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PARASHAT CHUKAT
BY RAV DAVID SILVERBERG

 

MOTZAEI

            The opening section of Parashat Chukat deals with the process whereby a person achieves tahara (ritual purification) after having become tamei (impure) through contact with a corpse.  We find in this section a verse that is the subject of one the more famous Talmudic proverbs: "Zot ha-tora adam ki yamut be-ohel" – "This is the law concerning a person who dies in a tent…" (19:14).  The Gemara (Shabbat 83b) suggests reading this verse to mean, "This is the Torah: a person dies in the tent…"  In other words, as the Gemara comments, "Torah is sustained only in somebody who kills himself over it."  The image of a person dying in a tent – which the Torah invokes here to introduce the laws relevant to the people and utensils in the tent – also alludes to the intense, rigorous schedule required for a person to obtain and retain Torah knowledge.

            As with all homiletic readings, we might wonder whether Chazal perhaps found some point of connection between the message conveyed and the context of the verse in question.  Does this reading operate completely outside the context of tum'at meit (impurity caused by a corpse), or does this context somehow relate to the critical message of intensity and exertion in the pursuit of Torah scholarship?

            Rav Shmuel Wosner of Bnei-Brak (cited in Pardes Yosef He-chadash) suggested a possible point of connection on the basis of an intriguing comment of the Chid"a (Rav Chayim Yosef David Azulai, 1724-1806) in his work Nachal Kedumim.  The Chid"a there advances the theory that one's potential for Torah scholarship is hampered, to one extent or another, by the status of tum'at meit.  Therefore, when the ashes of the para aduma (red heifer) are unavailable and we are therefore unable to rid ourselves of this status of impurity, it is more difficult for us to achieve greatness in Torah knowledge than it was for our ancestors.  The status of tum'at meit, according to the Chid"a, yields a spiritual effect that poses an impediment of sorts to growth in Torah, on account of which it is more difficult to achieve Torah greatness in the absence of the para aduma.

            Rav Wosner suggested that this theory may explain the relevance of "killing oneself" over Torah in the context of the section dealing with tum'at meit.  The Torah here outlines the procedure of ridding oneself of this status, a procedure which, as mentioned, has the effect of allowing easier access to Torah scholarship.  In this context, Chazal issue a reminder that "Torah is sustained only in somebody who kills himself over it."  In other words, notwithstanding the potential spiritual effects of ritual purity, there are no magical shortcuts to Torah scholarship.  When all is said and done, growth and achievement are possible only through intense effort and exertion, and by making the necessary sacrifices for the sake of Torah learning.  Even if we find in rabbinic literature various "segulot" ("charms") that are deemed beneficial in the pursuit of Torah knowledge, the primary factor has always been, and will always be, the individual's hard work and investment of time and energy in this endeavor.

 

SUNDAY

 

            Parashat Chukat concludes with the story of Benei Yisrael's victories over the Emorite kingdoms of Sichon and Og, which resulted in their taking possession of these kings' territory east of the Jordan River.  The Torah tells that after the victory over Sichon, Benei Yisrael were confronted by Og and his army, whereupon God assured Moshe that he will emerge victorious: "The Lord said to Moshe: Be not afraid of him [Og], for I have given him, his entire nation and his land into your hands, and you shall do to him as you did to Sichon, king of the Emori…" (21:34).

            Rashi, based on the Midrash Tanchuma, explains that Moshe was fearful not of Og's military power, but rather of the merits he had accrued many years earlier.  According to the Midrash, it was Og who fled from the city of Sedom when it was pillaged by the four eastern powers, and informed Avraham that his nephew had been taken captive.  Upon hearing of his nephew's crisis, Avraham immediately mobilized a modest army and freed Lot and the other captives.  Moshe feared that this merit would serve Og well in his campaign against Benei Yisrael, and God therefore reassured him that Og would be easily defeated.

            Presumably, as Professor Nechama Leibowitz discusses in her Studies, Rashi cited this Midrash in an attempt to resolve the question of why Moshe suddenly felt afraid.  Not since his killing of an Egyptian taskmaster – the news of which soon reached Pharaoh – do we read of Moshe experiencing fear of another human being.  Why was he so fearful of Og, to the point where God had to speak to him to offer reassurance?  Rashi answers by attributing Moshe's fear to the special merit Og earned when he reported to Avraham the news about Lot's captivity.

            Professor Leibowitz added that this reading of the verse is actually anchored in a subtle textual nuance.  Generally, when the verb y.r.a. is used in reference to fear, it is followed by the preposition mi-, or "from."  In Sefer Devarim (7:18), for example, Moshe urges the people not be fearful of the Canaanite armies, and exhorts, "Lo tira meihem" ("Do not be afraid of them").  Here, however, Og is the direct object of Moshe's fear: "Al tira oto" ("Do not fear him").  Moshe was not fearful "from" or "of" Og, but rather "feared Og."  This construction is used in reference to the obligation to fear God – "Et Hashem Elokekha tira" (Devarim 6:13) – as well as the mitzva of showing reverence to parents – "Ish imo ve-aviv tira'u" (Vayikra 19:3).  Seemingly, when the Torah speaks of a direct object of fear, it refers not to actual fright and trepidation, but rather to awe and reverence.  As Professor Leibowitz writes: "Our commentators have explained that 'fear' in the intransitive sense implies physical terror of the might of the enemy whilst 'fear' in the transitive sense implies 'to stand in awe'."

            Hence, in the context of Og, too, the Midrash understood Moshe's "fear" as referring to a degree of respect and admiration.  Moshe highly regarded Og's initiative in bringing the news of Lot's capture to Avraham, until God assured him that this lone merit did not suffice to render Og worthy of defeating Benei Yisrael.

            It is worth noting that in his commentary to Sefer Bereishit (14:13), Rashi himself commented (based on the Midrash) that Og had ulterior motives for reporting Lot's capture.  Og had set his eyes upon Avraham's attractive wife, Sara, and therefore sought to lure Avraham to battle, in the hope that he would be killed in action, leaving Sara eligible for marriage.  If this was Og's motive in bringing the news to Avraham, why did Moshe suspect that the merit of that report rendered Og worthy of victory?

            Chizkuni addresses this question and answers, very simply, by invoking the famous principle (Horiyot 10b), "A person should always involve himself in Torah and mitzvot even not for its own sake."  Good deeds are inherently valuable even when performed for ulterior motives, and thus even Og's scheme to have Avraham killed in battle earned him merit, in that it resulted in Lot's freedom from captivity.

 

MONDAY

 

            The opening section of Parashat Chukat addresses several laws relevant to tum'at meit, the status of ritual impurity that one assumes upon coming in contact with a human corpse.  The Torah lists a number of cases that result in this status, such as coming in contact with a fallen soldier on a battlefield and touching a grave (19:16).  Whenever a person comes in direct contact with a corpse or grave, he becomes tamei for seven days, and absolves himself of this status by being sprinkled with the waters prepared from the ashes of the para aduma (red heifer), followed by immersion.

In reference to a fallen soldier, the Torah employs the term chalal cherev ("fallen by the sword"), which the Gemara (Nazir 53b) takes as an allusion to a certain parity between the chalal (corpse) and the cherev (sword).  Namely, just as contact with a human corpse renders a person tamei, so does one obtain this status by touching the sword used to kill somebody.  Chazal understood that this principle applies to all metal utensils; any metal utensil that came in contact with a corpse has the same halakhic status as the corpse itself with respect to tum'a.  A person who touches the utensil becomes tamei for seven days, just as he would had he touched a corpse.  (The Rambam, in Hilkhot Tum'at Meit 5:3, applies this rule to all utensils, and not merely metal utensils, whereas most other Rishonim maintain that it applies only to metal objects.)

The Ramban, in his commentary to this verse, asserts that the tum'a transmitted by a utensil that had touched a corpse differs in certain respects from the tum'a transmitted by a corpse itself.  One difference which the Ramban establishes involves the requirement of haza'a – sprinkling with the para aduma waters.  When a person becomes tamei as a result of touching a human corpse, his seven-day purification process requires that he be sprinkled with these waters on the third and seventh day.  According to the Ramban, this is not necessary in the case of tum'a resulting from contact with a metal utensil that had touched a corpse.  Even though a person who touches such a utensil becomes tamei for a week (during which time he may not enter the Mikdash or partake of sacrificial meat), his purification process does not require haza'a.

The Ramban elaborates on this theory in his commentary to Masekhet Bava Batra (20b), where he discusses a difficult passage in Masekhet Nazir (54b).  The Mishna (54a) lists a number of instances of tum'a which do not constitute a violation of the nazirite vow, but otherwise entail full-fledged tum'a and require haza'a.  Included in the Mishna's list is the case of keilim ha-noge'im be'meit – touching utensils that had come in contact with a corpse.  The straightforward reading of the Mishna thus suggests that when one touches a utensil that had come in contact with a corpse, his process of purification requires haza'a.  The Gemara, however, dismisses this possibility, claiming that one who contracts tum'a by touching such a utensil does not require haza'a.  It therefore suggests a different reading of the Mishna.

As the Ramban notes, this Talmudic passage clearly indicates that tum'a resulting from contact with a utensil that had touched a corpse does not require haza'a.  The Gemara did not even consider the possibility that the Mishna speaks of metal utensils and for this reason required haza'a.  Seemingly, then, even metal utensils that had touched a corpse, which have the capacity of transmitting tum'a, do not transmit tum'a to the point where the individual requires haza'a as part of his purification.

Tosefot, however, cite Rabbenu Tam as taking a different position.  Rabbenu Tam held that a metal utensil that had touched a corpse indeed transmits full-fledged tum'a that is no different from the tum'a transmitted by a corpse itself.  As such, even a person who touches such a utensil must undergo haza'a as a prerequisite to purification.  Rabbenu Tam therefore suggested a different explanation of the aforementioned passage in the Gemara.  He contended that the Gemara could not entertain the possibility that the Mishna speaks of metal utensils, because, as mentioned, the Mishna lists those cases of impurity which are not included in the prohibitions of the nazirite vow.  According to Rabbenu Tam, a metal utensil that had touched a corpse transmits full-fledged tum'a, and therefore contact with this utensil is included under the nazirite restrictions.  A nazir may not touch such a utensil, just as he may not touch a corpse.  The Gemara therefore concluded that the Mishna speaks of only non-metal utensils, and thus justifiably noted that contact with this kind of utensil that had touched a corpse most certainly does not require haza'a.

 

TUESDAY

 

            Yesterday, we began discussing the halakha known as "cherev harei hu ke-chalal" that the Sages infer from a verse in Parashat Chukat (19:16).  This provision equates the halakhic status of a metal utensil that had come in direct contact with a corpse with the status of a corpse itself.  Just as a person who came in contact with a corpse is considered tamei and can transmit this status to people and utensils that he touches, so does a person who came in contact with a utensil that had touched a corpse bear this same status of tum'a.

            The Ramban, as we saw, qualified this halakha, claiming that a utensil that had touched a corpse does not convey the precise same tum'a status as a corpse itself.  Specifically, a person who touches such a utensil does not require haza'a, sprinkling from the para aduma waters, as part of his seven-day purification process.  Even though haza'a is an indispensable component of the purification process for one who comes in direct contact with a corpse, it is not required in the case of a person who came in contact with a utensil that had come in contact with a corpse.  (This is as opposed to the view of Rabbenu Tam, who, as we saw yesterday, fully equated these two situations of tum'a.)

            The Imrei Shamai (by Rav Shamai Ginsburg, Jerusalem, 5745) comments that the Ramban's position could resolve a difficulty raised by Tosefot (Shabbat 111a) concerning a passage in Masekhet Yoma (88a).  The Gemara there cites a berayta permitting tevila (immersion) on Yom Kippur, if it happens to be the day on which the immersion is warranted.  Although bathing is forbidden on Yom Kippur, a person who became tamei and the day for his purification through tevila happens to be Yom Kippur, he may immerse.  The Gemara explains this berayta as predicated on the theory of tevila bi-zmana mitzva – eliminating one's tum'a status at the first opportunity constitutes a mitzva, and this mitzva allows one to immerse despite the prohibitions of Yom Kippur.

The berayta explicitly includes a temei meit – somebody who contracted tum'a through contact with a corpse – in this halakha.  Tosefot raise the question of why this individual's immersion would be permissible on Yom Kippur, given the fact that it is insufficient to eliminate one's status of tum'a.  As mentioned earlier, the process of purification from this kind of tum'a requires also haza'a – sprinkling with the para aduma waters.  The Gemara in Pesachim (69a) establishes that haza'a is not performed on Shabbat, and thus, by extension, it cannot be performed on Yom Kippur, either.  Therefore, even if a temei meit reaches the final day of his purification on Yom Kippur, tevila should, seemingly, be forbidden, as it will not achieve the desired goal of purification in any event, given the impossibility of haza'a.

According to the Ramban, however, this question is easily resolved.  As we saw, the Ramban maintains that if somebody became tamei through contact with a utensil that had come in contact with a corpse, his process of purification does not require haza'a.  If so, then there will be situations where immersion will independently suffice for a temei meit to regain his state of impurity, even without haza'a.  The Imrei Shamai  therefore explains, quite simply, that the Gemara in Masekhet Yoma refers to a case of tum'a transmitted by a utensil, rather than by an actual corpse, and in such a case immersion would be permissible on Yom Kippur.  Since no haza'a is required for such an individual, the berayta in Masekhet Yoma allows him to immerse on Yom Kippur in order to fulfill the mitzva of regaining his state of purity at the first opportunity to do so.

 

WEDNESDAY

 

            Our last two editions of "S.A.L.T." dealt with the halakha of cherev harei hu ke-chalal, which establishes an equation between a metal utensil that comes in contact with a human corpse and a corpse itself, with respect to the laws of tum'a.  A person who comes in direct contact with this utensil has the same status of tum'a as one who comes in contact with a corpse itself.  He is tamei for a period of seven days, and he is capable of transmitting tum'a to other people as well as utensils.  As we saw, the Ramban, both in his commentary to Parashat Chukat (19:16) and in his commentary to Masekhet Bava Batra (20b), advances the theory that these two cases are not entirely identical.  A person who comes in direct contact with a corpse obtains purification by being sprinkled with the waters of the para aduma on the third and seventh days since his contracting tum'a, and thereafter immersing.  One who touches a utensil that had come in contact with a corpse, by contrast, does not require sprinkling to achieve purification.  He merely waits seven days, immerses on the seventh, and is then tahor that evening.

            Yesterday, we saw how the Ramban's theory may help explain a puzzling passage in Masekhet Yoma.  Today, we will see how it resolves a difficulty that arises concerning a comment in Masekhet Pesachim (80a).  The Gemara there addresses a hypothetical situation where exactly half of Benei Yisrael are tahor on Erev Pesach, when the korban pesach is to be offered, and the other half are tamei.  A famous principle establishes that tum'a hutra be-tzibur, meaning, if the majority of the nation is tamei, certain sacrifices – including the korban pesach – may be brought despite most of the nation's state of ritual impurity.  The Gemara cites different views as to how we should proceed if exactly half are tamei and half are tahor.

            Amidst this discussion, the Gemara considers the possibility of having somebody intentionally come in contact with a human corpse (or a grave) such that he contracts tum'at meit, thereby rendering the majority of the nation tamei.  This would then allow for the offering of the korban pesach, now that the majority of the nation are in a state of impurity.  The Gemara accepts this possibility, in principle, noting only that a problem could arise concerning the korban chagiga, the festival offering that each individual must bring during Pesach, and that cannot be brought in a state of impurity.  This korban may be brought at any point during the seven days of Pesach, but according to one view a person who was disqualified from offering a korban on the first day of Pesach may not bring the chagiga at all throughout Pesach.  The Gemara comments that according to this view, we may not have a person willingly contract tum'a on Erev Pesach, as he would not then be unable to bring a chagiga at all during Pesach.  According to the standard view, however, that under all circumstances one may bring a chagiga at some point during Pesach, we could, in principle, have a person become tamei through contact with a corpse or grave in order to render the majority of the nation tamei.  This individual becomes tahor after the end of the seventh day since his contracting tum'a, which would be after the sixth day of Pesach, and he can thus bring the chagiga on the seventh day of Pesach.

            The Tzelach raises the question of how this arrangement would be allowed in a case when Erev Pesach falls on Sunday.  In such a case, the individual's second sprinkling – which takes place on the seventh day since becoming tamei – is scheduled for Shabbat.  As we mentioned yesterday, Halakha does not allow sprinkling the para aduma waters on Shabbat.  Hence, this individual would be unable to become tahor until after Pesach, and would thus be unable to bring a chagiga.  In such a case, then, this solution is not viable, yet the Gemara makes no mention of this dilemma.

            The Imrei Shamai (by Rav Shamai Ginsburg, Jerusalem, 5745) suggests resolving this question on the basis of the Ramban's view, that one who contracts tum'a through contact with a utensil that had come in contact with a corpse, does not require haza'a (sprinkling with the para aduma waters).  According to the Ramban, we may explain the Gemara's proposal as referring to having a person intentionally become tamei through contact with such a utensil.  As such, no haza'a is required, and thus he indeed becomes tahor after the sixth day of Pesach, even if that day is Shabbat.

 

THURSDAY

 

            The opening section of Parashat Chukat outlines the procedure whereby a person or utensil that contracted tum'at meit – ritual impurity transmitted by a human corpse – regains his state of tahara (purification).  A person who comes in direct contact with a human corpse remains tamei for seven days, and to become tahor he must be sprinkled with the special para aduma (red heifer) waters on the third and seventh days.  He then immerses on the seventh day and becomes tahor that night.

            As we briefly mentioned earlier this week, Halakha forbids sprinkling somebody with the para aduma waters on Shabbat.  This issue is actually subject to a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva, as recorded in the Mishna in Masekhet Pesachim (65b-66a), and Halakha follows Rabbi Akiva's position, that the Sages forbade performing haza'a (sprinkling) on Shabbat.  Rashi explains that haza'a is forbidden on Shabbat "because it gives the appearance of 'fixing' a person" ("mitchazei ke-metaken gavra").  Sprinkling a person to divest him of his status of impurity resembles fixing a dysfunctional utensil, which constitutes a Torah prohibition on Shabbat, and Chazal therefore enacted a prohibition against performing haza'a on Shabbat.

            The Tzelach raises the question of why Rashi resorted to this explanation of this halakha, when the Gemara, just several pages later (69a), provides a much different reason.   The Gemara cites Rabba as explaining the prohibition against haza'a in the same manner as he explains the suspension of mitzvot such as lulav, shofar and megila on Shabbat.  Namely, the Sages were concerned that a person might mistakenly carry the given article – such as a shofar, lulav, megila or para aduma waters – in the public domain on Shabbat.  They found it necessary to forbid the performance of these mitzvot on Shabbat in order to safeguard against possible Shabbat violations that might occur as a result of the anxious preoccupation with the given mitzva.  The question thus naturally arises, what led Rashi to suggest a reason of his own?

            The Tzelach suggests an answer based on a famous discussion of the Ran, in Masekhet Rosh Hashana (8a in the Rif).  The Ran there establishes that Rabba's theory, whereby the Sages forbade performing certain mitzvot on Shabbat out of concern that the article in question may be transported, applies only to mitzvot with which all Jews are occupied – such as lulav and shofar.  In situations of a mitzva that is performed by only one person or several people, others will remind the individual not to bring the article through the public domain on Shabbat.  The Ran enlists this theory to explain why the Sages did not enact a prohibition against performing circumcision on Shabbat, out of concern that one may carry the necessary instruments (or the infant) through a public domain.  Since only the infant's parents (and the mohel) are involved in this mitzva, Rabba's concern does not arise and an enactment is thus not warranted.

            As the Ran notes, however, this theory fails to account for the halakha concerning haza'a, which, like circumcision, is performed by a relatively small number of individuals on any given day.  Why did the Sages forbid haza'a on Shabbat, if others could remind the person not to carry the para aduma waters through the public domain?  The Ran answers that the Gemara applies this provision specifically to a case of Erev Shabbat that falls on Pesach, when all Jews are preoccupied with the mitzva of korban pesach.  On this Shabbat, then, even regarding haza'a there is concern that one may mistakenly carry the waters through the public domain, thus warranting a rabbinic enactment forbidding haza'a.

            The Tzelach notes that according to the Ran's rationale, Chazal should have enacted a prohibition against circumcision on Shabbat Erev Pesach, when everybody is preoccupied and thus nobody will remind a potential inadvertent violator not to carry the instruments outdoors.  Apparently, the Sages felt it would be awkward to forbid circumcision in the unique circumstance of Shabbat Erev Pesach while allowing it on every other Shabbat.  But if so, then this logic should be applied to haza'a, as well.  If the Sages allowed haza'a on regular Shabbatot, why did they suddenly forbid it on Shabbat Erev Pesach?

            The answer, the Tzelach suggests, is found in Rashi's comments cited earlier – that the Sages forbade haza'a on Shabbat for an entirely different reason, namely, that it resembles "fixing."  In truth, haza'a is forbidden on every Shabbat throughout the year, for the reason Rashi mentioned.  The Gemara, however, wondered why, in the case of Shabbat Erev Pesach, the Sages did not suspend this prohibition and allow temei'im to undergo haza'a in order to enable them to participate in the korban pesach.  Since a person cannot offer the paschal offering in a state of impurity, we might have expected Chazal to permit haza'a on Shabbat Erev Pesach so that those who are tamei are given the opportunity to achieve tahara and bring the sacrifice.  The Gemara therefore answers that on Shabbat Erev Pesach we have an additional concern, namely, that one may carry the para aduma waters through the public domain, in violation of Shabbat.  Chazal therefore maintained the prohibition against haza'a even on Shabbat Erev Pesach, in order to safeguard against Shabbat violations.

 

FRIDAY

 

            Parashat Chukat begins with the laws of the para aduma, the red heifer, the ashes of which were used to make special waters through which people who had contracted tum'a could regain their status of tahara.

            Among the more famous and intriguing features of the para aduma waters is the opposite effects it has on different people.  Although the waters are effective in removing a person's status of ritual impurity, they also have the capacity to cause ritual impurity.  The Torah establishes that anybody involved in any aspect of the para aduma waters actually becomes tamei.  This applies to the kohen who sprinkles the heifer's blood before it is burned (19:7), the one who burns the heifer (19:8), the one who collects the ashes (19:10), the one who sprinkles the waters upon the person or object that had become tamei (19:21), and anybody who otherwise comes in contact with the waters (19:21).

            One insightful approach (among several) that has been taken to explain the symbolic meaning of this phenomenon views it as demonstrating the vastly different effects and impacts that an entity can have on different people.  Something that is beneficial and useful to one person may be detrimental or even destructive to another.  This concept can be applied to much of the wide spectrum of the human experience, including possessions, lifestyles, careers, pastimes, habits, tendencies, schedules, routines, personality traits, relationships, and so on.  Not only will one person's preferences not necessarily correspond to his fellow's, but those preferences may even be harmful or otherwise detrimental to his fellow.  The fact that something "purifies" one person does not negate the possibility of it "contaminating" somebody else.

            This symbolism of the para aduma should perhaps be carefully considered before one offers unsolicited advice or criticism, well-meaning as the intended remarks may be.  What works for one person might not necessarily work for another, and, what more, it may even be detrimental to somebody else.  One therefore should not assume that his decisions and way of doing things should be embraced by his fellow.  Like the para aduma waters, they may be "purifying" for one person, but "contaminating" and harmful for somebody else.

 

David Silverberg