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The Israel Koschitzky
Virtual Beit Midrash
Surf A Little Torah PARASHAT Matot Masei by
Rav David Silverberg Parashat Matot tells of the war waged by Benei Yisrael against Midyan in revenge for the incident of Pe'or (about which we read in the final section of Parashat Balak). Upon the soldiers' return, they are instructed with regard to the laws of tum'a (ritual impurity) and other halakhot relevant to themselves and the food utensils taken as booty. They are reminded that any person who came in contact with a corpse must undergo the seven-day process of tahara (ritual purification), which the Torah had outlined in greater detail at the beginning of Parashat Chukat. In the final verse of this section of instructions to the soldiers, they are told, "You shall wash your clothes on the seventh day and be pure; and thereafter you may enter the camp" (31:24). At first glance, this requirement to "wash" their clothing means immersion in a mikveh. Garments, like utensils, become tamei if they come in contact with a corpse, and become tahor through immersion. Indeed, the Sifrei interprets this verse as referring to the immersion of garments that had become tamei. However, Targum Onkelos here translates the word "ve-khibastem" ("you shall wash") as "u-techavrun." Rashi, in his commentary to Parashat Tazria (Vayikra 13:58), establishes that when Onkelos uses this Aramaic term, he refers to regular cleaning, rather than ritual immersion. It follows, then, that this verse instructs the soldiers to wash their clothing as part of their purification process. Why? Rav Moshe Feinstein, in his "Derash Moshe," suggests that this requirement perhaps relates to the conclusion of this verse: "and thereafter you may enter the camp." Rashi explains that "the camp" refers to the machaneh Shekhina, the area around the Mishkan (the equivalent of the azara, or courtyard, of the Beit Ha-mikdash). It cannot refer to the Israelite camp in general, because a temei meit (person who had become impure through contact with a corpse) is permitted everywhere except for the machaneh Shekhina. Therefore, when the Torah speaks of the tamei returning to "the camp" after completing his tahara process, it must mean that he now returns to the area around the Mishkan. Perhaps, Rav Moshe suggests, the verse here requires a person to wash his clothing before entering the area of the Mishkan as a sign of respect and honor. The obligation to "wash" involves not the soldiers' purification process, but rather the general obligation of respect and decorum when entering the sacred grounds of the Mishkan. Rav Moshe adds that just as one must wear fine clothing on Shabbat as a sign of respect to the sacred quality of the day, so must one maintain high standards of dress in the area of the Mishkan. Therefore, the soldiers are reminded to wash their clothing before reentering the machaneh Shekhina. The Netziv also notes Onkelos' translation and suggests a similar explanation. He claims that the soldiers were to rinse their bloodstained garments out of sensitivity to other people, who might be repulsed at the sight of these stains. The Netziv then cites another explanation, that this verse instructs the soldiers to rinse their garments before immersion due to the Halakhic issue of "chatzitza." Unwanted substances on a garment during immersion render the immersion invalid, as they "block" the water from reaching that part of the garment. In order to avoid this problem, the soldiers are urged to thoroughly clean their garments before immersing them in a mikveh. David Silverberg ***** Parashat Matot begins with the prohibition against violating vows:
"If a man makes a vow to the Lord or takes an oath imposing a prohibition
on himself, he shall not break his pledge; he must
carry out all that has come out of his mouth" (30:3). The Torah here speaks of two categories: neder (translated here as "vow") and shevu'a (translated here as "oath"). Chazal (see
beginning of Masekhet Nedarim)
explain that a neder means forbidding an object with
respect to oneself. A person who takes a
neder declares that as far as he is concerned, a
given item (such as a food item, for example) is forbidden to him like hekdesh ( Among the important Halakhic differences between nedarim and shevu'ot, as discussed in the mishna in Masekhet Nedarim (16a), relates to the possibility of overriding a Torah law through the utterance of an oath. The mishna establishes that one cannot take a shevu'a to violate the Torah. For example, if a person makes an oath that he will eat on Yom Kippur or that he will not eat matza on Pesach, his oath is not binding (and he has in fact violated the prohibition against uttering meaningless shevu'ot). Since a person is already bound by the Torah's law, he cannot take it upon himself to violate the Torah. Nedarim, by contrast, can take effect against Torah law. If a person takes a neder that all matza is forbidden for him, then all matza indeed transforms into forbidden food as far as he is concerned, and even on Pesach he may not partake of matza. Since here the person seeks to change the status of an object, rather than introduce a new prohibition or obligation upon himself, the neder takes effect. The Gemara derives this halakha from the aforementioned verse in Parashat Matot: "If a man makes a vow to the Lord " The phrase "to the Lord," the Gemara explains, may be taken to mean "against the Lord." Even a neder that opposes God's law takes effect, and the individual may not violate his neder in order to obey Torah law. The Rashba, in his chiddushim to Masekhet Nedarim, and the Sefer Ha-chinukh (mitzva 30), ask why a person in such a case must abide by his neder at the expense of a Biblical command. After all, a famous halakhic principle establishes that "asei docheh lo ta'aseh" a "positive" commandment overrides a conflicting "negative" commandment. In our case, then, the mitzva to eat matza on Pesach should override the prohibition of "he shall not break his pledge." The prohibition against violating nedarim should, it would seem, give way to the imperative to eat matza. The Rashba and Chinukh answer, quite simply, that nedarim involves not only a lo ta'aseh (negative prohibition), but a mitzvat asei (positive command), as well. The Torah writes not only, "he shall not break his pledge," but also "he must carry out all that has come of his mouth." And according to Halakha, although a mitzvat asei can override a lo ta'aseh, it cannot override a law which involves both an asei and a lo ta'aseh. Therefore, the mitzva of matza, for example, cannot override the prohibition/obligation of nedarim. We find in the Acharonim's discussion of this issue two different approaches to understanding the Rashba and Chinukh's question. The Sha'ar Ha-melekh (on the Rambam, in Hilkhot Nedarim, chapter 3) argues that these Rishonim could not have meant in their question that the rule of "asei docheh lo ta'aseh" should, at first glance, allow for violating a neder to fulfill a mitzva. After all, as mentioned, the Gemara derives the rule that a neder takes effect even to suspend a mitzva from a verse in the Torah. Clearly, one cannot question a law established by the Torah on the basis of a different law in the Torah. Therefore, the Rashba and Chinukh did not ask why the Torah mandated the suspension of a mitzva by force of a neder. Such a question, the Sha'ar Ha-melekh claims, would be ludicrous. Rather, he explains, these Rishonim wondered why this rule does not establish a precedent that a mitzvat asei does not, in fact, have the power to override a mitzvat lo ta'aseh. Once the Gemara deduces from the verse that a neder suspends a mitzva, then this should seemingly reveal a general principle that a mitzva asei (such as matza) does not have the capacity to override a mitzva lo ta'aseh (like the prohibition against breaking a neder). To this the Rashba and Chinukh respond that nedarim entails a mitzvat asei, as well, and thus this is not a case of "asei docheh lo ta'aseh." Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," cites the approach of the Sha'ar Ha-melekh and disagrees. He claims that the Gemara derived from the verse only the fact that a neder is Halakhically viable even if it entails the suspension of a mitzva. A shevu'a, as we saw, has no Halakhic meaning whatsoever if it runs counter to Torah law. The Gemara learns from the verse in Parashat Matot that a neder, in contrast to a shevu'a, is a Halakhically valid neder even if it negates a Torah law. This verse does not, however, give us any instruction as to how to proceed when we are faced with a conflict between a neder and a Torah law. It merely establishes that this neder is a Halakhic neder. The Rashba and Chinukh thus wonder why we don't apply the standard rules governing situations of conflicting mitzvot, which would seemingly require observing the mitzva at the expense of the neder. They respond that we in fact do apply the standard rules, because we have here a situation of a single mitzvat asei (matza in our example) that conflicts with a mitzva that is both an asei and lo ta'aseh (nedarim). Therefore, the law of nedarim outweighs the mitzva at stake, and one must abide by his neder even at the expense of the given Torah law. David Silverberg ***** Yesterday, we discussed the halakha presented in Masekhet Nedarim (16a-b) that distinguishes between two different types of vows neder and shevu'a with respect to their ability to suspend a Torah law. A neder, which means declaring an object forbidden with respect to oneself, can take effect even at the expense of a Torah law. Thus, a person who takes a neder rendering matza forbidden for him may not partake of any matza even on Pesach, when the Torah obligates us to eat matza. We cited the comments of the Rashba and Chinukh, who attribute this halakha to the general principle that "ein asei docheh lo ta'aseh va-asei." Although a mitzvat asei (Biblical imperative) generally overrides a conflicting mitzvat lo ta'aseh (Biblical prohibition), it does not override a conflicting lo ta'aseh if that lo ta'aseh also entails a mitzvat asei. In our case, then, since the Torah in Parashat Matot (30:3) both forbade violating a neder and obligated fulfilling it, this law cannot be suspended by the obligation of matza. Several Acharonim questioned this logic in light of a Gemara in Masekhet Yevamot (5a), where the Gemara establishes an exception to this rule, of "ein asei docheh lo ta'aseh va-asei." In Parashat Metzora, the Torah describes the series of rituals by which a metzora (person stricken with tzara'at, a form of leprosy) becomes tahor (ritually pure), a process which includes shaving all his hair (Vayikra 14:9). The Gemara in Yevamot discusses a case of a nazir who contracts tzara'at and undergoes the purification process while still in his term of nezirut. Now a nazir is bound by both a mitzvat asei and mitzvat lo ta'aseh to refrain from cutting his hair (see Bamidbar 6:5). We would expect, then, that a nazir stricken with tzara'at may not cut his hair as part of his purification process; the mitzva for a metzora to cut his hair should not override the asei and lo ta'aseh forbidding a nazir from cutting his hair. However, the Gemara establishes that nezirut marks an exception. A nazir can have his state of nezirut annulled through the process of "she'eila" (appearing before a scholar or group of scholars who establish that his acceptance of nezirut resulted from some degree of misjudgment). This possibility of annulment renders the nezirut prohibitions less stringent than ordinary prohibitions, and thus not necessarily subject to the same rules. The Gemara explains that due to the lenient nature of nezirut, its prohibitions even haircutting, which involves both an asei and lo ta'aseh are overridden by a mitzvat asei, and thus a nazir undergoing purification from tzara'at may, in fact, cut his hair as part of that ritual. In light of all this, the question has been raised as to why a neder can override a mitzva. Despite the fact that a person who takes a neder is bound by both an asei and a lo ta'aseh, a neder, like nezirut, features the extraordinary leniency of she'eila. According to the Gemara in Yevamot, then, the conflicting mitzva should override the prohibition of nedarim, and in our case, then, the individual should be permitted and in fact required to partake of matza and fulfill the mitzva at the expense of his oath. (Of course, this question does not arise according to the explanation cited yesterday from the Sha'ar Ha-melekh, who claims that the Torah itself establishes that a neder overrides a mitzva, and the rule of "asei docheh lo ta'aseh" does not apply here at all.) Rav Alexander Sender Ha-kohen of Kupishak, in his work, "Shalmei Nedarim" on Masekhet Nedarim (16b), cites a clever answer to this difficulty from the work, "Simlat Binyamin." Although generally a mitzvat asei overrides a conflicting mitzvat lo ta'aseh, this halakha does not apply when there exists the possibility of resolving the conflict and observing both the asei and the lo ta'aseh. This principle is known as "efashar le-kayem sheneihem" literally, "both can be accommodated." If, indeed, some way can be found to accommodate both, then one must employ that method rather than transgressing the lo ta'aseh in deference to the asei. Therefore, the Simlat Binyamin claims, when a neder conflicts with a mitzva, we require the individual to annul his neder through the process of she'eila, so as to accommodate both the laws of nedarim and the mitzva in question. This entire discussion of an irreconcilable conflict between a neder and a mitzva arises only when dealing with the small group of nedarim that are not subject to annulment. (The question of which nedarim fall into this category lies beyond the scope of our discussion.) For if she'eila is possible, then the person who took the neder must have it annulled rather than violate a Torah law to uphold the neder. This, claims the Simlat Binyamin, easily resolves the difficulty we discussed. Since in any event a conflict between a neder and a mitzva will arise only if she'eila is not possible, we can apply the standard rule that a mitzvat asei does not override a mitzva that entails both an asei and a lo ta'aseh. There is no leniency of she'eila to speak of, because this halakha applies only when she'eila is not an option. Therefore, the individual must obey his neder, even at the expense of the mitzva at hand. The Shalmei Nedarim, however, rejects the Simlat Binyamin's theory and even claims that it was never meant to be taken seriously. By having a neder annulled so as to avoid a conflict between the neder and a mitzva, one does not accommodate both laws. Once he has the neder annulled, the neder simply does not exist. He does not fulfill the neder through she'eila; he eliminates it completely. This is not considered "efshar le-kayem sheneihem," and therefore the individual is not required to have his neder annulled to avoid overriding a mitzva. The Shalmei Nedarim then cites a different answer suggested by a number of Acharonim, including the famous Rav Yitzchak Elchanan Spektor of Kovna. These Acharonim claim that in many instances, a neder will indeed be unable to override a mitzva, given its lenient nature. The halakha that a neder can suspend a mitzva applies only to mitzvot which themselves feature a particularly lenient quality. The leniency of the mitzva neutralizes the factor of the leniency of nedarim, and we thus return to the basic halakha that an asei cannot outweigh a conflicting asei and lo ta'aseh. Thus, these Acharonim claim, a neder overrides only mitzvot from which women are exempt, and are thus considered more lenient mitzvot. As the Shalmei Nedarim points out, however, we do not find in earlier sources any mention of such a significant limitation on this halakha allowing nedarim to override mitzvot, and thus this theory seems very difficult to accept. David Silverberg ***** In our last two divrei Torah we discussed the halakha derived by the Gemara (Nedarim 16a-b) from a verse in Parashat Matot (30:3) that a person who takes a neder (as opposed to a shevu'a) must abide by his words even if it undermines a mitzva from the Torah. For example, a person who declares through a neder that matza is forbidden for him, may not eat matza even on Pesach, when the Torah obligates him to do so. We discussed the question of why we do not apply in this situation the famous rule of "asei docheh lo ta'aseh," that a positive commandment overrides a conflicting negative prohibition. In this instance, the mitzvat asei of matza should override the prohibition against violating a neder. Thus far, our discussion has focused on the comments of the Rashba and Sefer Ha-chinukh regarding this issue. Today we present a different approach, advanced by the Sha'ar Ha-melekh (a work on the Rambam). The Sha'ar
Ha-melekh invokes a theory that appears to emerge
from Tosefot's comments towards the end of Masekhet Eruvin (100a). The Gemara there
(and elsewhere) cites a mishna
in Masekhet Zevachim that
addresses a situation where blood from different types of sacrifices became
mixed together. The blood of all animal
sacrifices is sprinkled on the altar in the Tosefot's answer appears to establish a new limitation on the scope of "asei docheh lo ta'aseh." They write, "Here, it [the situation] arose as a result of negligence, and it [the mitzvat asei] could have occurred without overriding the negative prohibition." Tosefot appear to hold that if the conflict between the mitzvat asei and mitzvat lo ta'aseh arose out of negligence (even the accidental mixing of two pails of blood), the asei does not have the power to override the lo ta'aseh. The rule of "asei docheh lo ta'aseh" applies only when the conflict between the two could not have been avoided. Tosefot's position easily explains why one must abide by his neder even at the expense of a conflicting mitzva. This conflict arose only because of the individual's decision to take a neder that negates the possibility of fulfilling the given mitzva. He voluntarily put himself in this situation where he cannot fulfill the mitzva without violating a lo ta'aseh. According to Tosefot, in such a situation the mitzvat asei does not have the power to override the lo ta'aseh, and therefore the person may not fulfill the mitzva at the expense of his neder. David Silverberg ***** Parashat Matot tells of Benei Yisrael's successful war against the nation of Midyan (chapter 31). In describing this initiative, the Torah employs the peculiar term, "va-yitzbe'u" ("they waged war" 31:7). The Sifrei comments that this word denotes that Benei Yisrael surrounded the Midyanites on all sides, allowing them no possibility of escape. The Sifrei then cites the dissenting view of Rabbi Natan, that Benei Yisrael surrounded Midyan on only three sides, leaving the fourth side available for escape. The Rambam, in Hilkhot Melakhim (6:7), codifies the position of Rabbi Natan and requires that during warfare we leave the fourth side open for escape. The Ramban similarly follows this position and goes so far as to count this obligation as one of the 613 mitzvot in the Torah; this mitzva appears in his list of mitzvot asei which, in his view, the Rambam incorrectly neglected to include (mitzva 5). The Megilat Ester (a work on the Rambam's Sefer Ha-mitzvot responding to the Ramban's objections) explains that the Rambam did not count this obligation as a separate mitzva because it is included under the general mitzva concerning wartime procedures (mitzvat asei 190). (Later we will see a different possible reason why the Rambam does not count this obligation as a mitzva.) But the obvious question arises as to why the Rambam and Ramban follow the minority view of Rabbi Natan, against the predominant view in the Sifrei. Among the most basic rules of Halakhic decision-making is that we follow the majority view in the Talmud. Why, then, do these Rishonim choose to adopt specifically the minority view, requiring that we leave the fourth side open? Rav Barukh
Epstein, in his Torah Temima, suggests that the Rambam and Ramban arrived at
their ruling based on a passage in the Talmud Yerushalmi
(Shevi'it 6:1), which tells of a number of
proclamations issued by Yehoshua before he led Benei
Yisrael into Eretz Canaan. Among them
was an announcement allowing all residents of A much different, and perhaps more plausible, explanation emerges from the approach taken by the Malbim (see his commentary here and to 25:17). He claims that even the Tanna Kama (first opinion cited) in the Sifrei maintains that generally, Benei Yisrael are required to leave an escape route. However, the Tanna Kama understood that this battle against Midyan marked an exception. In order to avenge Midyan's involvement in the incident of Ba'al Pe'or, Benei Yisrael were commanded by God to wipe them out completely and not permit anybody to flee. Generally, however, even the Tanna Kama would require allowing the enemy the possibility of escape. This approach easily explains why the Rambam and Ramban codified this position. They are not following the minority view, for this is the unanimously accepted position. The argument between the Tanna Kama and Rabbi Natan applies only to this specific war against Midyan. What is the underlying reason behind this halakha? The Ramban mentions two possible reasons. First, it demonstrates the obligation for Benei Yisrael to conduct themselves ethically and compassionately even during times of warfare against their enemies. Secondly, he writes, allowing the possibility of escape helps minimize resistance. A nation surrounded on all sides, with no other option than defeating the besieging army, will fight with far more vigor and desperation than an army with the opportunity to flee. Benei Yisrael are therefore instructed to allow the enemy to escape, thereby reducing the intensity of fighting. Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen of Dvinsk, in his Meshekh Chokhma, suggests that the Rambam followed the second reason suggested by the Ramban, and for this very reason he did not count this obligation as one of the 613 mitzvot. Since, in the Rambam's view, leaving an escape route serves merely as a tactical means of minimizing resistance, it should be viewed as sound and valuable advice, rather than a mitzva. Therefore, it does not qualify for inclusion in the list of 613 mitzvot. David Silverberg ***** The end of Parashat
Matot (chapter 32) tells of the request submitted by
the tribes of Reuven and Gad to settle the newly captured territory of the East
Bank of the Oddly enough, however, when it came time to apportion the territory, Moshe suddenly allots some of this area to "chatzi shevet Menasheh" part of the tribe of Menasheh. (The Ramban demonstrates that "chatzi" here does not mean "half," but rather "portion," for in truth only one-tenth of the tribe of Menasheh settled in the East Bank.) When did the tribe of Menasheh enter the picture? How did they get involved in this initiative of Reuven and Gad? Ibn Ezra (32:33) claims that the Menashites had, in fact, joined Reuven and Gad since the very beginning, when they brought the idea to Moshe. Only because they were but a portion of a tribe, the Torah did not bother mentioning them until its account of the land's distribution, which included part of the tribe of Menasheh. By contrast, the Ramban suggests that when Moshe began to divide the land among the tribes of Reuven and Gad, it become clear to him that the territory is too vast for settlement by only two tribes. He therefore invited other members of Benei Yisrael to join Reuven and Gad on the East Bank, and these people from Menasheh came forth to accept this invitation. A different approach is taken by the
Metzudat David, in his commentary to Sefer Yehoshua (17:1).
He claims that the Menashites settled on the
East Bank because of their military skill and power. The tribes east of the The Netziv,
in his commentary to Parashat Devarim
(3:16), suggests that these families of Menasheh had
no interest in settling in the East Bank.
Moshe, however, instructed them to settle there, because he saw the need
for a strong presence of Torah scholars in these territories. A verse in Sefer Shoftim (5:14) speaks of the "mechokekim"
("legislators," a reference to Torah scholars) of the tribe of Menasheh, indicating that this tribe produced great
scholars. Moshe therefore had these
families from Menasheh join with Reuven and Gad in
order to ensure a significant supply of rabbis and scholarship east of the Yet another explanation is offered
by Rav Avraham Korman, in his "Ha-parasha Le-doroteha." (The crux of his theory also appears in Rav Gavriel Zev Margolis' "Torat Gavriel.") The settlement of two tribes on the opposite
side of the David Silverberg ***** Yesterday, we discussed the
permission granted to the tribes of Reuven and Gad to establish their permanent
residences on the East Bank of the Today we will discuss another important source relevant to this topic. Chizkuni, in his commentary, brings a Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 84:19) that draws an association between this rupture within the tribe of Menasheh and this tribe's family history. The Midrash claims that since Yosef (Menasheh's father) caused his brothers to rend their garments, when he had his royal goblet placed in Binyamin's bag (Bereishit 44:13), his descendants the tribe of Menasheh were torn into two, inhabiting different sides of the Jordan. The division within the tribe of Menasheh is thus seen as a means of atonement for the torn garments caused by Yosef's mistreatment of his brothers. What connection did the Midrash see between the grief Yosef caused his brothers, and the division of the tribe of Menashe into two sections? Rav Moshe Sternbuch, in his "Ta'am Ve-da'at," suggests that Chazal here give us an insight into how we may mend the tear of sin'at achim hatred among brothers. The division of the tribe of Menasheh created a situation where kinsmen of the same tribe would have to exert special effort to maintain their relationship. They could no longer rely on territorial proximity to naturally sustain relationships among family friends. This, Rav Sternbuch suggests, is the solution for mending the rip separating Yaakov's sons: to make a proactive, concentrated effort to establish and maintain peaceful, loving relationships among people. The Netziv, in his "Herchev Davar" to Parashat Masei (36:34), writes that when Chazal speak of the "sin'at chinam" (senseless hatred) on account of which God destroyed and has yet to rebuild the Second Temple, they refer to religiously based hatred. The different religious factions thought of each other as heretics, and felt that they are therefore entitled and in fact obliged to hate and even kill one another. In his work of responsa, "Meishiv Davar" (1:44), the Netziv printed a letter he wrote in response to the editor of a religious periodical who advocated the Torah world's complete dissociation from the non-observant community. Referring to his own, aforementioned comments in "Herchev Davar," the Netziv sharply disagreed and insisted that this would only serve to perpetuate the plague of "sin'at chinam" which drove us into and has kept us in exile. As mentioned, the antidote to brotherly hatred is the proactive effort to engender brotherly love. Our torn garments can be mended if we make a point of crossing the river to the other side, of finding ways of communicating with and befriending those of different orientations. This, perhaps, may help cure the illness of "sin'at chinam" from which our nation has suffered for so many centuries. David Silverberg
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