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Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT CHAYEI-SARA

By Rav David Silverberg

            The opening section of Parashat Chayei-Sara tells of Avraham's purchase of Me'arat Ha-machpela as a burial site for his wife, Sara.  After Avraham paid the sum of money to Efron, who had owned the site, the Torah writes, "Efron's field…was established as an acquisition for Avraham, in the view of the Chitites… Avraham then buried his wife Sara in the cave of the Machpela field… The field, and the cave inside it, was established for Avraham as a burial property…" (23:17-20).

            The Or Ha-chayim notes the seemingly unnecessary repetition in these verses, which twice make reference to the "establishment" of this property as Avraham's possession ("Va-yakom sedei Efron…Va-yakom ha-sadeh…").  Why must the Torah repeat the fact that Avraham acquired the field of Machpela as his legal property?

            The Or Ha-chayim suggests an answer based on the halakhic mechanics of land acquisition.  Generally speaking, transferring money effectuates a kinyan (legal acquisition), and the transfer of ownership over property takes effect immediately when payment is rendered.  However, the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Zekhiya U-matana 1:14) that when a Jew purchases land from a gentile, the payment does not effectuate the transfer of ownership.  The gentile's ownership is indeed revoked once he receives the money, but the property does not come under the Jew's ownership until he performs some other means of acquisition.  In Avraham's case, then, although Efron relinquished ownership over Machpela upon receiving the money, Avraham did not take possession until he buried Sara, an act that constituted a chazaka – a formal act of acquisition.  The Torah thus twice mentions the effectuation of the acquisition.  Before Avraham buried Sara, the field changed hands "in the view of the Chitites," meaning, from the perspective of Efron and his townspeople.  As far as they were concerned, the transaction was completed once Efron received the money, at which point he no longer had ownership over the territory.  From Avraham's perspective, however, the field became his only after he buried Sara, which constituted a formal act of acquisition.  (See also Meshekh Chokhma.)

            At first glance, one might question the Or Ha-chayim's approach in light of the Gemara's comment on the first page of Masekhet Kiddushin, where this transaction is seen as the basis for the concept of kiddushei kesef, betrothing a woman by giving her money or a valuable object (usually a ring).  The Gemara suggests deriving this means of betrothal from the usage of the verb k.ch. (literally, "take" or "acquire") both in the context of the sale of Machpela (Bereishit 23:13) and regarding betrothal (Devarim 22:13).  Just as money effected the transaction of Machpela, the Gemara reasons, so is money an effective means of betrothal.  This clearly suggests that the transfer of money to Efron completed the transaction, in direct opposition to the Or Ha-chayim's approach.

            One may respond, however, that the Gemara later (3b) cites a different source for the notion of kiddushei kesef, and thus the parallel drawn between the sale of Machpela and betrothal need not be taken as the authoritative source.  Moreover, several Rishonim claimed that this discussion concerning kiddushei kesef on the first page of Masekhet Kiddushin was added later, by the Savora'im, and is not an authentic part of the Talmud.  Hence, the Or Ha-chayim likely did not feel bound by the conclusions reached in this discussion.

(Taken from Rav Aharon Miasnick, Minchat Aharon)

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            We read in Parashat Chayei Sara of Avraham's purchase of the Machpela territory from the Chitites, in which he buried Sara.  The Cave of Machpela later became the burial site of Avraham himself, as well, and of Yitzchak, Rivka, Yaakov and Leah (see Bereishit 49:31).  According to tradition, Adam and Chava are also buried in this cave.

            The Gemara, in Masekhet Bava Batra (58a), tells that Rabbi Bena'a placed indicators near numerous gravesites in Eretz Yisrael, including the graves of Avraham and Adam in Me'arat Ha-machpela.  Presumably, the intended purpose of these indicators was to warn of tum'a which one contracts by walking over a Jewish grave.  Tosefot thus raise the question of why these indicators were necessary for the graves of Adam and Avraham.  According to one view in Masekhet Yevamot (61a), which is accepted by most authorities, gentile corpses transmit tum'a only through direct contact.  Although one contracts tum'a even by passing over the airspace of a Jewish corpse, or by being under the same roof, from the remains of a gentile one cannot contract tum'a without direct contact.  The graves of Adam and Avraham, who lived before Matan Torah, thus do not transmit tum'a, and Tosefot therefore wonder why Rabbi Bena'a went through the trouble of marking these gravesites.

Tosefot answer by carefully examining the parameters of this halakha that distinguishes between Jews and gentiles with respect to tum'a.  The reason for this distinction, as mentioned in Masekhet Yevamot, stems from the Torah's use of the word adam in the context of the transmission of tum'a through airspace (Bamidbar 19:14).  Based on a verse in Sefer Yechezkel, the Gemara deduces that this term refers only to Am Yisrael, and therefore the remains of gentiles transmit tum'a only through direct contact.  Tosefot assert that Avraham, too, is referred to as "Adam" (based on a Midrashic reading of Yehoshua 14:14), and of course Adam would likely belong in this category, as well.  Thus, although generally the concept of tum'at ohel (contraction of tum'a through airspace) applies only to Jews, a status that did not exist before Matan Torah, it nevertheless applied to Adam and Avraham.

Of course, Tosefot's discussion works off the assumption that the patriarchs did not have the halakhic status of Jews, given that the Torah had yet to be given.  This issue is subject to considerable controversy and has generated quite a vast literature.  Among the earlier discussions of this question is a passage in the Ramban's commentary to Sefer Vayikra (24:10), where he cites the view of "the Tzorfatim" – French scholars – that the patriarchs and matriarchs did not have the halakhic status of Jews.  They therefore believed that lineage among Benei Yisrael before Matan Torah followed the rule of patrilineal descent, as only when the Torah was revealed at Sinai did the law of matrilineal descent take effect.  The Chida, in his work Petach Enayim (Kiddushin 39b), speculates that the Ramban refers here to the Tosafists, who, as we saw, discuss the status of Avraham's grave with respect to tum'a under the assumption that Halakha treats him as a gentile.

The Ramban himself disagrees with the Tzorfatim, and maintains that the halakhic status of Jews applied to Avraham and his descendants the moment he formally entered the covenant with God.  Interestingly, however, in his commentary to Masekhet Bava Batra, the Ramban accepts Tosefot's assumption that Avraham did not have the halakhic status of a Jew.  Addressing Tosefot's question as to the need for indicators to mark Adam and Avraham's graves, the Ramban writes that Rabbi Bena'a placed these markers out of respect for these men, rather than as a warning to avoid tum'a.  Alternatively, he suggests, Rabbi Bena'a may have followed the view in Masekhet Yevamot that draws no distinction between Jews and gentiles with respect to tum'at ohel, and thus even gentile graves could transmit tum'a.  Either way, the Ramban clearly accepted Tosefot's premise that Avraham had the formal status of a gentile, seemingly contradicting his own remarks in his commentary to Sefer Vayikra.  One might suggest that in his discussion in Bava Batra he refers mainly to Adam, who, even according to the Ramban's view, had the status of a gentile, since the halakhic status of Jews came into being only after God's covenant with Avraham.  Although the Ramban mentions both Adam and Avraham in this discussion, it is possible that his primary intention is to address the status of Adam with respect to tum'a, and not Avraham.

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            The haftara for Shabbat Parashat Chayei Sara, which is taken from the first chapter of Sefer Melakhim, deals mainly with the revolt led by Adoniyahu, one of King David's older sons.  This chapter tells of the efforts made by David's wife Batsheva and the prophet Natan to ensure that David would formally declare Shlomo – Batsheva's son – his successor, as he had promised to Batsheva.

            The first verses of this narrative, however, tell the peculiar and seemingly unrelated story of Avishag, the attractive girl brought to the palace to help keep the king warm.  As David aged, he found himself unable to keep warm through clothing alone, and his servants therefore brought him Avishag to provide warmth.  The verse emphasizes that David did not engage in intimate relations with Avishag (1:4).

            The Malbim proposes a surprising theory to explain the relevance of this story to the Adoniyahu narrative.  Later, in the second chapter of Sefer Melakhim, we read that after David's death and Shlomo's ascension to the throne, Adoniyahu approached Batsheva and asked that he be allowed to marry Avishag.  Batsheva brought his request to Shlomo, who interpreted it as a rebellion against his royal authority, and promptly had Adoniyahu executed.  It is generally assumed that Adoniyahu asked to marry Avishag as a means of renewing his efforts to win the kingship.  His marriage to Avishag would give him the appearance of David's successor, an image that would help him attract a following and overthrow Shlomo.  The Malbim, however, claims that to the contrary, Adoniyahu's rebellion was, from the outset, driven by his desire to marry Avishag.  He did not ask for Avishag as a means to rebel; he rebelled as a means to marry Avishag.

            Naturally, then, the Torah introduced the story of Adoniyahu's rebellion by telling of David's illness and Avishag's invitation to the palace.  It was Avishag's presence in the palace that drove Adoniyahu to the drastic measure of trying to assert himself as David's heir to the throne.

            Rav Avraham Rivlin (of Yeshivat Kerem Be'yavneh), in his work Iyunei Haftara, suggests that the Malbim's approach may shed light on Chazal's famous comment concerning the peculiar illness from which David suffered towards the end of his life.  The Gemara (Berakhot 62b) remarks that David's inability to warm himself with clothing came as punishment for his having torn a piece of King Shaul's garment many years earlier.  As told in Sefer Shemuel I (chapter 24), King Shaul pursued David to kill him and happened to enter a dark cave where David and his men had been hiding.  Rather than kill Shaul, David instead secretly cut the corner of his garment that he later used as evidence to Shaul that he was given the opportunity to kill him.  The Gemara comments that David was punished for this sign of disrespect towards the king's garments, and later in life David was unable to keep himself warm by wearing layers of clothing.

            Rav Rivlin notes that elsewhere in Tanakh, we find that cutting the corner of a garment serves to symbolize the end of a king's reign.  Shemuel proclaimed the end of Shaul's reign by cutting his garment (Shemuel I 15:27), and the prophet Achiya prophesied the division of Shlomo's empire by tearing the garment of Yerovam (Melakhim I 11:30).  David's tearing of Shaul's garment was perhaps understood in a similar vein, as a symbolic act foreseeing the imminent fall of Shaul's leadership.  David was punished for this insult to Shaul by suffering an illness that resulted in Avishag's entry into the palace, an event that precipitated a threat to the stability of David's dynasty.

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            Earlier this week, we made reference to the Gemara's comments in the beginning of Masekhet Kiddushin, where Chazal derive the concept of kiddushei kesef – betrothal through money or an object of value – from the opening section of Parashat Chayei-Sara.  Based on parallel terminology employed in the context Avraham's purchase of Machpela ("kach mimeni" – 23:13) and regarding betrothal ("ki yikach" – Devarim 22:13), the Gemara establishes that just as Avraham acquired Machpela through the transfer of money, so is kiddushin (betrothal) effectuated through the transfer of money (or an object of value).

            On one level, this inference, which is an instance of the tool in halakhic exegesis known as gezeira shava, is a purely technical one, whereby a similar term in two different contexts allows for applying a law relevant to one context to the other.  Nevertheless, the parallel drawn between Avraham's purchase of a burial plot and marriage is jarring.  It seems incongruous to establish laws governing the joyous, festive event of marriage on the basis of the painful experience of Avraham's loss of his beloved wife.  What deeper message might this parallel convey?

            Rav Eliyahu Baruch Shulman (www.yutorah.org/showShiur.cfm?shiurID=706307) suggested that this gezeira shava perhaps reflects the nature of what true commitment means.  When a groom betroths his bride under the canopy, he declares his commitment to her for a lifetime – and even beyond.  The association between marriage and Avraham's efforts to secure a proper burial plot for Sara reminds us that true commitment binds a person even under trying circumstances, during difficult times, when hardship strikes.  A commitment that expresses itself only under favorable conditions is not a true commitment at all.  Being committed means exerting oneself despite the difficulty entailed, being prepared to forgo on one's own personal interests on behalf of the person or object of his commitment, even under the most trying conditions.

            This lesson applies to everything to which a person commits himself, be it family members, friends, community, Kelal Yisrael, and certainly God.  A person who is faithful to the Torah only when he finds observance convenient, when it does not demand too much exertion or sacrifice, can hardly be described as a committed Jew.  The committed Jew dedicates himself to Torah and mitzvot not only "at the wedding," so-to-speak, at times of joy and festivity, but also under the much harsher conditions of Avraham's purchase of Machpela, when a person faces hardship and personal loss.

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            Towards the end of Parashat Chayei-Sara, the Torah writes, "Avraham gave everything he had to Yitzchak; and to the children of Avraham's concubines, Avraham gave gifts, and he sent them away from his son Yitzchak while he was still alive, to the east, to the land of the east" (25:5-6).  We are told that Avraham bequeathed his entire estate to Yitzchak, and to his other children he gave merely some "gifts."

            A number of writers have addressed the question of how to reconcile Avraham's handling of his estate with the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Ketubot (53a) and Masekhet Bava Batra (133b) that one should not transfer shares of his inheritance from one child to another.  The Gemara emphasizes that when it comes to inheritance one may not even favor a righteous son over a wicked son, "because he does not know what kind of children will emerge from him."  A person's inheritance passed not only to his children, but to their children, as well, and so on, and therefore the characters of the children in one generation should have no effect on how one distributes his estate.  The question thus arises, why was Avraham allowed to bequeath "everything he had" to Yitzchak, reserving only some small, token "gifts" to the other children?

            The Da'at Zekeinim Mi-Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot and the Peirush Ha-Rosh suggest that Yishmael was born to Avraham before Avraham officially entered the covenant with God.  Thus, both Avraham and Yishmael had the status of converts to Judaism, and according to Halakha a convert loses all legal familial relationships upon his conversion.  Hence, Yishmael was, technically speaking, no longer Avraham's son, and therefore he did not deserve a share in the inheritance.

            Of course, this answer does not explain how Avraham was entitled to diminish the portion of the children he begot from Ketura, whom he married well after his entry into the covenant.

            The Maharsha (Sanhedrin 91a) writes that Avraham's other wives (besides Sara) had the status of either a maidservant (Hagar) or a concubine (Ketura), and children born to maidservants and concubines are not necessarily entitled to an equal share in the inheritance.

            Rav Avraham Yitzchak Sorotzkin, in his Rinat Yitzchak, suggests a different explanation, distinguishing between an inheritance and a gift.  Earlier in this parasha, the Torah tells that Avraham's servant left to find a match for Yitzchak, and he took with him "all the goodness of his master" (24:10).  Rashi cites from the Midrash that this refers to a shetar matana, a legal document that Avraham wrote proclaiming that he gives all his possessions to Yitzchak.  This halakhic term, shetar matana, refers to something much different than inheritance.  This document was a deed signed by Avraham affirming that he gives all his possessions to Yitzchak already during his lifetime.  Now a person has every right to give his property to whomever he wishes during his lifetime; the prohibition mentioned above refers only to inheritance, the distribution of his assets after his death.  A person can circumvent this law by writing a shetar matana whereby he gives his property to a certain son as a gift, already during his lifetime, rather than as an inheritance.  Avraham thus was not in violation of this law by assigning his assets to Yitzchak.  This approach has origins already in the commentary of Seforno (25:6).

            Interestingly, Chizkuni (25:6) writes that the "gifts" Avraham gave to the other children were actually properties in his homeland, Aram, which he had inherited from his family.  When the Torah tells that Avraham sent the other children "to the east," it means that he bequeathed to them his property in Aram, to the east of Canaan, and sent them there to claim and take possession of that property.  According to this interpretation, it is possible that the other sons actually received a roughly equal share in the inheritance, only in a different region.  However, the Torah's reference to Avraham giving "everything he had" to Yitzchak certainly suggests that the "gifts" bequeathed to the other children paled in comparison to Yitzchak's share.

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            Yesterday, we addressed the question of how Avraham was permitted to give "everything he had" to Yitzchak, bequeathing to his other children only seemingly minor "gifts" (Bereishit 25:5-6), given the prohibition against increasing one child's share in the inheritance at the expense of the others (Ketubot 53a, Bava Batra 133b).

            Today we will present an additional answer to this question, which is offered, among others, by Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi and the Keli Yakar.  They explain, quite simply, that Avraham had already been explicitly informed by God that "through Yitzchak offspring will be called for you" ("ki ve-Yitzchak yikarei lekha zara" – Bereishit 21:12).  Although generally one cannot increase one child's share in the inheritance over another child's share, in this instance, when Avraham was specifically informed that only Yitzchak and his descendants will be considered Avraham's offspring, this preferential distribution of the estate was valid.

            In a similar vein, Rav Yosef Engel, in his work Beit Ha-otzar (ma'arekhet alef-bet, 1:3), claims that Avraham saw through ru'ach ha-kodesh that no righteous descendants will emerge from the other children.  As we mentioned yesterday, the Gemara forbids transferring shares of an inheritance from even a wicked child to a righteous one, and explains, "because he does not know what kind of children will emerge from him."  It thus stands to reason that in the exceptional case of a prophet, who is granted "privileged information" about his children's descendants, and knows that no virtuous offspring will descend from a certain child, he may deny that child his full share of the inheritance.  Avraham was thus entitled to bequeath the bulk of his estate to Yitzchak and leave only small items for the other children.
            This theory, however, gives rise to the question of whether knowledge acquired through prophetic insight can affect one's practical observance of Halakha.  One might, at first glance, compare the situation of Avraham's distribution of his estate – as explained by the aforementioned writers – with the famous story of Chizkiyahu, who chose not to marry because he had prophetically seen that he would beget sinful children (Berakhot 10a).  The prophet Yeshayahu censured the king for neglecting a mitzva based on prophetically-obtained knowledge.  We might thus similarly question the validity of Avraham's uneven distribution of his wealth on the basis of the prophecy he received concerning his progeny.

            Rav Yosef Engel addresses this question, and answers that Avraham was entitled to take this information into account because he lived before Matan Torah.  Avraham's observance of the mitzvot was in any event based upon his understanding of the divine will obtained through prophetic insight, rather than through the study of a revealed Torah.  He was therefore allowed to act upon prophetic knowledge of the future despite the fact that after Matan Torah such knowledge may not impact upon halakhic decision-making.

            Rav Reuven Margoliyot, in his work Margoliyot Ha-yam on Masekhet Sanhedrin (91a), cites Rav Engel's analysis and adds that the related rule of lo va-shamayim hi likewise did not apply before Matan Torah.  Lo va-shamayim hi means that halakhic decisions may be reached only on the basis of the written and oral laws revealed to Moshe at Sinai.  Subsequently revealed halakhic principles or rulings must be ignored, because "the Torah is not in the heavens."  After the Revelation at Sinai, the Torah is now on earth, in the hands of the scholars, and therefore "the heavens" no longer have any new laws, principles or commandments to present to us that were not presented at Sinai.  Rav Margoliyot demonstrates (and this is discussed as well by the Keli Chemda in this parasha) that this rule, too, did not apply before Matan Torah.  Since the Torah was still "in the heavens," it would have been legitimate for one of the patriarchs to violate the Torah based on prophetic instruction, even though after Matan Torah scholars may not rely on subsequently revealed halakhic instruction.

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            Towards the end of Parashat Chayei-Sara we read of the death of Avraham (25:8), after which, we are told, "God blessed his son Yitzchak" (25:11).  The Gemara in Masekhet Sota (14a) understands this verse to mean that God appeared to Yitzchak for the purpose of offering consolation after his father's death.  In light of the obligation of ve-halakhta bi-drakhav, which requires following the Almighty's example of conduct, the Gemara establishes on this basis the obligation of nichum aveilim, to offer condolences to, and help comfort, bereaved relatives.

            Similarly, towards the beginning of last week's parasha, Parashat Vayera, we read that God appeared to Avraham following his circumcision.  The Gemara explains God's appearance as intended for the purpose of visiting Avraham who felt ill after undergoing this painful procedure.  From here the Gemara derives the mitzva of bikur cholim, to pay visits to ailing patients.

            The Rambam, in Hilkhot Avel (14:7), famously rules that nichum aveilim takes precedence over bikur cholim.  If a person has one friend who lost a relative and another who has taken ill, but his schedule allows for visiting only one of the two, the mourner takes precedence over the ailing patient.  The Rambam explains that through nichum aveilim one performs an act kindness both for the bereaved relative, by offering sympathy and support, and for the deceased, by respecting his memory.  Bikur cholim, by contrast, is a favor done only for the patient himself, and thus a person faced with the option should pay a condolence call rather than visit an ill patient.

            The Or Samei'ach notes that a passage in the Gemara might suggest otherwise.  In Masekhet Sukka (41b), the Gemara describes the practice of the anshei Yerushalayim (people of Jerusalem) to carry the four species with them throughout the day on Sukkot.  The Gemara lists numerous regular activities during which the anshei Yerushalayim would hold their arba minim to emphasize that the four species stayed with them throughout the day.  This list includes visiting the sick and comforting mourners, with visiting the sick listed before comforting mourners.  This sequence might reflect the Gemara's perspective that bikur cholim takes precedence to nichum aveilim, in direct contradistinction to the Rambam's ruling.  Interestingly enough, the Rosh, in his citation of this passage (Sukka 3:32), reverses the sequence, and mentions nichum aveilum before bikur cholim.  The Rambam, however, follows the Gemara's sequence of presentation, listing bikur cholim before nichum aveilim (Hilkhot Lulav 7:24).

            Rav Yonasan Sacks of Yeshiva University (http://torahweb.org/torah/2005/parsha/rsac_chayey.html) suggested an approach to reconcile this implication of the Gemara with the Rambam's position.  Later in Hilkhot Avel (10:8), the Rambam rules that if a person loses a relative during a festival, no laws of aveilut take effect until after the festival.  Many Rishonim, including the Rosh (Ketubot 1:7), dispute this position of the Rambam, and maintain that private mourning observances are required on Yom Tov.  (See Tur and Beit Yosef, Y.D. 399.)  Now the Mishna in Masekhet Mo'ed Katan (27a) writes explicitly that the mizva of nichum aveilim applies during festivals, a ruling that appears difficult to understand in light of the Rambam's position.  If no laws of mourning are practiced during the festival, how could nichum aveilim apply?  Doesn't nichum aveilim require that the mourner be observing a period of aveilut?

            Rav Sacks cites Rav Betzalel Zholty as explaining that although a bereaved relative does not observe aveilut during a festival, the second aspect of nichum aveilim – showing respect for the memory of the deceased – certainly applies.  Even though the relatives are barred from mourning due to the festive nature of Yom Tov, there remains an obligation to show respect for the deceased by visiting the relatives.

            We can now readily understand why the Gemara – and the Rambam – listed bikur cholim before nichum aveilim in describing the practice of the anshei Yerushalayim.  Recall that the Rambam generally affords precedence to nichum aveilim because it involves kindness to both the bereaved relatives and the deceased.  On Sukkot, however, like on other festivals, nichum aveilim expresses only respect to the deceased; it does not involve chesed for the relatives, who do not observe any mourning practices until after Yom Tov.  Hence, on Sukkot, bikur cholim, which is a chesed performed for the living, takes precedence over nichum aveilim, which is a chesed performed only for the deceased.  Understandably, then, in describing the practice of anshei Yerushalayim on Sukkot, the Rambam lists bikur cholim before nichum aveilim.

            The Rosh, however, as mentioned earlier, held that certain aspects of aveilut are observed even during Yom Tov.  In his view, then, both aspects of nichum aveilim – the needs of the mourner, and respect for the deceased – apply on Yom Tov.  Accordingly, he would maintain that even on Yom Tov nichum aveilim takes precedence over bikur cholim, and for this reason he reversed the sequence in describing the practice of anshei Yerushalayim, mentioning nichum aveilim before bikur cholim.