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The Israel Koschitzky
Virtual Beit Midrash
Surf A Little Torah Yeshivat
Har Etzion
PARASHAT VAYERA
By Rav David Silverberg
In one of our editions of S.A.L.T. last year (www.vbm-torah.org/archive/salt-bereishit/04-9vayera.htm),
we addressed a comment in the Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 51:6) concerning
the angels' rescue of Lot from Sedom, as told
in Parashat Vayera. The Torah
writes, "God remembered Avraham; He sent Lot
away from the midst of the upheaval" (19:29). According to the Midrash, "God
remembered Avraham" means that God remembered the consideration Lot showed for
his uncle when the family settled in Egypt to escape the famine in Canaan.
Recall that Avraham and Sara came to Egypt
under the guise of siblings, out of fear that the local inhabitants might
otherwise kill Avraham to make Sara eligible for marriage. Lot
remained silent and did not divulge the truth about Avraham and Sara, and in
this merit God rescued him from the destruction of Sedom.
Several writers addressed the issue of why the Midrash did not point to
another merit of Lot – his gracious
hospitality, as evidenced in Parashat Vayera, when he invites the three angels
into his home, feeds them, and tries to protect them from the hostile
locals. In last year's discussion,
we cited an explanation from Rav Aharon Kotler's Mishnat Aharon, claiming
that Lot's hospitality did not originate from a conscientious desire to assist
people, from an ingrained benevolent nature, but rather had become second-nature
due to the years he had spent with Avraham. Lot
extended hospitality because it was part of his upbringing, it is what he had
observed while in his uncle's home.
This merit therefore did not suffice to spare him the devastation that
God brought upon Sedom. We
concluded that discussion by questioning the implications of this approach as to
the value of mitzvot performed by second-nature, or "because this is what
my parents did." Does mitzva
performance lose all value if it is done without deep conviction, but rather out
of some kind of mimetic conditioning?
I have since discovered that the source of Rav Kotler's comments is the
writings of the Saba of Kelm, who indeed addresses this issue at length in this
context. He cites a number of
sources in Chazal that clearly recognize value – and even immense value –
to mitzvot performed with ulterior motives. For example, if money falls from a
person's pocket and a poor man finds it and uses it to sustain himself, the
money's original owner is credited with the mitzva of
tzedaka. Even more
revealingly, perhaps, Rashi, in his commentary to Parashat Chukat (Bamidbar
21:34), writes (based on the Gemara in Masekhet Nidda 61a) that Moshe was
frightened by the attack of Og because Og might have deserved victory in merit
of an act of kindness performed many years earlier. According to a Midrashic tradition, Og
was the "palit" (refugee) who fled from the onslaught of the four eastern
kingdoms against Sedom to inform Avraham of his nephew's capture. Now the Midrash, cited in Rashi's
commentary to Parashat Lekh-Lekha (Bereishit 14:13), writes that Og brought this
news to Avraham in the hope that Avraham would attempt to rescue Lot and fall in
battle, rendering Sara available for marriage. Despite Og's ulterior motives, his role
in the rescue of Lot (not to mention the
kiddush Hashem that presumably resulted from Avraham's stunning victory)
earned him sufficient merit to arouse Moshe's fears when he attacked Benei
Yisrael.
Nevertheless, the Saba claimed, a
fundamental difference remains between mitzvot performed with deep
conviction and a sincere desire to serve God, and one which is done either with
ulterior motives or by sheer force of habit. In Lot's case, his hospitality was indeed something of
religious value, but it was not sufficient to spare him the fate that befell his
city. As a member of this
population, he was included in the decree of destruction, and the merit of
mitzvot performed by force of habit did not suffice to free him from this
decree. Only a mitzva that
he had performed with sincere conviction, out of a genuine commitment to ethical
conduct, could spare him the fate of Sedom.
Incidentally, the Saba of Kelm also explained how this assessment of
Lot's conduct reflected his nature and
character. According to this
approach, Lot welcomed guests insincerely, simply because he had grown
accustomed to hospitality, whereas his loyalty to Avraham in Egypt
stemmed from genuine ethical conviction.
Lot's idealism extended only to
refraining from harming other people, such as not divulging the truth of Avraham
and Sara's relationship. Proactive
assistance, however, exerting oneself on behalf of others, was outside the range
of Lot's moral conscience. Of course, he performed the motions, as
he had been conditioned to do while he lived with his uncle. But his moral conviction drove him only
to abstain from hurting other people, and not to act kindly and compassionately
beyond the basic call of duty.
******
Parashat Vayera tells of Sara's abduction by the Philistine king
Avimelekh, and the punishments God visited upon the king and his palace as a
result. God struck everyone in
Avimelekh's palace with infertility until Avimelekh beseeched Avraham to pray on
his behalf (end of chapter 20).
Immediately thereafter, the Torah tells of the long-awaited birth of a
son to Sara (21:1).
The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Kama (92a) famously concludes on the basis of
this sequence of events that "whoever requests compassion for his fellow and he
has that same need is answered first."
As Rashi explains, chapter 21 begins, "V'Hashem pakad et Sara" –
"God had been mindful of Sara."
Rather than writing, "Va-yifkod Hashem et Sara" – "God was mindful
of Sara" – the Torah chose a form that suggests that Sara had conceived prior to
the immediately preceding event recorded, namely, the cure of Avimelekh and his
household's infertility. This thus
shows that if one who prays on his fellow's behalf is in need of that same
salvation, such as Avraham, who, like Avimelekh, could not have children (at
least not with Sara), his personal need is provided first.
Rashi cites this remark in his Torah commentary, however, as Rav Eliyahu
Mizrachi notes, he employs a very different formulation. Commenting on the verse "V'Hashem
pakad et Sara," Rashi writes, "It [the Torah] juxtaposed this section with
this one [the story of Avimelekh] to teach you that whoever requests compassion
for his fellow…" It appears from
Rashi that this section, which tells of the birth of Yitzchak, appears out of
chronological sequence, and does not belong at this point in the narrative. The Torah arranged this section here,
immediately following the Avimelekh narrative, in order to teach this lesson
regarding one who prays for his fellow and has the same need. Of course, the Gemara's point is
precisely that the two events occurred in immediate succession – Avraham prayed
for Avimelekh, and Sara immediately conceived. Why, then, does Rashi speak of the Torah
specifically juxtaposing these sections, suggesting that this arrangement does
not reflect the true chronological sequence?
Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi then raises an additional question, one which
Tosefot already addressed in Masekhet Bava Kama. Namely, Avraham and Sara had already
been informed of Sara's imminent conception earlier in the parasha, when
the three mysterious men visited their tent. The Gemara in Bava Kama appears to
indicate that Sara conceived in the merit of Avraham's prayer on behalf of
Avimelekh, and that otherwise it may not have happened. How is that possible, if they had
already been told that Sara would deliver a child that year ("la-mo'ed ashuv
eilekha ka-eit chaya u-le-Sara vein" – 18:14)?
It is tempting to resolve both questions by claiming that Avraham and
Sara's experiences in Gerar occurred before the angels' visit to their tent,
when they were informed that Sara would soon bear a child. The principle of ein mukdam
u-me-uchar ba-Torah, which establishes that the Biblical narrative at times
deviates from chronological sequence, allows us to suggest that an incident may
have occurred earlier or later than the point at which it is recorded in the
Torah. Thus, one might wish to
claim that the story of Avimelekh preceded the angels' visit despite its
presentation after the story of the angels. This would easily explain Rashi's
comments. The Torah juxtaposed the
Avimelekh narrative with Yitzchak's birth to emphasize the link between them, as
Sara's conception resulted from Avraham's prayers on behalf of Avimelekh. Historically, the incident involving
Avimelekh occurred earlier, before the angels' visit, but it is recorded just
prior to Yitzchak's birth to highlight the relationship between these two
events. Of course, this theory
negates the question of why the Gemara attributes Sara's conception to Avraham's
prayers for Avimelekh if they had already been given a promise that she would
bear a child that year.
However, such a theory cannot be sustained – or at least cannot be
enlisted to explain Rashi's comments – due to an earlier passage in Rashi's
commentary (20:1). Based on
Bereishit Rabba, Rashi presents two explanations as to why Avraham
settled among the Philistines, both of which relate to the destruction of the
region of Sedom. First, the
disappearance of this densely-populated area resulted in a marked decline in
travel through Chevron, where Avraham resided, thus decreasing his opportunities
for welcoming guests. Secondly,
Avraham sought to distance himself from his nephew, Lot, who impregnated his daughters after Sedom's
destruction. Either way, Rashi
assumed that Avraham's experiences among the Philistines occurred in the
aftermath of the destruction of Sedom.
Now the destruction of Sedom clearly followed the angels' visit to
Avraham (the Torah explicitly writes that the angels proceeded from Avraham's
tent to destroy Sedom – 18:16), and thus the story of Avimelekh must likewise
have taken place after the angels' visit.
Tomorrow we will iy"H present some of the answers given for these
two questions.
******
Yesterday, we discussed the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Bava Kama (92a)
regarding the connection between Sara's abduction by the Philistine king
Avimelekh and the birth of her son Yitzchak. God had punished Avimelekh and his
household with infertility, which was cured only when Avraham prayed on the
king's behalf. And since Avraham
and Sara were themselves in need of this cure, God answered them first, and Sara
conceived. The Gemara derives from
here the general rule that "whoever requests compassion for his fellow and he
has that same need is answered first."
As we noted yesterday, Rashi, in his Torah commentary (21:1), paraphrases
this discussion, but with a surprisingly different formulation: "It [the Torah]
juxtaposed this section with this one [the story of Avimelekh] to teach you that
whoever requests compassion for his fellow…" Rashi seems to have understood that the
Torah's presentation of these two events – Sara's abduction and Yitzchak's birth
– does not follow chronological sequence.
This is, of course, difficult to explain, in light of the fact that Rashi
himself cites the Gemara's comment that Sara conceived as a result of Avraham's
prayers on behalf of Avimelekh.
The Maharal of Prague, in his Gur Aryeh, suggests that Rashi seeks
to explain not the sequence of presentation – which, as we said, follows the
true chronological order of events – but rather the Torah's emphasis on the link
between these two incidents. As we
mentioned yesterday, the Torah introduces the narrative of Yitzchak's birth with
somewhat unusual terminology: "V'Hashem pakad et Sara" ("God had been
mindful of Sara"), rather than the more common form, "Va-yifkod Hashem et
Sara." The Maharal contends
that this wording, "V'Hashem pakad," points to a natural progression of
events, indicating that what occurs now results and flows naturally from the
events just recorded. Rashi thus
explained that Sara's conception resulted directly from the immediately
preceding verses, which tell of Avraham's prayers on behalf of Avimelekh. According to the Maharal, when Rashi
speaks of the Torah "juxtaposing" these two events, he refers not to the
arrangement of these two sections, but rather to the Torah's wording, which
emphasizes the connection between the two events.
We might suggest an additional explanation of Rashi's comments. On numerous occasions in the Biblical
narrative, the Torah records events out of sequence in the interest of an
organized topical arrangement. For
example, Avraham's death is recorded towards the end of Parashat Chaye-Sara
(25:8), despite the fact that he was alive during the events recorded towards
the beginning of Parashat Toledot.
(Avraham died at the age of 175, when Yitzchak was seventy-five years of
age, and the births of Yaakov and Esav, which the Torah narrates in Parashat
Toledot, occurred when Yitzchak was sixty.) The Torah wished to conclude the story
of Avraham before telling the story of Yitzchak, and thus recorded his death
earlier. Likewise, Yitzchak's death
is recorded in Parashat Vayishlach (35:28), even though he was alive at the time
of the sale of Yosef, which the Torah tells later, in Parashat Vayeshev. (Yosef was sold to Egypt
when Yaakov was 108, twelve years before Yitzchak's death at the age of
180.)
Returning to the story of Avimelekh and Yitzchak's birth, Rashi was
perhaps bothered why the Torah did not present the entire story of Avimelekh in
a single section. After the story
of Yitzchak's birth and Yishmael's subsequent banishment from Avraham's home,
the story of Avimelekh resumes with the Philistine king's visit to Avraham to
offer a truce. This presentation
follows chronological sequence, but from a topical perspective, seems a bit
awkward, as the story of Yitzchak and Yishmael disrupts the story of
Avimelekh. (Contrast this structure
with the narrative in Parashat Toledot, which includes all of Yitzchak's
encounters with Avimelekh in a single section.) For this reason, perhaps, Rashi found it
necessary to explain why the Torah chose to present these two sections – the
story of Avimelekh and the account of Yitzchak's birth – in juxtaposition to one
another, despite the topical disruption.
He explains that the Torah sought to emphasize the fact that Sara
conceived as a result of Avraham's prayer on Avimelekh's behalf, and therefore
disrupted the Avimelekh narrative to tell of Sara's conception and the birth of
Yitzchak.
******
In the last two editions of S.A.L.T. we discussed the Gemara's comment in
Masekhet Bava Kama (92a) regarding the connection between two events told in
Parashat Vayera: Avraham's prayer on behalf of Avimelekh and his household, who
had become infertile as a result of Avimelekh's abduction of Sara, and the birth
of Yitzchak. On the basis of the
juxtaposition of these two events, the Gemara deduces, "Whoever requests
compassion for his fellow and he has that same need is answered first." In the merit of Avraham's appeal on
behalf of Avimelekh that his wives and maidservants would be able to have
children, he and Sara were blessed with a child of their own.
As we mentioned, some writers raised the question of why this merit was
necessary. After all, as we read in
the opening section of Parashat Vayera, three angels had already visited Avraham
and Sara and informed them of a son to be born to them the following year. If they had already been promised a son,
what was added by the merit of Avraham's prayer on behalf of Avimelekh?
Tosefot (there in Bava Kama) address this question and write that in the
merit of Avraham's prayer Sara experienced an easy labor and delivery. According to Tosefot, Avraham prayed not
only that God cure the infertility of Avimelekh's household, but also that He
grant them smooth and (relatively) painless births. In the merit of this prayer, Sara, too,
was blessed with a trouble-free birth.
The Maharal of Prague, in his Gur Aryeh, explains much
differently. In his view, Avraham's
prayer on behalf of Avimelekh was included in the angels' prediction. Meaning, the angels' prediction did not
mean that Avraham and Sara had already earned the merit of begetting a child the
following year; rather, they foresaw that God would grant Avraham the
opportunity to earn this blessing.
This occurred in Gerar, when God told Avimelekh to beseech Avraham to
pray on his behalf, in the merit of which Avraham was himself blessed with a
child.
Rav Simcha Bunim Sofer (son of the Ketav Sofer, grandson of the
Chatam Sofer), in his work Sha'arei Simcha, suggests a different
explanation as to what Avraham earned through his prayer on Avimelekh's
behalf. As Rashi famously cites
from the Midrash in his commentary to Parashat Toledot (25:19), Sara's
conception immediately after her abduction by Avimelekh elicited cynical rumors
regarding her pregnancy. The
leitzanei ha-dor ("cynics of the generation") charged that it was
Avimelekh, not Avraham, who fathered this child, and God therefore saw to it
that Yitzchak would closely resemble Avraham, to dispel any such rumors. The Sha'arei Simcha suggests that
Avraham earned this miracle through his prayer on Avimelekh's behalf. He appealed to God to restore
Avimelekh's fertility knowing full well that this would allow the cynics to
question Yitzchak's origins: if Avimelekh remained infertile, nobody could
attribute Sara's conception to her experiences in Gerar. But Avraham nevertheless interceded on
Avimelekh's behalf, and in this merit God shielded him from the charges of the
leitzanei ha-dor.
The Sha'arei Simcha's explanation brings to mind a clever reading
of this Talmudic passage cited in the name of the famous Chassidic master, Rav
Bunim of Pashischa. The Gemara
speaks of somebody who prays on behalf of his fellow "ve-hu tzarikh le-oto
davar," literally, "and he needs that same matter." The plain meaning of this expression
means that the person praying shares the need for which he prays on his fellow's
behalf. Rav Bunim, however,
suggesting reading this phrase to mean that this individual "needs" the current
crisis faced by his fellow to continue.
"He needs that same matter" means that it is in his best interest for the
current misfortunes befalling the other person to remain unresolved, as in the
case of Avraham and Avimelekh, as discussed. The lesson of this passage is thus that
one should pray for the welfare of others even if their welfare poses a certain
threat to one's own well-being. In
the merit of this prayer, God will see to it that "he is answered first," that
his needs will be cared for despite the resolution of the crisis facing his
fellow.
In concluding this topic, it is worth noting that Rav Yehuda Leib
Ginsburg, in his work Yalkut Yehuda, points to this comment in the Gemara
as a possible reason why the section of Yitzchak's birth is read as the Torah
reading on Rosh Hashanah. The more
obvious reason, of course, is the tradition that Sara conceived on Rosh
Hashanah. But in addition, Rav
Ginsburg suggests, Chazal perhaps sought to impress upon us during the
High Holiday season the importance of praying on behalf of all Am
Yisrael, rather than focusing only on one's own personal needs. By reading of the connection between
Yitzchak's birth and Avraham's prayer on behalf of Avimelekh, we are reminded to
include the entire nation in our prayers, that we must beseech God on behalf of
everybody, even those whom – like Avimelekh – we might have reason to
dislike. As we come before God in
prayer we are to forget our differences and overcome the hard feelings and
resentment we might feel towards others, and appeal for compassion on behalf of
everybody, and not only ourselves.
******
Parashat Vayera tells of the expulsion of Yishmael and Hagar from
Avraham's home, as God had instructed.
We read that Yishmael nearly died of thirst as he and his mother wandered
in the arid wilderness outside Be'er Sheva, until, ultimately, "God heard the
voice of the lad" (21:17) and provided a well of water to save his life.
Rashi, commenting on this verse, cites from Bereishit Rabba
(53:14), "From here [we may derive] that an ill patient's prayer is more
effective than the prayer of others on his behalf." The previous verse had told that Hagar
stood at a distance and wept, presumably referring to prayer. The Torah thus emphasizes that God
"heard the voice of the lad," indicating that He answered specifically
Yishmael's prayer, and not his mother's, because a patient's own prayers are
more effective than those that others pray on his behalf.
Many writers have noted the seeming discrepancy between this Midrashic
passage and a comment in Masekhet Berakhot (5b). The Gemara tells that Rabbi Chanina paid
a visit to the ailing Rabbi Yochanan, and asked the patient to give him his
hand. Rabbi Chanina took hold of
the sage's hand and he immediately recovered. The Gemara wondered why Rabbi Yochanan
was incapable of curing himself in this supernatural manner, and needed Rabbi
Chanina's assistance. The Gemara
answered, "Ein chavush matir atzmo mi-beit ha-asurim" – "An inmate does
not release himself from prison."
This would seem to imply that a patient – even as spiritually gifted as
Rabbi Yochanan – may be incapable of invoking divine intervention to cure his
own ailment, while others are. This
appears to run in direct opposition to the comment in Bereishit Rabba
that a patient's own prayers are more effective than the prayers of others.
Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi and Chizkuni suggest resolving the two
passages by explaining that the efficacy of a patient's prayer depends on his
ability to concentrate. The Gemara
establishes that ein chavush matir atzmo mi-beit ha-asurim because ill
patients are generally too debilitated to properly concentrate during prayer,
thus hindering their prayer's effect.
The prayers of their healthy peers are thus more effective in invoking
divine compassion. This
understanding of the Gemara's comment allows for exceptions to this rule. There may, indeed, be situations where a
sick patient musters sufficient mental energy to pray with intense
concentration, in which case his prayer will have a greater effect than those of
others. Conceivably, then, Yishmael
managed to pray with intensity despite his deadly state of dehydration, and thus
his prayer was more effective than his mother's.
The Maharal of Prague, in his Gur Aryeh, suggests a different
explanation, distinguishing between prayer and other means of curing an
illness. When it comes to prayer, a
patient's own prayers are more effective, as the Midrash establishes. In the story of Rabbi Yochanan, however,
Rabbi Chanina did not cure Rabbi Yochanan through prayer. He rather helped Rabbi Yochanan muster
the physical strength and stamina to begin overcoming his illness, at which
point the Almighty then assisted him and fully restored his health. This type of encouragement, the Gemara
comments, is only possible through the efforts of one's peers. An ill patient is generally too
despondent and discouraged to take the critical first steps towards battling the
illness and returning to his normal state of functioning, and it is therefore
the responsibility of his friends and family to come to his side and offer him
the much-needed encouragement and will-power to fight the disease. Thus, the Midrash and the Gemara speak
of two entirely different issues, and there is thus no conflict whatsoever. It should be noted that the Maharal's
approach has origins already in the Hadar Zekeinim commentary (from the
Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot), which answers this question very briefly, "Prayer is
different."
Finally, Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his work Yalkut Yehuda,
suggests a distinction between ordinary people and important leaders. While in most cases a patient's own
prayers will yield a greater effect, the prayers offered by others on behalf of
an ill leader might be more effective than his own prayers. Rabbi Yochanan was a religious leader of
his generation, upon whose leadership scores of Jews depended. Therefore, the prayers offered by others
had an effect that surpassed Rabbi Yochanan's own prayers. Thus, even if generally "an ill
patient's prayer is more effective than the prayer of others on his behalf,"
when a distinguished leader takes ill the prayers of the community might be more
effective in "releasing him from prison" than the prayers he recites on his own
behalf.
******
We read in Parashat Vayera that before God proceeded to destroy the
sinful city of Sedom, he first informed Avraham of this decision, and the Torah
offers us a glimpse into God's "thought process," as it were, in choosing to
disclose this information to Avraham: "For I have chosen him, for the purpose
that he will instruct his children and household after him to follow the way of
the Lord, to perform righteousness and justice…" (18:19). God here declares that He chose Avraham
for the purpose of instructing his children to "follow the way of the Lord."
The Rambam, in Hilkhot Dei'ot (1:4), advances a novel interpretation of
this term derekh Hashem ("the way of the Lord"), claiming that it refers
to the notion of the derekh ha-emtza'it, or "the doctrine of the
mean." The Rambam here famously
develops the theory that one should train himself to act moderately in all
respects. One should be neither too
stingy nor overly generous; neither short-tempered nor self-degradingly tolerant
of abuse; neither gluttonous nor ascetic.
(The famous exception to this rule is humility, with which one should
conduct himself to the extreme.)
According to the Rambam, the Biblical imperative of ve-halakha
bi-drakhav, which requires one to "follow His ways," includes this ideal, to
conduct oneself moderately with respect to all character traits. And it is to this ideal, the Rambam
surprisingly contends, that God refers when He speaks of Avraham's role to teach
his children to "follow the way of the Lord."
The obvious question arises, where in this verse does the Rambam find any
allusion to the doctrine of the mean?
On what basis does he conclude that derekh Hashem refers to this
particular value?
The Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein shlit"a (www.vbm-torah.org/archive/sichot66/04-66vayera.htm),
suggested that the Rambam arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the
subsequent clause: "la-asot tzedaka u-mishpat" ("to perform righteousness
and justice"). The verse defines
derekh Hashem in reference to the ideals of tzedaka and
mishpat. The Rambam
discusses these terms in his Guide for the Perplexed (3:53), where he
defines tzedaka as "giving every one his due" and "showing kindness to
every being according as it deserves."
Mishpat, he claims, denotes "the act of deciding upon a certain
action in accordance with justice which may demand either mercy or
punishment." These two terms,
according to the Rambam, differ from the word chesed, which refers to
something beyond the call of duty, beyond that which is deserved or mandated by
the basic principles of justice.
With this in mind, Rav Lichtenstein suggested, we could perhaps
understand why the Rambam interpreted derekh Hashem in this verse in
reference to the doctrine of the mean.
God speaks here not of chesed, abundant graciousness, but rather
of tzedaka and mishpat, a balanced mode of conduct in which one
executes his basic responsibilities and treats others as they deserve to be
treated. This is the derekh
Hashem, the approach of moderation, of finding the "golden mean" between
extremes.
Rav Lichtenstein added that this is by no means the final word on the
Rambam's view of religious life. In
the final chapter of Hilkhot Teshuva, the Rambam describes the experience of
ahavat Hashem towards which each Jew must strive, comparing this emotion
to the love between a man and a woman, whereby one feels "lovesick" for
God. How may this state of
emotional intensity be reconciled with the doctrine of the mean, with the ideal
of a balanced, moderate approach represented by the terms tzedaka and
mishpat?
Rav Lichtenstein answered (as paraphrased by a student):
The
answer is that there is certainly some value in a person achieving a sense of
religious fervor, of cleaving to God, but for this purpose he must build himself
a lifestyle of "righteousness and justice." A person who strives to exist in a
constant state of religious ecstasy, spending his life dancing in the streets
with intense fervor, may well experience some lofty and uplifting moments in his
Divine service, but he is also likely to end up in less desirable states…
In
order to achieve lofty levels of religious upliftment, a person must first
establish an orderly, structured way of life in which he controls his
personality traits and characteristics.
When a person lives like this, he is able – at the appropriate time and
place – to elevate himself and achieve a very high level of loving God and
cleaving to Him. A life of
moderation and control allows one to achieve – in a controlled manner – some
special moments of extreme ecstasy.
Thus, the
Rambam requires that one first establish a lifestyle characterized by tzedaka
u-mishpat, a life of structure, discipline and moderation. Only with this firm basis of discipline
and control is one then able to move forward and pursue the lofty experience of
ahavat Hashem, the kind of emotional fervor and spiritual intensity
described in Hilkhot Teshuva.
******
In Parashat Vayera the Torah tells of the destruction of Sedom and its
surrounding cities. The Torah does
not explicitly specify the sin for which Sedom was annihilated, referring in
general terms to its iniquitous conduct (13:13, 18:20). However, the story told in this
parasha of the angels' visit to Sedom, where the townspeople violently
object to the hospitality extended to them by Lot, gives us a more precise indication of the source of
their guilt. This impression is
corroborated by a comment of the prophet Yechezkel (16:49): "Now this was the
iniquity of your sister Sedom: it and its suburbs had pride, satiation with
bread, and calm tranquility, but it did not strengthen the hand of the poor and
the needy." The people of Sedom
enjoyed peace and prosperity, but selfishly kept its resources for
themselves. They refused to share
their supply of water and food with those in need, and chose instead to isolate
themselves in their exclusive communities and bar entry to anybody seeking
assistance.
A famous passage in Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer (25) reveals an
additional element that rendered Sedom worthy of destruction. The Midrash writes, "They issued a
proclamation in Sedom stating: Anybody who supports a poor person, a pauper or
foreigner with bread will be burned by fire!" The Midrash proceeds to tell the tragic
story of Lot's daughter, Plotit, who pitied a
certain poor resident of Sedom and secretly brought him provisions each day as
she went to draw water from the local well. The townspeople investigated the matter,
discovered that Plotit had been feeding the pauper, and had her executed.
Professor Nechama Leibowitz commented on this story as follows:
But the
height of their wickedness lay not in the activities of individual transgressors
but in the fact that such iniquitous behavior was clothed with a cloak of
legality, raised to the level of a social norm…
Their
wickedness was not committed in secret, as something to be ashamed of, nor was
it the product of a spontaneous outburst of the populace provoked by
irresponsible elements. It was
rather the law of the land, and whoever violated this savage law, and performed
a good deed, prompted by his own instincts of pity, was condemned to be burnt at
the stake. There was no remedy for
such a society but total destruction.
What sealed
the fate of Sedom was not the attitude of insensitivity per se, but rather the
institutionalization of this attitude as part of the law of the land. Selfish greed became the formally
accepted norm, rather than an innate human instinct that people ought to
struggle to overcome. Abandoning
hungry peasants and allowing them to die of thirst and starvation transformed
from an unfortunate result of indifference, to the society's ideal
standard. Such a society, God
determined, was beyond moral repair, and had to be eliminated.
The story of Sedom is repeated not only in societies that formally
condone corrupt behavior and lend it a stamp of legal approval, but also within
the lives of each individual.
Acknowledging failure or inadequacy leaves one feeling uneasy and
insecure, and we often free ourselves from this discomfort through the
retroactive legitimization of our behavior. Rather than endure the duress of a
nagging conscience or the insecurity brought on by failure, we prefer to
transform the failure into a success, by finding a basis for justifying our
mistakes. Many people, like Sedom,
clothe their corrupt behavior in a cloak of legality and ethical propriety in
order to spare themselves the emotional burden of failure.
This retroactive validation of improper conduct makes it virtually
impossible to change. The first
step to character refinement is acknowledging that one's character must be
refined. The story of Sedom should
thus remind us to assess ourselves and our behavior with honest objectivity, and
to recognize the need to improve.
We will then be able to begin molding our characters in accordance with
our values and ideals, rather than molding our values and ideals in accordance
with our characters.
(Based in
part on Rabbi Natan Slifkin's work Focus, Parashat
Vayera) |