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Parashat Matot opens with the halakhot of "hafarat nedarim," the power of a husband or father to annul the nedarim (vows) taken by his wife and young daughter, respectively. Another related halakha, which does not appear explicitly in the Torah, is "hatarat nedarim," the annulment of vows through the authority of a three-member Bet-Din or a single scholar proficient in Jewish law. At first glance, the annulment appears to be simply a privilege, the right of a husband or father to render the wife's or daughter's neder null and void, or the opportunity for one taking a vow to have it annulled by a scholar.

However, several Rishonim consider hafarat nedarim a mitzva. The Rambam lists as one of the 613 mitzvot that of "adjudicating in cases of hafarat nedarim" (asei 95). What does the Rambam mean? The Sefer Ha-chinukh (406) suggests that according to the Rambam, a scholar who properly tends to a case of hatarat nedarim fulfills this mitzva. Meaning, there is no mitzva to initiate the annulment of the vow; doing so properly, however, constitutes a mitzva. Accordingly, one who permits a neder improperly, not in line with the relevant halakhot, has violated this mitzvat asei.

The Ramban, by contrast, follows the instinctive approach, that no mitzva whatsoever is involved the process of hatarat nedarim. Rather, the Torah provided the possibility of having vows annulled. The annulment does not fulfill any mitzva, but rather prevents the violation of a Biblical command should the vow be subsequently broken. Therefore, no mitzva is violated by one who incorrectly annuls a vow. All that happens, according to the Ramban, is that the vow remains in force. This would be akin to one who incorrectly determines the kashrut of a given food item. He has committed no violation by declaring the goods kosher; only when he partakes of the non-kosher food has he violated the Torah. Similarly, according to the Ramban, one transgresses no provision by issuing an incorrect ruling concerning a given vow; however, the one who took the vow must still abide by his words.

A third position seems to emerge from the writings of the "Semak" ("Sefer Mitzvot Katan"), who lists as mitzva 107 that of, "to annul vows." Apparently, he believes that an obligation rests on the shoulders of the father or husband to annul the vow of his daughter or wife. The Semak proceeds by citing a comment by Chazal strongly encouraging fathers and husbands to annul these vows, further reinforcing the impression that he considers the annulment itself the fulfillment of a mitzva. Importantly, however, the Semak lists several obligations instituted by Chazal among the 613 mitzvot. Possibly, he listed this mitzva, too, as merely a rabbinically-ordained obligation.

Rav Sa'adya Gaon, in his listing of the 613 mitzvot, also implies that annulling vows itself constitutes a mitzva. (See also the Rambam's introduction to his Hilkhot Nedarim as it appears in the Frankel edition of the Mishneh Torah, which also appears to recognize a mitzva to annul nedarim.)

An interesting ramification of this question may relate to the recitation of a berakha before annulling a vow. The Shibalei Ha-leket (317) observes the practice of reciting such a berakha and expresses his disapproval. According to the Semak, however, there would appear to be room for this berakha, as the annulment fulfills a mitzva (be it one ordained by the Torah itself or by Chazal). According to the Ramban, and seemingly the Rambam, as well, since no mitzva is involved in the actual annulment, there would be no basis whatsoever for a berakha before hatarat nedarim.

(Summary of Rav Binyamin Tabory's column, "Ha-mitzva She-beparasha," in Shabbat Be-Shabbato, Parashat Matot-Masei, 5761)

*****

In Parashat Matot, the Torah makes its first explicit reference to Bilam's culpability for the incident of Ba'al Pe'or. As God had commanded, Benei Yisrael wage a vengeful war against Midyan in retaliation for its having plotted against them by seducing them to the idolatrous worship of Pe'or. As the soldiers returned home, Moshe noticed that they brought with them the women who had participated in the Pe'or debacle. He angrily responds, "They are the very ones who, at the bidding of Bilam, induced Benei Yisrael to trespass against God in the matter of Pe'or… " (31:16). Here Moshe clearly attributes the wicked plot to Bilam himself. In truth, a clear reference to this effect, albeit more subtle, appears earlier, in the Torah's brief description of the battle against Midyan, where we are told that Benei Yisrael made a point of assassinating Bilam (31:8).

The question, of course, arises, why did the Torah not inform us immediately, when initially presenting the incident of Ba'al Pe'or, of Bilam's having instigated it? Why do we hear of his involvement only later, in Parashat Matot? Perhaps even more troubling is the Torah's formulation of the sin of Ba'al Pe'or in Parashat Balak: "Yisrael was staying in Shittim, and the people began committing harlotry with the Moavite women… " (25:1). Whereas in Parashat Matot Moshe explicitly casts the blame squarely on Bilam, the Torah's narrative seems to accuse Benei Yisrael themselves of initiating the prohibited relations!

Professor Nechama Leibowitz z"l offers an insightful answer with a critical lesson. Bilam's having masterminded and orchestrated the incident in no way absolved Benei Yisrael of their own guilt. The Torah specifically describes Benei Yisrael as "beginning" - meaning, initiating - the encounter, in order to emphasize their guilt in spite of the plot devised against them. True, Bilam thought of the idea and set it into motion, a crime for which he paid with his life in our parasha. However, the seductive tactics employed by the women of Moav and Midyan does not excuse Benei Yisrael's consent to temptation and idolatry that ensued. Therefore, in its initial account, the Torah portrays Benei Yisrael as the instigators, rather than Bilam, Moav or Midyan.

How convenient it is to find a guilty party on whom to blame all of one's own shortcomings! A person can ever so easily clear his conscience by attributing his wrongdoing to others, by pointing a finger somewhere other than at his own faults. Forensic psychologists can identify any number of factors that contributed to the making of a criminal, but this dare not lead us - at least in most instances - to excuse crime. Life presents us with many challenges, including moral, ethical and religious tests. And we are expected to pass each and every one. When we don't, we must blame first and foremost ourselves, no matter what external circumstances may have contributed to the failure.

*****

Parashat Matot opens with the laws of "nedarim," vows. The Torah issues the prohibition known in Talmudic jargon as "bal yachel," forbidding one from breaking a vow that he took upon himself: "If a man makes a vow to God… he shall not break his pledge… " (30:3).

Generally speaking, if someone swears to perform a mitzva ("I swear I will put on tefillin tomorrow morning"), the oath is not binding. Meaning, if he fails to perform the mitzva, he has done only that; he has not violated his oath. Since, as the Gemara puts it, we are all already bound by the Torah's laws, an oath cannot apply to mitzvot, as oaths cannot apply to preexisting obligations or prohibitions. Nevertheless, in Masekhet Nedarim 8a, the Gemara says that it is permissible for one to "urge himself on" in the performance of mitzvot by taking an oath. For example, one who finds it difficult to recite shacharit in the morning before the deadline may take an oath to do so as a means of ensuring proper observance of this mitzva.

The obvious question is, if this oath does not take effect, then of what inspirational value is it to the individual? As it does not add any further obligations or responsibilities, howould a vow strengthen a person's resolve to observe mitzvot?

In light of this question, the Ran maintains that - as opposed to the Gemara's implication - such a vow actually does take effect. A person who swears to perform a certain mitzva and fails to do so has, in fact, violated "bal yechel." When the Gemara established that such a vow cannot take effect, it meant that one who unintentionally violates the vow need not bring the sacrifice normally required in such a case (see Vayikra, beginning of chapter 5). The Ramban, however, disagrees, and claims that such a vow is effectively meaningless. Our question thus remains: how would such a vow provide further motivation to observe mitzvot?

The Steipler Gaon zt"l (in "Birkat Peretz") explains by taking a closer look at the origins of laxity among generally observant people. Those who believe in and accept the authority of the Torah and its obligations sin primarily after convincing themselves that the given action (or inaction) is permissible. While the motive behind this process varies, in the end, the desire for the given act clouds one's conscience and leads him to find a reason why no prohibition applies: "For me it's okay, because I'm not so religious anyway"; "So-and-so did it, so it must be fine"; "The rabbi told me I can't, but he really doesn't understand the situation"; "God won't mind if I do it only once"; "I need the money to pay for my children's tuition"; and so on. If one takes a vow to perform a given mitzva, these "excuses" will not help him. For even if he comes up with a "reason" to permit the action or inaction, he must still perform the mitzva as now his vow takes effect. Once the deed becomes permissible, his oath applies and requires his compliance. Therefore, taking such a vow can, indeed, help ensure one's observance of mitzvot.

*****

Parashat Matot begins as follows: "Moshe spoke with the heads of the tribes of Yisrael, saying: This is what God commanded: If a man makes a vow to God… he shall not break his pledge." Rashi explains that in truth, Moshe transmitted all mitzvot first to the tribal leaders and only thereafter to all of Benei Yisrael. However, the Torah mentioned this only here, in the context of the annulment of vows, to teach us the halakha that this procedure requires a scholar well-versed in the halakhot of vows. Not anyone has this power; only the "heads," those proficient in the relevant laws, are granted the authority to revoke oaths. (Otherwise, three people are necessary to annul a vow.)

Several later commentators raised a difficulty with this explanation. According to Rashi, it turns out that the Torah addresses the possibility of revoking an oath before ever requiring that one abide by his words. Why would the Torah allude to a halakha relevant to the annulment of vows, by mentioning the tribal "heads" in this context, before ever stating the prohibition against violating one's vow?

The Shem Mi-Shmuel cites a sharp explanation from his father, the Avnei Neizer, one which touches upon a fundamental precept regarding the institution of "hafla'a" (taking upon oneself additional prohibitions and obligations). How could the Torah possibly allow a person to create a new "mitzva"? Does this not suggest an equation, of sorts, between man and God? Furthermore, does not the requirement to obey one's vow suggest a degree of subjectivity in one's religious performance, that he can decide how to best serve the Almighty? Isn't the Torah the single, authentic expression of the divine will?

The answer to all these questions, explains the Avnei Neizer, lies in the possibility of "hatara" or "hafara" (annulment). The ability to revoke one's vow sets self-imposed prohibitions and obligations fundamentally apart from the mitzvot ordained by the Torah. The latter are permanent, everlasting and non-negotiable; they bind us at all times and in all places (except when the Torah itself limits the scope of a given mitzva). Laws legislated by the individual himself have no permanent hold; practically by definition, they must have the possibility of revocation.

Therefore, the Torah had to discuss - if only by allusion - the concept of "hatara" even before presenting the prohibition against violating one's vow. Without it, a vow cannot bind the individual, as it would then resemble the divinely ordained laws of the Torah. For good reason, then, the parasha opens with a subtle reference to the annulment of vows, even before mentioning the requirement to abide by them.

*****

We read in Parashat Matot of Benei Yisrael's retaliatory attack against the nation of Midyan. Along with them on their return, the warriors brought a large amount of spoils, including cooking utensils. Accordingly, Elazar, who succeeded his father, Aharon, as kohen gadol, introduced the warriors to the laws of "tevila" and "hakhshara," the procedure by which utensils acquired (or, in this case, seized) from a gentile become fit for use by a Jew. It is important to realize that two independent halakhot were presented here. First, any utensil used in the preparation of consumption of food requires immersion, or "tevila," when acquired from a gentile, even if the gentile had never used it before. This requirement, then, has nothing to do with the laws of forbidden foods and the like. The second halakha presented here, "hakhshara," known in contemporary Jewish jargon as "kashering," requires expelling the taste of non-kosher food absorbed into the walls of a utensil. Today we are familiar with these halakhot due to their critical relevance before Pesach, in preparing year-round kitchen utensils for use in anticipation for, and on, Pesach. We should note, however, that some Rishonim view this parasha as introducing only the second of these two mitzvot. They maintain that the obligation of immersion is a "mitzva de-rabbanan," instituted by Chazal. The Ramban, for example, raises such a possibility (albeit with hesitation) in his commentary on Parashat Matot. Most authorities, however, maintain that tevila constitutes a Biblical obligation, though it is generally assumed even within this position that glass utensils require immersion only due to rabbinic enactment.

An interesting question regarding the requirement of tevila arose with the capture by the Israeli Defense Forces of territories in Eretz Yisrael that included homes and villages that had been abandoned by their Arab inhabitants. Did utensils retrieved from these areas require immersion prior to use by Jews? It was observed in addressing this question that the Israeli government did not formally confiscate these utensils; they were all labeled as spoils of war and kept presumably with the possibility in mind of returning them. Hence, some argued, these utensils cannot be considered Jewish property and thus do not require tevila. (A Jew may use a gentile's utensil without immersing it.)

This question, along with the aforementioned argument, came before Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank zt"l, who served as the chief rabbi of Jerusalem. In his response, printed in Har Tzvi Y.D. 109, Rav Frank rules that these utensils do, in fact, require tevila. He noted that in reality these spoils were treated as Jewishly owned, despite the formal registration to the contrary by state officials. Since military conquest constitutes legal acquisition (known in halakha as "kibbush milchama"), only genuine disinterest in acquisition can undermine the legal transfer of ownership. As this was clearly not the case here, as Rav Frank observed, the utensils were to be viewed as Jewish property and hence requiring immersion.

Rav Frank does, however, raise a different argument to exempt the seized property from tevila, though he promptly rejects this line of reasoning, as well. He cites the view of one authority that property abandoned by their gentile owners, which at that point become ownerless, do not require immersion upon their acquisition by a Jew. Thus, the Arabs who fled during the war (Rav Frank's response is printed without a date, but it appears to refer to the Independence War of 1948) in effect declared this propownerless, exempting all utensils from tevila. Rav Frank however disputes this view, based on a ruling of the Beit Yosef and Rema in what he considers a parallel case. A Jew who purchases a utensil from a gentile for purposes other than cooking or eating need not immerse the utensil. However, should another Jew then buy the utensil from the first for use with food, the second buyer must perform tevila before putting the utensil to use. Apparently, notes Rav Frank, an "in-between" step separating gentile and Jewish ownership does not affect the requirement of tevila. He acknowledges that one may distinguish between the two cases, but concludes that without an explicit source otherwise, we may not exempt from tevila utensils acquired indirectly from gentiles. Therefore, the seized utensils required immersion.

*****

As discussed yesterday, after Benei Yisrael's successful battle against Midyan, Elazar, the kohen gadol, instructs the warriors with regard to handling the cooking and eating utensils taken as spoils of war. First, the taste of forbidden foods that had been absorbed by the utensils had to be expunged, through the process known to us as "kashering." A second obligation requires that any utensil acquired from a gentile be immersed in a mikveh ("tevila") before use by a Jew.

Many commentaries, most prominently the Ramban, ask why we learn of these halakhot only at this point. This is not the first time Benei Yisrael have seized utensils from gentile nations. Back in Parashat Chukat we read of Benei Yisrael's conquest and occupation of the lands of Sichon and Og; didn't these mitzvot apply in the aftermath of this war, too? Why do Benei Yisrael hear these laws only now?

The Ramban answers by drawing a basic distinction between these two battles. Sichon and Og were from the nation of Emori, one of the seven nations promised to Avraham's offspring. As such, the conquest of their land - however unplanned it may have been, as implied in Parashat Chukat - marked the initial stage of the conquest of Eretz Yisrael. Now Chazal say that during the battles for Eretz Yisrael, the soldiers were allowed to take all spoils and even partake of normally forbidden foods. Thus, the laws of "kashering" bore no relevance at that point. The battle against Midyan, however, was of a purely retaliatory nature; it involved no occupation of land. Therefore, the unique dispensation that applied during the conquest of Eretz Yisrael did not take effect, and Elazar needed to introduce these halakhot in the aftermath of this campaign.

However, the Ramban's answer appears to resolve only half the question, the issue of "kashering." It does not explain why Benei Yisrael did not hear of the second requirement, that of "tevilat keilim," after the war with Sichon. After all, the dispensation allowing forbidden foods did not include, as far as we know, an exemption from immersing utensils. Didn’t Benei Yisrael require this information after this battle, too?

Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, in the responsum cited in yesterday's S.A.L.T., explains that in truth, one cannot question the timing of the initial transmission of a given mitzva. Some were initially stated in Mara, others at Mount Sinai, still others from the Ohel Moed, etc. Only the Almighty Himself knows why certain mitzvot were presented at any given point and why others came later. The Ramban asked only with regard to the issue of "kashering," since this discussion does not introduce a new mitzva of which we had not heard earlier. Already back in Parashat Shemini, Benei Yisrael learned of the foods forbidden to them. The Ramban and many other Rishonim (and this is in fact the accepted halakha) hold that the principle of "ta'am ke-ikar," that the taste of forbidden foods has the same status as the forbidden foods themselves - constitutes a Biblical obligation. Therefore, the laws presented here, of extracting the taste of forbidden foods from the walls of the utensils, are merely ramifications of the basic halakhot of kashrut. Since the concept of prohibited foods had been presented earlier, asks the Ramban, the guidelines for extracting the taste should have therefore been discussed after the war against Sichon and Og. The Ramban never raised this question with regard to immersion, since, as Rav Frank insists, one cannot question as to why the Almighty chose one moment over another for the initial presentation of a given mitzva.

[In conclusion, we should perhaps note that in this piece, Rav Frank very subtly touches upon a fundamental issue concerning this principle of "ta'am ke-ikar." He presumes that this halakha flows naturally from the basic laws of kashrut; we view taste as being as significant as the actual substance, rendering it equally as forbidden. Therefore, the laws of "kashering" presented in Parashat Matot do not introduce a new prohibition. One may, however, formulate this rule differently. In truth, halakha does not equate taste with substance. If one eats food cooked in a pot with the taste of forbidden fat, for example, he has not, according to this argument, violated the same prohibition as one who partook of the actual fat. Rather, the Torah introduced a new, independent category called "ta'am," forbidding the taste of forbidden foods. This does not naturally flow from the original prohibition; it rather constitutes its own halakhic category. If this is the case, then one may easily dispute Rav Frank's analysis, by which the laws of "kashering" represent merely the ramifications of previously mentioned prohibitions.]

*****

The previous two editions of S.A.L.T. spoke of the laws presented in Parashat Matot concerning kitchen utensils acquired from gentiles. As we saw, the Torah requires one to extract the forbidden taste embedded within the walls of utensils through the process known in contemporary Jewish jargon as "kashering." Secondly, any utensil acquired from a gentile must be immersed in a "mikveh," a process known as "tevila." This second obligation applies even to brand new utensils right out of the factory, since it does not at all relate to "kashrut." It simply requires that any utensil transferring ownership from gentile to Jew be immersed before the Jew uses it.

If one purchased or received a utensil from a gentile who had used it with non-kosher food, in which case both "kashering" and "tevila" are required, which should he do first? While the halakha clearly requires that one first "kasher" the utensil before immersing it, a controversy exists regarding a situation in which one mistakenly reversed the order. Tosafot and the Rosh (end of Masekhet Avoda Zara) maintain that ex post facto the immersion was effective, despite its having occurred prior to kashering. The Rashbam and Rashba, however, require a second tevila after the kashering. The Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 121:2) cites both views; the Shakh writes that one should perform a second tevila though without reciting the usual berakha.

The question, of course, arises, why should the sequence make a difference? After all, as stated, a utensil acquired from a gentile requires immersion even if it had never been used with non-kosher food. Clearly, then, as we said earlier, the obligation of tevila in no way relates to the laws of forbidden foods. Why should it matter, then, if the utensil contains within its walls the taste of forbidden foods during tevila?

In light of this question, we must arrive at a more precise definition of the obligation of tevila. Namely, halakha requires that a utensil acquired from a gentile undergo a process that we may call a "matir," a process that renders this utensil permissible. Meaning, the immersion required by the Torah transforms the utensil from forbidden to permissible; this is the definition of the halakha. Accordingly, at the moment of tevila, the utensil must be otherwise halakhically employable; the immersion must take on a quality of "matir," that it transforms the utensil into a functional apparatus. For this reason, one must first rid the utensil of anything that renders it forbidden before immersing it in a mikveh. (This apprworks well particularly with the second view presented, that reversing this sequence invalidates the tevila.)

This explanation calls into question the view of the Noda Bi-Yehuda, expressed in his Dagul Mei-revava on the Shulchan Arukh. There he distinguishes between two types of utensils: "ben yomo" and "eino ben yomo." A utensil that has gone twenty-four hours since its last absorption of forbidden food, called an "eino ben yomo," may be used according to Torah law. Since we assume that the taste has become spoiled over this period of time, the prohibition no longer takes effect. Rabbinic enactment, however, forbids the use of even these pots and pans. The Dagul Mei-revava extends this distinction to our case. If the utensil acquired from a gentile had not absorbed forbidden taste in twenty-four hours, one may - even optimally, and according to all views - perform the immersion prior to the kashering. Since by Torah law this utensil is clean of forbidden substance, it may be immersed despite the rabbinic enactment that requires kashering.

According to the explanation presented earlier, however, one should follow the prescribed sequence even when dealing with an "eino ben yomo." As we said, the tevila must transform the utensil from forbidden to permissible; thus, even a prohibition ordained by Chazal would prevent the efficacy of the tevila. In all cases, then, it would seem that utensils that had been owned and used by gentiles should, upon their acquisition by a Jew, be first kashered and only then immersed.

(Taken from Rabbi Menachem Genack, Gan Shoshanim, chapter 15)

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This shiur is provided courtesy of the Virtual Beit Midrash, the premier source of online courses on Torah and Judaism - 14 different courses on all levels, for all backgrounds.

MakeJewish learning partof your week on a regular basis - enroll in the
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(c) YeshivHar EtzioAll rights reserved to Yeshivat Har Etzion

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Alon Shvut, Israel, 90433
office@etzion.org.il