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by Rav David Silverberg

Parashat Chayei-Sara tells the story of how Avraham's servant, identified by Chazal as Eliezer, travels to Aram Naharayim to find a wife for Yitzchak. Upon deciding upon Rivka, Eliezer goes to her home where he is warmly greeted by Lavan, Rivka's brother. Lavan sees the servant and exclaims, "Come, he who is blessed by the Lord!" (24:31). Chazal see in this reference to Eliezer as "beruch Hashem" ("he who is blessed by the Lord") an indication of his newfound stature and prominence. The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 60) comments, "Through his having served that tzadik [Avraham], he [Eliezer] left the category of 'curse' into the category of 'blessed'." Eliezer descended from Canaan, Noach's grandson, whom Noach cursed for having mistreated his grandfather (Bereishit 9:20-27). This curse affected all of Canaan's offspring, including Eliezer. However, by "serving the tzadik faithfully," the Midrash writes, Eliezer managed to divest himself of this curse and come under the blessing of Avraham's family.

How exactly are we to understand this curse upon Canaan and his descendants, and how did Eliezer shake himself free from this curse by "serving the tzadik faithfully"?

Rav Yechezkel Levenstein zt"l, the famous "mashgi'ach" of the Ponivitch Yeshiva, explains based on a more famous Midrashic passage (Bereishit Rabba 59), cited by Rashi later in this parasha (24:39). The Midrash tells that Eliezer himself had a daughter, whom he wished to marry Yitzchak. For this reason, when Avraham first instructs his servant to go to Aram Naharayim to find Yitzchak's mate, Eliezer asks what he should do if the right girl refuses to resettle in Eretz Canaan. Chazal explain that Eliezer tried to dissuade Avraham from his decision to marry Yitzchak to a girl from Aram Naharayim, in the hope that he would marry Eliezer's daughter, instead. But Avraham said to his servant, "You are 'cursed,' and my son is 'blessed' – and the 'cursed' cannot join the 'blessed'." Rav Levenstein explains that the "curse" refers to Eliezer's selfishness as expressed by his desire that Yitzchak marry his own daughter. Rather than concerning himself purely with satisfying Avraham's wishes, Eliezer, if only for a moment, gave priority to his own selfish interests. This is the "curse" of Canaan. According to one view in Chazal, Canaan castrated his drunken father, Noach, to ensure that he would not beget anymore children, which would lessen his inheritance. In response, Noach cursed Canaan's descendants with slavery (9:25). A slave owns nothing; anything he acquires automatically becomes the possession of his owner. This is the rectification of Canaan's self-centered attitude and greed. The "curse" of Canaan affected his offspring, including Eliezer, who selfishly thought about his own honor and prestige, rather than immediately obeying his master's wishes.

But Eliezer overcomes this blemish when he faithfully obeys Avraham's instructions and selects an appropriate mate for Yitzchak. By the time he approaches Rivka's family to seek their consent to the match, he has become a "beruch Hashem," he is no longer afflicted by the "curse" of selfishness and greed he had inherited from his ancestor, Canaan.

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In Parashat Chayei-Sara, Avraham instructs his servant to find a bride for his son, Yitzchak, and has him take an oath that he will not choose a girl from the local Canaanite population. Instead, the servant is to go to Avraham's birthplace, Aram Naharayim, to find a mate for Yitzchak. Many commentators have asked why Avraham so adamantly forbade the servant from selecting a girl from Canaan. Were the people of Aram Naharayim any less corrupt or idolatrous than the local Canaanite population? As we read in the Haggada, Yehoshua (24:2) explicitly notes the idolatry that characterized Avraham's birthplace. Why, then, was it is so important to Avraham that his son marry a girl from Aram Naharayim, rather than from Canaan?

The Midrash Ha-gadol views Avraham's policy in this regard as an example of the principle, "mi-besarkha al tit'alam" (Yeshayahu 58:7) – one should not ignore his relatives. Avraham wanted to grant his extending family this privilege of marrying his son and thereby taking part in the establishment of God's special nation. The issue of ethical or spiritual qualities was not what prompted Avraham to send his servant back to his homeland; it was rather his commitment to his relatives and desire to offer them the opportunity of joining his son's family.

Later commentators, however, suggest much different approaches. The Ran, in one of his "derashot" (5), explains that certain qualities and character traits are transmitted genetically among certain peoples. True, the Ran writes, many beliefs and tendencies are transmitted only culturally, by force of trained habit, and these can be overcome through reverse habituation. Some qualities, however, are passed biologically from parent to child. Canaan, the Ran claims, was corrupt at its very core, and no girl from there could completely free herself of these negative tendencies. The people of Aram Naharayim, by contrast, were indeed idolatrous, but their shortcomings were in spirit alone, and were not part of the nation's very fabric and nature.

In a slightly different vein, Abarbanel suggests that quite simply, the nations of Canaan, who obviously descended from Noach's grandson, Canaan, were included under the curse Noach placed upon Canaan. Yesterday, we mentioned that Avraham did not want Yitzchak to marry the daughter of his servant, Eliezer, because Eliezer descended from Canaan and thus had upon him Noach's curse. Similarly, Abarbanel suggests that for this very reason Avraham insisted that Yitzchak would not marry a girl from the Canaanite nations, who wore the stain of Noach's curse.

Abarbanel then adds a second factor, as well, namely, the fact that God promised to banish the Canaanite peoples from the land of Canaan and give the territory to Avraham's offspring. Avraham thus wanted to ensure that Yitzchak would not marry into the Canaanite population, for this might prevent the possibility of his offspring taking possession of the Promised Land. A variation of this approach was suggested several centuries later by Rav Shemuel David Lutzatto, or Shadal, who notes that Benei Yisrael are later commanded not to initiate hostilities against the descendants of Lot and Esav, due to our shared ancestry. Similarly, Shadal claims, were Yitzchak to marry a girl from Canaan, Benei Yisrael would have been denied the right to wage war against the Canaanites and seize their land, due to our ancestral relationship with them.

Professor Nechama Leibowitz, in her study sheets (20^th series), objects to this final approach of Shadal. She notes that thus far, God never told Avraham that his descendants would have to wage war to seize the land from the Canaanites. Instead, He said simply that the land would be taken from the Canaanites and given to Benei Yisrael – not necessarily through warfare. Therefore, Yitzchak's marriage to a Canaanite woman would not have precluded the possibility of Benei Yisrael's ultimate possession of Eretz Yisrael. (Clearly, however, her objection would not affect the position of Abarbanel, that Yitzchak's marriage to a Canaanite would prevent his offspring from possessing the land.)

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Two days ago, we made mention of the Midrash cited by Rashi in his commentary to Parashat Chayei-Sara (24:39), that Avraham's servant, Eliezer, had hoped that his own daughter would marry Avraham's son, Yitzchak. When Avraham asks him to bring a girl for Yitzchak from Avraham's birthplace, Eliezer deliberately raises the concern that the right girl may refuse to return with him to Canaan to marry Yitzchak. According to Chazal, Eliezer here attempts to dissuade Avraham from sending him to find a girl for Yitzchak, in the hope thaYitzchak would marry his own daughter, instead.

Today we will discuss the halakhic propriety of an Eliezer-style attempt to thwart a shiddukh (match). Namely, according to Halakha, if a man and woman are considering marriage (in modern terminology, "dating"), may another man interfere and try to win the woman for himself, or vice-versa? This question was brought before Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l, who published his response in Iggerot Moshe (E.H. vol. 1, 91). We bring here a brief overview of his ruling in this regard.

The relevant Talmudic source for this issue is a Gemara in Masekhet Kiddushin (59a), which concludes that if someone plans on purchasing a given property, another person who jumps in and purchases it first is considered a "rasha" (wicked person). As the Gemara notes, this is obviously assuming that he knows that the first individual already has plans to make the acquisition. The Gemara notes another example of this halakha: if a poor person surveys a sheaf with the idea of taking it, it is forbidden for another to come take it first. Accordingly, this halakha, forbidding to seize that which another has already planned to take, has become known as, "ani ha-mehapech be-charara" ("a poor person surveying a sheaf").

The Mechaber, in the Shulchan Arukh (C.M. 237:1), codifies this halakha and cites a critical debate among the Rishonim concerning its scope. According to Rabbenu Tam (cited by Tosefot there in Kiddushin), this halakha applies only to cases of buying and selling. When, however, someone wishes to acquire a heretofore ownerless item, it is not forbidden for others to preempt him and take it for themselves. Rabbenu Tam explains that the poor person in the case described by the Gemara does not consider picking up a morsel of food to eat, but rather comes across some investment opportunity or attractive transaction with lucrative potential. In cases of ownerless items that one seeks to acquire, however, the prohibition does not apply. The reason for this distinction stems from the availability of alternative options. When dealing with purchases, one can generally find an equally attractive option elsewhere; it is improper, therefore, for him to interfere with the plans of another. By contrast, in a case of a metzia (lost object that someone comes across), for example, one cannot assume that such an opportunity will arise again. He is therefore not forbidden from making an effort to acquire it even if somebody else already expressed interest in the item first. The second view in the Shulchan Arukh, expressing the position of Rashi in Masekhet Kiddushin, maintains that no distinction exists in this regard. In all matters, including acquiring hefker (ownerless items), one may not interfere with the plans of another to take the object. The Rama writes that Halakha follows the first position, that the prohibition applies only to buying and selling. (According to the Arukh Ha-shulchan, this is the conclusion of the Mechaber, as well.)

It would appear, Rav Moshe writes, that the question of interfering with a shiddukh hinges on this debate. Undoubtedly, we cannot tell somebody interested in marrying a certain person that he/she has other available options, just as an executive looking for office space has many options from which to choose. The situation of shiddukhim is similar to the instance of hefker; it is a case where the opportunity in question will likely never present itself again. Therefore, according to the view of Tosefot, which the Rama, and perhaps the Mechaber, adopts, the prohibition of "ani ha-mehapech be-charara" does not apply. It turns out, then, that according to Halakha, someone interested in marrying a certain man or woman may try courting that person, even if this entails disrupting his/her current courtship.

Rav Moshe does, however, add two qualifications relevant to his ruling. Firstly, he notes, many communities of yesteryear have adopted a widespread "cherem" (ban) against breaking engagements. (When and to whom this "cherem" applies lies beyond the scope of our discussion.) Therefore, once a couple has become formally engaged to be married, others may not make attempts to court the man or woman and have the engagement broken. Secondly, Rav Moshe recommends that a "God-fearing person" should observe the stringent ruling of Rashi, according to which the prohibition applies even in the context of shiddukhim, and should therefore not interfere with a relationship. Even here, however, the prohibition takes effect only once the couple decides to get married. The Rama writes that in the situation of buying and selling, third-party interference becomes forbidden only once the buyer and seller agree on a price and the terms of the transactions. During the negotiating stage, however, the prohibition does not yet apply, and a third party may place a higher bid and take possession of the property. Correspondingly, during courtship, when the couple has yet to decide upon marriage, somebody else may, even according to Rashi, make attempts to himself enter into a relationship with the man or woman.

(Based on a shiur by Rav Yissachar Frand)

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Parashat Chayei-Sara begins with Avraham's purchase of Me'arat Ha-machpela as the burial plot for his wife, Sara. The Gemara at the beginning of Masekhet Kiddushin draws an association between the word "kach" employed by Avraham in reference to this transaction (23:13) and the word "yikach" with which the Torah describes the halakhic process of betrothal (Devarim 22:13). The Gemara sees within this association a basis for "kiddushei kesef" – the fact that a woman can be betrothed through her receiving of money or some object of value. The verse in Parashat Chayei-Sara indicates that the term "yikach" refers to the transfer of money, just as Avraham purchased the property of Machpela with money, and hence betrothal, too, can be executed through the transfer of money from the groom to the bride.

This Gemara gives rise to a question as to the nature of this association between monetary transactions and betrothal. If, indeed, Avraham's purchase of Machpela serves as the basis for kiddushei kesef, then perhaps we would expect that the details of these two institutions – transaction and betrothal – should correspond. Meaning, once kiddushei kesef – betrothal with money - evolves from "kinyan kesef" – the purchase of property with money, then perhaps any halakhic detail of one must find expression in the other, as well. Alternatively, one might minimize the ramifications of this association between kiddushei kesef and kinyan kesef. Namely, this association teaches us one thing and one thing only: that one can accomplish betrothal with money. How this happens, the limitations on this mechanism of kiddushin, and other rules have nothing at all in common with the realm of legal acquisition.

This question may likely find expression in a very famous debate between the Sema and the Taz, two commentators on the Choshen Mishpat section of the Shulchan Arukh. The Sema (190:1) writes that when one transfers money to purchase a piece of property, he does not receive legal ownership over it until he pays the full sum. A symbolic payment does not suffice in affording one ownership over a property he purchases; only once he pays the complete value does the land become his. The Taz argues, citing the aforementioned passage in Masekhet Kiddushin as proof. Kiddushei kesef quite obviously does not operate as a quid pro quo transaction (though the Avnei Miluim 29:2 tries to show how it in fact might be an actual exchange). No matter how much money the groom spent on the wedding ring, what he receives is worth far more. Clearly, then, the transfer of an object of value to the bride is meant as a formal act that triggers the betrothal and effectuates the woman's transformation to the status of "arusa" (betrothed). It thus follows, the Taz contends, that kinyan kesef, from which we derive kiddushei kesef, operates similarly. Here, too, the transfer of money is a formal act effectuating a transaction, rather than an actual exchange of money for pr. Therefore, the Taz argues, one takes possession over the acquired property even through a symbolic payment, and he need not pay the full price before we can consider him the owner.

How would the Sema respond to the Taz's proof?

Undoubtedly, the Sema maintained that the Gemara never intended to draw an absolute comparison between kiddushei kesef and kinyan kesef. The "kach"-"yikach" connection reveals merely that kiddushin, like property transfer, can be effected through money. We cannot, however, reach any conclusions as to the precise mechanics of one based on the other. In the Sema's view, kinyan kesef works as a mutual transfer of value: one party gives the money value of a property, and receives that property in return. Kiddushei kesef, by contrast, is ceremonial in nature: it is the act of transferring money that effects the kiddushin, not the exchange of value.

In fact, support may be drawn for the position of the Sema from the halakhot as to how kiddushei kesef must be performed. The Ran in Masekhet Kiddushin cites the view of the Ba'al Ha-ittur, that one cannot perform kiddushin by giving the bride "mechubar le-karka" – an object attached to the ground. The Ba'al Ha-ittur arrives at this ruling based on a principle mentioned in the Talmud equating the laws of kiddushin with the laws of gittin (divorce). He reasons that just as one cannot divorce his wife by giving her a "get" that is attached to the ground, the same restriction must apply to kiddushin.

This view of the Ba'al Ha-ittur clearly demonstrates the disparity between kiddushei kesef and kinyan kesef that we have shown within the position of the Sema. When it comes to kinyan kesef, there are no halakhic guidelines as to the precise manner in which the money must be transferred from buyer to seller. What's important is that the seller receives the payment, so that in exchange, the change of ownership can be executed. Kiddushei kesef, by contrast, constitutes a formal act by which kiddushin is effectuated. Therefore, we might indeed expect to find strict rules governing the contour of this act. Although the Ran and other Rishonim disagree with this position of the Ba'al Ha-ittur, they do so only because they maintain that the connection between kiddushin and gittin applies to the other means of kiddushin (shetar and bi'a), not to kiddushei kesef. In principle, however, they accept the premise of the Ba'al Ha-ittur that Halakha could impose specific guidelines and restrictions onto the process of kiddushei kesef. This would certainly point us in the direction of the Sema, who minimizes the scope of this association drawn between kiddushei kesef and kinyan kesef.

(Based on Rav Asher Zelig Weiss' "Minchat Asher" on Sefer Bereishit)

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Yesterday, we saw that the Gemara at the beginning of Masekhet Kiddushin enlists the account of Avraham's purchase of Me'arat Ha-machpela in Parashat Chayei-Sara as a source for the concept of kiddushei kesef. The Gemara notes that the Torah describes Avraham's payment for the land with the verb "kicha," the same verb used much later in the Torah (Devarim 22:13) to describe the process of betrothal. From here the Gemara deduces that just as land can be legally transferred through the payment of money, so can betrothal be effectuated through the payment of money or some object of value – a method of kiddushin called "kiddushei kesef." (Of course, this has become the universally accepted manner of performing kiddushin).

As we saw yesterday, it is likely that this association between kinyan kesef (acquisition through payment) and kiddushei kesef need not be taken to an extreme; the halakhic details of one do not necessarily apply to the other. Today we will discuss another example of the disparity between the halakhic details of kinyan kesef and kiddushei kesef. In a number of places in Masekhet Kiddushin, the Gemara discusses a case of "mekadesh be-milva" – betrothing a woman by foregoing on a debt she owes the groom. Does this accomplish kiddushin, just as if he actually gave her the money? On the one hand, no formal transfer of money has occurred; on the other hand, the net effect is the same: the woman receives money from the man. The Gemara (Kiddushin 47a) cites two views in this regard, and the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Ishut 5) that such a betrothal is ineffective. However, when it comes to purchasing objects or property, the Rambam rules (Hilkhot Mekhira 7:4) that one indeed effectuates a transfer of ownership in this manner. Meaning, foregoing on a loan in exchange for a piece of property is akin to the actual transfer of money, and the sale takes effect.

Thus, according to the Rambam, the procedure of kinyan kesef does not correspond precisely to that of kiddushei kesef, despite the fact that the Gemara extracts the latter from the former. As we explained yesterday, the Gemara deduced from the "kicha-kicha" association merely that kiddushin can be accomplished through money; this does not establish an outright equation between kinyan kesef and kiddushei kesef.

But why did the Rambam draw this distinction between the two with respect to foregoing on a loan? Why would this method work in the context of kinyan, but not in the realm of kiddushin?

The answer emerges quite clearly from yesterday's discussion. According to the Sema, as we saw, a fundamental difference exists between the process of kiddushei kesef and kinyan kesef. When someone purchases property with money, the transaction is effected through the transfer of the value of that property. By awarding the current owner the value of his property, the buyer acquires ownership. It is of no consequence, therefore, how this value reaches the seller. So long as he receives the value of the land, the transaction can be effected. Therefore, foregoing on a debt can transfer the property, despite the absence of any formal act of payment. Kiddushin, however, is not effected through an equal exchange. After all, how can we ascribe a monetary value to the woman "received" by the groom? Rather, kiddushei kesef operates as a formal act that effectuates the betrothal. This is not an exchange, but rather a formal, ceremonial act. Quite reasonably, then, Halakha demands a physical transfer of money or object of value to the bride, and therefore foregoing on a loan will not suffice.

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The opening verse of Parashat Chayei-Sara tells that Sara lived for one hundred and twenty-seven years. The verse then adds a seemingly superfluous phrase: "shenei chayei Sara" – "these are the years of Sara's life." Rashi somewhat ambiguously comments, "Kulan shavin le-tova" – the years of Sara's life were all equal in goodness. According to Rashi, the clause "shenei chayei Sara" emphasizes that the totality of Sara's life was good.

What exactly does it mean that all of Sara's years were "equal," and why is this point worthy of emphasis?

One explanation is cited in the name of the work, "Nachalat Chamisha." Sara lived most of her life with the anguish of infertility, and it was only in the final thirty-seven years that she enjoyed the pleasures of parenthood. One might have therefore considered only those final thirty-seven years the happy, content period of Sara's life, whereas the first ninety were marked by frustration and shame. In truth, however, "kulan shavin le-tova" – all of Sara's years were years of happiness and joy. The Torah here emphasizes Sara's positive attitude throughout her ordeal of infertility, that she never allowed her inability to conceive to interfere with her vitality and enthusiasm towards life.

Rav Soloveitchik zt"l suggested a different explanation of this passage in Rashi (cited in Abraham Besdin's "Reflections of the Rav," vol. 2, chapter 9). He explains that these comments of Rashi must be seen as a continuation of Rashi's previous comments on this verse. In recording Sara's age when she died, the verse writes that she lived "one hundred years, twenty years, and seven years." Rashi notes the obvious difficulty in this formulation, that rather than stating simply that Sara lived "one hundred and twenty-seven y," the verse instead describes three distinct periods – one hundred years, twenty years, and seven years. Based on the Midrash, Rashi explains that the verse seeks to compare these three periods in Sara's life. She was as sinless at one hundred as she was at twenty, and she was a beautiful at twenty as she was at seven. It is with this in mind that we must read the next passage in Rashi's commentary, that "they were all equal in goodness." Rav Soloveitchik explains that Sara managed throughout her life to retain the unique qualities of each stage. Rashi describes here three phases of life: childhood, youth, and adulthood. Rav Soloveitchik explains:

Rashi describes Sara's years as "equal" because she never fully left behind any stage of her life. As she progressed from one phase to the next, she retained the unique characteristics of the earlier stage and refined it as she continued growing. Even in adulthood, Sara retained the "faith and trustfulness" of her childhood years, as well as the "zealousness, idealism and optimism" of her youth.

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Yesterday we discussed Rashi's comments on the opening verse of Parashat Chayei-Sara. After recording that Sara lived one hundred and twenty-seven years, the Torah adds, seemingly superfluously, "shenei chayei Sara" – "these are the years of Sara." Rashi explains this clause to imply that "kulan shavin le-Torah" – Sara's years were "all equal in goodness."

Today we will present a very simple interpretation of Rashi's comments, taken from Rav Moshe Rosen's "Ohel Moshe." According to Rabbi Rosen, Rashi refers here to Sara's consistency. Sara remained "good" throughout her life, regardless of the changing circumstances. Sara was born in Ur Kasdim, then moved to Charan, and from there to Canaan. While in Canaan she lived in several different locations, and spent time in Egypt and in Gerar. According to the Midrash, she lived during the despotic reign of Nimrod, and she later saw his downfall. The final phrase of this verse, "shenei chayei Sara," points to the consistency of her piety, the fact that it did not hinge on any particular setting or circumstance. Noach, for example, is described before the flood as "righteous" and "blameless," but after the flood, when he finds himself alone in the world, he cannot maintain his spiritual standards and gets himself drunk. Sara, by contrast, remained consistent throughout her life.

We might add that later in the parasha (24:67), Rashi writes that Yitzchak, upon marrying Rivka, noticed that several phenomena that had ceased after Sara's death returned with Rivka's introduction to the family. One of these phenomena was that "so long as Sara was alive, a candle was lit from one Erev Shabbat to the next." Sara would light a candle on Erev Shabbat, and that candle would last until the following Erev Shabbat. This may very well refer to this quality of consistency. Sara's "light" shone all week long; her spirituality was not restricted to any one particular day of the week, it did not depend on any specific set of circumstances. Rather, "kulan shavin le-tova" – throughout her life, Sara remained consistently devoted to the service of God.

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