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PARASHAT Korach
by
Rav David Silverberg
Parashat Korach tells the story of the audacious challenge against the leadership of Moshe and Aharon, arranged and led by Korach, Moshe's first cousin. Among those who joined the rebellion were two hundred and fifty people described in the parasha's second verse as "keri'ei mo'ed" – literally, "chosen in the assembly." On the simple level of interpretation, this means that this group consisted of highly respected and prominent men. The Gemara, however, in Masekhet Sanhedrin (110a), suggests an additional meaning. The word "mo'ed" also means "occasions," and often refers to the Jewish calendar cycle. Hence, the Gemara understands the phrase "keri'ei mo'ed" as an allusion to the fact that these men were assigned the task of overseeing the Jewish calendar. They were the ones who would conduct the astronomical calculations necessary to determine when a leap year should be observed in order to keep the Jewish, lunar cycle consistent with the solar calendar. (Rav Reuven Margaliyot, in his "Margaliyot Ha-yam," explains that the Gemara arrives at this homiletic interpretation by reading the word "keri'ei" as "kor'ei." The phrase, "keri'ei mo'ed" thus becomes "kor'ei mo'ed" – those who "call," or determine, the festivals.)
The obvious question arises, how is this information about these two hundred and fifty insurrectionists relevant to their uprising? How did this job affect their participation in Korach's revolt?
The simplest explanation, perhaps, is that Chazal here seek merely to emphasize that Korach's campaign attracted the highest echelons of the nation, including the religious leaders. Generally, populist uprisings appeal specifically to the lower classes, the poor, the ignorant, and the despondent. Korach, by contrast, won the support of the intellectual and even spiritual elite of the people, thus posing a formidable political challenge to the authority of Moshe and Aharon. On a deeper, Midrashic level, this Gemara perhaps seeks to warn that even the greatest achievements in Torah and intensive involvement in religious leadership do not protect one from wrong ideas, theological misconceptions, or plain jealousy. These two hundred and fifty men were of a particularly high caliber and ranked among the nation's finest Halakhic scholars, but nevertheless fell prey to the winds of rebellion generated by Korach's uprising.
Some, however, explain this Gemara in light of another famous Gemara (Chulin 60b) regarding the relationship, so-to-speak, between the sun and the moon. Initially, the Gemara comments, the sun and the moon were created equal. The moon, however, complained to the Almighty, claiming that two kings cannot wear the same crown; it would be impossible for both the sun and the moon to work simultaneously and with equal authority. As punishment for the moon's jealousy, God made the moon smaller. While it is hard to know exactly what this Gemara means (and we discussed it in our S.A.L.T. series to Parashat Pinchas last year), the message emerging from this account is the dangers of envy and jealousy. Now the moon's protest against its shared status with the sun is what resulted in the different lunar and solar cycles. Had the moon accepted the fair "division of labor," the sun and the moon would have worked hand-in-hand, and there would thus be no need to adjust the Jewish calendar to maintain its synchronization with the solar calendar. Therefore, some writers explain, the Gemara makes a point of informing us that the two hundred and fifty rebels worked in this field, of synchronizing the solar and lunar calendars. They should have understood the lesson of the sun of the moon, of the dangers of seeking fame and glory and exclusive rights to prominence.
We might suggest yet a third approach, as well. According to the Gemara, these two hundred and fifty men worked in what we might term a "thankless job." Their assignment entailed hard work, difficult, intricate calculations and hours of thought and consideration, sorting through the complexities of their astronomical findings to reach a conclusion. These were the most talented mathematicians of the nation, the finest and sharpest minds. And yet, they presumably received little recognition for their efforts. Their job did not carry with it the authority enjoyed by Moshe nor the honor and splendor showered upon Aharon and his sons. Perhaps the Gemara means that these men felt resentful over their investment of hard work without public acknowledgment. The message of this Gemara, then, is that what matters is getting the job done, rather than respect and admiration. Performing a task that one deems important and meaningful should be a sufficient source of pride and gratification. These scholars, however, were not content with simply doing the job, and therefore joined Korach in the hope of earning greater honor and recognition with him as leader.
David Silverberg
*****
The opening verse of Parashat Korach introduces us to On ben Pelet, a man from the tribe of Reuven who is said to have joined Korach in his revolt against Moshe's authority. Curiously, however, On is never mentioned again after this first verse. The Gemara (Masekhet Sanhedrin 109b-110a) explains that though On initially participated in the uprising, he ultimately withdrew, thanks to his wife. On's wife cogently argued that his involvement in Korach's movement will yield him no benefit. Even if Korach and his following succeed, she pointed out, On will still remain a commoner. He will enjoy no more honor and prestige under Korach's authority than he did under Moshe and Aharon.
The Gemara concludes its account of this woman's efforts by citing a verse in Sefer Mishlei (14:1), "The wisest of women builds her house." This verse, the Gemara declares, accurately describes the wisdom of On's wife, through which she managed to save him from the doom that befell Korach and his following.
The obvious question arises, why does the Gemara ascribe to On's wife the particular quality of "wisdom"? On's wife undoubtedly acted nobly, with conviction, out of genuine love and concern for her husband. All these qualities are worthy of note and render her deserving of praise and admiration. But the Gemara lauds On's wife specifically for her "wisdom." What was so "wise" about the way she helped her husband? What extraordinary brilliance did she display by pointing out to On that he will fare no better under Korach than under Moshe?
Rav Chayim Shemuelevitz (as cited by Rav Yissachar Frand) explains that it is indeed a sign of wisdom when somebody manages to maintain a sense of reason and rational thinking during a heated controversy. One can easily imagine the widespread spirit of contention that swept through Benei Yisrael during the time of Korach's rebellion. In fact, the Gemara in Sanhedrin tells that all the men suspected Moshe of engaging in illicit relationships with their wives. A frenzy of anti-Moshe sentiment erupted and gripped the nation. The wisdom of On's wife is manifest in her ability to think rationally and keep calm during this nationwide rush of anger and resentment. People generally have the tendency to be taken in by popular fads and widespread emotional trends. Often it is only the exceptionally wise person who can think intelligently and logically and see the obvious realities that others overlook.
David Silverberg
*****
Parashat Korach tells of the death and destruction that resulted from the revolt led by Korach against the authority of Moshe and Aharon. Korach's campaign included two hundred and fifty followers who petition for the right to offer the ketoret (incense) in the Mishkan. Moshe instructs them to bring the offering together with Aharon, and the one whose incense is accepted by God will have proven his right to the role of kohen gadol. They accept the challenge, bring ketoret, and are burned to death by a divine fire (16:35). In the aftermath of this tragedy, God has Moshe instruct Elazar (Aharon's son) to take the firepans used by the two hundred and fifty insurrectionists and make from them a metal covering for the altar. This covering was to serve as an eternal reminder to Benei Yisrael: "It was to be a reminder to the Israelites, so that no outsider – one not of Aharon's offspring – should presume to offer incense before the Lord and should not be like Korach and his band – as the Lord ordered him through Moshe" (17:5).
On the simple level of interpretation, the phrase in this verse, "and should not be like Korach and his band" ("ve-lo yihyeh khe-Korach ve-kha-adato") serves as a warning to anyone planning to again "presume to offer incense before the Lord," as Korach's followers did. The verse warns that a non-kohen who offers incense will suffer the same fate as Korach and his following.
Two Midrashic sources, however, read this verse differently. Rashi, in his commentary to Sefer Yeshayahu (6:4), and the Rambam, in the eighth "shoresh" of his introduction to Sefer Ha-mitzvot, cite a Midrash that explains this verse to mean the exact opposite – that future non-kohanim who offer ketoret will suffer a different fate from Korach. Such a person, the Midrash explains, will "not be like Korach and his band." Korach was devoured by the ground, and his band was consumed by a divine fire. Subsequent ketoret violators, by contrast, will be punished differently, as suggested by the conclusion of this verse: "ka'asher diber Hashem be-yad Moshe lo." Literally, this verse translates, "as the Lord spoke to him in the hand of Moshe." The Midrash interprets this clause as an allusion to Moshe's hand, which was stricken with tzara'at (a leprous-type infection) when God appeared to him at the burning bush (Shemot 4:6). (This infection was to serve as a sign to Benei Yisrael that God had sent him to free them from slavery.) Here God tells Moshe that unlike Korach and his followers, a non-kohen in future generations who ventures into the Sanctuary to offer incense will be punished with tzara'at. Indeed, a famous narrative in Sefer Divrei Hayamim II (26) tells that the otherwise righteous King Uziyahu brought an incense offering in the Beit Ha-mikdash, stubbornly ignoring the kohanim's warnings. The king was stricken with tzara'at on his forehead, an illness from which he suffered for the rest of his life.
The Gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin (110a) advances another, seemingly Halakhic, interpretation of the clause, "and should not be like Korach and his band." Citing this verse, the Gemara establishes that "whoever takes hold of an argument transgresses a 'lav' [Torah prohibition]." According to the Gemara, this verse introduces a prohibition against initiating argument and contention. The Torah here presents not a warning, but a law: one may not act like Korach, who led a campaign to fracture the nation and generate animosity and hostility among the people.
The Rishonim disagree as to how this statement should be understood. The Rambam, in the aforementioned passage, explains why he does not include this prohibition in his list of the 613 commandments. He claims that the Gemara's reading of the verse constitutes an "asmakhta" (secondary reading, an allusion in the text), and does not reflect the straightforward meaning. Clearly, as we mentioned earlier, the primary interpretation of the verse is that it warns potential violators that unlawful offering of the ketoret will bring upon the same fate suffered by Korach's followers. The Gemara simply suggests a secondary reading of the verse in an effort to reinforce within us the gravity of instigating machloket (controversy and disharmony).
The Ramban, by contrast, in his critique of the Rambam's Sefer Ha-mitzvot, argues that the Gemara's interpretation is intended as a bona fide extrapolation of the verse, rather than an asmakhta, and he therefore indeed lists this prohibition as one of the 613 Biblical commandments. He does, however, modify the Gemara's reading considerably. Whereas the Gemara indicates that any instigation of controversy violates this prohibition, the Ramban claims that this verse forbids specifically the kind of controversy waged by Korach – a challenge to the rights of Aharon and his descendants to the kehuna (priesthood).
The Sefer Yerei'im (345) follows the general approach of the Ramban, only with one slight variation. Like the Ramban, he, too, counts this prohibition as one of the 613 mitzvot, and he also limits it to certain kinds of controversies. Only whereas the Ramban claimed that the prohibition applies only to challenging the kehuna, the Yerei'im writes that it forbids campaigning against anybody upon whom God has bestowed honor and authority.
Yet another perspective appears to emerge from the She'iltot (131), who explains this verse as follows: "It is forbidden for a Jew to instigate a fight, for people will thereby come to hate one another, and the Torah says (Vayikra 19:17), 'You shall not despise your brother in your heart." Rav Yosef Engel, in his "Gilyonei Ha-Shas," as well as Rav Reuven Margaliyot, in his "Margaliyot Ha-yam," point out that the She'iltot understands this violation as a means to protect against hatred. It does not constitute an independent prohibition, but rather the Torah's own "seyag" – protective fence – around the prohibition against despising other Jews.
David Silverberg
*****
The final section of Parashat Korach lists the various matenot kehuna – the gifts that Benei Yisrael were to give to the kohanim. Towards the beginning of this list (18:9) we find the halakha that the kohanim received the meat of certain sacrifices: "This shall be yours from the most holy sacrifices, the offerings by fire: every such offering that they render to Me as most holy sacrifices, namely, every meal offering, sin offering, and guilt offering of theirs, shall belong to you." In the verse that follows, the Torah appears to specify the location where the sacrificial meat must be eaten: "You shall partake of them be-kodesh ha-kodashim." At first glance, the term "be-kodesh ha-kodashim" means "in the holiest of holies" – a reference to the inner, sacred chamber in the Mishkan, behind the parokhet (curtain), where the ark stood.
As the commentators note, however, this cannot possibly be the meaning of the verse. After all, the Torah has already established that meat from the sacrifices listed in this verse – mincha, chatat and asham, which are referred to as "kodashei kodashim" – may be eaten anywhere in the azara, the courtyard surrounding the Mishkan (e.g. Vayikra 6:19). Secondly, we know that no human being – including kohanim – may ever enter the kodesh kodashim, with the exception of the kohen gadol who may enter this sanctum only once a year (on Yom Kippur). Quite clearly, then, this verse cannot require partaking of sacrificial meat in the kodesh ha-kodashim.
We
find different approaches in the commentaries to deal with this problem. Already the Sifrei
cites two views concerning this verse.
According to the first opinion, "kodesh
ha-kodashim" here refers not to the innermost
sanctum of the Mishkan, as the term usually denotes,
but rather to the azara. Apparently, as the Maharal
explains in his "Gur Aryeh,"
this view in the Sifrei interprets "kodesh ha-kodashim" to mean
"holier" rather than "holiest." These sacrifices, which are of a higher level
of sanctity, must be eaten in the courtyard of the Mishkan,
whereas lower-level sacrifices ("kodashim kalim") may be eaten anywhere in the camp (or, in the
times of the
The
Sifrei then proceeds to cite a second approach in the
name of Rabbi Yehuda Ben Beteira. He claims that this verse alludes to the halakha permitting, under extenuating circumstances, the
consumption of sacrificial meat even inside the Mishkan. Rabbi Yehuda Ben Beteira
speaks of a situation where a war is waged in the vicinity of the
The Rambam, in Hilkhot Ma'aseh Ha-korbanot (10:3), appears to adopt this reading of Rabbi Yehuda Ben Beteira. The Rambam writes that although a kohen must eat kodashei kodashim meat in the azara, if, for some reason, he partook of the meat inside the heikhal (Sanctuary), he has, be-di'avad (ex post facto), fulfilled his obligation to eat sacrificial meat. Thus, he follows Rabbi Yehuda Ben Beteira's view, that this verse establishes that although the meat must optimally be eaten in the azara, eating it inside the Mikdash nevertheless fulfills the obligation, on the level of "be-di'avad."
Other commentators, including Rav Sa'adya Gaon and the Ramban, explain much differently, that "be-kodesh ha-kodashim" refers not to location, but to manner of consumption. According to Rav Sa'adya Gaon, this verse requires eating sacrificial meat "with the utmost purity and sanctity." He appears to interpret this verse as referring to the general spiritual aura that must surround the kohanim's consumption of sacrificial meat. "Kodesh ha-kodashim" means not the specified area known as the "kodesh ha-kodashim," but rather to a particularly intense atmosphere of holiness in which the kohanim must partake of the meat. The Ramban also interprets the phrase as referring to manner of consumption, rather than location, but in a much different vein. "Be-kodesh ha-kodashim," according to the Ramban, means "like kodashei kodashim." The verse refers not to the location known as "kodesh ha-kodashim," but rather to the category of sacrifices – "kodashei kodashim." The Torah here simply establishes, in a general sense, that we must treat these sacrifices with the laws and guidelines applicable to kodashei kodashim, as stipulated earlier in Chumash.
The Netziv, in his "Ha'amek Davar," offers a characteristically novel interpretation. Like other commentators we encountered earlier, the Netziv claims the "kodesh ha-kodashim" means relative holiness, an area that is holier than another area. He claims that within the azara, there were different levels of sanctity, which are determined by proximity to the altar. (The mizbach ha-nechoshet, or mizbach ha-ola, the standard altar upon which all animal and flour sacrifices were offered, stood in the azara.) This verse requires a kohen to begin eating the sacrificial meat as soon as he can after descending from the altar. Once he completes the rituals required for a given sacrifice upon the altar, the kohen must immediately, at the first available opportunity, begin eating the sacrificial meat, given the principle of "ein ma'avirin al ha-mitzvot" – we do not unnecessarily delay the performance of mitzvot. The Torah therefore instructs the kohanim to eat the meat "be-kodesh ha-kodashim" – in the most sacred location possible, meaning, as close to the altar as they can.
David Silverberg
*****
Yesterday, we looked at a verse in the final section of Parashat Korach (18:10) which instructs the kohanim to partake of the sacrificial meat "be-kodesh ha-kodashim." At first glance, this suggests that the kohanim must eat the sacrifices in the inner chamber of the Mishkan, the kodesh ha-kodashim. As the commentaries point out, however, this cannot possibly be the verse's intent, for no man is ever permitted to enter the kodesh ha-kodashim (see Vayikra 16:2), with the exception of the kohen gadol while performing the Yom Kippur service. Certainly, then, the Torah would not permit a kohen to enter into the kodesh ha-kodashim to eat the sacrificial meat. As we saw, one view in the Sifrei, which several other commentators – including Rashi – follow, suggests that the term "kodesh ha-kodashim" in this verse refers not to the inner sanctum of the Mishkan, but rather to the azara – the courtyard surrounding the Mishkan. It is here where the kohanim would partake of the meat.
Clearly, however, this approach requires further clarification. If "kodesh ha-kodashim" generally refers to the inner chamber of the Mishkan, what gives us the license to interpret it differently in this context? Yesterday, we cited the Maharal as explaining that the term "kodesh ha-kodashim" denotes a place of relative sanctity, which is more sacred than other places. In general it refers to the innermost chamber, but in truth, it can refer to any area that is singled out as a place of unique sanctity, even if it is not the holiest site.
A much different approach to the etymology of this term is taken by Rav Avraham Avigad of Petach-Tikva, in a piece printed in the journal Moriah (no. 15, vol. 5-6, pp. 70-71). Rav Avigad claims that indeed, the term "kodesh kodashim" generally means "the place that is holier than all other places." In some instances, however, the word "kodesh" in this expression serves as a verb, rather than a noun. Meaning, the term "kodesh kodashim" sometimes refers to a place or object that has the ability to render something sacred, to confer upon an object Halakhic sanctity.
Rav Avigad demonstrates this second usage of this term from two passages in Rashi's commentary to Sefer Shemot. In Parashat Tetzaveh (29:37), the Torah says, "The altar shall be kodesh kodashim; whatever touches the altar shall be holy." Rashi there explains that the altar is "kodesh kodashim" in that "whatever touches the altar shall be holy." A sacrifice placed upon the altar – even if it had previously become disqualified – attains the Halakhic status of kedusha, and all the laws that apply to sacrificial meat pertain to this meat, as well. Quite clearly, then, Rashi here understands "kodesh kodashim" as a description of the altar's power to confer a status of kedusha upon a sacrifice.
The second relevant passage is found in Rashi's commentary to Parashat Ki-Tisa (Shemot 30:29). The Torah there requires anointing all the appurtenances and utensils in the Mishkan with the special shemen ha-mishcha (anointing oil). After they are anointed, the Torah says, they will be "kodesh kodashim." Rashi explains that "kodesh kodashim" means that once an anointed utensil has some item or substance placed inside it, that item becomes Halakhically sacred. Here, too, "kodesh ha-kodashim" refers to the ability to render something else sacred.
This explains why "kodesh kodashim" may indeed refer to the azara. The azara likewise has the power to confer a status of kedusha, inasmuch as the keilim in the Mishkan become formally sacred once they are placed in the azara. This quality of the azara - its ability to make other objects holy – is what allows the Sifrei to interpret the term "kodesh kodashim" as a reference to the azara. Generally, this term refer to the holiest chamber in the Mishkan. In this instance, however, like in the aforementioned verses in Sefer Shemot, the word "kodesh" means "that which sanctifies," and thus "kodesh kodashim" may, indeed, be taken here as a reference to the azara.
David Silverberg
*****
Over
the last two days, we have discussed a problematic verse towards the end of Parashat Korach (18:10), which
appears, at first glance, to indicate that the kohanim
must eat the meat of sacrifices in the kodesh kodashim – the innermost chamber of the Mishkan. The commentators point out, however, that
this cannot possibly be true. Firstly,
only the kohen gadol may
enter the kodesh ha-kodashim,
and only on Yom Kippur, and secondly, elsewhere the Torah explicitly permits
and in fact requires eating sacrificial meat in the azara
(courtyard of the Mishkan/Mikdash). As we saw, one view in the Sifrei (cited in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Ben Beteira) understands this verse as permitting the
consumption of sacrificial meat in the "heikhal"-
the outer chamber inside the Mishkan – under
extenuating circumstances. For example,
if a war is being waged in the area around the
The
Ramban, in his commentary to this verse, cites this
view from the Sifrei and adds, astonishingly enough,
that this view would permit – under extenuating circumstances – partaking of
sacrificial meat even in the kodesh ha-kodashim, in the innermost sanctum of the Mikdash. Although
the Sifrei makes mention only of the heikhal, in truth, the Ramban
claims, the halakha applies to the kodesh ha-kodashim, as well. Thus, according to the Ramban,
when warfare or some other danger forces the kohanim
to remain inside the
The
Keli Chemda (on this parasha) discusses this position of the Ramban
at length. After noting the novelty of
such a halakha, permitting kohanim
to eat sacrificial meat in the kodesh ha-kodashim, the Keli Chemda poses a challenge to this view based on a Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (63a). The Gemara there discusses a situation of an animal sacrifice
that was mistakenly slaughtered inside the Mikdash. Generally, animal sacrifices were slaughtered
in the azara.
However, according to Rabbi Yochanan, a shelamim offering that was mistakenly slaughtered inside
the
In asking this question, the Gemara assumes that the Sifrei extracted from this verse only one halakha: that in certain situations, the Mikdash is a suitable place of the consumption of sacrificial meat. Had there been a different source for this halakha – such as Rabbi Yochanan's reasoning – then this verse, as understood by the Sifrei, would be superfluous. According to the Ramban's reading of the Sifrei, however, the verse introduces a far more novel rule: that kohanim may enter the kodesh ha-kodashim to partake of sacrificial meat. Normally, entering the kodesh ha-kodashim is strictly forbidden and carries with it a death penalty (with the exception of the kohen gadol during the Yom Kippur service). Therefore, if we accept the Ramban's reading of the Sifrei, the Gemara's challenge against Rabbi Yochanan's position is easily resolved; the verse is not superfluous, because it presents a most novel halakha, permitting entry into the kodesh kodashim.
The
Keli Chemda t suggests a
very simple explanation of the Ramban's position to
resolve this difficulty. Recall that the
Sifrei refers to a case when the kohanim
face actual danger to life by remaining outdoors, due to warfare and the like,
in which case they may eat the sacrificial meat even indoors. When the Ramban
extended this provision to the kodesh ha-kodashim, he meant that should the kohanim
be forced to retreat to the kodesh ha-kodashim, because the enemy legions had penetrated the
David Silverberg
*****
The haftara for Parashat Korach, taken from Sefer Shemuel I (11:14-12:22), tells of the assembly called by the prophet Shemuel after Benei Yisrael's resounding victory over the nation of Amon. This was the first war waged since the crowning of Am Yisrael's first king, Shaul. Shemuel gathers the people to "renew the coronation" (11:14), and at this assembly he delivers a lengthy address in which he reinforces the fundamental notion that in reality, God, not Shaul, is Benei Yisrael's king. He reiterates his basic opposition to the idea of having a king, which might replace the prophet – God's messenger – as the nation's leader, and reminds the people that their success or failure in war ultimately depend not on their flesh-and-blood king, but on the true King of the world.
Towards the end of his address, Shemuel declares:
"Now stand by and see the wondrous thing that the Lord will do before your eyes. It is the season of the wheat harvest. I will pray to the Lord and He will send thunder and rain; then you will take thought and realize what a wicked thing you did in the sight of the Lord when you asked for a king." (Shemuel I 12:16-17)
Sure enough, after Shemuel finishes speaking, a summertime thunderstorm – all
but unheard of in the
It is clear from the verses that Shemuel had it rain as an indication of God's anger over Benei Yisrael's request for a king. But why did he choose specifically this demonstration? What particular point did he wish to convey through this sudden, supernatural change of weather pattern?
Rashi explains that Shemuel simply wanted to prove the unlimited power of his prayer. Shemuel saw within Benei Yisrael's request for a king an element of skepticism in his ability to lead the nation to victory over their enemies. Through this spectacle, he sought to show that he could accomplish through his prayer far more than any monarch could through his authority and military might.
The Radak and Mahari Kara explain somewhat differently, that Shemuel here simply seeks to scare or warn Benei Yisrael. The mishna in Masekhet Ta'anit (1:7) cites this verse from Sefer Shemuel as proof to the fact that rainfall after the month of Nissan constitutes a "siman kelala" – an ominous sign, forewarning catastrophe. Shemuel thus had it rain to frighten the people and inform them that they are deserving of calamity because of their wrongdoing.
Malbim, however, takes an entirely different approach to these verses. Among the central issues that arise when studying Sefer Shemuel I is the seeming inconsistency between Shemuel's vehement opposition to the monarchy and the Torah's commandment to appoint a king (Devarim 17:15). Why would Shemuel so strongly oppose the idea of appointing a king, if the Torah appears to not only sanction a monarchy, but require it? Among the answers suggested is that of Rabbi Yehuda, cited in the Sifrei to Parashat Shoftim. He claims that indeed, as the Torah indicates, a monarchy is desirable and even constitutes a Biblical command. The problem lies in the timing. Benei Yisrael requested a king too early in their history; the time for kingship had yet to arrive. Malbim explains that the Torah calls for the establishment of a royal government only once Benei Yisrael settle in, so-to-speak, to a life governed by natural law. In the meantime, however, Benei Yisrael still lived a miraculous existence; they had yet to reach the stage of national maturity where they could strike the delicate balance between natural living and recognition of divine providence. It was therefore necessary for them to live under the rule and authority of a prophet, rather than of a king.
This, Malbim writes, explains the significance of the unseasonable thunderstorm. Rain is a great blessing, but only if it falls in its proper time. Shemuel hoped to teach Benei Yisrael that the same could be said about the monarchy. Though inherently acceptable and in fact obligatory, kingship will work only if it is introduced at the proper time.
David Silverberg
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