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PARASHAT
NOACH
By Rav
David Silverberg
Toward the end of Parashat Noach we read the enigmatic story of Migdal Bavel, the
people’s attempt to construct “a city with a tower whose top reaches the
heavens” (11:4), and the punishment they suffered as a result. A famous Midrashic tradition, cited by
Rashi (11:1), explains that the people of the time sought to wage war against
the Almighty. The idea of the tower
was to extend human dominion to the heavens, as opposed to leaving it confined
to the earth.
Among the questions that arise from this explanation is why God chose the
particular punishment visited upon the people of this generation, namely, making
the people speak different languages.
What made this the most appropriate response to the people’s attempt to
conquer the heavens?
The simplest answer, perhaps, is that this punishment shook the very
foundations of this sinister project, the people’s joint and unified sense of
mission. The endeavor was made
possible by the “single language” (11:1) of that generation, their deep-seated
feeling of unity. (In this sense,
the generation of Migdal Bavel
represents the polar opposite of the generation of the flood, which was plagued
by crime and violence.) God
disrupted this project by shattering the foundation of social harmony upon which
it rested, by seeing to it that the people would be unable to understand one
another.
We may, however, add another explanation for the significance and purpose
of this specific punishment. The
result of the multiple languages was the people’s dispersion throughout the
world: “The Lord dispersed them from there across the entire earth, and they
ceased building the city” (11:8).
Rather than continuing their attempts to conquer the heavens, the people
were compelled to scatter about the earth and build new cities and
countries. In other words, God
responded to Migdal Bavel by forcing the people to conquer the
earth, rather than trying to conquer the heavens. They had assembled with the intent of
concentrating the world’s population in a single city from which they would
ascend and take possession of the heavens.
In response, God had them go down from the heavens and leave the confines
of their city to conquer and develop the entire earth.
Symbolically, the story of Migdal
Bavel perhaps conveys a meaningful
lesson regarding the prioritization of our aspirations. We must focus our efforts on conquering
the earth, not the heavens. Our
pursuit of lofty goals must never come at the expense of our basic, primary
responsibilities. The generation of
Migdal Bavel neglected the charge to Noach to populate the earth
(9:7), preferring instead to embark on the more ambitious endeavor of populating
the heavens. We, too, must ensure
to work toward our responsibilities on “earth” before trying to reach the
“heavens,” to first meet our basic obligations and commitments before
undertaking more ambitious and lofty goals.
*******
In his commentary to the Migdal Bavel narrative, Rashi (11:1)
cites a number of different explanations from the Midrash Bereishit Rabba
(38:6). One view claims that the
people of the time sought to ascend to the heavens and wage war against
God. As we discussed yesterday, it
appears that they resented being confined to the earth, and endeavored to
conquer the heavens. Another famous
interpretation that Rashi cites from the Midrash explains that this generation
feared the possibility of another deluge.
They therefore planned to rise to the heavens and build “supports” to
prevent a flood.
Upon analyzing these two views regarding the nature of this generation’s
sin, one notices that they essentially reflect two very different forms of
heresy. Entertaining the
possibility of waging war against the Almighty demonstrates a denial of divine
omnipotence. According to this view
in the Midrash, the people of the time failed to recognize God’s unlimited
might, and instead perceived Him as simply a more impressive form of the human
being, who could be overpowered.
The people thought they could extend their dominion to the heavens,
because they did not acknowledge the vast difference between heaven and earth,
between God and mortals, between the infinite and the finite. It was this blurring of the lines
between the heavenly and earthly realms that allowed this generation to believe
in their ability to conquer the heavens.
The second view seems to reflect a much different perspective, namely,
that heaven and earth can be separated from one another. According to this view, the people built
the tower not to possess the heavens, but rather, to the contrary, to disconnect
themselves from the heavens.
Instead of trying to defeat God, they endeavored to hide themselves from
God, to construct an impenetrable wall between themselves and the divine
being. They waged war not against
God, but against providence; they sought to create a situation whereby the
Supreme Being would no longer govern earthly affairs, and would instead remain
in His heavenly chamber and leave mankind to supervise itself
independently.
To some extent, these two approaches to the Migdal Bavel heresy correspond to the two primary
mistakes that have been made concerning God. Some pagans erred by reducing God to a
type of human being, by attributing to Him the same frailties and limitations to
which people are subjected. On the
opposite extreme, others claimed that God is too great to concern Himself in any
way with human affairs. They held
that an all-powerful God could not possibly relate to such flawed creatures as
the human being. Similarly, the
enterprise of Migdal
Bavel could be understood as
either trying to combine heaven and earth, by lowering God to the level of the
human being, or as trying to drive a wedge between heaven and earth, such that
God yields no authority or control over the world.
The Torah, of course, sees no contradiction between divine omnipotence
and divine providence. God can be,
and is, both all-powerful and intimately involved in human affairs. And we are to follow His example by
concerning ourselves with the needs and concerns of even those whom we perceive
as “lower,” as less accomplished or less virtuous than ourselves. Just as God involves Himself in the
world despite His greatness, so must we show concern for others even if they
seem “inferior” and unworthy of our attention or
assistance.
*******
We read toward the end of Parashat Noach of God’s promise to never again
flood the earth, as He did in Noach’s time. God proclaims this covenant to Noach and
then designates the rainbow as the eternal symbol of His promise: “I have placed
My rainbow in the cloud, and it shall be a sign of the covenant between Me and
the earth. It shall be, when I
place clouds over the earth, the rainbow will be seen in the cloud. And I shall [then] remember My covenant
between Me and you…” (9:13-15).
A number of different approaches have been taken to explain the symbolic
significance of the rainbow, why it, specifically, was chosen as the symbol of
God’s covenant with the earth. One
particularly insightful explanation (cited in the Yalkut Yehuda) takes
note of the fact that God emphasizes the rainbow’s appearance through a
cloud. A careful reading of God’s
words in these verses reveals that the rainbow itself does not, independently,
serve as the sign of the covenant.
Rather, the sign is the rainbow’s appearance within the cloud: “I have
placed My rainbow in the cloud, and it shall be a sign of the covenant between
Me and the earth…” The sun’s light
will penetrate the cloud, and its refraction results in the colorful appearance
of the rainbow, thereby announcing God’s promise to all mankind. Until the flood, it seems, the clouds
formed too thick a barrier between the sun and the earth to allow for the
penetration of any light. The
change that God brought about after the flood diminished the strength,
so-to-speak, of the clouds, such that they could allow the infiltration of some
rays of light, and were unable to produce the kind of rain that fell during the
time of the flood.
The
phenomenon of the rainbow was symbolic of the ability granted to the “light” of
ethical and moral conduct to penetrate even the darkest, thickest “cloud cover,”
in times when the forces of evil and corruption prevail. God guaranteed Noach that He will never
again allow mankind to degenerate to the point of depravity as they did in that
generation, that even the thickest “clouds” would not succeed in obstructing all
rays of light. Even when the
“clouds” of cruelty, barbarism or decadence cover the sky, when society is
overrun by impiety, the “light” of morality will still manage to surface. God gave us His word that even in the
world’s darkest periods, it will still be possible to shine the light of faith
and sanctity through the dark cloud, and illuminate even the darkest, stormiest
skies.
*******
After Noach and his family’s departure from the ark following the flood,
God speaks to Noach, issuing a number of directives relevant to the process of
rebuilding upon which he is to now embark.
Included in this series of instructions is the prohibition against
murder: “He who spills human blood – by witnesses shall his blood be spilt, for
He made man in the image of God” (9:6).
Immediately thereafter, God commands, “And you – be fruitful and
multiply; propagate in the earth and multiply in
it.”
A number of different approaches have been taken to explain the
connection between these two commands – the prohibition of murder, and the
obligation to procreate. The Radak
(see also Chizkuni and Seforno) suggests, quite simply, that God’s intent is to
lay the groundwork for the repopulation of the earth. To that end, He strictly warns against
murder and issues a command to reproduce.
Chazal
(Bereishit
Rabba 34:14;
Yevamot 63), as cited by Rashi, extend this notion one step further, suggesting
that this juxtaposition reflects the gravity of the obligation to
procreate. By introducing this
command in association with the prohibition against murder, God indicates that
willfully refraining from procreation is equivalent to murder, as in both
instances one fails to further the goal of populating the
earth.
The Meshekh
Chokhma offers a
much different explanation, citing a famous passage from Masekhet Bava Batra
(60b). The Gemara there tells that
in response to the ruthless persecution suffered under the Roman Empire, the Jews considered the idea of ceasing to
beget children, and allowing the Jewish nation to naturally disappear. Rather than beget children who will
suffer religious persecution and be unable to properly observe the Torah, it
would perhaps be preferable, they initially thought, to simply bring an end to
Am
Yisrael through
nationwide celibacy.
The Meshekh
Chokhma suggests
that the Torah perhaps seeks to dispel such a notion by juxtaposing its
discussion of murder with the obligation to procreate. The Torah alludes to the fact that even
during times of rampant persecution and bloodshed, when tyranny and violence run
rampant, people must still marry and beget children in an effort to populate
God’s earth. The question of
whether or not this earth is an inviting place for these children to inhabit is
one which only God Himself must answer; as far as the people are concerned, they
bear the obligation to reproduce even during times of hardship and
oppression.
The Meshekh
Chokhma
concludes his discussion by noting that the She’iltot, in
Parashat Vezot Haberakha, does not cite a verse from the Torah as the Biblical
source of procreation. Instead, he
cites a verse from Sefer Yirmiyahu (29:6), in which Yirmiyahu instructs the
Jewish exiles in Babylonia to marry and beget
children. Possibly, the Meshekh
Chokhma
suggests, the She’iltot chose this verse in order to emphasize the point
mentioned above. Yirmiyahu exhorts
the despondent Jews in exile that despite all they have endured, and although
they live under foreign rule in a foreign land, they must not despair from
establishing future generations of Am Yisrael.
The She’iltot may have seen within this admonition a
critical element of the obligation of peru u-revu (procreation), namely, that it
applies regardless of the conditions to which we are subject. The nation’s responsibility is to build
the next generation, and trust in God’s ability to protect and nurture that
generation even amid hostility and
persecution.
*******
We read in Parashat Noach that after the flood, Noach planted a vineyard
from which he produced wine. He
then partook of the wine and became intoxicated, to the point where he exposed
himself in his tent, in full view of his son Cham
(9:20-21).
Chazal, in a famous Midrashic passage (Bereishit Rabba 36),
sharply criticize Noach for choosing the particular endeavor of planting a
vineyard: “…he was desecrated, and became profane – why? [Because] ‘he planted a vineyard.’ Should he not have planted something
beneficial, [such as] a shoot of a fig tree…?”
Clearly, Chazal do not frown upon grapes and wine generally; in
fact, drinking wine is even deemed a mitzva on certain occasions. Their condemnation of Noach’s choice no
doubt relates to the particular context of his recent emergence from the
ark. Noach was assigned the
responsibility of rebuilding the earth, restarting the process of the world’s
development after the floodwaters destroyed all that had been accomplished
before Noach’s time. This specific
circumstance mandated careful prioritization, that Noach first concern himself
with the most pressing and immediate needs of himself, his family, and the
offspring they would soon beget.
Off this backdrop, wine production was a poor choice. It reflected the priority Noach afforded
to his personal gratification, over the more basic needs of
mankind.
This perspective on Noach’s failure might explain the introductory clause
to this passage: “nitchalel ve-na’asa chulin” (“he was desecrated, and
became profane”). Chazal see within the word va-yachel (literally, “he began”) in this verse an
allusion to a process of chilul – “desecration” – and the status of
chulin – “profane.”
The term chilul is used to describe an object of sanctity that has
been misused or misappropriated, in a manner that undermines its sacred quality.
A consecrated article becomes
chulin when a person uses it as something mundane. The term chilul Hashem refers to
a situation that causes God’s Name to be looked upon with ridicule and contempt,
as opposed to the sense of awe and reverence that it ought to evoke. Noach became chulin in that he
betrayed the unique role and stature assigned to him. He was chosen to be the new builder of
the world and of mankind, but he instead focused on personal indulgence, at the
expense of the earth’s restoration.
(Rabbenu Bechayei offers a different explanation of Noach’s
“desecration,” noting that as the tenth generation from Adam, he was invested
with a unique stature of kedusha which he betrayed by involving himself in
planting a vineyard.)
Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, draws
our attention in this context to the famous story of Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai’s
emergence from the cave where he had hid for over two decades. Rabbi Shimon and his son were
miraculously sustained during this period, and upon emerging from the cave,
Rabbi Shimon said, “Since a miracle occurred, I shall go and help in some way”
(Masekhet Shabbat 33b). His
miraculous survival impelled him to search for a way to serve the people, to
help benefit the world. The Gemara
relates that Rabbi Shimon took example from Yaakov, who, upon returning to
Canaan unscathed after his confrontations with Lavan and Esav, helped the city
of Shekhem by
either establishing a new currency, or building new marketplaces or bathhouses
(different views exist in this regard).
Similarly, Rabbi Shimon saw it as his duty to provide some community
service in response to the miracle he had just experienced. He decided to work to confirm the status
of certain areas where there was a suspicion of tum’a (ritual
impurity), so that kohanim could walk there without concern.
The Midrash’s criticism of Noach addresses his failure to respond
appropriately to the extraordinary miracle of his survival. His situation called for leadership and
a sense of mission, a calling to which he neglected to respond. As Chazal
commented, Noach was thus “desecrated,” he betrayed his status and mission, and
as a result lost his dignity, as well, in the form of the humiliation he
suffered.
********
The Torah tells that following the flood that destroyed the earth in
Noach’s time, God made the decision to never again undertake so drastic a
measure in response to man’s sinfulness: “I shall never again curse the ground
on account of man, for the inclination of the heart of man is evil from his
youth, and I shall never again smite all living things as I have done”
(8:21).
The description in this verse of the yetzer ha-ra (evil
inclination) was the subject of a curious exchange between Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi
and the Roman emperor Antoninus, as related in Bereishit Rabba (34; see
also Sanhedrin 91b). Antoninus
posed to Rabbi Yehuda the question of whether the evil inclination enters a
person already during the fetal stage, in the mother’s womb, or if it surfaces
only at the time of birth. Rebbe
(Rabbi Yehuda) initially replied that the yetzer ha-ra descends upon a child already in the womb,
but Antoninus disagreed, arguing that if so, “he would pick at her stomach and
leave.” Meaning, if a child
possessed an evil inclination in the mother’s womb, he would push his way out of
the womb.
Rebbe
conceded to Antoninus’ objection, and even drew proof from the verse here in
Parashat Noach: “for the
inclination of the heart of man is evil from his youth.” The word mi-ne’urav (“from his
youth”) may be read to mean “from the time he is shaken,” referring to the
infant’s displacement from his position in the womb during childbirth. This reading would suggest that, as
Antoninus claimed, the yetzer ha-ra does not surface within a child
during gestation, and surfaces only at the time of birth.
How might we understand this seemingly
peculiar exchange? Why would it
matter whether or not the evil inclination affects a child in the womb, and why
would we assume that the infant would “escape” from the womb had he possessed a
yetzer ha-ra?
Rav
Yitzchak Goldwasser, in
his work Yitzpon La-yesharim
Tushiya (Bnei-Brak, 5744),
explains this conversation by distinguishing between two different kinds of
negative tendencies, which he terms ta’avot (physical drives) and middot ra’ot (negative character traits). The drive for physical gratification is
undoubtedly an intrinsic part of a person’s physical existence, and therefore a
fetus desires nourishment and comfort no less than an adult. Antoninus’ question clearly did not
relate to this form of “inclination.”
Rather, it pertained to negative qualities such as arrogance,
selfishness, greed, anger and envy.
These tendencies stem not from the innate drive for survival and
self-preservation, but rather from an inflated sense of self, attributing too
much importance to oneself and placing oneself in the center, while relegating
others to the periphery. A fetus
does not experience this feeling, Rav Goldwasser asserts, because he has no
independent identity. As reflected
in the halakhic principle of “ubar
yerekh imo,” a fetus is perceived
as part of the mother. The very
nature of gestation, during which the fetus is simply part of the mother’s body,
precludes the possibility of his feeling envious or arrogant. These emotions set in only later, once
an infant exits the womb and gradually individuates and forms its own,
independent identity and sense of self.
This, Rav
Goldwasser suggests, is what Antoninus meant when he said, “he would pick at her
stomach and leave.” He did not
intend to say that a fetus with a yetzer ha-ra would
actually seek to leave the womb prematurely. Rather, he meant that the fetus’
condition inside the womb inherently negates the possibility of its possessing a
yetzer ha-ra, an
inflated ego. As it is merely a
part of somebody else, without a separate identity, it cannot feel the desire
for honor or experience the drive for competition. It is only once a person forms his
independent sense of self that he begins to feel the need to compete with
others, which in turn gives rise to negative character traits such as arrogance
and jealousy.
********
Rav Yair Bachrach (Germany, 1638-1702), in his work of
responsa Chavot
Yair
(163), addresses the case of a group of merchants who all dealt in the clothing
industry. Often, they would find
themselves entangled in legal disputes with one another, usually involving
issues of hasagat
gevul
– infringing upon each other’s client base and the like. They would bring their disputes to a
certain rabbi for arbitration, a service for which the rabbi would charge a
fee. With time, the merchants
determined that their legal costs began to exceed the losses incurred by what
each perceived as the others’ unethical practices. They therefore entered into an agreement
granting each other unrestrained commercial freedom. The terms of the agreement established
that “anything goes,” and the merchants promised not to sue one another for
overaggressive marketing or expansion.
The question was posed to the Chavot
Yair
as to the legal and religious propriety of this agreement, and he responded by
issuing a harsh condemnation. He
asserted that giving each other license to ignore the Torah’s commercial laws
constitutes a more grievous transgression than actually violating those
laws. This agreement, he warned,
would assuredly result in their growing accustomed to improper business
practice, and, besides, others will likely take example from their conduct and
run their businesses without any regard for halakhic
restrictions.
Amidst his response, the Chavot Yair draws a parallel between
these merchants’ proposed agreement and the sin of the generation of the
flood. During the time of Noach, he
claims, corruption became so rampant that people ceased to object to each
other’s crimes. Later in Sefer
Bereishit (18:20), the Torah describes the “cries” that arose due to the crimes
perpetrated in the city of Sedom, which Chazal
interpreted as referring to the cries of the victims. The Chavot Yair
notes that no mention of the victims’ cries is made in the Torah’s description
of Noach’s generation. Quite
possibly, he writes, this is due to the fact that people stopped caring. They simply accepted lawlessness as a
way of life, and resigned themselves to the fact that only the strongest,
wiliest, and luckiest people would survive and succeed.
This, the Chavot Yair writes, demonstrates that lawlessness is not
an acceptable solution for excessive legal disputes. It is far preferable for quarreling
parties to reconcile their disputes in court – regardless of the expense and
inconvenience entailed – than to simply fight it out in the battle of the
marketplace. When God saw that
lawlessness prevailed, that human beings fought for wealth just as animals fight
over prey, He decided to bring the flood.
If the world cannot operate on the basis of a civilized system of law,
then it simply could not exist at all.
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