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PARASHAT PINCHAS
By Rav David Silverberg
The latter part of Parashat Pinchas delineates the various musaf ("additional") sacrifices offered on Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh and festivals. A quick survey of these sacrifices reveals several patterns, among the more obvious of which is the se'ir chatat goat as a sin-offering a feature shared by the musaf offerings of all these occasions, with the exception of Shabbat. However, the Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (60b), cited by Rashi in his commentary to this parasha (28:15), notes a subtle but unmistakable difference in the Torah's presentation of the se'ir chatat for Rosh Chodesh. Unlike in all other instances, here the Torah describes this sacrifice as a chatat le-Hashem a "sin-offering to the Lord." The Gemara there in Chulin reaches a startling conclusion on the basis of phraseology, namely, that the Rosh Chodesh sin-offering is brought on behalf of the Almighty, so-to-speak. As the Gemara puts it, God tells Benei Yisrael, "Bring a sin-offering for My having shrunk the moon." Initially, the Gemara records, God created the sun and moon of equal size. Ultimately, however, He decreased the moon's size, which reaches its lowest point around the time of Rosh Chodesh, when the new moon appears. God thus requires atonement, as it were, for this "injustice," which He achieves through our offering of a Rosh Chodesh sin-offering on His behalf. Clearly, this Gemara cannot be understood on a literal level. God never "sins"; He is beyond reproach and cannot ever require atonement. This Gemara has therefore become the subject of much homiletic discussion, as scholars and darshanim have attempted to uncover the meaning underlying this otherwise astonishing passage. (Last year, in our series to Parashat Pinchas, we cited two possible explanations.) Rav Gavriel Zev Margolis, in his Torat Gavriel, suggests an allegorical interpretation, whereby the "moon" actually refers to Benei Yisrael (or perhaps mankind in general). The human being is born as an essentially physical being, fundamentally similar to other creatures, but is infused with a spiritual quality. Like the moon, which is inherently dark and unimpressive, but shines with the light it receives from the sun, a person's essence is essentially physical, but can "shine" spiritually through the inspiration and spiritual sensitivity with which the Almighty endows him. We are called upon to capitalize upon this gift and radiate as brightly as possible, to fully utilize the light from the "sun," from the Almighty, to overcome the darkness. Very often, however, we find ourselves comparable to the moon around the time of Rosh Chodesh, when it hardly shines, when it does not receive enough light from its source, and remains mostly dark. The Rosh Chodesh sin-offering differs from that of all other festivals in its frequency. Each and every month, on Rosh Chodesh, we are called upon to offer this sacrifice and seek atonement, a process which obviously entails teshuva. As we recite in the Rosh Chodesh musaf prayer, "You have given New Months to Your people as a time of atonement." For this reason, many communities observe Erev Rosh Chodesh as a "Yom Kippur Katan," a day of fasting and repentance resembling Yom Kippur, because of Rosh Chodesh's function as a time of atonement. Clearly, a monthly period of atonement is a very tall order. Can we really observe a Yom Kippur each and every month? For many of us, it is difficult enough to properly devote ourselves to sincere repentance during the High Holiday period each year. Can we really be expected to observe a day of atonement every month? Rav Margolis suggests that it is this question the Gemara addresses by speaking of God's atonement for "shrinking the moon." In ordering the monthly Rosh Chodesh sin-offering and concomitant process of repentance, the Almighty takes full responsibility, as it were, for the absence of abundant "light" within us. He assures us that He will look favorably upon even our minor achievements in the pursuit of teshuva every month. After all, it was He who created the "moon," the human being, as a physical entity depending on "outside sources" for spiritual light, and He can therefore expect only so much. Thus, the Gemara refers to Benei Yisrael's need for atonement, not the Almighty's. God's "confession" here relates not to any wrongdoing, but rather His acknowledgment of the human condition, which often renders significant improvement difficult. He guarantees us that He will nevertheless look favorably upon even minimal improvement, provided that we make the most of whatever spiritual "light" He shines upon us, and exert ourselves to the utmost.******
Parashat Pinchas tells of the formal designation of Yehoshua, Moshe's closest disciple, as his successor as leader of Benei Yisrael. God orders Moshe to conduct a formal installation ceremony, which included the placing of Moshe's hands on Yehoshua's head (27:18,23). The Rambam, in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (4:1), points to this ritual as the original semikha, or formal conferral of status of Torah authority. Though today semikha refers to certification by a rabbi (or institution) of a student's qualifications to render halakhic decisions, the origins of the term relate to a far more specific status, which was passed from mentor to student in an unbroken chain that began with Moshe and Yehoshua. The status conferred through semikha grants the scholar certain powers, particularly involving punitive measures (such as monetary fines and corporal punishment), which rabbinical judges are authorized to administer only if they had received formal semikha. Likewise, all members of the Sanhedrin (supreme rabbinical court) must have received semikha; for this reason, the Jewish people have been unable to reestablish the Sanhedrin since the discontinuation of the semikha chain during the period of persecution following the Bar-Kokhba revolt. However, the Rambam, in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (4:11), famously asserts that semikha can be reinstated after having been discontinued. He writes that if all the rabbinical scholars in Eretz Yisrael agree to confer the semikha status upon a given scholar, he is indeed deemed a "samukh," and he is then authorized to confer this status upon others. The Rambam's ruling was invoked and implemented by the rabbis of Tzefat in the year 5298 (1538), who convened and granted semikha to Rav Yaakov Beirav (known as "Mahari Beirav"). This initiative triggered considerable controversy, as the rabbis of Jerusalem, particularly the city's chief rabbi, Rav Levi Ben Chaviv, vehemently opposed the reinstating of semikha.In his commentary to the Mishna (Sanhedrin 1:3), the Rambam provides the rationale behind his surprising position. He claimed that since the prophet Yeshayahu (1:26) promised the restoration of Am Yisrael's judicial system, which, of course, cannot be complete without the Sanhedrin, some mechanism for reinstating semikha must exist. Otherwise, the Sanhedrin could never be reestablished.
Rav Soloveitchik (cited by Rav Herschel Schachtar, Eretz Ha-tzvi, p.233) suggested a possible basis for the Rambam's novel theory, in the Torah's description of Yehoshua's formal appointment as Moshe's successor. A careful reading of these verses reveals a two-stage process. God orders Moshe, "Take Yehoshua, son of Nun and place your hands upon him. Have him stand before Elazar the kohen and before the entire congregation, and commission him in their sight" (27:18-19). Rav Soloveitchik claimed that two rituals were required: Moshe's direct, personal designation of Yehoshua, symbolized by the hand placing, and, secondly, his public instatement, in the presence of the entire nation. These two stages perhaps correspond to the two possible methods of conferring semikha. Moshe's direct assignment of Yehoshua parallels the more conventional method, of direct conferral from one samukh to the next, while the public installation represents the second means of conferring semikha, through a consensus among the nation's rabbinic leaders. Moshe conferred semikha upon Yehoshua with both methods in order to establish the precedent for all future conferrals. Thus, the Rambam's novel and somewhat controversial theory might actually have roots in the Chumash itself.******
The Torah presents in Parashat Pinchas the details concerning the temidin daily sacrifices offered in the Temple and the musafin the special, musaf or "additional" sacrifices brought on Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh and festivals. Rav Shemuel Baruch Deutsch, in his Birkat Kohen, notes several indications that the Shabbat musaf offering stands separate and apart from that of the other special occasions (Rosh Chodesh and Yom Tov). Most obviously, it is the least elaborate and complex of all the musafin. All other musafin feature a combination of bulls, rams and sheep as an ola (burnt offering), as well as a goat serving as a chatat (sin offering). On Shabbat, however, the korban musaf consists of merely two sheep (accompanied by the standard meal offering and libations, required with every sacrificial offering). In addition, Rav Deutsch observes, the Torah introduces all the musaf offerings with a specific imperative takrivu, or ve-hikravtem ("you shall offer "). In presenting the Shabbat musaf offering, however, the Torah omits the imperative term: "And on the day of Shabbat two unblemished, yearling sheep " (28:9). How might we account for this discrepancy? Rav Deutsch contends that the Torah does not introduce the Shabbat musaf with a new imperative because this section simply continues the previous discussion, regarding the daily tamid offerings. The musaf on Shabbat, unlike that of the other special occasions, is essentially an extension of the daily tamid offering. Rather than constituting a separate, independent obligation, the Shabbat musaf is integrated as part of the day's tamid ritual. This also accounts for the simplicity of this sacrifice. The tamid offering brought each morning and afternoon consisted simply of a single sheep. On Shabbat, we are to bring an extra tamid, as it were, distinct from the normal tamid only in terms of quantity. The Torah does not require bringing an additional korban on Shabbat, but rather mandates expanding the standard offering in honor of Shabbat. A subtle nuance in the Rambam's terminology, Rav Deutsch notes, supports this theory. Before each section of halakhot in Mishneh Torah, the Rambam delineates which of the 613 mitzvot are addressed in that section. Naturally, then, as he introduces Hilkhot Temidin U-musafin, the Rambam lists the various occasions on which these sacrifices are required, as each occasion constitutes one of the 613 mitzvot. Interestingly, he employs different terminology in introducing the Shabbat musaf than he does when listing the others. Regarding the musaf of Shabbat he writes, "To add two sheep as an ola on Shabbat," whereas the other musafin are described as, "The mitzva of the Rosh Chodesh musaf; the mitzva of the Pesach musaf," and so on. Seemingly, unlike the other musafin, the musaf of Shabbat is integrally bound to the daily tamid offering, and is merely an "addition" to the existing sacrificial framework of the temidin. This principle might yield practical ramifications. Rav Deutsch refers us to a discussion of Tosefot in Masekhet Berakhot (28a) where Tosefot cite Rabbenu Shimshon as indicating that specifically on Shabbat, the musaf offering was slaughtered together with the tamid offering. This halakhic distinction appears to corroborate the theory that the Shabbat musaf is of a different nature from the other musafin, and constitutes an integral part of the korban tamid. This role is reflected in the procedure of its offering, which mandates its incorporation within the tamid ritual.******
Parashat Pinchas begins with God's emphatic endorsement of Pinchas' otherwise questionable act of zealotry, which the Torah narrates in the final verses of Parashat Balak. In according with the halakha known as kana'in pog'in bo allowing a zealot to kill a Jew who sins with a gentile woman Pinchas slew Zimri, the tribal leader of Shimon, and Kozbi, the Midianite princess whom Zimri had taken in the presence of the entire nation. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 82b), cited in Rashi's opening comments to Parashat Pinchas, tells that Pinchas' violence earned widespread condemnation among the people. God therefore spoke to Moshe and expressed His resounding approval of Pinchas' zealotry, on account of which he and his offspring were granted an "eternal blessing of priesthood" (25:13). God's praise for Pinchas, and the principle of kana'in pog'in bo in general, calls into question a halakha established earlier in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 82a). The Gemara states that had Zimri killed Pinchas in self-defense, he would not have been liable for murder. By approaching to kill Zimri, Pinchas assumed the status of a rodef a "pursuer." Halakha licenses killing a person who pursues another to kill him, and the Gemara applies this provision even in cases of kana'in pog'in bo. Although a zealot is allowed (or perhaps even obligated) to act upon his zealous rage and kill the violator, the violator is nonetheless licensed to kill the zealot in self-defense. At first glance, these two halakhot appear contradictory. If Pinchas was legally justified in killing Zimri, how could he be considered a rodef? Consider, for example, the situation of a capital violation. Certainly, the convicted violator is not justified in turning around and killing the shali'ach beit din (court executioner). How, then, could the Gemara permit Zimri to kill Pinchas? Rav Shaul Yisraeli (as cited by Rav Yaakov Ariel, in his Mei-ohola Shel Torah) suggested that this license, granted to the violator to slay the approaching zealot, is necessary to establish the sincerity of the alleged zealotry. Kana'in pog'in bo marks an exceptional, extraordinary provision, and is restricted to only the very rare circumstances where an individual is genuinely driven to zealotry by a pure desire to defend God's honor. As we saw last week, Moshe himself refrained from taking this initiative due to personal motives that may have obscured his judgment and would have adulterated the sincerity of any act of zealotry on his part. Rav Yisraeli suggested that the zealot's sincerity is determined by his willingness to sacrifice his life for the cause. Halakha entitles him to take the life of the violator in defending the Almighty's honor only if he is prepared to possibly give his own life in this effort. Thus, the application of the rodef principle in this context is not contradictory at all. It is necessary to affirm the purity of the zealot's motives, which is an indispensable prerequisite for the permissibility of what would otherwise be looked upon as a criminal act of wanton violence.******
Parashat Pinchas, as we discussed yesterday, begins by lauding the zealous act of Pinchas, who slew the Israelite man and the Midyanite women who had publicly desecrated God's Name. Pinchas' act brought an end to a deadly divine plague that had killed 24,000 members of Benei Yisrael as punishment for their religious and sexual involvement with women from Moav. In this context, the Torah reveals the identities of the two perpetrators. The Israelite man was Zimri, whom the Torah identifies as "nesi beit av la-Shimoni" literally, "prince of a paternal family in Shimon" and the women was Kozbi, whose father was among the princes of Midyan. Rashi, commenting on the title "nesi beit av la-Shimoni," explains that Zimri held the leadership position of one of the five principal families of Shimon. This interpretation, which is adopted as well by Ibn Ezra, runs counter to Rabbi Yochanan's comment in Masekhet Sanhedrin (82b), identifying Zimri as Shelumiel ben Tzurishadai, the tribal leader of Shimon (see Bamidbar 7:36). According to Rashi, it appears that Zimri was merely one of the five family chieftains, if you will, of the tribe. Rashi then adds, "Davar acheir" the term he normally employs when introducing an alternative interpretation to the verse under discussion. Surprisingly, however, he proceeds to make a comment with seemingly no connection whatsoever to his previous remark, identifying Zimri as one of the five family chieftains. Instead, he writes, "This expresses the praise of Pinchas, that although this one [Zimri] was a prince, he did not refrain from responding zealously to the desecration of [God's] Name. The verse therefore informs you of who the slain person was." Rashi here does not provide an alternative interpretation to the phrase nesi beit av; rather, he explains why the Torah here finds it necessary to identify the slain perpetrator, claiming that it adds to Pinchas' praise. Why, then, does Rashi introduce this remark as a "davar acheir" an alternative approach to the issue previously addressed? The Maharshal, in his work on Rashi's commentary entitled Yeri'ot Shelomo, suggests two approaches in explaining Rashi's comments. The first (and seemingly more compelling) approach claims that by writing "davar acheir," Rashi introduces an alternative explanation not to the issue he had just addressed the definition of "nesi beit av" but rather to what he had discussed prior to that. Before commenting on the term "nesi beit av," Rashi cited from the Midrash Tanchuma an explanation for why the Torah discloses the names of the slain violators. He writes, "When it [the Torah] identifies the tzadik for praise, it identifies the sinner for denigration." Meaning, after elaborating on Pinchas' identity and eternal reward for his courageous zealotry, the Torah seeks to draw a stark contrast by briefly discussing the perpetrator. The "davar acheir" mentioned by Rashi suggests a different reason why the Torah identifies Zimri, namely, to emphasize Pinchas' heroism in not hesitating to kill even a man of prominent stature in defense of God's honor. The Maharshal's second explanation suggests that indeed, Rashi's "davar acheir" represents a different view concerning the term "nesi beit av la-Shimoni." The Maharshal suggests that Zimri's prominent position adds to Pinchas' courage only if he was indeed an actual nasi a tribal leader. If he were merely one of five family leaders within the tribe of Shimon, this position would not have caused Pinchas to hesitate before eliminating him in any event. Thus, Rashi's "davar acheir" follows the view of Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemara, identifying Zimri as the tribal leader, rather than just a family chieftain. We should note that the Maharsha, in Masekhet Sanhedrin, claims that Zimri was both one of five family chieftains and the tribal leader of Shimon. Apparently, he felt that the position of tribal leader was held by one of the five family chieftains, and Zimri thus functioned in both capacities. The Maharshal clearly felt otherwise, that these two definitions of nesi beit av cannot be reconciled, and refer to two separate positions of leadership.******
In the middle of Parashat Pinchas we read of the benot Tzelofchad the five daughters of a man named Tzelofchad, who had died in the wilderness without any sons. The daughters requested that although inheritance in Jewish law generally passes only to sons, and not daughters, they should nevertheless inherit their father's portion in Eretz Yisrael. Otherwise, they contended, his share would be entirely lost, as he had no sons to receive it. God instructed Moshe to grant their request, and He established the permanent provision that daughters indeed inherit a person's estate when he leaves no sons (27:1-11). The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Batra (119b) tells that the five women advanced a sound halakhic argument in presenting their case. They made reference to the mitzva of yibum (Devarim 25:5-10), whereby a man must marry his childless brother's widow in order for her to bear children and thereby perpetuate the name of the deceased brother. Tzelofchad's daughters argued that if they are denied Tzelofchad's share in Eretz Yisrael, then this would mean that Halakha considers Tzelofchad to have died without any heirs. If so, then their mother should be subject to yibum, and thus Tzelofchad's brother should bear an obligation to marry her and thereby perpetuate Tzelofchad's heritage and estate. Since the law of yibum does not apply when the deceased left behind daughters, evidently Halakha considers daughters rightful heirs of the estate. Accordingly, they demanded that their father's share be transferred to them. Rav Menachem Ben-Tziyon Zaks, in his work Menachem Tziyon, mentions that some authorities point to this account as proof that the obligation of yibum applies even to the widow of a Torah violator. After all, Rabbi Akiva, as the Gemara records in Masekhet Shabbat (96b), identifies Tzelofchad as the mekoshesh eitzim the Shabbat violator about whom we read earlier in Sefer Bamidbar (15:32-36). If, indeed, his daughters demanded either a right to the inheritance or the application of the yibum provision, evidently the mitzva of yibum was theoretically applicable despite Tzelofchad's status as a sinner.******
As we discussed earlier this week, the latter sections of Parashat Pinchas deal with the musaf or "additional" sacrifices offered on special occasions (Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh, festivals). Beyond the daily, standard tamid offerings, these occasions require an additional sacrifice, to which we refer as the musaf sacrifice. One feature common to all the musaf offerings (with the exception of that brought on Shabbat, which, as we said, is likely of an entirely different nature) is a se'ir chatat a goat as a sin-offering. However, the Talmud Yerushalmi (Rosh Hashanah 4:8) notes a subtle distinction in syntax between the musaf sin-offering of Shavuot, and that of the other festivals. The Torah describes the sin-offering of Shavuot as simply "se'ir izim" a goat (28:30), whereas in all other instances, the musaf sin-offering is referred to as "se'ir izim le-chatat" or "se'ir chatat." Meaning, the Torah generally includes the word chatat sin-offering in describing this offering, while in the context of Shavuot this word is omitted. The Yerushalmi attributes this nuance to Shavuot's role as commemorating Matan Torah. It writes that God tells Benei Yisrael, as it were, "Once you accepted upon yourselves the yoke of Torah, I consider you as having never sinned before in your lives." According to the Yerushalmi, the omission of the word chatat alludes to the absence of sin, thus symbolizing the sinless stature one attains by genuinely accepting upon himself the yoke of Torah and mitzvot. A deeper insight into this Midrash is provided by Rav Shimon Schwab, in his Ma'ayan Beit Ha-sho'eiva. Sin-offerings serve to earn one atonement and expiation, but generally the achievement of expiation does not eliminate all effects of sin within the individual's being. Even after undergoing the process of repentance including the offering of a sacrifice the individual retains the proclivity to the given improper mode of conduct. Human nature remains strongly inclined towards physical gratification and comforts, rather than spiritual excellence. The Torah alludes to this reality by appending the word chatat ("sin") to its references to sin-offerings. Even the process of atonement cannot completely eliminate the effects of, and tendency towards, wrongdoing. On Shavuot, we commemorate the Revelation at Sinai, when, at least temporarily, this reality changed. The Gemara (Avoda Zara 22b) tells that when the snake lured Chava to partake of the forbidden tree, it infused within her a certain zuhama a spiritually contaminating agent, of sorts that became part of the human condition. This zuhama, Rav Schwab explains, refers to the sensual drives that lure the human being away from virtue and piety and draw him to physical and material gratification. However, the Gemara states, Benei Yisrael rid themselves of this quality at the time of Matan Torah. By Rav Schwab's understanding of this zuhama, this would mean that the divine revelation beheld by the people negated their attraction to sensuality. The direct encounter with the Almighty enabled them to overcome this innate tendency and devote themselves entirely to spiritual values and ideals. Unfortunately, the Gemara tells, this perfected state lasted only until the sin of the golden calf, at which point the zuhama returned, and has remained part of the human condition ever since. On this basis, Rav Schwab explains the aforementioned passage in the Talmud Yerushalmi. On Shavuot, God wants us to recall that when we accepted upon ourselves the yoke of mitzvot, at the time of Matan Torah, we were considered as never having sinned in our lives. At that stage, we indeed reached the point where sin was absent altogether from our consciousness, when we entirely devoted ourselves to the pure service of God. The Torah subtly alludes to this commemoration by omitting the word chatat from its description of the Shavuot musaf offering. At the occasion commemorated on Shavuot, we reached a degree of devotion where we achieved not only atonement, but also the absolute absence of chatat, the loss of the innate human tendency to pursue gratification and enjoyment.