The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

by Rav David Silverberg

The concluding section of Parashat Lekh-Lekha tells of God's command to Avraham concerning berit mila (circumcision) and the patriarch's obedient compliance with this command. While the narrative leaves us with the impression that Avraham fulfilled the mitzva immediately, without any hesitation or misgivings, the Midrash implies otherwise. In one particularly surprising passage (which apparently appears in old editions of Rashi's commentary), the Midrash tells that just as Avraham prepared to perform the incision, he suddenly became frightened and could not go through with the mila. God therefore came to assist him, so-to-speak, by taking hold of his hand and performing the mila with him.

Why would this mitzva frighten Avraham? If, as a different, famous Midrashic passage tells, while still a young man Avraham willingly allowed himself to be cast in a furnace rather than worship an idol, why would the relatively harmless – albeit painful – procedure of circumcision frighten him?

The Ketav Sofer suggests that Avraham hesitated not because of the physical pain or the risk of complications, but rather due to the fundamental significance underlying the mitzva of berit mila. Berit mila involves the conferral of a formal stature of prominence upon the individual. It serves as an everlasting, physical testimony to the person's unique bond with the Almighty, which sets Am Yisrael apart from the rest of humanity. The Ketav Sofer here refers to the mila as "chotamo shel Melekh" – the insignia of the King – which a person stamps, so-to-speak, upon his body. Avraham hesitated before accepting this privilege. He feared that performing a berit mila would be interpreted by others as arrogance and elitism – an impression he very much wished to avoid.

We might suggest that this idea perhaps explains another seemingly peculiar passage in the Midrash, which Rashi cites in his commentary to the opening verse of Parashat Vayera. The Midrash tells that before performing berit mila, Avraham first consulted with his three comrades – Aner, Eshkol and Mamrei. Why would he consult with others once God explicitly commanded him to perform circumcision? In light of what we have seen, we might answer that Avraham consulted with them not to hear their advice, but rather to explain to them the situation that has now arisen. The berit mila would raise Avraham to a fundamentally different status and create a close bond between him and God. Earlier in this parasha (14:13), Aner, Eshkol and Mamrei are described as Avraham's "ba'alei berit" – literally, "partners in a covenant." Avraham's exclusive berit with God necessarily entails the abrogation – on some level – of his berit with his former allies. The singular relationship with God represented by the berit mila, and the concept of an ethnically distinct nation which this mitzva signifies, will inevitably infringe upon his relationship to other people. Avraham therefore meets with his close friends to explain to them what is about to occur to their relationship. As the Midrash mentions, only Mamrei encouraged Avraham to proceed and carry out the circumcision. Aner opposed the idea, and Eshkol remained silent. They perhaps felt that it was not worth it for Avraham to allow his influence upon people to decrease in order to establish this unique bond with the Almighty.

Avraham, of course, felt much differently. And though he may have hesitated somewhat, fearful of the impression of arrogance and elitism that might result from his circumcision, he ultimately went through with the procedure and entered into a unique covenant with the Almighty.

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We read in Parashat Lekh-Lekha that God showed Avraham – who was still childless – the starlit sky and declared, "Look toward heaven and count the stars, if you are able to count them… So shall your offspring be" (15:5). In the next verse, we are told, "He believed in the Lord, and He considered it for him righteousness."

We translated this final verse in accordance with the interpretation of Rashi, who writes, "The Almighty considered it for Avraham righteousness and a merit because of the faith he had in Him." Avraham earned merit for his unwavering trust in God's promise that he will father a large nation. As the Ramban notes, however, it is difficult to understand why God would consider Avraham's belief as a demonstration of immense piety. Why wouldn't a prophet believe the prophecy he hears from God? Avraham believed his prophecies to the extent that he was prepared to slaughter his beloved son in fulfillment of a prophecy (as we will read next week). Why, then, was the Almighty so impressed, so-to-speak, by Avraham's belief in His promise of a large nation? Due to this difficulty, the Ramban proposes a much different reading of this verse, that Avraham deemed God's promise an expression of piety. He wholeheartedly believed that God will grant him offspring as an undeserved gift, rather than because he earned it. This conviction strengthened his belief in the promise's fulfillment, as he had no reason to worry that he might forfeit this blessing by committing a sin.

Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his "Yalkut Yehuda," suggests an explanation for Rashi's interpretation. This verse refers to Avraham's belief not in the promise of offspring, but in one particular detail of this promise. The Midrash in Bamidbar Rabba comments that when God promises Avraham, "So shall your offspring be," He had in mind not only the number of his offspring, but their quality, as well. God promises Avraham that his offspring will "shine" like the stars, that they, like him, will faithfully follow God's laws and thereby serve as a guiding light for mankind. Avraham's trust in this promise is indeed praiseworthy because of the anomaly inherent in such a guarantee. God cannot dictate whether or not a person will conduct himself properly; this decision can be made only by the individual himself. Many Jewish philosophers have struggled with the paradox of "bechira-yedi'a" – that man possesses free will, yet God – who knows all future events – clearly has advanced knowledge of how the individual will choose to act. Avraham trusted God's promise despite the philosophical inconsistency that it appears to entail, and he earned additional merit for this trust and belief.

Rav Yitzchak Zilberstein (rabbi of the Ramat-Elchanan neighborhood in Bnei-Brak), in his work, "Aleinu Le-shabei'ach," suggests a different approach, based on a principle established by Rav Yisrael Salanter in his famous book, "Or Yisrael." When a person observes a given mitzva under difficult and challenging circumstances, he receives greater reward than he would for fulfilling the same mitzva under more hospitable conditions. This concept is succinctly formulated in Pirkei Avot: "Le-fum tza'ara agra" ("the reward is commensurate to the difficulty involved"). Rav Yisrael claimed, however, that after one has overcome challenges and obstacles to perform a given mitzva, he will receive that same, increased reward each time he subsequently performs that mitzva, even when no obstacles stand in his way. Once a person has demonstrated his willingness to observe a given mitzva even under difficult circumstances, he is rewarded each time he observes the mitzva with the reward one would earn for observing under harsh circumstances. According to this theory, Rav Zilberstein writes, we can perhaps understand why, as Rashi says, Avraham received special reward for trusting in God's promise. This verse tells that God added merit to Avraham because he always believed God's word, even under the most trying circumstances. As the famous Midrash tells, he stood by his belief in monotheism even at the threat of death, when Nimrod cast him into the furnace for not worshipping idols. Therefore, even when Avraham received an explicit prophecy from God and belin it, he earned immense reward for that faith, as he had previously demonstrated his firm belief in God even when he heard no explicit prophecy, and even when his life was at risk because of that faith.

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As we discussed yesterday, Parashat Lekh-Lekha concludes with the commandment to Avraham concerning the mitzva of berit mila – circumcision. God commands Avraham to observe "My covenant" (17:9) and then proceeds to specify the nature of this covenant and the procedure for its observance: "Such shall be the covenant between Me and you and your offspring to follow which you shall keep: every male among you shall be circumcised."

A careful reading of this verse reveals a subtle peculiarity that, somewhat surprisingly, appears to have caught the attention of very few commentators. God here mentions that this covenant is established "between Me and you and your offspring." In this clause, "you" is written in the plural form – "beineikhem." To whom does this refer? Clearly, God establishes this covenant only between Avraham and his offspring. Whom does God have in mind, then, when he mentions "you [plural form] and your offspring"? Who else, besides Avraham and his descendants, is included in this covenant?

Radak explains that "you" refers to Avraham and those descendants born during his lifetime – meaning, his son Yitzchak and his grandson Yaakov. (Avraham died fifteen years after Yaakov's birth.) "Your offspring" refers to Avraham's descendants born after his death – Yaakov's children, their children, and so on. (Yaakov married at age sixty, well after Avraham's death.) According to Radak, then, nobody else besides Avraham and his descendants are included in the covenant with God, as we assumed. Clearly, however, it seems difficult to accept Radak's interpretation of the word "beineikhem" as including Yitzchak and Yaakov, who have yet to be born. Why would God include them in the plural "you," rather than in "your offspring," if they were not yet alive?

Rashi appears to interpret this verse differently, though his intention is not entirely clear. He writes, "'Between Me and you' – those of the present; 'and your offspring to follow' – who will be born in the future." At first glance, Rashi appears to include Avraham's current household – his son, Yishmael, and the children born to his servants – in this covenant. Indeed, Avraham is required to circumcise not only himself, but Yishmael and his servants, as well. But the Gemara (Sanhedrin 59) explicitly excludes all non-Jewish descendants of Avraham from the obligation of berit mila, based on a verse in Parashat Vayera – "for it is through Yitzchak that offspring shall be continued for you" (21:12). Only Yitzchak and some of his offspring (the descendants of Yaakov) are considered Avraham's heirs, and thus only they are included in the mitzva of mila. Although Yishmael and Avraham's servants were required to be circumcised, their circumcision clearly did not signify their inclusion in the eternal covenant made with Avraham. To whom, then, does Rashi refer when he writes, "those of the present"?

We might suggest, very simply, that Rashi refers to Yishmael and the servants themselves, but not to their offspring. Meaning, God may have indeed included Avraham's household in the covenant, but their inclusion did not extend to the next generation or beyond. "Between Me and you and your offspring" would thus mean that God establishes this covenant with Avraham and his household, as well as with "your offspring" – Avraham's descendants, but not those of Yishmael or the servants.

Rav Chayim Hirschensohn, however, in his work, "Nimukei Rashi" (and, at greater length, in his "Eileh Divrei Ha-berit"), suggests a novel interpretation of Rashi's comments, claiming that "beineikhem," according to Rashi, refers to Avraham and his wife, Sara. Although women are excluded from the formal mitzva of berit mila, as the mitzva is cast specifically upon the father, women are nevertheless very much included in the covenant represented by berit mila. The practical application with regard to mila, Rav Hirschensohn claims, involves the mother's consent, which is required before a child's circumcision. This is necessary due to the mother's inclusion in the berit signified by the mila. She takes part in this covenantal process by allowing her son to be circumcised. Thus, when Rashi writes, "those of the present," he refers to Avraham and Sara.

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Towards the beginning of Parashat Lekh-Lekha, we read of the famine that struck Eretz Canaan shortly after Avraham settles there in fulfillment of God's command. Avraham responds to the crisis by leaving Canaan and relocating in Egypt, which apparently was not affected by the famine.

The Ramban, in a famous passage, claims that Avraham committed a "chet gadol" – a grave sin – by leaving Canaan to escape the famine. For one thing, the Ramban writes, he should not have devised the scheme to pose as brother and sister, effectively subjecting his wife to defilement in order to protect himself. Secondly, he should have remained in Canaan, the land where God ordered him to reside, and have faith in the divine promise of blessing and prosperity.

Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch, in his commentary, devotes a lengthy discussion to this assertion by the Ramban. First, he elaborates on the critical educational message latent within the Ramban's criticism of Avraham. The Torah never presents to us a portrait of a perfect, infallible human being and bids us to follow his example. There was never a person, Rav Hirsch writes, about whom we could say, "This must be right for did not so-and-so do it!" And for good reason. By disclosing the faults and weaknesses of our spiritual giants, the Torah "gives the stamp of veracity to what it relates." If we were shown perfect people, we would immediately attribute all their qualities to a fundamentally different nature with which they were endowed, thereby conveniently exempting ourselves from aspiring to emulate any of their admirable characteristics. "Were they without passion and without internal struggles, their virtues would seem to us the outcome of some higher nature, hardly a merit and certainly no model that we could hope to emulate." Thus, by exposing the mistakes of righteous men such as the patriarchs, the Torah actually proves their greatness, demonstrating that they, too, are capable of stumbling, and yet they still managed to achieve what they achieved.

After extracting and developing this important principle that emerges from the Ramban's approach to this narrative, Rav Hirsch proceeds to question the Ramban's theory that Avraham erred in this episode. As for Avraham's first supposed sin, in that he posed as Sara's brother to save his life, Rav Hirsch claims that in fact it was in Sara's best interest to appear as Avraham's sister, rather than his wife. In ancient Egyptian society, a man who desired a married woman would simply eliminate the husband and marry the wife. Should he desire an unmarried woman, he would attempt to win the favor of her family and thus earn her hand in marriage. This process would not only save Avraham's life, but would also buy them time, and in the interim the famine would perhaps end and they could return home to Canaan. Thus, Avraham did not, as the Rambam claimed, sacrifice his wife's honor to protect his own skin. He rather acted wisely and devised a plan intended to protect them both. And as for the decision to leave Canaan, Rav Hirsch – as well as others – argues that Avraham had no reason to expect God to provide him with supernatural sustenance in drought-ravaged Canaan. He had no history behind him of Benei Yisrael's sojourn in the wilderness, living off a mobile well and heavenly manna, to assure him of God's miraculous means of sustaining him and his wife. Furthermore, Rav Hirsch adds, "even having this experience does not preclude the duty of doing everything that is legally within one's own powers first, and having confidence in God only for that which lies beyond."

In fact, a brief passage in Masekhet Bava Kama (60b) appearsto directly and explicitly contradict the Ramban's claim. The Gemara succinctly comments, "If there is famine in the city – scatter your legs [meaning, move out of the city], as it says, 'There was a famine in the land, and so Avram went down to Egypt to reside there'." Not only does the Gemara advise one to move out of a famine-stricken area, it cites proof from the story of Avraham's relocation in Egypt to escape the famine, clearly giving its stamp of approval to Avraham's decision. Seemingly, the Ramban did not accept this passage as authoritative. Or, he perhaps distinguished between standard situations of famine and Avraham's situation, where he was specifically instructed by God to settle and live in Canaan. The Gemara, the Ramban might explain, perhaps cited this verse only as an asmakhta (secondary interpretation), but in truth Avraham's situation differs from standard circumstances of famine.

However, Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his "Yalkut Yehuda," suggests reconciling the Gemara's comment with the Ramban's theory. When an individual suffers from economic hardship, then he should, indeed, relocate. Am Yisrael as a whole, however, must trust in God's guarantee of protection, even if this requires anticipating a miracle. Avraham's mistake, according to the Ramban, was that he acted as an individual, rather than recognizing his role as representative of all his progeny. As an individual, he acted properly, and thus the Gemara cites his residence in Egypt as a valid example for other people to follow. He erred, however, in that he should have followed the proper procedure for the Nation of Israel, which would warrant remaining in their homeland despite the hardships they might encounter there.

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Yesterday, we discussed the propriety of Avraham's decision to leave Canaan and reside in Egypt to escape the famine that struck Canaan. As we saw, the Ramban claims that Avraham erred in this regard. The Ramban criticizes not only Avraham's decision to move to Egypt, but also his scheme to pose as Sara's brother out of fear that otherwise an Egyptian who desired Sara would kill him. In yesterday's discussion, we showed (based on the commentary of Rav Hirsch) how Avraham in fact may have acted properly in this regard, as opposed to the Ramban's criticism of his conduct.

Today we will focus on one particular phrase that troubled several commentators for its implication that Avraham's selfish interests motivated this scheme. Avraham tells Sara, "Please say you are my sister, so that it may go well with me because of you, and that I may remain alive thanks to you" (12:13). The straightforward reading of this verse suggests that Avraham's concern is not only that he "remain alive," but also that "it may go well" with him, that he will benefit from Sara's abduction. Sure enough, we read that when Pharaoh abducted Sara, "And it went well with Avraham because of her: he acquired sheep, oxen, donkeys, male and female servants… " (12:16). The obvious textual parallel between these two verses ("so that it may go well with me"; "and it went well with Avraham") strongly implies that it was this particular benefit and gain that Avraham had in mind. But could this really have been Avraham's concern? Could he have really intended to enjoy financial gain as a result of Sara's abduction and defilement?

The Ramban, in his commentary to this verse, seems to explain that when Avraham says, "so that it may go well with me," he refers not to the wealth he accumulated as a result of his "sister's" marriage to Pharaoh, but rather to their general well-being in Egypt. Avraham tells Sara that their trip to Egypt is necessary for their financial survival. By taking measures to avoid the risks involved in this trip, things will "go well" with them and they will ultimately return to Canaan after the famine with financial security. Avraham does not have Sara pose as his sister for his personal gain, but rather to ensure his survival and ultimate return to Canaan. It is to this basic survival that Avraham refer when he says, "it will go well with me." Clearly, however, the parallel between this phrase and the description of Avraham's wealth he received after Sara's abduction strongly suggests that Avraham refers to his financial gain as a result of her abduction, rather than to his overall well-being in Egypt.

The Radak offers a different interpretation, claiming that "so that it may go well with me" introduces the next phrase: "that I may remain alive thanks to you." In other words, according to the Radak, we should read this verse as follows: "Please say you are my sister, so that it may go well with me because of you; meaning, that I may remain alive thanks to you." Thus, Avraham asks Sara to follow this scheme not to bring him wealth, but rather to ensure his survival. Once again, however, this approach overlooks the clear parallel between this verse and the later phrase, "And it went well with Avraham because of her," which refers to wealth.

Rashi's approach to this verse has triggered considerable discussion among later writers. He writes, "So that it may go well with me because of you – they will give me gifts." Indeed, as the straightforward reading of the verse suggests, Avraham here – according to Rashi – seems to anticipate the accumulation of wealth that will result from Sara's abduction. This only reinforces the original question: how could Avraham have thought of money and wealth as he realizes the risk posed to Sara as they arrived in Egypt?

This question, particularly in light of Rashi's comments, has triggered a number of novel approaches to this verse. The work, "Or Torah" (cited in "Pirchei Rashi") contends that this phrase, "so that it may go well with me," should be read as part of what Avraham asks Sara to tell the Egyptians, rather than Avraham's own words. Avraham realizes that if Sara identifies herself as Avraham's sister, people might wonder why she accompanied him on his trip to Egypt. He thus instructs her to explain to them, "so that it may go well with me" – that her brother took her along with him in order to receive money and riches from those who might wish to marry her. As we discussed yesterday, in ancient times men would attempt to win the favor of a woman's family in order to marry her. Sara would thus explain that she was taken along for her "brother's" financial gain, so that he would receive gifts from suitors.

Several commentators, including Seforno, Rav Hirsch, and Rav Chayim Hirschenson in explaining Rashi, offer a simpler explanation. Avraham simply tells Sara that when she poses as his sister, people will want to treat Avraham honorably and bestow upon him gifts, thereby saving his life. The Egyptians would try to win his favor, rather than treat him with hostility. We should read this phrase to mean, "Please say you are my sister, so that the Egyptians treat me well, rather than kill me." Thus, Avraham was not interested in the accumulation of wealth per se, but rather in ensuring that the Egyptians would attempt to win Sara by showering him with gifts, rather than eliminating him.

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In the final chapter of Parashat Lekh-Lekha, God introduces to Avraham the mitzva of berit mila – circumcision. The mitzva of mila is rare in that by its very nature it demands the experience of pain. Under normal circumstances, of course, a person undergoes circumcision as a week-old newborn, when, we presume, the experience of pain is less severe and the recovery far quicker than for adults. Nevertheless, clearly the infant also suffers pain, and certainly an adult who was not circumcised as a child and must therefore undergo the procedure as an adult would experience intense pain.

The question then arises, may an anesthetic be used during circumcision, so as to alleviate or avoid altogether the pain of berit mila?

Rav Aryeh Leib Baron of Montreal, in his "Netzach Yaakov" (5757), includes a letter he wrote to one of the local community rabbis concerning an adult gentile who underwent conversion, a process which entails – among other requirements – circumcision. The questiarose concerning the validity of a circumcision performed while the patient was under anesthesia. Rav Baron cites the ruling of Rav Meir Arik in his "Imrei Yosher" (vol. 2, 140:3) forbidding the use of an anesthetic for berit mila. Rav Arik notes that anesthetic substances were available in Talmudic times, as evidenced from the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Bava Kama (beginning of chapter 8) that one could, theoretically, have his hand amputated without pain by using a "sam" (a kind of lotion). And yet, despite the availability of anesthesia, nowhere do we find any record of Chazal using such a substance when performing circumcision. The only explanation, Rav Arik claimed, is that the mitzva of mila requires – besides the actual removal of the orla (foreskin) – the experience of pain. He draws further proof from a comment in the Midrash Rabba (Parashat Lekh-Lekha) that after Avraham performed his berit mila, "hirgish ve-nitzta'er kedei she-yakhpil Ha-kadosh Barukh Hu sekharo" – "he felt and experienced the pain in order that the Almighty will double his reward." Apparently, then, the sensation of pain constitutes part of the obligation of berit mila, and therefore one should not try avoiding the pain through the use of anesthesia.

Rav Baron, however, strongly disputes this position of Rav Meir Arik. As for the absence of any record of earlier generations using anesthesia, Rav Baron attributes this to the simple fact that circumcisions are generally performed on infants, when anesthetics are considered unnecessary. On the rare occasions when an adult underwent mila, communities that had access to anesthetic substances may very well have used them. The halakhic authorities make no mention of this, Rav Baron speculates, for the simple reason that they deemed it obvious that these substances may be used. Nowhere do we find the Torah obligating a person to subject himself to pain. For example, although the Torah demands under certain circumstances that a person must be prepared to surrender his life and endure suffering rather than transgress the Torah, clearly if he has the option of alleviating the suffering he is entitled to do so. Likewise, we read in Parashat Bereishit that as part of the punishment for Chava's partaking of the forbidden tree, God decreed that women will suffer pain during childbirth (Bereishit 3:16). And yet, nowhere in halakhic sources do we find a prohibition against women utilizing the various means at their disposal to alleviate the pain of labor. All the more so, then, the mitzva of berit mila, regarding which the Torah never explicitly requires pain, the use of anesthesia would in no way invalidate the act of circumcision.

As for the Midrash's comment that Avraham concentrated on his pain to double his reward, Rav Baron claims that this passage proves that to the contrary, the pain of mila only increases one's reward, in light of the general principle of "le-fum tza'ara agra" (one is rewarded in accordance with the difficulty endured). Pain is not, however, integral to the mitzva of mila in any way.

Rav Baron in fact draws proof to the fact that the mitzva of mila does not require the experience of pain, from the Rishonim's discussion of a case of "nolad mahul" – a Jew who is born circumcised. Halakha follows the opinion cited in the Gemara requiring that such a person undergo "hatafat dam berit" – the extraction of blood from the area of the mila. Two reasons are given for this requirement: either we are concerned that the person may have some foreskin beneath the visible layer of skin ("orla kevusha"), or because the mitzva of mila formally requires the extraction of blood, beyond the removal of the orla. Significantly, no source mentions an obligation to experience pain as part of the fulfillment of this mitzva, strongly suggesting that no such requirement exists.

In the specific case of a convert, a separate issue arises when a person is under anesthesia and thus asleep during his circumcision. One might argue that since the act of mila constitutes an indispensable stage of the conversion process, it requires the convert's cognizance of the procedure. Rav Baron argues, however, that just as a young infant can undergo conversion at the hand of Beit-Din, who supply the requisite "da'at" (awareness) on his behalf, a convert may similarly be circumcised while sleeping. Furthermore, Rav Baron brings evidence showing that the obligation of circumcision as it applies to converts is cast not upon the convert himself, but rather upon the Jewish people, to circumcise any gentile who wishes to convert. Therefore, since it is the mohel, rather than the convert, who bears the obligation, the convert's cognizance is not necessary for the fulfillment of the mitzva.

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Parashat Lekh-Lekha is so named because of the command God issues to Avraham in the first verse of the parasha: "Lekh-lekha mei-artzekha" ("Go forth from your land"). The Midrash Rabba (chapter 39) explains that the word "lekha" in this verse suggests a certain novelty in this instruction that Avraham leave his family and settle in the land of Canaan, that this applied, in one sense, only "lekha" – "to you," to Avraham. Avraham's relocation in Canaan entailed abandoning his aging father, which would, under normal circumstances, violate the Torah's code concerning treatment of parents. God therefore emphasizes that only in this particular instance does He permit someone to neglect his parent in such a manner. Normally, a person may not show disrespect to his parents to move to the Land of Israel.

This comment of the Midrash lends support to the view of the Rambam (Hilkhot Mamrim 6:11) that the mitzva of kibbud av va-eim (respecting one's parents) applies even to one whose parents are sinners. The Midrashim describe at length the firm devotion Terach – Avraham's father – showed to paganism, and how he even brought Avraham before the king, Nimrod, for prosecution after his refusal to bow to idols. The fact that God had to grant Avraham a unique exemption from honoring his father strongly suggests that under normal circumstances, a person must show honor and respect to his parents even if they are notorious sinners like Terach. The Tur (Y.D. 240) disputes this ruling of the Rambam and holds that the mitzva of kibbud av does not apply to sinful parents. He draws proof to his position from a halakha stated in the Gemara (Bava Kama 94b) that if a man steals an animal and subsequently dies, his children must return the stolen animal to preserve their father's honor. The Gemara explicitly limits this halakha to cases when the father repented for his crime but died before he had the opportunity to return the stolen property. If, however, the father died an unrepentant rasha (sinner), the children bear no obligation to return the animal for the sake of their father's honor. Seemingly, then, this Gemara appears to establish that the mitzva of honoring parents does not apply to parents who are resha'im. The Tur apparently felt that this compelling evidence from the Gemara overrides the implication of the Midrash, that the mitzva applies even to a father like Terach.

How might the Rambam resolve his position with the Gemara in Bava Kama?

Rav Mordechai Willig (http://www.torahweb.org/torah/2000/parsha/rwil_lechlecha.html) suggested that the Rambam perhaps distinguished between the mitzva of honoring parents during the parent's lifetime, and the obligation as it applies after a parent's death. The Gemara in Bava Kama, of course, speaks of honoring a deceased parent, and for this reason, perhaps, the mitzva does not apply to a parent whom we may consider a rasha. During a parent's lifetime, however, the children must show honor regardless of his virtues.

The basis for such a distinction is the dual aspect of the mitzva of kibud av va-eim. On the one hand, this mitzva falls under the category of mitzvot bein adam la-chaveiro – interpersonal obligations. A person must show respect to his parents because as his parents, they deserve respectful treatme. But this mitzva contains an additional component of "bein adam la-Makom" – man's obligation to his Creator. As the Ramban writes in his commentary to the Ten Commandments (Shemot 20:12), one must treat his parents with respect by virtue of their status as God's partners in his creation. In this respect, honoring one's parents is part of a person's obligation to show honor to the Almighty.

These two aspects of the mitzva, Rav Willig suggested, do not necessarily depend on one another. We should expect to find situations in which one would apply independently of the other. For example, we might reasonably assume that the interpersonal element of kibud av va-eim applies only during the parent's lifetime. After a parent's death, the child's obligations towards his parent involve purely the aspect of showing honor to God. Additionally, the Rambam perhaps felt that if a person's parent is sinful, then although the interpersonal aspect of the mitzva still applies, as Halakha demands proper treatment of all people regardless of their level of observance, the "bein adam la-Makom" component does not obtain. A parent who consistently sins forfeits his status as God's partner in the creation of his children; he is unworthy of this noble stature. Hence, the obligation of kibud av va-eim as it relates to showing honor to God does not apply to a rasha.

Accordingly, the halakha mentioned by the Gemara in Bava Kama poses no difficulty against the Rambam's position. After the unrepentant thief's death, his heirs bear no obligation of kibbud av va-eim because neither of the mitzva's two aspects apply. The interpersonal aspect does not apply because the father has already passed on, and the "bein adam la-Makom" element is not in force because the criminal is unworthy of the status of God's partner in his children's creation. Thus, while in general one must respect his parents even if they are sinners, they must do so only during the parents' lifetime. After their death, such as in the case discussed in Bava Kama, the mitzva of honoring parents does not apply.

As far as the final halakha is concerned, this debate between the Rambam and the Tur later became a debate between the Mechaber and the Rama. The Mechaber (Y.D. 240:18) accepts the Rambam's view, that one must respect even sinful parents, whereas the Rama codifies the Tur's position, that the obligation of kibud av va-eim does not apply to resha'im.

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