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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Surf A Little Torah Yeshivat Har Etzion
PARASHAT PINCHAS
By Rav David Silverberg
The latter part of Parashat Pinchas delineates the
various musaf ("additional") sacrifices offered on Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh
and festivals. A quick survey of these sacrifices reveals several patterns,
among the more obvious of which is the se'ir chatat goat as a
sin-offering a feature shared by the musaf offerings of all these
occasions, with the exception of Shabbat. However, the Gemara in Masekhet Chulin
(60b), cited by Rashi in his commentary to this parasha (28:15), notes a subtle
but unmistakable difference in the Torah's presentation of the se'ir
chatat for Rosh Chodesh. Unlike in all other instances, here the Torah
describes this sacrifice as a chatat le-Hashem a "sin-offering to the
Lord." The Gemara there in Chulin reaches a startling conclusion on the basis of
phraseology, namely, that the Rosh Chodesh sin-offering is brought on behalf of
the Almighty, so-to-speak. As the Gemara puts it, God tells Benei
Yisrael, "Bring a sin-offering for My having shrunk the moon." Initially,
the Gemara records, God created the sun and moon of equal size. Ultimately,
however, He decreased the moon's size, which reaches its lowest point around the
time of Rosh Chodesh, when the new moon appears. God thus requires atonement, as
it were, for this "injustice," which He achieves through our offering of a Rosh
Chodesh sin-offering on His behalf.
Clearly, this Gemara cannot be understood on a literal
level. God never "sins"; He is beyond reproach and cannot ever require
atonement. This Gemara has therefore become the subject of much homiletic
discussion, as scholars and darshanim have attempted to uncover the
meaning underlying this otherwise astonishing passage. (Last year, in our series
to Parashat Pinchas, we cited two possible explanations.)
Rav Gavriel Zev Margolis, in his Torat Gavriel,
suggests an allegorical interpretation, whereby the "moon" actually refers to
Benei Yisrael (or perhaps mankind in general). The human being is born as
an essentially physical being, fundamentally similar to other creatures, but is
infused with a spiritual quality. Like the moon, which is inherently dark and
unimpressive, but shines with the light it receives from the sun, a person's
essence is essentially physical, but can "shine" spiritually through the
inspiration and spiritual sensitivity with which the Almighty endows him. We are
called upon to capitalize upon this gift and radiate as brightly as possible, to
fully utilize the light from the "sun," from the Almighty, to overcome the
darkness. Very often, however, we find ourselves comparable to the moon around
the time of Rosh Chodesh, when it hardly shines, when it does not receive enough
light from its source, and remains mostly dark.
The Rosh Chodesh sin-offering differs from that of all
other festivals in its frequency. Each and every month, on Rosh Chodesh, we are
called upon to offer this sacrifice and seek atonement, a process which
obviously entails teshuva. As we recite in the Rosh Chodesh musaf
prayer, "You have given New Months to Your people as a time of atonement." For
this reason, many communities observe Erev Rosh Chodesh as a "Yom Kippur Katan,"
a day of fasting and repentance resembling Yom Kippur, because of Rosh Chodesh's
function as a time of atonement. Clearly, a monthly period of atonement is a
very tall order. Can we really observe a Yom Kippur each and every month? For
many of us, it is difficult enough to properly devote ourselves to sincere
repentance during the High Holiday period each year. Can we really be expected
to observe a day of atonement every month?
Rav Margolis suggests that it is this question the
Gemara addresses by speaking of God's atonement for "shrinking the moon." In
ordering the monthly Rosh Chodesh sin-offering and concomitant process of
repentance, the Almighty takes full responsibility, as it were, for the absence
of abundant "light" within us. He assures us that He will look favorably upon
even our minor achievements in the pursuit of teshuva every month. After
all, it was He who created the "moon," the human being, as a physical entity
depending on "outside sources" for spiritual light, and He can therefore expect
only so much.
Thus, the Gemara refers to Benei Yisrael's need
for atonement, not the Almighty's. God's "confession" here relates not to any
wrongdoing, but rather His acknowledgment of the human condition, which often
renders significant improvement difficult. He guarantees us that He will
nevertheless look favorably upon even minimal improvement, provided that we make
the most of whatever spiritual "light" He shines upon us, and exert ourselves to
the utmost.
******
Parashat Pinchas tells of the formal designation of
Yehoshua, Moshe's closest disciple, as his successor as leader of Benei
Yisrael. God orders Moshe to conduct a formal installation ceremony, which
included the placing of Moshe's hands on Yehoshua's head (27:18,23). The Rambam,
in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (4:1), points to this ritual as the original
semikha, or formal conferral of status of Torah authority. Though today
semikha refers to certification by a rabbi (or institution) of a
student's qualifications to render halakhic decisions, the origins of the term
relate to a far more specific status, which was passed from mentor to student in
an unbroken chain that began with Moshe and Yehoshua. The status conferred
through semikha grants the scholar certain powers, particularly involving
punitive measures (such as monetary fines and corporal punishment), which
rabbinical judges are authorized to administer only if they had received formal
semikha. Likewise, all members of the Sanhedrin (supreme
rabbinical court) must have received semikha; for this reason, the Jewish
people have been unable to reestablish the Sanhedrin since the
discontinuation of the semikha chain during the period of persecution
following the Bar-Kokhba revolt.
However, the Rambam, in Hilkhot Sanhedrin (4:11),
famously asserts that semikha can be reinstated after having been
discontinued. He writes that if all the rabbinical scholars in Eretz
Yisrael agree to confer the semikha status upon a given scholar, he
is indeed deemed a "samukh," and he is then authorized to confer this
status upon others. The Rambam's ruling was invoked and implemented by the
rabbis of Tzefat in the year 5298 (1538), who convened and granted
semikha to Rav Yaakov Beirav (known as "Mahari Beirav"). This initiative
triggered considerable controversy, as the rabbis of Jerusalem, particularly the
city's chief rabbi, Rav Levi Ben Chaviv, vehemently opposed the reinstating of
semikha.
In his commentary to the Mishna (Sanhedrin 1:3), the Rambam
provides the rationale behind his surprising position. He claimed that since the
prophet Yeshayahu (1:26) promised the restoration of Am Yisrael's
judicial system, which, of course, cannot be complete without the
Sanhedrin, some mechanism for reinstating semikha must exist.
Otherwise, the Sanhedrin could never be reestablished.
Rav Soloveitchik (cited by Rav Herschel Schachtar,
Eretz Ha-tzvi, p.233) suggested a possible basis for the Rambam's novel
theory, in the Torah's description of Yehoshua's formal appointment as Moshe's
successor. A careful reading of these verses reveals a two-stage process. God
orders Moshe, "Take Yehoshua, son of Nun
and place your hands upon him. Have
him stand before Elazar the kohen and before the entire congregation, and
commission him in their sight" (27:18-19). Rav Soloveitchik claimed that two
rituals were required: Moshe's direct, personal designation of Yehoshua,
symbolized by the hand placing, and, secondly, his public instatement, in the
presence of the entire nation. These two stages perhaps correspond to the two
possible methods of conferring semikha. Moshe's direct assignment of
Yehoshua parallels the more conventional method, of direct conferral from one
samukh to the next, while the public installation represents the second
means of conferring semikha, through a consensus among the nation's
rabbinic leaders. Moshe conferred semikha upon Yehoshua with both methods
in order to establish the precedent for all future conferrals.
Thus, the Rambam's novel and somewhat controversial
theory might actually have roots in the Chumash itself.
******
The Torah presents in Parashat Pinchas the details
concerning the temidin daily sacrifices offered in the Temple and the
musafin the special, musaf or "additional" sacrifices
brought on Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh and festivals. Rav Shemuel Baruch Deutsch, in
his Birkat Kohen, notes several indications that the Shabbat musaf
offering stands separate and apart from that of the other special occasions
(Rosh Chodesh and Yom Tov). Most obviously, it is the least elaborate and
complex of all the musafin. All other musafin feature a
combination of bulls, rams and sheep as an ola (burnt offering), as well
as a goat serving as a chatat (sin offering). On Shabbat, however, the
korban musaf consists of merely two sheep (accompanied by the standard
meal offering and libations, required with every sacrificial offering). In
addition, Rav Deutsch observes, the Torah introduces all the musaf
offerings with a specific imperative takrivu, or ve-hikravtem
("you shall offer
"). In presenting the Shabbat musaf offering, however,
the Torah omits the imperative term: "And on the day of Shabbat two
unblemished, yearling sheep
" (28:9). How might we account for this
discrepancy?
Rav Deutsch contends that the Torah does not introduce
the Shabbat musaf with a new imperative because this section simply
continues the previous discussion, regarding the daily tamid offerings.
The musaf on Shabbat, unlike that of the other special occasions, is
essentially an extension of the daily tamid offering. Rather than
constituting a separate, independent obligation, the Shabbat musaf is
integrated as part of the day's tamid ritual. This also accounts for the
simplicity of this sacrifice. The tamid offering brought each morning
and afternoon consisted simply of a single sheep. On Shabbat, we are to bring
an extra tamid, as it were, distinct from the normal tamid only in
terms of quantity. The Torah does not require bringing an additional
korban on Shabbat, but rather mandates expanding the standard offering in
honor of Shabbat.
A subtle nuance in the Rambam's terminology, Rav Deutsch
notes, supports this theory. Before each section of halakhot in
Mishneh Torah, the Rambam delineates which of the 613 mitzvot are
addressed in that section. Naturally, then, as he introduces Hilkhot Temidin
U-musafin, the Rambam lists the various occasions on which these sacrifices are
required, as each occasion constitutes one of the 613 mitzvot.
Interestingly, he employs different terminology in introducing the Shabbat
musaf than he does when listing the others. Regarding the musaf of
Shabbat he writes, "To add two sheep as an ola on Shabbat," whereas the
other musafin are described as, "The mitzva of the Rosh Chodesh
musaf; the mitzva of the Pesach musaf," and so on.
Seemingly, unlike the other musafin, the musaf of Shabbat is
integrally bound to the daily tamid offering, and is merely an "addition"
to the existing sacrificial framework of the temidin.
This principle might yield practical ramifications. Rav
Deutsch refers us to a discussion of Tosefot in Masekhet Berakhot (28a) where
Tosefot cite Rabbenu Shimshon as indicating that specifically on Shabbat, the
musaf offering was slaughtered together with the tamid offering.
This halakhic distinction appears to corroborate the theory that the Shabbat
musaf is of a different nature from the other musafin, and
constitutes an integral part of the korban tamid. This role is reflected
in the procedure of its offering, which mandates its incorporation within the
tamid ritual.
******
Parashat Pinchas begins with God's
emphatic endorsement of Pinchas' otherwise questionable act of zealotry, which
the Torah narrates in the final verses of Parashat Balak. In according with the
halakha known as kana'in pog'in bo allowing a zealot to kill a Jew who
sins with a gentile woman Pinchas slew Zimri, the tribal leader of Shimon, and
Kozbi, the Midianite princess whom Zimri had taken in the presence of the entire
nation. The Gemara (Sanhedrin 82b), cited in Rashi's opening comments to
Parashat Pinchas, tells that Pinchas' violence earned widespread condemnation
among the people. God therefore spoke to Moshe and expressed His resounding
approval of Pinchas' zealotry, on account of which he and his offspring were
granted an "eternal blessing of priesthood" (25:13).
God's praise for Pinchas, and the principle of
kana'in pog'in bo in general, calls into question a halakha established
earlier in the Gemara (Sanhedrin 82a). The Gemara states that had Zimri killed
Pinchas in self-defense, he would not have been liable for murder. By
approaching to kill Zimri, Pinchas assumed the status of a rodef a
"pursuer." Halakha licenses killing a person who pursues another to kill him,
and the Gemara applies this provision even in cases of kana'in pog'in bo.
Although a zealot is allowed (or perhaps even obligated) to act upon his zealous
rage and kill the violator, the violator is nonetheless licensed to kill the
zealot in self-defense.
At first glance, these two halakhot appear
contradictory. If Pinchas was legally justified in killing Zimri, how could he
be considered a rodef? Consider, for example, the situation of a capital
violation. Certainly, the convicted violator is not justified in turning around
and killing the shali'ach beit din (court executioner). How, then, could
the Gemara permit Zimri to kill Pinchas?
Rav Shaul Yisraeli (as cited by Rav Yaakov Ariel, in his
Mei-ohola Shel Torah) suggested that this license, granted to the
violator to slay the approaching zealot, is necessary to establish the sincerity
of the alleged zealotry. Kana'in pog'in bo marks an exceptional,
extraordinary provision, and is restricted to only the very rare circumstances
where an individual is genuinely driven to zealotry by a pure desire to defend
God's honor. As we saw last week, Moshe himself refrained from taking this
initiative due to personal motives that may have obscured his judgment and would
have adulterated the sincerity of any act of zealotry on his part. Rav Yisraeli
suggested that the zealot's sincerity is determined by his willingness to
sacrifice his life for the cause. Halakha entitles him to take the life of the
violator in defending the Almighty's honor only if he is prepared to possibly
give his own life in this effort. Thus, the application of the rodef
principle in this context is not contradictory at all. It is necessary to affirm
the purity of the zealot's motives, which is an indispensable prerequisite for
the permissibility of what would otherwise be looked upon as a criminal act of
wanton violence.
******
Parashat Pinchas, as we discussed yesterday, begins by
lauding the zealous act of Pinchas, who slew the Israelite man and the Midyanite
women who had publicly desecrated God's Name. Pinchas' act brought an end to a
deadly divine plague that had killed 24,000 members of Benei Yisrael as
punishment for their religious and sexual involvement with women from Moav. In
this context, the Torah reveals the identities of the two perpetrators. The
Israelite man was Zimri, whom the Torah identifies as "nesi beit av
la-Shimoni" literally, "prince of a paternal family in Shimon" and the
women was Kozbi, whose father was among the princes of Midyan.
Rashi, commenting on the title "nesi beit av
la-Shimoni," explains that Zimri held the leadership position of one of the
five principal families of Shimon. This interpretation, which is adopted as well
by Ibn Ezra, runs counter to Rabbi Yochanan's comment in Masekhet Sanhedrin
(82b), identifying Zimri as Shelumiel ben Tzurishadai, the tribal leader of
Shimon (see Bamidbar 7:36). According to Rashi, it appears that Zimri was merely
one of the five family chieftains, if you will, of the tribe. Rashi then adds,
"Davar acheir" the term he normally employs when introducing an
alternative interpretation to the verse under discussion. Surprisingly, however,
he proceeds to make a comment with seemingly no connection whatsoever to his
previous remark, identifying Zimri as one of the five family chieftains.
Instead, he writes, "This expresses the praise of Pinchas, that although this
one [Zimri] was a prince, he did not refrain from responding zealously to the
desecration of [God's] Name. The verse therefore informs you of who the slain
person was." Rashi here does not provide an alternative interpretation to the
phrase nesi beit av; rather, he explains why the Torah here finds it
necessary to identify the slain perpetrator, claiming that it adds to Pinchas'
praise. Why, then, does Rashi introduce this remark as a "davar acheir"
an alternative approach to the issue previously addressed?
The Maharshal, in his work on Rashi's commentary
entitled Yeri'ot Shelomo, suggests two approaches in explaining Rashi's
comments. The first (and seemingly more compelling) approach claims that by
writing "davar acheir," Rashi introduces an alternative explanation not
to the issue he had just addressed the definition of "nesi beit av"
but rather to what he had discussed prior to that. Before commenting on the term
"nesi beit av," Rashi cited from the Midrash Tanchuma an explanation for
why the Torah discloses the names of the slain violators. He writes, "When it
[the Torah] identifies the tzadik for praise, it identifies the sinner
for denigration." Meaning, after elaborating on Pinchas' identity and eternal
reward for his courageous zealotry, the Torah seeks to draw a stark contrast by
briefly discussing the perpetrator. The "davar acheir" mentioned by Rashi
suggests a different reason why the Torah identifies Zimri, namely, to emphasize
Pinchas' heroism in not hesitating to kill even a man of prominent stature in
defense of God's honor.
The Maharshal's second explanation suggests that indeed,
Rashi's "davar acheir" represents a different view concerning the term
"nesi beit av la-Shimoni." The Maharshal suggests that Zimri's prominent
position adds to Pinchas' courage only if he was indeed an actual nasi
a tribal leader. If he were merely one of five family leaders within the tribe
of Shimon, this position would not have caused Pinchas to hesitate before
eliminating him in any event. Thus, Rashi's "davar acheir" follows the
view of Rabbi Yochanan in the Gemara, identifying Zimri as the tribal leader,
rather than just a family chieftain.
We should note that the Maharsha, in Masekhet Sanhedrin,
claims that Zimri was both one of five family chieftains and the tribal leader
of Shimon. Apparently, he felt that the position of tribal leader was held by
one of the five family chieftains, and Zimri thus functioned in both capacities.
The Maharshal clearly felt otherwise, that these two definitions of nesi beit
av cannot be reconciled, and refer to two separate positions of
leadership.
******
In the middle of Parashat Pinchas we read of the
benot Tzelofchad the five daughters of a man named Tzelofchad, who had
died in the wilderness without any sons. The daughters requested that although
inheritance in Jewish law generally passes only to sons, and not daughters, they
should nevertheless inherit their father's portion in Eretz Yisrael.
Otherwise, they contended, his share would be entirely lost, as he had no sons
to receive it. God instructed Moshe to grant their request, and He established
the permanent provision that daughters indeed inherit a person's estate when he
leaves no sons (27:1-11).
The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Batra (119b) tells that the
five women advanced a sound halakhic argument in presenting their case. They
made reference to the mitzva of yibum (Devarim 25:5-10), whereby a
man must marry his childless brother's widow in order for her to bear children
and thereby perpetuate the name of the deceased brother. Tzelofchad's daughters
argued that if they are denied Tzelofchad's share in Eretz Yisrael, then
this would mean that Halakha considers Tzelofchad to have died without any
heirs. If so, then their mother should be subject to yibum, and thus
Tzelofchad's brother should bear an obligation to marry her and thereby
perpetuate Tzelofchad's heritage and estate. Since the law of yibum does
not apply when the deceased left behind daughters, evidently Halakha considers
daughters rightful heirs of the estate. Accordingly, they demanded that their
father's share be transferred to them.
Rav Menachem Ben-Tziyon Zaks, in his work Menachem
Tziyon, mentions that some authorities point to this account as proof that
the obligation of yibum applies even to the widow of a Torah violator.
After all, Rabbi Akiva, as the Gemara records in Masekhet Shabbat (96b),
identifies Tzelofchad as the mekoshesh eitzim the Shabbat violator
about whom we read earlier in Sefer Bamidbar (15:32-36). If, indeed, his
daughters demanded either a right to the inheritance or the application of the
yibum provision, evidently the mitzva of yibum was
theoretically applicable despite Tzelofchad's status as a sinner. In this
context, Rav Zaks strongly condemns the practice of people he called
kana'im "zealous ones" to speak disdainfully of Torah violators and
even add to the mention of their names the words, "yimach shemo" ("may
his name be blotted out"). This Gemara demonstrates that even when dealing with
violators of grave transgressions, the Torah applies the mitzva of
yibum, which serves the explicitly stated purpose of "ve-lo yimacheh
shemo mi-Yisrael" to ensure that the deceased's name is not erased from
memory (Devarim 25:6). The Torah's concern extends to all members of the nation,
even those who have strayed far from observance. However objectionable their
conduct, their beings are deemed precious, and their memories must be honored
and cherished. Rav Zaks records an incident involving Rav Yosef Chaim Sonenfeld,
rabbinic leader of Jerusalem in the earlier part of the 20th century,
who walked with some disciples and came upon a street named after a secular
Jewish personality. One of his attendants muttered a contemptuous remark about
the individual whose name was memorialized by this street sign. Rav Sonenfeld
sharply criticized the student, commenting that he clearly had no understanding
at all of how much the Torah values the merit of even the sinners among the
Jewish people.
******
As we discussed earlier this week, the latter sections
of Parashat Pinchas deal with the musaf or "additional" sacrifices
offered on special occasions (Shabbat, Rosh Chodesh, festivals). Beyond the
daily, standard tamid offerings, these occasions require an additional
sacrifice, to which we refer as the musaf sacrifice.
One feature common to all the musaf offerings
(with the exception of that brought on Shabbat, which, as we said, is likely of
an entirely different nature) is a se'ir chatat a goat as a
sin-offering. However, the Talmud Yerushalmi (Rosh Hashanah 4:8) notes a subtle
distinction in syntax between the musaf sin-offering of Shavuot, and that
of the other festivals. The Torah describes the sin-offering of Shavuot as
simply "se'ir izim" a goat (28:30), whereas in all other instances, the
musaf sin-offering is referred to as "se'ir izim
le-chatat" or
"se'ir chatat." Meaning, the Torah generally includes the word
chatat sin-offering in describing this offering, while in the context
of Shavuot this word is omitted. The Yerushalmi attributes this nuance to
Shavuot's role as commemorating Matan Torah. It writes that God tells
Benei Yisrael, as it were, "Once you accepted upon yourselves the yoke of
Torah, I consider you as having never sinned before in your lives." According to
the Yerushalmi, the omission of the word chatat alludes to the absence of
sin, thus symbolizing the sinless stature one attains by genuinely accepting
upon himself the yoke of Torah and mitzvot.
A deeper insight into this Midrash is provided by Rav
Shimon Schwab, in his Ma'ayan Beit Ha-sho'eiva. Sin-offerings serve to
earn one atonement and expiation, but generally the achievement of expiation
does not eliminate all effects of sin within the individual's being. Even after
undergoing the process of repentance including the offering of a sacrifice
the individual retains the proclivity to the given improper mode of conduct.
Human nature remains strongly inclined towards physical gratification and
comforts, rather than spiritual excellence. The Torah alludes to this reality by
appending the word chatat ("sin") to its references to sin-offerings.
Even the process of atonement cannot completely eliminate the effects of, and
tendency towards, wrongdoing.
On Shavuot, we commemorate the Revelation at Sinai,
when, at least temporarily, this reality changed. The Gemara (Avoda Zara 22b)
tells that when the snake lured Chava to partake of the forbidden tree, it
infused within her a certain zuhama a spiritually contaminating agent,
of sorts that became part of the human condition. This zuhama, Rav
Schwab explains, refers to the sensual drives that lure the human being away
from virtue and piety and draw him to physical and material gratification.
However, the Gemara states, Benei Yisrael rid themselves of this quality
at the time of Matan Torah. By Rav Schwab's understanding of this
zuhama, this would mean that the divine revelation beheld by the people
negated their attraction to sensuality. The direct encounter with the Almighty
enabled them to overcome this innate tendency and devote themselves entirely to
spiritual values and ideals. Unfortunately, the Gemara tells, this perfected
state lasted only until the sin of the golden calf, at which point the
zuhama returned, and has remained part of the human condition ever
since.
On this basis, Rav Schwab explains the aforementioned
passage in the Talmud Yerushalmi. On Shavuot, God wants us to recall that when
we accepted upon ourselves the yoke of mitzvot, at the time of Matan
Torah, we were considered as never having sinned in our lives. At that
stage, we indeed reached the point where sin was absent altogether from our
consciousness, when we entirely devoted ourselves to the pure service of God.
The Torah subtly alludes to this commemoration by omitting the word
chatat from its description of the Shavuot musaf offering. At the
occasion commemorated on Shavuot, we reached a degree of devotion where we
achieved not only atonement, but also the absolute absence of chatat, the
loss of the innate human tendency to pursue gratification and
enjoyment. |