They both sought to take on a role not destined for them, they both attempted to afford their own interests higher priority over those of the community. Having refused to accept their destined role within society, they are stricken with leprosy and compelled to dwell outside of that society.

Moshe's initial response to Korach's charges is one of helplessness: "Moshe heard and fell on his face." As Rashi notes, Moshe here felt no longer capable to petition the Almighty to pardon Benei Yisrael's sin. Although he successfully interceded on their behalf after the golden calf, incident of the spies, and the sin involving the people's complaints, here he felt helpless. Why?

One answer given focuses upon one of Moshe's arguments in the aftermath of the golden calf. As Chazal explain, Moshe contended that only he heard the Ten Commandments directly from God. Since Benei Yisrael did not, they are not to be held entirely accountable for their misdeed. Korach and his following, however, challenged Moshe's authority on the basis of the fact that "the entire community is sacred," which Chazal understand as referring to the nation's equal participation in the Revelation at Sinai. Now that the people argue for equal standing with Moshe, his arguments falls flat on its face. According to their claims, they heard as much at Sinai as Moshe did!

Said otherwise, Moshe felt capable of defending the people on the basis of their indirect comprehension of God, which renders them more vulnerable to mistakes. He successfully argued that given Benei Yisrael's deficient knowledge and somewhat clouded awareness of God - at least in comparison with his own - some flexibility must be exercised when dealing with their misdeeds. However, Korach and his followers now purport equal stature with Moshe and Aharon. They themselves have raised the standard by which they are to be judged. Hence, Moshe feels powerless to help them. He realizes that God will exact strict judgment against the rebels, and his prayers will be ineffective. Indeed, when God seeks to destroy the nation as a result of Korach's revolt, Moshe's only argument is, "Shall one person sin - and You will be wrathful upon the entire community?!" He was able to defend the rest of the people, but he had no argument on behalf of the dissidents themselves.

The message, of course, is clear. We mustn't pretend to be who we're not. If we do, the level demanded of us is not the level on which we stand, but rather the level on which we tried to stand.

Where is the first time in Chumash where the name "Korach" is mentioned?

Most people would probably answer, in the opening verse of Parashat Korach. This is probably because they don't pay attention to the reading of the end of Parashat Vayishlach, where the Torah lists the genealogy of Esav, which includes his son (or, according to Rashi, stepson), Korach.

This gave rise to an interesting question raised by the Chatam Sofer (Shut Chatam Sofer, Even Ha'ezer vol. 2, 22). Assuming that Esav's son Korach adopted his father's unimpressive moral standards, he was not of the highest religious caliber. Now the Gemara in Yoma 38b forbids naming a child after a wicked person. How, then, could Yitzhar, Korach's father, have named his son after Esav's wicked son?

Of course, one can easily answer the question by denying the underlying assumption. After all, the Midrashim have nice things to say about Elifaz, another son of Esav (see Rashi, Bereishit 29:11). Thus, it may be that Korach, too, turned out not too badly. It should be noted, however, that Rashi in Bereishit 36:5 writes that Elifaz actually ended up as an adulterer. He engaged in sexual relations with none other than his father's other wife, Ahalivama, and specifically from this union emerged Korach. We see here two important points for our discussion: even Esav's alleged "good son" took a turn for the worse at some point, and secondly, Korach himself was a "mamzer." We therefore come back to our original question, why did Yitzhar name his son Korach?

In his work, "Pardes Yosef," Rav Yosef Patzanavsky offers several possible solutions. We present here one possibility he raises, and iy"H tomorrow we will see two other approaches.

Several sources in Chazal suggest that the name "Korach" directly relates to the incident of which we read in this parasha. For example, the Yalkut Shimoni records that the head-shaving required of the Levi'im - including Korach - as part of their consecration ritual was among the direct causes of the rebellion. Korach felt denigrated by the procedure, which left him - as well as the rest of the tribe - bald. As we know, the Hebrew word for bald - "keirei'ach," is similar to the name "Korach." Similarly, the Gemara in Sanhedrin 109b understands the name as referring to Korach's having made a "bald spot" amongst the nation, as a segment of the population was devoured by the ground as a result of his rebellion.

Rav Patzanavsky thus suggests that "Ko" was only a nickname of sorts, used in reference to the leader of the revolt only after this incident. Although we do find Korach referred to as such already in Sefer Shemot (6:21), it may be that his father gave him a different name, but the Torah refers to him with the name by which he became known later.

It should be noted, however, that other sources indicate otherwise, that Korach was his name from birth. The Panei'ach Raza, among other commentaries, writes that Korach observed that his name had the same numerical value as the name "Elazar," the son and destined successor of Aharon the kohen gadol. Korach thus saw himself equivalent in stature and qualifications to the heir to the high-priesthood. According to this approach, of course, Korach was his name before this entire incident.

Tomorrow we will discuss two other answers raised by Rav Patzanavsky.

In yesterday's S.A.L.T., we posed the question raised by the Chatam Sofer regarding Korach's name. Given that Esav had a son (or stepson) named Korach, who presumably was a renown delinquent, why would Yitzhar, Korach's father, choose such a name for his son?

Yesterday we presented one answer suggested by Rav Yosef Patzanavsky in his work, "Pardes Yosef." Today, we discuss two other suggestions, both of which assume a qualification of the Gemara's ruling (Yoma 38b) prohibiting one from naming his son after a wicked person.

The first possibility relates to a Gemara in Sanhedrin (109b) that we noted yesterday. The Gemara explains Korach's name as meaning, "shena'asa korcha b'Yisrael." Rashi, whose interpretation of the Gemara we adopted yesterday, understands the Gemara as saying that the name "Korach" - which is related to the Hebrew word for "bald" - alludes to the "bald spot" created by the death of large number of people as a result of Korach's rebellion. The Maharsha, however, offers a completely different explanation. He suggests that the "bald spot" spoken of by the Gemara refers to the fact that as a result of Korach's revolt, his name is never again used within Am Yisrael. In light of the prohibition of naming one's child after a sinner, Jews have never again named their children Korach.

According to the Maharsha, the prohibition of naming children "Korach" arose specifically in the aftermath - and as a consequence - of Korach's revolt. Rav Patzanavsky thus suggests a somewhat counterintuitive qualification to the prohibition of naming a child after a sinner: it applies only with regard to names of Jewish sinners. One may, he suggests, name a child after a gentile sinner. Therefore, before Korach's revolt, the name "Korach" could have been - and was - used among Benei Yisrael, since its previous association was with a gentile sinner. Through his rebellion, Korach eliminated the name's use, whereas now it became the name of a Jewish transgressor. A possible precedent for such a notion may be Yehuda's son Zerach, whose name corresponds to that of Yehuda's first cousin, Zerach - another son of Esav. Here, too, the justification of such a naming may lie in the fact that Esav and his children were, of course, not considered Jews.

Another answer may emerge from the comments of the Penei Yehoshua (Ketubot 104b), who limits the prohibition of naming a child after a sinner significantly. He claims that the prohibition applies only to names who themselves express or embody the wicked qualities of the sinner. A neutral name that happened to have been the name of a delinquent may be given to a child. Although we find sources, as we have seen, that identify the name "Korach" with Korach's revolt, presumably the name had no such connotation prior to his uprising. Assuming, therefore, that the name bore no direct connotation of sin as a result of Esav's son, Korach, there was no prohibition against Yitzhar's giving this name to his son.

After being confronted by Korach & company, Moshe sends a message summoning Datan and Aviram, two of Korach's cohorts and Moshe's longtime opponents. Although the Torah does not clarify for what purpose Moshe sent for them, Rashi explains based on the Gemara in Sanhedrin (110): "From here we learn that one should not hold on to an argument, for Moshe was seeking them out to make up with them with kind words."

It is commonly understood that "one should not hold on to an argument" ("ein machazikin b'machloket") means simply that one should let go and make certain sacrifices for the sake of peaceful resolutions. Rather than "hanging tough" and insisting unwaveringly on one's demands, one should accustom himself to loosen his demands in order to avoid ongoing quarrels. The Chatam Sofer, however, adds a "halakhic twist," if you will, to this exhortation. (A similar explanation is cited in the name of Rav Yitzchak of Vorki.) The word employed by Chazal in this context is "machazikin" (holding on). The Chatam Sofer suggests that this term here refers to the halakhic principle of "chazaka," established patterns. In several different areas in halakha, a mode of conduct that has repeated itself several (usually three) times is considered an established routine, which can be assumed to always continue. Perhaps the best known example is the case of the goring ox. After three fatal incidents, the ox is deemed aggressive, and its owner runs the risk of harsher punishment should its animal kill yet another person. Regarding quarrels, claims the Chatam Sofer, Chazal teach us that the principle of "chazaka" does not apply. No matter how long an argument has persisted, no matter how many times given individuals have proven their inability to resolve their differences and get along peacefully, one may never assume that an irreversible pattern has been established. When it comes to harmonious relationship among people, we must continue to work and seek resolution.

This rule articulated by the Chatam Sofer may be understood not only in light of the immense importance of social harmony, but also based on the dynamics of strife itself. So many disagreements and misunderstandings never reach settlement specifically because the parties involved maintain their belief in the "chazaka." People give up on each other far too easily, failing to recognize the complexities of each human being and the innumerable factors that dictate or impact upon one's behavior. The worst thing a person could do to another is to assume a "chazaka," to refuse to give the other individual a chance to again earn his trust and respect. This we learn from Moshe, who continued to seek a peaceful agreement with Datan and Aviram, no matter how many times they proved their disloyalty towards him and rejection of his authority.

Moshe instructs Korach and his followers to take incense pans to the Ohel Moed, where a "showdown" was later conducted to determine the rightful appointee to the post of the high-priesthood. As we know, Aharon - expectedly - emerges victorious, while the 250 dissenters are consumed by a heavenly fire. Thereafter, God tells Moshe that the incense pans used by the rebels are to be fashioned into a covering for the altar.

Based on this commandment, several acharonim have called into question the halakha in the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 153:21) that forbids turning an item already used or designated for mundane purposes into a sacred object. For example, jackets may not be used for the covering of a Sefer Torah. If this is true, then how were the incense pans used by Korach's followers allowed to serve as a covering for the altar?

One simple answer may be that "we don’t ask questions on God." The Almighty Himself ordered the manufacture of this covering from the incense pans in order to remind Benei Yisrael of the calamity suffered by those who insisted on bringing an unwarranted offering. God may have felt compelled to override His own commandment, as it were, for this important purpose.

In truth, however, the transformation of the incense pans into a covering for the altar reflects an important qualification to this halakha. An item used for mundane purposes may be converted into a sacred object once its form has been significaaltered. The incense pans were turned into "hammered sheets as plating for the altar," a physical change significant enough to allow them to be used as sacred objects. It should be noted that the Mishna Berura (147:13) cites authorities (Mateh Yehuda, V'shav Hakohen) who prohibit transforming mundane objects into sacred ones even when they undergo significant physical alteration. Nevertheless, the Mishna Berura observes that common practice is to be lenient in this regard.

Additionally, this prohibition applies only to transforming mundane objects into "tashmishei kedusha" - objects used with sacred items such as a Torah scroll, tefillin or mezuza. One may, however, use mundane objects for purposes of a mitzva. For example, while one cannot use a rug as a covering for the Torah scroll, one may use it as a case for his tallit. Likewise, Rav Mordechai Eliyahu rules that an ordinary carpet may be donated to a synagogue to be used as a mat for birkat kohanim.

Rashi's opening remarks to his commentary to Parashat Korach are rather unusual: "This parasha is expounded nicely in the Midrash of Rabbi Tanchuma." Believe it or not, this seemingly innocent comment actually sparked a halakhic controversy. The Taz, in his work on Rashi's commentary on Chumash, questions the permissibility of issuing such a flattering assessment of a piece of Torah in light of the Gemara in Masekhet Eruvin (64): "Whoever says, 'This teaching is nice, this teaching us not nice' destroys the glory of Torah." One is not entitled to assume the role of the Torah's editor. We must approach it as the living, immutable Word of God, and may not subject it to the scrutiny of our personal preferences. How, then, could Rashi express his affinity for the Midrash Tanchuma on our parasha?

This issue is the subject of a "teshuva" of Rav Ovadia Yosef (Yabi'a Omer, vol. 2, Y.D. 16). Rav Yosef notes that from Rashi's commentary to this passage in the Gemara, it appears that the prohibition applies only when specifically contrasting two pieces of learning, dubbing one as "nice" and the other as "not nice." However, one may express his fondness for a given idea, so long as he does not contrast it with a different idea over which he is less enthusiastic. Indeed, this position is expressly taken by the Reshash, in his commentary to the Gemara, challenging the view of the Maharsha who prohibits even an entirely complimentary remark. Rav Yosef therefore surmises that Rashi, in his commentary on the Torah, followed his own view in his work on the Talmud, that so long as no negative assessment is made, personal feelings towards a given area of Torah is permissible.

In the course of his discussion, Rav Yosef draws several other qualifications, as well. Firstly, we find many times throughout halakhic literature that scholars vehemently denounced the positions of their disputants. Harsh language is not uncommon in halakhic discourse, as Talmudic scholars discuss and debate in their quest for a truthful conclusion. It would seem, claims Rav Yosef, that the prohibition against expressing personal feelings about Torah concepts does not forbid one from strongly disagreeing with the position of another. Judgmental comments are forbidden when no final halakhic ruling is at stake, and one merely expresses his personal attraction to one piece of Torah or another. However, it is permissible to prefer one view over another.

Additionally, even those who apply the prohibition to even purely positive evaluation would not prohibit the experience or expression of excitement over hearing or reading an interesting, enjoyable, or just brilliant analysis. One may not say about a given straightforward halakha that it finds favor in his eyes, as this will imply that others do not. However, this applies when dealing with straight halakha. When it comes to analysis and rigorous reasoning, one may express his affinity for a given thought or extrapolation. This, too, may justify Rashi's remarks in our parsha.

Rav Yosef further comments that this passage in the Gemara should not be understood as an outright prohibition, but rather as guidance regarding proper attitude towards Torah.

In conclusion, this discussion must heighten our awareness of the awe and reverence with which we must approach Torah. It is forbidden - at least on some level - for us to relate to Torah as simply one of many fields of scholarship. It is not for us to decide which mitzvot are more or less important, or which areas of the Talmud are more significant than any other. All of Torah constitutes the "devar Hashem" and demands our utmost love and respect.

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