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Parashat Lekh Lekha

By Rav David Silverberg

            Towards the beginning of Parashat Lekh-Lekha we read of Avraham's relocation in Egypt after Canaan is struck by drought, and the travails he experiences during this period.  He ultimately emerges from Egypt as a wealthy man, and returns to Canaan.  The verse states in describing his return, "Va-yeilekh le-masa'av," which literally means, "He went along his travels" (13:3).  Rashi, however, citing the Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 41:3), explains this as a reference to Avraham's lodging as he made his way from Egypt to Canaan.  He made a point of staying in the same inns where he had lodged as he traveled initially from Canaan to Egypt.  "He went along his travels" thus means that he ensured to follow the same route as he did "along his travels" when he first moved to Egypt, and even stayed overnight at the same motels.  Rashi refers us to the Gemara in Masekhet Arakhin (16b), which extracts from this verse a general rule that one should not lodge with a different host than the one with whom he had previous stayed.  Seeking accommodations elsewhere raises suspicions about both the host and oneself, as people will conclude that either the host did not extend proper hospitality, or that he found the guest distasteful and did not invite him back.

            Rav Avraham Pam (as cited in Rav Pam on Chumash) added yet another lesson that may be derived from Avraham's lodging as he returned to Canaan.  Avraham had fled Canaan due to the financial hardships wrought by the drought, and returned from Egypt a fabulously wealthy man.  This kind of drastic increase in wealth is generally followed by a drastic "upgrade" in one's quality of life.  One might have expected Avraham to use his newfound wealth for better accommodations, to treat himself to more comfortable and luxurious travel conditions.  But he chose differently, preferring to continue living the life of humble simplicity that he lived before earning his fortune in Egypt.  He decided to use the money for more important causes, such as hospitality, of which we read in Parashat Vayera.  Additionally, nobody really knows when or how the tides will reverse, and Avraham therefore exercised discretion in spending his fortune.  This Midrash thus advises against squandering wealth on unnecessary luxury items, that even the wealthy should budget carefully and spend their money wisely.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the verse in Parashat Lekh-Lekha that describes Avraham's return to Canaan after his turbulent sojourn in Egypt: "Va-yeilekh le-masa'av" (literally, "He went along his travels").  As we saw, Rashi cites the Midrash's interpretation that Avraham found lodging in the same inns in which he had stayed when he first journeyed from Canaan to Egypt.

            In addition, however, Rashi cites a second interpretation from the Midrash, which reads this verse to mean that Avraham "repaid his debts."  According to the simple reading of the Midrash, it seeks to emphasize Avraham's sense of respect and responsibility towards others, that immediately upon acquiring wealth and returning home, he made a point of repaying his outstanding loans.  The priority he afforded to his financial obligations serves as yet another example of his strict ethical standards and respect for other people and their property.

            Rav Shlomo Breuer (son-in-law of Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch), however, in his work Chokhma U-musar, suggested a deeper reading of the Midrash's comment.  The Torah tells that when Avraham first arrived in Canaan, he "called in the Name of the Lord" (12:8), which the Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 39) and several commentators (such as the Ramban and Radak) explain to mean that he began his campaign of disseminating the belief in the one true God.  In a pagan world, that had for several generations been taught to bow to and worship graven images and natural elements, one can easily imagine the challenges and ridicule Avraham had to confront during this campaign.  He sought to teach the people of his time to worship and believe in a God whom they neither saw nor heard, and whom they could not even conjure in their minds as any kind of image.  We may assume that these challenges only intensified as drought struck the area and Avraham fell into destitution.  "If you do worship a kind, benevolent God," they may have asked, "why does he not provide you with rain and miraculously bring you food and water?"  These difficulties in disseminating monotheism intensified as Avraham fled to Egypt and then had to endure the abduction of his wife.

            But just then, God intervened and brought plagues upon Pharaoh and his household.  Sara was returned, and Avraham was showered with wealth.  He could now return to Canaan and look forward to a future of financial security.  Upon his return, he went to "repay his debts."  According to Rav Breuer, this comment in the Midrash alludes to his "debts" to his interlocutors, those who pointed to his struggles as proof against the beliefs he was trying to sell.  Indeed, this verse tells of Avraham's renewed efforts to draw people to the belief in God: "He went along his travels…to the site of the altar which he had initially made, and Avraham called there in the Name of the Lord" (13:3-4).  (According to one interpretation suggested by Rashi, this refers to a new campaign to "call in the Name of the Lord.")  Equipped with success and salvation, Avraham was now in a position to teach and inspire, to provide some of the answers he "owed" to those who rejected him.  He showed his audience that even when God's power and authority over the world seems difficult to discern, when the rewards of belief and observance seem distant, ultimately His salvation surfaces and His unchallenged dominion over the earth becomes evident and undeniable.

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            The final verses of Parashat Lekh-Lekha tell that upon hearing God's command regarding berit mila, Avraham circumcised himself, his son Yishmael, and his male servants.  Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer (chapter 29) elaborates a bit on the circumcision ritual, emphasizing Avraham's efforts at publicizing the event.  To this end, he invited a number of prominent dignitaries and conducted the ritual at high noon.

            Rav Avraham Gombiner (author of the Magen Avraham), in his work Zayit Ra'anan (a commentary to the Yalkut Shimoni), questions how Avraham was permitted to delay his berit mila until midday.  The famous rule of zerizin makdimin le-mitzvot requires performing mitzvot at the earliest opportunity, and it is in fact Avraham who, as the Gemara writes (Pesachim 4a), establishes the precedent by arising early in the morning to fulfill God's command of the akeida (see Bereishit 22:3).  Indeed, the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 262:1) rules explicitly that a circumcision should be performed early in the day, and not be delayed.  Interestingly, Pitchei Teshuva cites the Shevut Ya'akov as warning chazanim not to prolong the Shabbat morning service if a berit is held that day, so as not to delay the circumcision until midday.  Why, then, did Avraham delay the circumcision until noon?  Apparently, as the Zayit Ra'anan writes, the concern for publicizing the mitzva of berit mila warranted delaying the circumcision, and outweighed the consideration of zerizin makdimin.

            It appears, at least at first glance, that this position of the Zayit Ra'anan is not universally accepted.  As noted by Rav Aharon Miasnick, in his work Minchat Aharon (Parashat Lekh-Lekha), the Birkei Yosef (O.C. 1) held that the factor of zerizin makdimin supersedes the value of be-rov am hadrat melekh, which encourages performing mitzvot together with a large crowd of Jews.  According to the Birkei Yosef, one should not delay the performance of a mitzva in the interest of joining with a large group; one should preferably perform the mitzva earlier and in private, or with a small group, rather than delaying it to participate with a larger group.  This position seems to be at odds with the approach of the Zayit Ra'anan, who justified the delay of Avraham's circumcision on the grounds that it allowed for greater publicity.

            In truth, however, as Rav Miasnick suggests, the delay of Avraham's circumcision does not necessarily run in opposition to the Birkei Yosef's position.  In the case of Avraham, who devoted his life to disseminating monotheism and advocating the service of the one, true God, there was more at stake then the standard value of be-rov am hadrat melekh.  Here, there was also the concern for kiddush Hashem.  Avraham sought to make a public display of his unwavering devotion to God by performing circumcision in fulfillment of His command.  Thus, even if under normal circumstances one should not delay a mitzva in the interest of greater participation and publicity, in Avraham's case this was justified.

            Rav Miasnick then suggests a different theory, raising a possible distinction between mitzvot that are to be done on a specific day, and mitzvot that are not bound to one particular day.  The halakha of zerizin makdimin perhaps applies only when a mitzva applies on a specific day, in which case one should endeavor to perform the mitzva as early as possible that day.  When, however, a mitzva need not necessarily be performed on a particular day, then although one should not unnecessarily delay its performance, lest circumstances change and the opportunity is lost (shihuyei mitzva lo meshahinan), other competing factors may in fact allow for a delay.  Therefore, zerizin makdimin would apply only in cases of a berit mila performed on a child's eighth day, when the father bears a special obligation to circumcise the child that day.  In such a case, the Birkei Yosef would require performing the circumcision early in the morning even at the expense of a large attendance.  However, in situations of a mila performed after the eighth day, as in the case of Avraham, who underwent circumcision at the age of ninety-nine years, no particular obligation exists requiring the circumcision on a particular day, and hence it may be delayed in deference to other factors, such as greater publicity.

            As far as practical Halakha is concerned, Rav Yitzchak Weiss (Minchat Yitzchak 8:4) and Rav Ovadya Yosef (Yabia Omer vol. 2, Y.D. 18) allow delaying a berit if this is necessary for a minyan to attend.  If a minyan is already present, the berit should not be delayed to allow others to attend.

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            We read in Parashat Lekh-Lekha of the prophecy to Avraham warning of the subjugation of his descendants to a foreign nation for a period of four hundred years (15:13).  Many sources in Chazal and later commentators addressed the seeming contradiction between this verse and a verse in Sefer Shemot (12:40) which states explicitly that Benei Yisrael spent four hundred and thirty years in bondage.  If God forewarned four hundred years of exile, why did Avraham's descendants endure four hundred and thirty years of oppression?

            Rashi (in Sefer Shemot) cites from the Midrash that the two verses count from two different starting points.  When God informed Avraham of a four hundred-year period of his offspring's subjugation, He refers to the period beginning with the birth of Yitzchak, at which point Avraham lived under foreign rule in Canaan.  This condition of living as a foreigner continued until Benei Yisrael's departure from Egypt four hundred years later.  The verse in Sefer Shemot, by contrast, begins counting from the time of the berit bein ha-betarim, when this prophecy was conveyed to Avraham.  Avraham beheld this prophecy thirty years before the birth of Yitzchak, and hence the Torah in Sefer Shemot speaks of a period spanning four hundred and thirty years, rather than just four hundred.

            This resolution, however, gives rise to a glaring chronological problem.  Avraham was one hundred years old at the time of Yitzchak's birth (21:5), and thus according to the Midrash, he was seventy upon hearing this prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim.  Yet, towards the beginning of Parashat Lekh-Lekha (12:4), we are told that Avraham emigrated from Charan to Canaan at the age of seventy-five.  It thus emerges that Avraham beheld this prophecy in Charan, before resettling in Canaan, despite the fact that the Torah records this prophecy several sections after the narrative of Avraham's emigration to Canaan (beginning of chapter 12).  This sequence of presentation can be understood in light of the general principle that the Torah does not necessarily follow chronological sequence, but another, more difficult problem arises, as well.  From God's words to Avraham in this prophecy, it clearly emerges that He spoke with him in the land of Canaan ("the fourth generation shall return here" – 15:16; "I have given this land to your offspring" – 15:18).  Undoubtedly, God conveyed this prophecy to Avraham in Canaan – and yet this occurred five years before Avraham's emigration to Canaan!

            To resolve this difficulty, Seder Olam claims that Avraham emigrated to Canaan twice.  He first moved to Canaan at the age of seventy, at which point he beheld the prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim, but he then returned to Charan for five years.  God then commanded Avraham to return to Canaan, and the Torah's account of Avraham's emigration to Canaan at the age of seventy-five refers to this second and final relocation.

            Abarbanel raises the obvious question of why Avraham returned to Charan after beholding the berit bein ha-betarim prophecy, in which he was promised that his descendants would inherit this land.  Did he doubt God's promise?

            In truth, at least two sources in the Rishonim already addressed this question.  The Rosh (Yevamot 6:12) discusses Avraham's return to Charan in a halakhic context, concerning the halakha that if a couple lived together for ten years without begetting children, the husband must wed another woman with whom to reproduce.  (We will not discuss here the practical applications of this halakha.)  As the Rosh cites, some authorities held that the years the couple spent in chutz la-aretz (outside the Land of Israel) do not count towards the ten years with regard to this halakha.  If they do not beget children while living in chutz la-aretz, this can be attributed to their residence outside the Land of Israel, rather than to the woman's infertility, and therefore the husband is not required to marry another woman.  The Rosh proves this halakha from the case of Avraham and Sara.  Avraham married Hagar ten years after relocating in Canaan (16:3).  Now the Torah later tells that when Avraham and Yishmael – Hagar's son – underwent circumcision, Avraham was ninety-nine years old, and Yishmael, thirteen (17:24-5).  And according to the Midrash (cited by Rashi, 17:4), Hagar conceived immediately upon marrying Avraham.  Thus, Avraham married Hagar at the age of eighty-five – ten years after his second and final relocation in Canaan, at the age of seventy-five.  This demonstrates that the five years spent in Charan in the interim did not count towards the ten years that required him to marry an additional wife, and the Rosh writes that Sara's inability to conceive during these five years served as a punishment to Avraham for leaving Canaan.  According to the Rosh, then, Avraham indeed sinned in leaving Canaan after the berit bein ha-betarim.

            The Sefer Ha-chasidim, however, in the section concerning the laws of Eretz Yisrael, explains differently.  He claimed that God had initially instructed Avraham to visit Eretz Yisrael only briefly, to "whet his appetite," so-to-speak, and arouse his love and affection for the land.  The five subsequent years in Charan were intended as a period of anticipation and longing to return to Eretz Yisrael, so that Avraham would feel a deep sense of gratitude and appreciation when he ultimately settles there permanently.

            According to the Sefer Ha-chasidim, then, Avraham did not sin by returning to Charan; to the contrary, this was precisely what God had instructed, in order to build his enthusiasm and anticipation towards his resettlement in Canaan.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the view of Seder Olam that the prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim (Bereishit 15), in which Avraham was informed of the future subjugation of his descendants, took place five years before Avraham's emigration from Charan to Canaan.  According to this view, Avraham first arrived in Canaan at the age of seventy, at which point he beheld this prophecy, and he then returned to Charan for five years, after which he left Charan to permanently settle in Canaan.  Although the prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim is recorded in the Torah several chapters after the narrative of Avraham's settlement in Canaan at the age of seventy-five, these narratives are presented out of chronological sequence.  The prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim was conveyed five years before Avraham's final relocation to Canaan, contrary to the implication of the Torah's arrangement of the narrative.

            Tosefot in Masekhet Berakhot (7b) note that this theory would appear, at first glance, to oppose another Midrashic passage, cited in Rashi's Torah commentary (15:1), linking the section of berit bein ha-betarim with the preceding section.  Chapter 14 of Sefer Bereishit tells the story of the battle waged by the five kings of the Jordan Valley region (the area of Sedom) against the four eastern powers, and Avraham's successful intervention in this war.  Commenting on the first verse of chapter 15, which introduces the narrative of berit bein ha-betarim, Rashi, based on the Midrash, explains this verse as God's reassurance to Avraham that his miraculous triumph over the four eastern powers would not diminish from his merit.  He would still be granted children, despite his already having earned miraculous divine assistance in waging this battle.  God further reassured Avraham that he would not be punished for the blood spilled during this campaign.  In any event, this understanding of the verse clearly assumes the chronological accuracy of the Torah's arrangement, that the prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim occurred after the battle Avraham waged against the four kings.

            Conflicting Midrashic passages could be understood as reflecting different views among Chazal, but in this instance, we find a glaring inconsistency within Rashi's commentary.  As we mentioned, Rashi cites the Midrashic passage that the prophecy of berit bein ha-betarim followed the war against the four kings.  Yet, as we mentioned yesterday, in Rashi's commentary to Sefer Shemot (12:40) he cites the view that berit bein ha-betarim took place when Avraham was seventy years old, five years prior to his final relocation in Canaan.  How could Rashi accept both these Midrashim?

            Tosefot offer a startling answer, suggesting that chapter 15 itself, though presented as a single prophecy, actually consists of two distinct prophecies that were conveyed to Avraham five years apart.  The first prophecy is recorded in the first six verses of this chapter, and consists of God's reassurances of protection and offspring, in response to Avraham's concerns after the war.  Verse 7 – "He said to him: I am the Lord who has taken you from Ur Kasdim" – begins a different prophecy, which Avraham beheld five years earlier, during his initial trip to Canaan.  In this prophecy God makes the formal berit bein ha-betarim covenant with Avraham and warns of his descendants' oppression in a foreign land.

            Tosefot demonstrate how this theory may resolve a number of other difficulties, as well.  Firstly, early in this chapter (verse 5), God says to Avraham, "Look, please, to the heavens, and count the stars, if you can count them," emphasizing how numerous his offspring will become.  This strongly suggests that this prophecy was conveyed at nighttime, when the stars are visible.  Yet, later in this chapter (verse 12), when the Torah describes the actual covenant, it tells of the sun setting, suggesting that this took place during late afternoon.  Tosefot cite the Rashbam as drawing proof from this inconsistency that these two sections refer to two different prophecies that Avraham beheld on entirely different occasions.

            Furthermore, the Gemara there in Berakhot asserts that Avraham was the first person to ever refer to the Almighty with the term Adon ("Master"), and it cites a verse from the second section of chapter 15 (verse 8), when Avraham asks, "Ado-nai Elokim, how shall I know that I will inherit it [the land]?"  Tosefot note that Avraham had already employed this term earlier in the chapter (verse 2): "Ado-nai Elokim, what can You give me – and here I am childless…"  The answer, Tosefot claim, becomes clear in light of their theory, that the first six verses of this chapter refer to a prophecy Avraham received after the war against the four kings, while the remainder of the chapter speaks of a prophecy conveyed five years earlier.

            Of course, the question arises as to why the Torah chose to combine these two prophecies and present them as a single event.  Any and all suggestions are welcome.

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            The final section of Parashat Lekh-Lekha tells of the commandment to Avraham regarding berit mila.  The Beit Ha-levi (vol. 2, 47:4) develops a theory found in the Maharach Or Zarua (11), who claimed that the mitzva of berit mila is an ongoing mitzva, which one fulfills each day of his life after undergoing circumcision.  As opposed to other mitzvot, which one performs in a single action or over the course of a specific period of time, a circumcised Jew performs the mitzva of mila each day of his life simply by virtue of his being circumcised.

            The Beit Ha-levi suggested that this perspective on the mitzva of mila may actually be mentioned in the Torah itself.  God instructs Avraham, "At eight days old every male among you shall be circumcised…and My covenant shall be in your flesh as an eternal covenant" (17:12-13).  At first glance, the second clause – "and My covenant shall be in Your flesh" – refers to the result, or purpose, of the first clause: as a result of a child's circumcision, God's covenant is now "in his flesh as an eternal covenant."  However, the Beit Ha-levi suggested, it may also be understood to mean that this mitzva entails not merely undergoing the procedure of circumcision, but having the sign of God's covenant on one's body each day of his life.

            The Maharach Or Zarua proves his theory from a famous passage in Masekhet Menachot (43b).  The Gemara tells that when King David would bathe, he would initially be taken somewhat aback by the fact that he observes no mitzvot during those moments.  He would then look upon his mila and be reminded of this mitzva that he performs even as he bathes.  This would seem to prove that one fulfills the mitzva of berit mila each day of his life, and not merely by undergoing the procedure of circumcision.  Otherwise, what consolation would it be for King David knowing that he had underwent circumcision many years earlier, if he still observes no mitzvot at this moment?  Seemingly, then, the mitzva of mila is observed constantly throughout one's life.

            Rav Moshe Segal, in his work Peri Moshe (Berit Mila, 1), refutes this proof on the basis of Rashi's comments in Masekhet Shabbat (130a).  Rashi there makes reference to the Gemara's remark in Masekhet Menachot, and he appears to have understood that David saw his berit mila as a constant reminder of his status of an observant Jew.  Circumcision is the only indication to this effect that remains with a person at all times, even as he bathes.  According to Rashi, then, David refers not to the mitzva of berit mila as much as to what it represents and reflects.

            The practical application of the Maharach Or Zarua's theory involves his dispute with his father, the Or Zarua (Hilkhot Mila 190:5), as to whether a father capable of circumcising his son may summon somebody else to perform this mitzva.  Whereas the Or Zarua held that a proficient mohel is obligated to circumcise his son and may not summon somebody else, the Maharach held that a father bears no personal obligation in this regard.  The Maharach contends that the mitzva is to ensure that one's son becomes circumcised, and not to perform the act of circumcision, and hence it makes no difference whether the father performs this act personally or invites somebody else to do so in his stead.

            This issue might also affect the question of whether a berakha may be recited after one's circumcision if it had not been recited just prior to circumcision.  The Rambam writes (Hilkhot Berakhot 11:5) that berakhot recited over a mitzva may not be recited after the mitzva has been performed.  (He argues in this regard with the Or Zarua; see Hagahot Oshri, beginning of Masekhet Chulin.)  However, the Rambam adds, in cases of a mitzva ha-nimshekhet, a mitzva whose performance continues over a period of time, such as tzitzit and tefillin, one may recite the berakha throughout that period.  Thus, for example, one who forgot to recite the berakha before donning tefillin may recite the berakha so long as he has yet to remove them.  According to the Maharach Or Zarua, then, if one forgot to recite the berakha at the moment of circumcision, he may still recite it, even many years later, since the mitzva is fulfilled each day of one's life.

            As for practical Halakha, however, it is generally accepted that the berakha over circumcision should not be recited once the process of mila (including the peri'a) has been completed.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the view of the Maharach Or Zarua concerning the nature of the mitzva of berit mila.  Based on a passage in Masekhet Menachot, the Maharach understood that berit mila is a mitzva that one fulfills each day of his life.  He defined the obligation not in terms of the act of circumcision, but rather as requiring a condition of being circumcised.  Thus, each day that a person is in such a condition he fulfills this mitzva.

            The Beit Ha-levi (vol. 2, 47:4) challenges this theory on the basis of the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Shabbat (132a).  This discussion pertains to the famous position of Rabbi Eliezer, who held that just as the act of circumcision itself is performed on Shabbat despite the prohibition against inflicting a wound on Shabbat, so may all preparations necessary for a berit be made on Shabbat.  Most obviously, the mohel can bring the knife through a public domain to perform a circumcision on Shabbat.  The Gemara notes that Rabbi Eliezer held this view concerning a number of other mitzvot, as well, such as shofar, lulav and tzitzit; according to Rabbi Eliezer, one may carry the necessary article through a public domain on Shabbat for the purpose of performing the given mitzva.  (Recall that Torah law requires sounding the shofar on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah and taking the lulav on Shabbat Sukkot; it was Chazal who later suspended the performance of these mitzvot on Shabbat.)  Nevertheless, the Gemara comments, Rabbi Eliezer derived the halakha in each case from a different source, and the Gemara demonstrates how each instance features unique factors that do not allow Rabbi Eliezer to extend this rule from one case to another.  Thus, for example, the fact that the Shabbat prohibitions are suspended for the purpose of bringing a lulav or shofar does not necessarily allow us to bring a knife for a berit mila on Shabbat.  One could theoretically argue that the Torah suspended the Shabbat prohibition for these mitzvot because they must be performed on that day; if one misses shofar blowing or lulav on the day of Rosh Hashanah, he has lost this mitzva opportunity forever.  Mila, however, can be performed on the following day.  Thus, when the Torah indicates that one may violate Shabbat for the preparations of mitzvot such as lulav and shofar, this provision cannot be automatically extended to mila, and therefore Rabbi Eliezer finds a separate Biblical source for the parallel halakha regarding circumcision.

            This comment of the Gemara strongly suggests that the mitzva of berit mila is defined in terms of the act, rather than the state of being.  According to the Maharach Or Zarua, one fulfills the mitzva of mila by being circumcised, and therefore delaying the circumcision for a day means forfeiting the opportunity to fulfill a mitzva, similar to the cases of lulav and shofar.

            One possible answer, suggested by Rav Moshe Segal, in his work Peri Moshe (Berit Mila, 1), distinguishes between the father's obligation with respect to his son's circumcision, and a person's responsibility towards his own berit mila.  When the Maharach Or Zarua mentioned the continuous nature of this mitzva, whereby it is fulfilled each day of one's life, he referred to the individual himself, with respect to his own circumcision.  A father's obligation to see to it that his son receives a berit mila is fulfilled and completed once the son undergoes circumcision; from that point, the child indeed fulfills a mitzva each day, but the father's mitzva is completed.  Now an eight-day-old infant clearly bears no personal obligation with regard to mila; one becomes obligated only once he reaches adulthood.  Therefore, when the Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat speaks of delaying a circumcision scheduled for Shabbat (which obviously refers to a case of an eight-day-old child, the only case when circumcision overrides Shabbat), it refers to the father's obligation, not the child's.  Thus, indeed, the mitzva is not lost if the mila is delayed, as in cases such as lulav and shofar, and this Gemara therefore does not serve as proof against the theory of the Maharach Or Zarua.