The Israel Koschitzky
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PARASHAT VAYERA
Rav David Silverberg
The haftara for Parashat Vayera, which is taken from Sefer Melakhim II (4), tells the famous story of the "Shunamite woman" who offered lodging to the prophet Elisha, in reward for which she was blessed with a child at an advanced age. In response to the woman's gracious hospitality, Elisha asks her whether he could express his gratitude by speaking on her behalf to the king or military commander: "What can be done for you? Is there for what to speak on your behalf to the king, or to the military commander?" (Melakhim II 4:13). The Shunamite woman declines the offer, and responds, "Be-tokh ami anokhi yoshevet" – "I dwell among my own people." What precisely does the woman mean with this response?
Rashi explains, "Among my kinsmen – nobody causes me harm; I do not need
the king or the commander." The
Shunamite informs the prophet that she has no claims or grievances against
anybody. Everyone with whom she
associates is "my own people" – she enjoys friendly, peaceful relationships with
them all. She has no complaints and
nothing for which she needs the prophet to intercede on her
behalf.
Rav Chayim Dov Rabinowitz, in his Da'at Soferim, explains this response somewhat differently, as referring to her status as a full-fledged citizen of the country. The Shunamite did not need any "connections" because she enjoyed full rights as an Israelite citizen and therefore managed perfectly well without any difficulties.
Either way, the woman's response appears to be a very admirable one. Most people in this position would not forego on an opportunity to enlist the assistance of a prominent, influential man such as Elisha. Everybody has some area in his life that causes some degree of frustration and anxiety, some grievance – big or small – that he wishes to be resolved. In the case of the Shunamite, she had suffered infertility her entire adult life, and was nevertheless capable of affirming that she had everything she needed. In this sense, perhaps, the Shunamite woman exemplified the timeless proverb, Eizehu ashir – ha-samei'ach be-chelko ("Who is wealthy? He who is happy with his lot"). She found joy and satisfaction in what she had, rather than focusing her attention on what was lacking.
Conversely, however, one may approach the Shunamite's response to Elisha
more critically, as an expression of overconfidence and an exaggerated sense of
personal security. The comfort and
tranquility reflected in the Shunamite's response should perhaps be contrasted
with the previous narrative, which comprises the first section of the haftara for Parashat Vayera: the story of the
impoverished widow (Melakhim II 4:1-7).
The widow, who had been married to a righteous prophet, found herself
mired in debts and her creditor threatened to take her sons as slaves in lieu of
payment. Elisha saved the woman by
miraculously multiplying the small amount of oil she had at home. The widow was thus able to sell her oil
and repay her debts. The sense of
idyllic serenity expressed by the Shunamite stands in stark contrast to the
plight of the poor widow; she enjoys comfort and security while the prophet's
widow faces the prospect of losing her sons to her
creditors.
Indeed, Rav Mendel Hirsch, in his commentary to the haftarot, notes this contrast in
describing the lamentable ethical state of the
This supposedly enlightened, pseudo-cultural Israeli society, in which of course a well-to-do, respected lady could say, just like in Sodom, too, in full consciousness of her secure position, "I live in the midst of my people," I require no influence to be brought on my behalf…but in which widows and orphans are exposed to the bitterest need without a helping hand being raised anywhere…
The Shunamite woman lived in blissful ignorance of women such as the impoverished widow, who were left hopeless, helpless and neglected by the wealthy class. From this perspective, the Shunamite's expression of contentment is not necessarily admirable. She felt content and at ease because she lived be-tokh ami, among her close circle of fellow upper-class aristocrats. She cared little about the plight of the many hapless souls in the kingdom suffering from hunger and destitution.
Support from this approach may be drawn from a later narrative (Melakhim
II, chapter 8) where Elisha advises the Shunamite woman to relocate in the
Philistine region in anticipation of a harsh drought that God would bring upon
Possibly, if one follows the critical approach to the Shunamite's remark, Elisha perhaps specifically instructed her to leave her "people" and forego on the sense of social and financial security that she had enjoyed heretofore. She was to experience firsthand the unsettling feeling of displacement and instability which would heighten her sensitivity to the plight of the less privileged among Am Yisrael, so that she would consider them, as well, her "people" and lend them the helping hand they so desperately needed.
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Towards the end of Parashat Vayera we read the famous story of akeidat Yitzchak, where God tests Avraham by ordering him to offer his son Yitzchak as a sacrifice. The Torah tells that Avraham "arose early in the morning" (22:3) to fulfill the command, and from here the Talmud (Pesachim 4a) derives the famous principle of zerizin makdimin le-mitzvot – mitzvot should be performed with as little delay as possible.
Among the interesting issues raised concerning this rule is whether or not one should delay performing a mitzva for the sake of observing it at a higher standard. Meaning, if a person must choose between performing the mitzva immediately at a minimally acceptable standard, or performing the mitzva later at a higher level, should he delay the mitzva? One example is a case addressed in the Sha'arei Teshuva (651:17) where a person has an etrog one morning during Sukkot but will be receiving a higher-quality etrog later in the day. Should he perform the mitzva in the morning with the etrog currently in his possession, in fulfillment of zerizin makdimin, or does this rule give way to the conflicting value of hiddur mitzva, the endeavor to maintain high aesthetic standards in mitzva performance?
The Terumat Ha-deshen (35) suggests answering this question in light of a comment of the Gemara in Masekhet Yevamot (39a). The obligation of yibum requires that when a married man dies without children, his brother must either marry the widow or perform the chalitza ritual, which then allows her to marry somebody else. The Mishna rules that if the deceased left two or more brothers, the oldest brother is given priority. If he refuses, then the oldest among the other brothers is given the opportunity, and so on. If all the brothers refuse to marry the widow or perform chalitza, then the oldest is required to do so. The Mishna further establishes that if a younger brother is in a distant country, or too young to marry, the process is not delayed until the brother returns or reaches marriageable age so he can be given the option of performing yibum. The older brother must perform yibum/chalitza and may not insist on waiting until his younger brother can be given the opportunity. The Gemara adds that this law applies even if the older brother prefers to perform chalitza, rather than marry the widow. Despite the fact that the younger brother might prefer marriage, which, according to one view, is preferable to the older brother's chalitza, the process is not delayed and the older brother is told to perform chalitza. Even though delaying the mitzva could result in a higher level of performance – marriage, as opposed to chalitza – the importance of performing mitzvot at the earliest possible point overrides the enhancement of the mitzva.
The Terumat Ha-deshen thus concludes that the rule of zerizin prevails even at the expense of a higher level of mitzva performance.
The Sedei Chemed (Ma'arekhet Zayin, 1) refutes this proof, noting that the case addressed in this Gemara involves two different individuals. The Gemara establishes that the older brother is not exempted from his current mitzva in order to allow for a higher level of performance by somebody else (the younger brother). Understandably, the anticipated higher standard on the part of the younger brother ought not to affect the obligation of the older brother, and hence he should perform the mitzva immediately rather than wait until he can attempt to transfer it to his brother. This halakha cannot necessarily be applied to the case under discussion, where a person will himself be able to perform the mitzva at a higher standard at a later point. In such a case, we might indeed require that he delay the performance of the mitzva so that he can achieve the highest possible level of fulfillment.
It should also be noted that in the case addressed in the Gemara, it is uncertain whether delaying the mitzva will result in a higher standard of performance. The older brother, who prefers chalitza, does not know whether the younger brother will opt for marriage or chalitza, and hence delaying the mitzva does not guarantee the achievement of a higher standard. Therefore, even if generally we would suspend the obligation of zerizin to facilitate a higher level of fulfillment, in this case the brother is told to perform chalitza rather than wait for his younger brother, as it is uncertain whether the delay will result in the preferred standard of yibum. Thus, this discussion of the Gemara does not shed light on the question of whether the law of zerizin applies at the expense of the higher standard of mitzva performance.
We will iy"H discuss this issue further tomorrow.
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Yesterday, we began discussing a famous halakhic question addressed already by the Terumat Ha-deshen concerning the scope of the rule of zerizin makdimin le-mitzvot – that one should fulfill mitzvot at the earliest possible point, without delay. The question involves situations where delaying the mitzva will allow for its fulfillment at a higher standard. We mentioned as an example the case discussed in the Sha'arei Teshuva (651:17) of a person who has a valid etrog on Sukkot but will be receiving a higher-quality etrog later in the day. The question thus becomes whether he should perform the mitzva immediately in fulfillment of the rule of zerizin, or delay the mitzva in order to achieve a higher standard of fulfillment.
Rav Meir Ha-kohen of Warsaw, in his Imrei Kohen (Warsaw, 1937), expresses his astonishment over the fact that the authorities who addressed this question made no mention of a Talmudic passage that appears to issue an explicit ruling on this topic. The Mishna in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (32b) draws a distinction between the mitzvot of hallel and shofar blowing: on occasions when hallel is recited, it is included as part of the shacharit service, whereas the shofar on Rosh Hashanah is sounded during musaf. The Gemara comments that the rule of zerizin makdimin should dictate performing both mitzvot at the earliest possible time. Instinctively, then, we would have required sounding the shofar, too, during the morning shacharit service, rather than delaying it until the later musaf prayer. Conversely, the Gemara notes, the value of be-rov am hadrat Melekh, performing mitzvot in as public a fashion as possible, would lead us to delay both hallel and shofar blowing until musaf, when more people are in attendance in the synagogue. The Gemara concludes that hallel is recited during shacharit in the interest of zerizin makdimin, but shofar was delayed until musaf because the governmental authorities had at one point issued a ban against shofar blowing. The officials sent to enforce the edicts would generally leave after shacharit, and therefore it was established that the shofar should be sounded later, during musaf.
It clearly emerges from the Gemara's discussion that the law of zerizin makdimin obtains even at the expense of a higher standard of mitzva performance. Despite the lower attendance during shacharit, Halakha prefers that hallel be recited and the shofar sounded during the shacharit, rather than in the presence of greater numbers during musaf. It was only due to practical considerations that the shofar blowing was delayed until after shacharit. Seemingly, then, as the Imrei Kohen notes, zerizin indeed warrants performing a mitzva at the earliest possible time even if this necessitates a lower level of performance.
It should be noted, however, that be-rov am hadrat Melekh is not necessarily representative of all
forms of enhancing mitzva performance. One might distinguish between this
principle, which encourages public displays of mitzva observance, and the concept of hiddur
mitzva – beautifying mitzva performance aesthetically. The fact that be-rov am gives way to the value of zerizin makdimin would not necessarily dictate that in the
case of the etrog, for example, one should perform the
mitzva earlier with the lower-quality
etrog. This
distinction perhaps accounts for the view of the Shevut Yaakov, cited by
the Sha'arei Teshuva, that one should, in fact, delay his taking
of the four species if he knows he will be receiving a higher-quality etrog later in the day – despite the Gemara's
conclusion concerning be-rov am
hadrat Melekh.
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Parashat Vayera begins with the famous story of the three mysterious
visitors whom Avraham graciously welcomes into his tent in Elonei Mamrei. The Rambam, in his Guide for the Perplexed (2:43), advances the controversial theory
that this narrative tells only of a prophetic vision that Avraham beheld, rather
than an actual event. He claims
that when the opening verse of this parasha tells, "The Lord appeared to him in Elonei
Mamrei," it speaks in general terms of what is later told in full detail. Meaning, the ensuing narrative of three
visitors is the very content of this "appearance" of God to Avraham; God
appeared to Avraham and showed him this vision of the three angels visiting his
tent and informing him of Sara's imminent conception of a
child.
In presenting this theory, the Rambam indicates that it is subject to a
debate among Chazal regarding the third verse of this parasha (18:3). Upon noticing the three travelers,
Avraham immediately remarks, "My lord…please do not leave your servant"
("Ado-nai…al na ta'avor mei'al
avdekha"). The Gemara in Masekhet Shevuot (35b)
cites two views as to whether Avraham here addresses God, or one of the three
travelers. According to one view,
God had been speaking with Avraham when the men arrived, and thus upon seeing
them Avraham asked God not to leave him, to wait until after he hosts the
visitors before continuing the prophetic vision. The second view, by contrast, held that
Avraham here speaks with one of the three men, asking that they remain rather
than immediately continue their journey.
This debate directly affects the plausibility of the Rambam's
theory. Recall that according to
his reading, the revelation mentioned in the verse, "The Lord appeared to him in
Elonei Mamrei" refers to the vision of the three angels. However, the first view recorded in the
Gemara clearly maintains that the Torah speaks here of a revelation independent
of the three visitors. According to
this reading, God appeared to Avraham and began speaking with him before the
three men arrived. The Rambam's
reading is thus possible only according to the second reading, which claims that
Avraham did not have to ask God not to leave him. This view maintains that there was no
prophetic vision apart from the arrival of the three angels, which was itself
the revelation spoken of in the parasha's opening verse.
Indeed, earlier in the Guide for the Perplexed (1:61), the Rambam writes explicitly that
the term "my lord" in the aforementioned verse refers to one of the angels, and
not to God. Consistent with his
view that there was no revelation other than the vision of the three visitors,
he maintains that Avraham did not have to address God before welcoming the
guests.
Surprisingly enough, however, the Rambam adopts the precise opposite view
in his Mishneh Torah, where he explicitly rules that in the
verse, "My lord…do not leave your servant" Avraham addresses God (Hilkhot
Yesodei Ha-Torah 6:9). The context
of this ruling is the Rambam's discussion of the prohibition against erasing or
otherwise destroying the written Name of God. The question of whether the word
ado-nai ("my L/lord") refers
to an angel or to God thus yields important practical ramifications. In any event, the Rambam's ruling here
in Mishneh Torah appears to run in direct opposition to the
theory he so emphatically advances in the second section of his Guide for the Perplexed.
Rabbi Yosef Kapach (in the annotation to his translations of the Guide and Mishneh Torah) suggested that the Rambam's ruling in Mishneh Torah should be seen as a measure of stringency intended to satisfy all views. Although the Rambam clearly maintained that the word ado-nai in this verse refers to an angel, and not to God, he nevertheless showed deference to the stringent position requiring that this word be treated as a Name of God. Underlying Rav Kapach's theory, of course, is the notion of limited interplay between the realms of philosophy and practical Halakha. Even though in his philosophical work the Rambam sided with the view that ado-nai here refers to an angel, in his halakhic code he chose to adopt the more stringent position.
Tomorrow we will iy"H discuss this issue further.
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Yesterday we discussed the Rambam's controversial view presented in his Guide for the Perplexed (2:43) regarding the introductory narrative of Parashat Vayera, which tells the famous story of the three visitors whom Avraham invited and hosted. The Rambam claimed that the Torah describes a prophetic vision that Avraham beheld, rather than an actual event, and it is to this vision that the Torah refers when it says in introducing this narrative, "The Lord appeared to him in Elonei Mamrei." As we saw, this approach hinges on a debate recorded in the Talmud (Shevuot 35b) concerning Avraham's remark upon seeing the travelers – "My lord…please do not leave your servant." According to the view that Avraham here addresses God, asking that He remain there as Avraham hosts the guests, then the revelation described in the parasha's opening verse does not refer to the vision of the guests. The Rambam's theory operates only according to the second view, that Avraham speaks here to the angels and asks that they accept his invitation.
In yesterday's discussion we noted the Rambam's seemingly contradictory rulings in this regard. Whereas in the Guide he clearly maintains that Avraham speaks here to the angels, in Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah (6:9), amidst his discussion of the laws pertaining to the written Name of God, he rules differently. There he maintains that the term Ado-nai ("My Lord") in this verse refers to the Almighty, in direct contrast to the position he adopts in his Guide. According to this ruling, we are seemingly compelled to conclude that God appeared to Avraham and then three guests actually arrived – in contradistinction to the theory espoused in the Guide.
In truth, the Rambam's ruling in Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah is not the only instance in Mishneh Torah where he seems to adopt the literal approach to this narrative. In Hilkhot Avel (14:2), in discussing the importance of hakhnasat orechim (welcoming guests), the Rambam writes, "And this is the rule that our patriarch Avraham established and the path of kindness which he followed: feeding wayfarers, giving them drink, and accompanying them." The Rambam here speaks of Avraham setting the example of gracious hospitality, and makes reference to the events described in Parashat Vayera, where Avraham welcomes guests, offers food and drink, and then accompanies them as they take leave. This portrayal of Avraham certainly appears to assume that the recorded events actually occurred, and were not merely envisioned as part of a prophetic revelation.
The Rambam's son, Rabbi Avraham, noted this question in his ethical work Ha-maspik Le-ovedei Hashem (p. 39), where he, like his father, speaks of Avraham as the prototype of gracious and selfless kindness to other people. He, too, points to the depiction in Parashat Vayera as an example of Avraham's benevolence, while accepting his father's theory that this narrative refers to a prophetic vision. Rabbi Avraham comments that although this story of hospitality did not actually occur, the vision shown to Avraham could be assumed to accurately depict his customary mode of conduct. Avraham's kindness to his guests in this prophecy corresponds to his general practice of welcoming wayfarers and offering them food and drink. Thus, even if this story did not actually occur, it nevertheless establishes the precedent that we, as Avraham's descendants and bearers of his legacy, are to follow. This thus explains why the Rambam points to Avraham as the model of hakhnasat orechim despite his claim that the story of Avraham's welcoming the angels did not actually occur.
However, the Rambam's subsequent remarks in Hilkhot Avel do not, at first glance, appear reconcilable with the theory he advances in his Guide for the Perplexed: "And welcoming guests is greater than greeting the presence of the Shekhina, as it says, 'He saw and behold there were three men…'" (In some editions, this passage reads, "And welcoming guests is as great as greeting the presence of the Shekhina…") The Rambam here refers to the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Shevuot (ibid.) that infers from Avraham's conduct that "welcoming guests is greater than greeting the presence of the Shekhina." The fact that Avraham interrupted his prophetic vision for the purpose of inviting and hosting the travelers demonstrates that welcoming guests is of greater importance than "greeting the presence of the Shekhina." The Gemara explicitly ascribes this principle to the view that the verse "My lord…do not leave your servant" was spoken to God, and not to one of the visitors. Only according to this reading does it emerge that Avraham was experiencing prophecy at the time when the three visitors arrived. According, however, to the view espoused in the Rambam's Guide, the prophecy Avraham experienced was the vision of the three visitors' arrival, and hence there was no interruption of prophecy for the sake of inviting guests. The fact that the Rambam cites this remark would appear to suggest that he accepted the view that the three visitors actually arrived, and not merely as part of a prophetic vision.
To reconcile this passage with the Rambam's theory in the Guide, we might claim that the Rambam accepts the Gemara's conclusion even if he cannot accept the interpretative process by which it was reached. Even though in his view Avraham did not disrupt a prophetic vision to invite guests, the Rambam acknowledged the significance of the fact that this indeed occurred according to one view among the Sages. According to the view that the incident of the three visitors actually took place, it emerges that Avraham chose to disrupt his prophecy in order to welcome these guests. The Rambam found this point an apt expression of the importance of hakhnasat orechim, and hence worthy of mention, even if he personally disagreed with the assumption on the basis of which this conclusion was reached.
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Yesterday, we mentioned the rule established in the Gemara (Shevuot 35b and elsewhere) that "welcoming guests is greater than greeting the presence of the Shekhina." The Gemara infers this principle from the fact that (according to one view) Avraham disrupted a prophetic revelation upon seeing three angels – whom he mistakenly identified as simple nomads – passing near his tent. That Avraham saw it appropriate to put God "on hold," as it were, while he tended to the needs of weary wayfarers indicates that the importance of hospitality exceeds that of kabbalat penei Shekhina – "greeting the presence of the Shekhina."
Rav Yosef Dov Soloveitchik (as cited in Rav Herschel Schachtar's Mi-peninei Ha-Rav, p. 271) explained this rule based on the well-known halakhic concept of kevod ha-beriyot – human dignity. Showing concern for the needs of weary travelers – regardless of their identity – serves as a reflection of the general value of kevod ha-beriyot, which is afforded great importance in Halakha and Jewish thought. Rav Soloveitchik also drew an association between this incident and the halakha established in the beginning of the second chapter of Masekhet Berakhot requiring that one interrupt his shema recitation to extend a greeting to people such as his father or rabbi. (This general rule is subject to various details and conditions that lie beyond the scope of our discussion.) The experience of kabbalat ol malkhut Shamayim, accepting upon oneself the yoke of divine kingship, entails the affirmation of kevod ha-beryiot – the respect and dignity owed to the Almighty's creatures. It would therefore be inconsistent with the essential theme and purpose of shema to disregard a person of distinction while performing this mitzva. Just as Avraham took leave of God, as it were, for the purpose of welcoming guests, so must a person disrupt his declaration of commitment to malkhut Shamayim for the sake of displaying honor to certain people.
Rav Soloveitchik noted in this context that, ironically enough, we find in the very next narrative in Parashat Vayera an expression of the precise opposite motif – that of man's lowliness. As Avraham turns to God in prayer on behalf of the condemned city of Sedom, he acknowledges his audacity in submitting such a petition, declaring, "anokhi afar va-eifer" – "I am but earth and ashes" (18:27). Earlier, Avraham had shown such respect for three strangers that he disrupted a prophetic revelation for the sake of welcoming them. How could he then speak so degradingly about a human being, referring to himself as "earth and ashes"?
The answer, as Rav Soloveitchik noted, can be found in the aforementioned halakha requiring that one interrupt the shema to extend a greeting. While this is true concerning the recitation of shema, it does not apply to the amida prayer, when a person actually stands before the Almighty and addresses Him. Indeed, the Mishna rules (Berakhot 30b) that one may not interrupt the amida to greet or return a greeting to anybody – including a king. Apparently, the experience of prayer – as opposed to the recitation of shema – is not the time for expressing kevod ha-beriyot, the respect and dignity owed to human beings. Prayer is an exercise in humility and submission; it must engender a sense of "ke-dalim u-khe'rashim dafaknu delatekha" – that we come knocking on the Almighty's door like paupers begging for an undeserved morsel of food in order survive. In a sense, kevod ha-beriyot is suspended during prayer, which is a time to reflect on man's lowliness, helplessness and complete dependence on God for his very survival. Accordingly, while in shema it is appropriate to interrupt for the sake of expressing the greatness and importance of the human being, prayer is a time to focus one's attention solely on the greatness of the Almighty and the meekness of man.
Hence, there is no contradiction between Avraham's expression of kevod ha-beriyot when welcoming the three travelers, and his self-deprecating proclamation, "anokhi afar va-eifer." This proclamation was made during prayer, as he stood before God to submit his requests, an experience that demands recognition of man's lowliness, of his being no greater than the dust of the earth. While the human being is undoubtedly a lofty creature worthy of respect and dignity, as one stands before God in prayer he must be mindful of his position vis-à-vis his Creator, that he is indeed "earth and ashes" in comparison with God's power and authority.
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Earlier this week, we encountered the debate recorded in the Gemara (Shevuot 35b) concerning the third verse in Parashat Vayera, which tells that upon seeing three travelers passing near his tent, Avraham remarked, "My lord, do not leave your servant." The dispute concerned the word ado-nai ("My lord") and the question of whether Avraham refers here to God, or to one of the three travelers.
After discussing this debate, the Gemara then addresses a similar
question that arises regarding a later narrative in Parashat Vayera: "All the
names mentioned in the context of Lot are chol [does not refer to God],
with the exception of the following instance which is 'sacred' [refers to God]:
'Lot said to them: No, please, my lord.
Behold, I have found favor in your eyes…'" The Gemara here refers to the story of
the angels' visit to Sedom, where they were hosted by
A number of commentators raised the question of to which "names" of God
the Gemara here refers. As the
Maharsha notes, the divine Name of Y-H-V-H appears several times in the
This question was discussed already by the Ritva, who answered that in
truth, the Gemara here intends simply to establish that the word ado-nai in this verse refers to God; it does not
address any other verses at all. It
speaks in terms of "all the names…with the exception of" because this is the
formulation used in reference to other Biblical passages throughout the Gemara's
discussion in this context. The
Gemara in this section addresses instances of ado-nai in a number
of different narratives in Tanakh, and identifies which of these refer to
God. With regard to
Several later commentators, however, were dissatisfied with the Ritva's
answer. Rav Yaakov Reisher, in his
Iyun Yaakov, suggested that the Gemara refers to "all
the names" mentioned by
Rav Shlomo of Vilna, in his Cheshek Shelomo, cites the work
Melekhet Ha-kodesh as strongly rejecting this contention of the Iyun
Yaakov. There can be no doubt,
he argues, that
The Cheshek Shelomo then suggests a possible approach of his own,
claiming that the Gemara perhaps refers to a different verse in this
narrative. When the people of Sedom
assemble outside Lot's home demanding that he send out his guests,