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PARASHAT CHUKAT

 

 

Sheva berakhot are blessings recited at the conclusion of meals held to celebrate a wedding, within the first seven days of married life. They are also recited under the chupa, and at the end of the wedding feast on the night of the wedding. These blessings are recited only when ten men, constituting a minyan, are present. However, when such a group eats together, in celebration of a wedding, and in the presence of the bride and groom, they are obligated to say these blessings. Contrary to what is usually assumed, the individual diners are obligated to recite the sheva berakhot, not the hosts of the function. This means that if a group chooses to leave early, they are obligated to say the sheva berakhot even if the function has not ended.

 

            This halakha can prove highly inconvenient. Today, weddings often continue into the early hours of the morning, and grace-after-meals is often delayed until that time. Many guests travel great distances, and are unable to stay late into the night. If they choose to join the wedding feast, they are obligated to say sheva berakhot. While this is the halakha in the Shulchan Arukh (Even Ha-ezer, 62:11), its application to present-day reality is problematic.  If the guests break into groups and say sheva berakhot early, this may hurt the feelings of the hosts and cause great inconvenience.

 

            Rav Moshe Feinstein ztz"l was asked for a solution (Iggerot Moshe, vol. 1, 56). He first recognized that this really is a halakhic problem: guests are not permitted to leave before reciting sheva berakhot. Eating mezonot rolls instead of bread would not help, as the context of the meal would invest them with the same halakhic importance as bread.

 

Rav Moshe found a practical solution by opening up the more fundamental question of what actually lies at the root of the obligation to recite the zimun, the communal form of grace-after-meals. This is important because it is this prayer, at the conclusion of the feast, to which sheva berakhot is appended. Rav Moshe showed that it is not the fact of eating in a group that obligates one to make a zimun, nor even the intention to do so. It is rather the intention, from the start of the meal, to recite grace-after-meals in a group. In a normal case, since it is preferable to pray in a group, a group of diners are considered to be set to recite grace-after-meals together. Without any particular intention, they automatically form a group; since it is the preferable thing to do, it is considered their assumed intention. However, since fundamentally the forming of a group for the prayer is not automatically dependent on eating together, but rather upon the intention to pray together, it may be circumvented. If one explicitly says, before the beginning of the meal, that one does not wish to form a group for the purpose of reciting grace-after-meals together, the group is not formed. While there is a group of diners, they are not a group for prayers. Each individual prays alone at the end of the meal.

 

            Rav Moshe shows that this is the opinion of the Rama (O.C. 193:3) and the Magen Avraham (O.C. 552:9), and says that when one is unable to stay at a wedding feast, one may rely upon it. Therefore, if a guest sees from the start that a wedding will continue longer than he or she is able to stay, the guest can explicitly deny an intention to become part of the group for the recital of grace-after-meals. In this way, the guest would not be obligated to stay to the end of the wedding.

 

            While this technical solution may be used when one is unable to remain at the wedding, the halakhic discussion teaches us much about the correct approach that one should have as a guest. Ideally, one should appreciate that being a guest at a wedding makes one part of a group of celebrators. The obligation to recite sheva berakhot is not upon the hosts alone. All the guests at the wedding are party to the recitation, to which they should all answer amen. Being a guest at a wedding means that one is a part of the celebration, not a visitor.

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

*****

 

            Chapter twenty of Bamidbar tells of the sin that Moshe committed, which made him unable to lead the Jewish People into the Promised Land. The chapter opens with the death of Miriam, his older sister. The next verse informs us that there was no water for the people, which caused them to gang up against Moshe and Aharon. Rashi (quoting the Gemara in Ta'anit 9a) tells us that there is a connection between these two pieces of information. For forty years the people received water in Miriam's merit. Now that she had passed away, they thirsted, because the well that had provided for them had disappeared.

 

            It is easy to understand the connection between Miriam's merit and the supplying of water. Miriam stood guard when her baby brother, Moshe, floated down the Nile. Her meritorious deed was accomplished by using water, such that the water of the Nile would save the life of her brother. The people whom her brother took out of slavery therefore received water in her merit. When we use nature for the service of God, God sets nature at our service.

 

            There is a closer connection between the issues. Ultimately, these people were saved because of Miriam. By using water in the service of God, she made her brother's mission, as a leader, possible. In the same way, his mission was always made possible through her merit. For her sake, water was supplied to the people in the desert, without which Moses would not have been able to lead them there for forty years.

 

            This idea follows throughout the narrative, and opens a window into understanding fundamental issues later in the chapter. It was because of a lack of water that the people rose against Moshe and Aharon. God commanded them to speak to a rock, and when they hit it twice, and it still gave water, they were told that they had sinned - presumably, in diverting from the particular command. Not only was Moshe's mission hindered by the lack of water, by the lack of his sister's merit, but his whole leadership was challenged, and ultimately his mission was curtailed.

 

            Miriam saved her baby brother's life. Her merit was always with him, his success always related to it. The water, made by her to save his life as an infant, stood by him always, in her merit. The fact that the people had water throughout their wanderings made his mission possible. As soon as this merit was lost, his mission was subject to the threat held off by that merit - the challenge of leadership over people without water. The complexity of the issue is remarkable. There is a direct correspondence, on several levels, between the nature of the valorous act performed, and its projected implications over time.

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

*****

 

            Moshe committed a sin, because of which he was not allowed to enter the land of Israel. The text of the Torah is unclear as to what exactly was the sin that he committed. If his transgression was that he hit the rock, as Rashi understands, then why did God command him to take the rod? It would seem that God's intention was that he should use the rod also.

 

            The Rambam claims, in the fourth chapter of his introduction to Pirkei Avot, that Moshe's sin was that he got angry. He spoke to the people in a furious manner, which was particularly improper for one whose behavior would be watched and emulated. Furthermore, by behaving in an angry manner he gave the impression to the people that God was angry with them also. This was incorrect. While God, on other occasions, is described anthropomorphically as being enraged, here He simply commanded Moses to perform this miracle. The fact that the people behaved in an aggressive manner towards Moshe (Bamidbar 20:3) does not mean that their behavior unleashed God's wrath. In showing anger, Moses gave the impression that it did.

 

            For the Rambam this is a crucial issue. Firstly, the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Teshuva 7:3) that one must repent over bad character traits, just as one must repent bad deeds. Secondly, he claims that one who is not of a virtuous and exemplary character cannot possibly prophesy. This does not mean that a prophet must be perfect, as this episode concerning Moshe proves. However, a prophet is not simply God's mouthpiece, but an image to be emulated. Therefore, the way he presents himself to the people is of the utmost importance.

 

            What is the connection between Moshe's sin and his punishment? A divine punishment is not merely a technique for putting one to order. There is always, we assume, a direct connection between the nature of the sin and the form of punishment. Furthermore, according to the Rambam's explanation, why was Moses angry when God was not?

 

            When, at Mount Sinai, the people asked that they cease to experience the direct encounter with God, Moses became upset, and was calmed by God. Moshe wanted the people to experience the ultimate; God, however, knows human weakness. Moshe led the people through the wilderness for forty years, while they lived a miraculous existence. Now, on the verge of entering the land, they complained bitterly about the manna, the source of this miraculous existence. Moshe could not take it, and he lost his temper. As a spiritual leader, he was unable to deal with the idea that people lose interest in miraculous sustenance, just as he was upset by the people's withdrawal at Mount Sinai. God, however, understands. Therefore, both here and at Sinai there was a discrepancy between God's reaction and Moshe's.

 

            The people were on the verge of entering the land and beginning to lead a natural existence. Moshe showed here that he was unable to deal with the people's succumbing to mediocrity. He demanded from them an ideal form of spiritual life. God also demands this of us; but He understands when we fall, and sees the difference between various forms of weakness. Moshe was let down. In his anger, he revealed that he was simply unable to make the necessary move between being the leader in the wilderness, and leading the people into a natural existence in the land of Israel. His sin revealed an inability to perform the mission that he was deprived of, as a punishment for his sin.

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

*****

 

            Yesterday, we discussed Rambam's opinion that Moshe's sin was his anger with the people when he performed the miracle of bringing water out of a rock. This failing was serious enough to merit divine punishment. The Rambam is of the opinion that one must repent bad character traits just as one must repent bad actions, and that the former are actually worse, as they are harder to change (Hilkhot Teshuva 7:3).

 

The particular sin of anger is one of the two cases of character traits that the Rambam understands to be completely inappropriate, and never acceptable. Generally, the Rambam argues that one should regulate all of one's personality into the golden mean. This Aristotelian idea is understood by the Rambam to be our Rabbis' opinion also. Neither the extreme in excess or in deficiency is praiseworthy or good; rather, God teaches us to be moderate in all aspects of our character. In this way, we should be able to keep His commandments and become closer to him in a healthy and true manner.

 

            The two exceptions that the Rambam makes to this rule are anger and pride. In no situation whatsoever is it acceptable to become angry. Unlike various other moods, which each have a place and time, anger is always harmful. The Gemara teaches (Pesachim 66b) that anger causes the wise to make mistakes, and prophets to lose their ability to prophesy. In tune with these ideas, the Rambam makes anger an exception to the rule of the middle path (Hilkhot De'ot 2:3). Yet he believes that the effect produced in becoming angry can have an appropriate place and time. Often it may be important to seem angry, and cause the effect of anger. But one should never actually become angry.

 

            The other exception is pride. Aristotle believed in the idea of the great-souled man (Nicomachean Ethics, IV:iii, IX:xiii). He thought that if a person is truly good, he should be proud of himself and insist upon honors. Jewish thought completely rejects such an idea. The Rambam claims that it is insufficient to be simply humble; one must totally expel feelings of haughtiness from one's personality (Hilkhot De'ot 2:3, Commentary on Pirkei Avot 4:4). It is interesting that the Rambam takes Moshe as an example of this. We are told that Moses was "exceedingly humble" (Bamidbar 12:3). The Rambam understands that being humble is the middle path. So, when we are informed of Moshe's extreme humility, we are to understand that he veered from a normal state of humility to an extreme in this character trait.

 

            The Rambam considers Moses the best case by which to show that it is not enough to be simply humble; one must become excessive in this quality. The greatest prophet and leader of the Jewish People is the example from which we learn both of the two exceptions to middle-path conduct. From him we learn that we must be extremely humble, and it is in study of his character that we appreciate the correct approach to anger. For a person of his extreme spirituality, losing his temper was a terrible sin. Therefore, in study of his character we are able to comprehend the ideal in a personality. In the case of humility we learn by appreciating his extreme achievements, and in the case of anger by his single weakness, in the context of his greatness.

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

*****

 

            Yesterday, we discussed the Rambam's approach to anger and pride. While generally he is of the opinion that the golden mean should be followed, in these cases, he argues that one must go to the extreme. One should be exceedingly humble, perhaps meek. The Rambam has no problem in finding foundation for this idea in Talmudic sources. Gemara Sota includes two long pages in discussion of issue (4b-5b), the overwhelming majority of which presents an extreme position. A proud individual is compared first to an idolater, then to a heretic, and then to the idol itself. These three opinions exhibit three attempts to express the extreme contempt our sages felt for arrogance. One who is vain worships himself as a false god. Since he replaces God with himself, he does not believe in God, and this makes him a heretic. But in actual fact, he is the idol itself.

 

            The Gemara records a disagreement between Amoraic sages whether a very small amount of pride should be considered appropriate in the personality of a scholar. Rav Chiya argued that a learned person should ideally have a small degree of pride, so that he be able to influence others, and hold positions of authority in the community. Rav Nachman dismissed this idea by quoting a verse that presents a vain person as an abomination to God. If so, no aspect of it should be legitimized. Rabbeinu Yona (Commentary to Pirkei Avot 4:4) understands that the halakha is decided in favor of the latter position, but the Rambam leaves these two positions open (Commentary to Pirkei Avot 4:4).

 

An interesting argument, presented in the Gemara between these two positions, is that of Rava. He makes a seemingly paradoxical statement: "One who has it should be excommunicated (or ostracized), and so should one who does not." The Rambam understood this as being in agreement with the first position. One must have only a small degree of pride; it must be very small, but it is crucial.

 

            However, seemingly paradoxical statements contain a certain beauty, and have their own logic. Rava's statement may reveal something of the complexity of the human condition. Both having and not having pride are problematic. One is caught in an intrinsically paradoxical situation, in which there is not only no simple solution, but, often, no real solution all.

 

            A similar contradiction becomes apparent by comparing two mishnayot in Pirkei Avot with a Gemara. We are taught (Pirkei Avot 2:18) that one must not be wicked in one's own eyes, that is, one must not consider himself wicked. However, in the Gemara (Nidda 30a) we are told that before a baby is born, he is made to swear that he will be righteous, yet that even if the whole world considers him such, he should be wicked in his own eyes. To strengthen the contradiction, we may cite another mishna from Pirkei Avot (1:6), which says that one should judge people favorably. Are we to understand that this positive outlook on people should not be exercised towards oneself? Perhaps.  What, then, are we to make of the contradiction between the other mishna and the Gemara?

 

            Obviously, how one views himself may be a pivotal issue. Humility does not mean naivete concerning oneself, but rather some form of outlook that emphasizes the real issues and reality. We see here a contradiction between two sources, the earlier one (the mishna) being so famous that it is hard to imagine it was unknown to the author of the later one. A contextual analysis suggests different readings in the different cases.  Furthermore, it is possible that the later source simply disagrees with the earlier one. However, in light of Rava's paradoxical statement, we may suggest that our Rabbis are really calling our attention to the paradoxical and inherently problematic situation that a human being is in. Existentially, one is caught in a form of existence that offers no safe solution. God places us in such a position. We are expected to appreciate what this situation means, and to understand the paradoxical aspect of the human condition.

 

            (Compare Gemara Kiddushin 40b: "Study is greater [than action], for it leads to action.")

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

*****

 

Parashat Chukat opens with the laws concerning the red heifer. In the middle of elucidation of the laws of purification through the red heifer, the narrative includes the following phrase, "This is the law, a man who dies in a tent…" (Bamidbar 19:14). While the literal meaning of these words is easily understood within the context of the narrative, the sages showed us a deeper meaning in them. The word used for "law", in this phrase, is "torah". This word can be understood, by its more general meaning, to relate to the whole of the Torah.

 

"Reish Lakish said: From where do we learn that the words of Torah endure only with one who kills himself over them? From that which it says, 'This is the Torah, a man who dies in a tent'" (Gemara Berakhot 63b).

 

The sages interpreted this phrase out of context in order to illustrate an idea that is of great issue for them. We read in the fourth section of the beraita appended to Pirkei Avot (Pirkei Avot 6:4), "This is the way of the Torah: you shall eat bread with salt, drink a measurement of water, sleep on the ground, and live a life of pain [perhaps 'strain,' or 'suffering']. If you do so…you are fortunate in this world, and it will be good for you in the next." This, presumably, is what our rabbis meant when they spoke of killing oneself over Torah. One must renounce the pleasures of the world, in an effort to give oneself over to the Torah; only in such a manner can one develop a real mastery over the Torah.

 

However, such a scheme seems highly problematic, as study in such dire circumstances would not seem optimal. Most Jewish religious thinkers do not consider such asceticism spiritually beneficial. Furthermore, study in desperate conditions is not a recipe for good acquisition of knowledge and understanding.

 

The Rambam, in his commentary on Pirkei Avot, explains that it means, "Even if you have nothing to eat but bread with salt, do not withhold yourself from the study of Torah." By this explanation, the excerpt is understood not as relating to the preferred "way of the Torah", but rather, to a possible one. The way of the Torah is such that even in dire circumstances one should study.

 

The Abarbanel moves the phrase in the opposite direction. He understands this excerpt to be an explanation of an earlier assertion, that the study of Torah refines a person, and improves him morally. How does this happen? It is because "the way of the Torah" is to make one content with only the necessary, in one's physical needs. "The way of the Torah," does not refer to the correct manner by which one should follow a course of study, but rather, the nature of the study of Torah. While the Rambam saw the phrase as encouraging a dedication to Torah under any circumstances, the Abarbanel understood it as explaining what a real dedication to Torah does to a person. It transforms the student into one who is above physical desires. The Torah does not demand such abstention from a person; rather, it propels him beyond a dependence on physicality.

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

*****

 

Yesterday, we discussed the rabbinic dictum that one should kill oneself in the tent of Torah. We compared it to another idea, that the way of the Torah is one of pain, and saw that the Rambam understood this to encourage a dedication to Torah under any circumstances, even the most dire. The Abarbanel understood it as an explanation of the idea that the study of Torah transforms the student, making him less interested in physical pleasures.

 

However, the Rambam quotes the fist rabbinic idea, that one should kill oneself in the tent of Torah, in his Mishne Torah (Hilkhot Talmud Torah 3:12), and understands it in a comparatively literal manner. He tells us that the words of Torah do not become established in one who studies in luxurious circumstances, but in one who kills himself over them. Only in one who continuously causes himself physical pain, and restrains his eyes from sleep. While the Rambam understood the dictum, that the way of Torah is one of suffering, in a non-literal manner, he understood the idea of killing oneself in the tent of Torah to be calling for extreme devotion in one's application to Torah, even including physical suffering.

 

Such an extravagant call for dedication to study, even in the face of physical suffering, makes one wonder if enjoyment of one's learning is positive at all. A danger, inherent in such ideas, is that they cause one to confuse the concepts of physical and spiritual enjoyment. The whole point of abstention from physicality, and extreme dedication to a spiritual aim, is to develop one's identification with, and internalization of, the spiritual goal, even at the expense of physical enjoyment. Such a spiritual goal, however, should also be one of enjoyment, only spiritual and deep, not external and superficial.

 

In the eighth chapter of Mishlei we learn that the Torah preceded the existence of the universe. We are then told (verse 30) that it was God's plaything. We are to understand that, in some metaphorical sense, the Torah gave God pleasure. It played before Him. The next verse (31) tells us that it plays in His land, and is a source of pleasure for mankind.

 

Rabeinu Yona (in his commentary to Pirkei Avot 2:14) explains these verses as outlining and illustrating the correct approach to the study of Torah. The Torah played before God prior to the creation of the world, and it gave Him pleasure. Our relationship to Torah should be similar. It should play in the world today, and should give us pleasure. What the verse means, when it says that the Torah plays in the world, is unclear. Perhaps it is related to the issue of our enjoyment. The study and observance of Torah should not be seen as taking pleasure away from us, but rather, as something which comes into our lives and exchanges physical and superficial pleasure for more meaningful and spiritual enjoyment. Inherent to the idea of the giving of the Torah is that it should play in the world, and become a source of enjoyment for humanity.

 

Shlomo Dov Rosen

 

 

 

 

To see this year's S.A.L.T. selections:

 

www.vbm-torah.org/salt.htm


 

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