The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

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by Rav David Silverberg

Parashat Toledot tells the famous story of the blessing Yitzchak intended to bestow upon his older son, Esav, which was instead shrewdly seized by the younger twin, Yaakov. The Torah introduces this story by telling that Yitzchak had lost his vision as he aged (27:1). The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 65:5) provides a fuller, yet mysterious, account of the origins of Yitzchak's blindness: "At the time when Avraham Avinu bound his son upon the altar, the ministering angels cried, and their tears fell into his [Yitzchak's] eyes. They remained there inside his eyes, and once he aged, his vision dimmed."

What is meant by this vision of the angels' tears, and why did they affect his vision? Furthermore, if these tears somehow do impair eyesight, why did this occur only later in Yitzchak's life?

Rav Yechezkel Lifshitz of Platzk, in his "Ha-Midrash Ve-ha'ma'aseh" (1901), explains this Midrash as referring not to Yitzchak's loss of vision in the physical sense, but rather to his misperception, specifically his misperception of his son, Esav. Yitzchak's "blindness" towards his older son originated at the akeida, when he prepared to sacrifice his life in fulfillment of the divine command. This experience left Yitzchak unable to ever again understand the world of falsehood, to the point where "the possibility of speaking deceitfully never entered his mind… It is this that dimmed his vision so that he could not see evil even in Esav's trickery, and it is what caused his eyesight to dim in his old age such that he believed that Esav even deserved the blessing more than Yaakov." Chazal describe in detail the methods Esav employed to deceive his father into thinking of him as pious and law-abiding. The Midrash, as explained by Rav Yechezkel Lifshitz, attributes Yitzchak's inability to see through Esav's antics to the level of absolute truth he achieved at the akeida.

We might add that this could help explain another Midrashic passage associating the blessing to Yaakov and the incident of the akeida. The verse states that after Yitzchak blessed Yaakov and Esav walks in, Yitzchak "shuddered" (27:33). The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 67; Tanchuma Yashan) comments that Yitzchak experienced this "shuddering" twice: when he was bound upon the altar, and now, when Esav enters and Yitzchak realizes his mistake. This second shuddering, the Midrash notes, surpassed the former in severity. The Midrash perhaps refers to the shock that results from a certain realization that drastically changes one's previous outlook and assumptions. When Yitzchak sat bound upon the altar, as the "Ha-Midrash Ve-ha'ma'aseh" explained, he experienced truth in its most pristine form. At that moment, he understood the ultimate meaning of life for what it truly is, unadulterated by the false illusions of happiness and gratification under which most humanity lives. To this, perhaps, the Midrash refers when it speaks of Yitzchak "shuddering." He was shaken from the falsehoods of life, as he was shown the emptiness of that to which human beings ordinarily afford so much importance. Similarly, Yitzchak's second "shuddering" occurs when he realizes how wrong he had been in his assessment of Esav. Yaakov's seizing of the blessings revealed that it is Yaakov, rather than Esav, who was deserving of their father's blessing, and that his assumptions all along had been entirely mistaken.

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Towards the beginning of Parashat Toledot, the Torah tells of Rivka's inability to conceive and Yitzchak's prayers on her behalf: "Va-yetar Yitzchak le'Hashem le-nokhach ishto" (25:21). Chazal, cited by Rashi, interpret this phrase to mean that Yitzchak prayed "opposite his wife," meaning, he prayed in one corner while she prayed in the other. Meaning, Yitzchak and Rivka prayed together. However, this verse continues by telling that "va-yei'ater lo Hashem" – God answered "his" prayers. This would imply, of course, that God answered Yitzchak's prayer. But if both Yitzchak and Rivka prayed, why did God answer only Yitzchak's prayer? The Gemara (Yevamot 64a) explains, "The prayer of a tzadik who is the son of a tzadik is not the same as the prayer of a tzadik who is the son of a wicked person." The prayers of Yitzchak, who was himself righteous and whose parents were righteous, were more effective than those of Rivka, who was herself righteous but came from a family of idolaters. The merits of one's parents and ancestors assists him in his prayers, such that one who comes from pious lineage has an advantage over one who does not.

The practical ramifications of this Gemara are debated by the halakhic authorities. The Taz (O.C. 53:3) cites two earlier authorities – the Maharshal, and the Taz's father-in-law, the Bach – as establishing on the basis of this Gemara that a congregation should attempt to appoint as a shaliach tzibur specifically someone whose parents were righteous. Just as Yitzchak's prayers were more effective than his wife's because of his illustrious parents, so should we always attempt to have our prayers led by the son of righteous people. The Taz, however, argues, claiming "Rachamana liba bai" – the Almighty is interested primarily in people's hearts. What counts most is sincerity and concentration, and family background therefore should not be a factor in selecting a shaliach tzibur.

On what basis did the Taz arrive at this ruling? And how does he reconcile his position with the aforementioned passage in Masekhet Yevamot?

Rav Barukh Ha-levi Epstein, in his "Torah Temima," suggests that the Taz bases his position on a different Gemara, in Masekhet Ta'anit (25b). The Gemara there tells a fascinating story of a drought that struck the Land of Israel, and the great Rabbi Eliezer led a prayer service for rain. But his prayers went unanswered, and no rain fell. Then Rabbi Akiva (originally a student of Rabbi Eliezer) led the prayer service, and rain began falling. This naturally led people to question Rabbi Eliezer's greatness in comparison with Rabbi Akiva. A heavenly voice declared, "Not because he is greater than he – but rather, because he [Rabbi Akiva] acts with forbearance, whereas he [Rabbi Eliezer] does not act with forbearance." Significantly, Rabbi Akiva, the Gemara elsewhere tells, descended from converts. What this story thus reveals, the Torah Temima writes, is that personal character outweighs family background with respect to credentials as a ba'al tefila. We thus have an important qualification on the rule established in Yevamot, that the child of righteous parents is more successful in prayer. Namely, this is not the case if the one from a less auspicious family is kinder and more indulgent than the child of tzadikim. Therefore, the Torah Temima writes, the Taz felt that congregations should focus their attention on character rather than family background in their search for a suitable shaliach tzibur.

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The final verse of Parashat Toledot tells of Esav's marriage to Yishmael's daughter, Machalat. The Talmud Yerushalmi in Masekhet Bikkurim (3:3) notes that as we know from Parashat Vayishlach (36:3), Machalat's name was really Bosmat. However, the Torah refers to her here as "Machalat" to allude to "mechila" – forgiveness. On the day of his wedding, all of Esav's sins were atoned. The Yerushalmi thus cites this verse as a source for the well-known concept that a bride and groom are forgiven for all their sins on their wedding day. The Yerushalmi mentions that a person earns atonement also when he is appointed to a prestigious leadership position.

One reason given for this atonement, as suggested by Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg in his "Yalkut Yehuda," is that in such instances, the individual in question begins sharing his fate with others. Once a person gets married, anything that happens to him now directly impacts upon his spouse. He is therefore no longer held accountable for awrongdoing committed during his single years, and the couple now begins a "joint account" which will determine their shared fate. The same applies to a public leader, whose welfare will have a direct effect on his constituents.

The Beit Shemuel, the famous commentator to the Even Ha-ezer section of the Shulchan Arukh (in 61), brings this Yerushalmi (in the name of the Maharam Mintz) as one of two possible reasons for the widespread custom for a bride and groom to fast on their wedding day. The wedding day for them is a "Yom Kippur" of sorts, and therefore, as the Rama there records, the custom evolved for the couple to observe a fast day as part of their process of atonement. The second reason cited by the Beit Shemuel is the concern that the bride and groom might overindulge on their wedding day to such an extent that their mental faculties might be hampered. Since Halakha requires a clear, conscious decision on the part of the bride and groom for the marriage to be formally valid, the practice developed that the couple refrain from eating altogether on the day of the wedding.

These two different reasons might yield practical ramifications, as mentioned by several halakhic authorities. (The sources cited here are taken from Rav Matis Blum's "Torah La-da'at," vol. 1, pp. 91-93). Very often, particularly in the summertime, the chupa is held and completed well before nightfall. Must the bride and groom continue fasting even after the chupa, until dark? According to the first reason, that the custom involves a quasi-"Yom Kippur" for the bride and groom, then the fast would presumably last until dark, just as all fast days do. If, however, the fast is intended merely to preserve the couple's focus and attention, then it would naturally last only until after the wedding ceremony itself. This distinction would apply in the converse when dealing with nighttime weddings in the winter months, which generally begin well after nightfall. According to the first reason, the bride and groom may eat after dark, despite the fact that the ceremony has not even taken place. The second reason, of course, would require the couple to continue fasting until the ceremony.

Finally, these two reasons might affect a different issue entirely: cases of people assuming positions of leadership. Recall that the Yerushalmi included such people together with a bride and groom as those whose sins are forgiven. Therefore, if this Yerushalmi gives rise to the practice of fasting on one's wedding day, then perhaps somebody should fast on the day he assumes a leadership position, such as a rabbinical post.

Obviously, however, no such practice exists. The Sedei Chemed (Ma'arekhet Chatan Ve-kalla, end of 4) claims that the reason why the custom to fast developed only with regard to a bride and groom involves a difference he detects between the Talmud Bavli and the Talmud Yerushalmi regarding this "atonement." The Gemara in the Talmud Bavli – Masekhet Yevamot (63b) – writes that when a man marries, his sins are "mitpakekin." From Rashi's translation of this term ("nistamim"), it appears, the Sedei Chemed claims, that one's sins are not automatically forgiven when he marries. Rather, when one marries he is given a unique opportunity for atonement if he repents. Unlike the Yerushalmi, which speaks of automatic forgiveness, the Bavli claims that a groom (and, presumably, a bride) is forgiven on his wedding day specifically if he undergoes a process of teshuva. The common practice for a couple to fast on their wedding day follows this view of the Bavli, which requires teshuva for this atonement to take place. It thus turns out that we do not accept the position of the Yerushalmi, and therefore people assigned to leadership posts do not fast on the day they begin their duty.

Tomorrow we will iy"H discuss some practical halakhot relevant to the fast observed by a bride and groom on their wedding day.

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Yesterday, we saw that the final verse of Parashat Toledot tells of Esav's marriage to a woman named Bosmat, whom the Torah calls in this verse "Machalat." We mentioned that the Yerushalmi sees this name "Machalat" as an allusion to the "mechila" (forgiveness) Esav achieved when he married Bosmat, and from here Chazal derive the concept that one's sins are forgiven on his wedding day. According to some views, this forms the basis of the practice that a bride and groom fast on their wedding day. Others, however, maintain that this fast has nothing to do with atonement, but rather stems from the concern that the bride and groom might overindulge and thus lose the mental focus required for the wedding ceremony. Yesterday we discussed several practical ramifications of this issue.

Before proceeding to the practical halakhot concerning this fast, we will first add two more ramifications of this question. The first has no practical application today, but did centuries ago when it was customary for fathers to arrange betrothals for their daughters during childhood. According to Jewish law, a minor cannot perform betrothal. However, a girl can become betrothed even during childhood if her father performs the betrothal on her behalf, such as by accepting the ring from the groom. If kiddushin (betrothal) is performed in this way, must the girl or her father fast on the day of the kiddushin? If this fast has to do with atonement, then the custom would not apply; the father does not fast because he is not the one earning atonement, and we cannot expect the girl to fast, given the fact that she is under the age of bat-mitzva. If, however, this fast is observed to ensure the couple's focus and attention, then perhaps the father in such a case would have to refrain from eating that day until the betrothal.

Another ramification of this issue applied in times when it was customary to perform "yibum." According to Torah law, a childless widow may not remarry after her husband's death until she performs either "yibum" – meaning, she marries the deceased's brother – or "chalitza" – a formal ceremony permitting her to remarry. Today, it has become widespread that chalitza, rather than yibum, is performed to allow the widow to marry. Generations ago, however, some communities in fact had the practice that the deceased's brother would marry his widowed sister-in-law. Would this couple have to fast on their wedding day? The Peri Megadim (Mishbetzot Zahav 573) writes that if we accept the first reason, that one fasts on his wedding day to achieve atonement, then a situation of yibum would be no different. If, however, we accept the second reason, that the fast helps preserve the proper frame of mind, then a couple performing yibum would be exempted from the fast. There is a unique halakha concerning yibum that the marriage takes effect even if the man and woman have no intention whatsoever for the marriage to be consummated. Therefore, we would not forbid the couple in this case from eating, since the marriage will be valid even if they overindulge and their mental faculties are hampered.

The Arukh Ha-shulchan (E.H. 61:21) rules that the second explanation for the custom, that it evolves from the concern of overindulgence, is accepted as authoritative. Therefore, no matter how early in the day the wedding ceremony takes place, the bride and groom may eat immediately after the chupa. Conversely, the Arukh Ha-shulchan writes, no matter how long after dark the ceremony takes place, the bride and groom may not eat until after the chupa. The Chokhmat Adam (129:2), however, claims that when the wedding ceremony takes place an hour or two after dark, the bride and groom may rely on the first reason and eat even before the ceremony. He argues that the custom to fast never intended for this fast to be more stringent than ordinary fasts, which end at nightfall, and therefore we should not require the bride and groom to fast long after dark.

The Arukh Ha-shulchan there adds that if the bride or groom finds it exceedingly difficult to fast, he/she need not fast, since this fast is required only by force of custom, as opposed to strict Halakha. They must, how, ensure not to drink intoxicating beverages on the wedding day.

Do a bride and groom fast if they get married on a festive day, when fasting is normally forbidden? According to some views, a couple does not fast on any day when tachanun is omitted, including Rosh Chodesh, the entire month of Nissan, and so on. According to other views, however, they must fast even if tachanun is omitted, unless fasting is forbidden on that day by Halakha (as opposed to custom). This view would require a couple to fast on Rosh Chodesh, during the month of Nissan, on Lag Ba-omer, and the first two weeks of Sivan. Even according to this position, however, a couple would not fast if the wedding takes place during Chanukah. (When my wife and I got married on Lag Ba-omer, 5759, the Rosh Yeshiva, Rav Aharon Lichtenstein shlit"a, instructed us to fast.)

(Sources taken from Rav Matis Blum's "Torah La-da'at," vol. 1, pp. 91-93)

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Rashi, towards the beginning of his commentary to Parashat Toledot, tells, based on the Midrash, that upon Yitzchak's birth, the "leitzanei ha-dor," the cynics of the time, claimed that Yitzchak resulted from Avimelekh's abduction of Sara (recorded in chapter 20), and was not the son of Avraham. In response to these aspersions, God ensured that Yitzchak would physically resemble Avraham, such that it would be clear that at one hundred years old, Avraham begot a son. The opening verse of Parashat Toledot therefore emphasizes, "Avraham fathered Yitzchak," stressing the undeniable reality that Yitzchak was Avraham's son.

At first glance, these "cynics" simply denied the possibility that at such an old age and after so many years of infertility, Avraham and Sara could have a child together. They therefore found a different explanation for the birth of Yitzchak, which did not have to accept the premise that Avraham and Sara bore a child.

Rav Soloveitchik, however, explained this Midrash differently ("Five Addresses," 3:3). The cynics denied not necessarily the biological reality of a son born to Avraham and Sara, but rather the possibility of an ideological and spiritual heir to Avraham. Though Avraham made considerable inroads in disseminating his ideology of ethical monotheism and dispelling the pagan myths of his time, there remained many who scoffed and jeered at Avraham's innovations, and saw him as merely a passing trend. To them it seemed inconceivable that Avraham could leave any significant legacy. It is impossible, they argued, that "Avraham fathered Yitzchak," that Avraham would have a son who would continue his work and perpetuate his heritage. Rather, any son of Avraham must be the son of Avimelekh, he will undoubtedly follow the popular trends of the time rather than retain his commitment to the "outdated" ideas of his father. The Rav writes:

In applying the skepticism concerning Yitzchak to a parallel phenomenon in modern times, Rav Soloveitchik added that in the scoffers' view, "it is impossible to pass on Abraham's outlook, the mitzvot of Abraham, his statutes and laws, to the modern generation, to young Isaac who fights with a rifle, works in laboratories and thinks in modern categories of thought."

Rav Soloveitchik detects this theme later in the parasha, as well, in the story of Yitzchak's quarrels with the Pelishtim. The Torah (26:18) tells that after Avraham's death, the Pelishtim filled with dirt the wells of water he had dug during his lifetime, and Yitzchak, after his father's death, dug those same wells again. Twice the Pelishtim fought with Yitzchak over his wells, and only the third time around did he dig without contention. Rav Soloveitchik viewed this event, too, as symbolic of the cynicism surrounding Avraham's teachings and ideas. The "filling of the wells" represents the Pelishtim's mistaken assumption "that with Abraham's death his work was at an end and Isaac would pay no attention to wells dug by his father," to the spiritual approach he preached and practiced. But Yitzchak continued digging his father's wells. He committed himself to ensuring that his father's legacy would continue, rather than collect dust in the annals of history.

Rav Soloveitchik depicts the astonishing, modern-day Yitzchak as follows:

The scoffers of Avraham's day and Yitzchak's resemblance to his father set a precedent that has repeated itself innumerable times ever since. Whenever it has appeared as though "Yitzchak," the newer generation, has once and for all shaken itself free of its ancestry and tradition, it turns out that, indeed, "Avraham fathered Yitzchak" – the new generation continues following the path of Avraham and his teachings.

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Parashat Toledot tells of Yitzchak's experiences living among the Pelishtim. Having settled in Gerar among the Pelishtim to escape the famine that ravaged most of the region, Yitzchak, much to the local population's astonishment, engages in highly successful agricultural pursuits: "Yitzchak sowed in that land and reaped a hundredfold the same year" (26:12). The Torah tells that even after that successful crop, Yitzchak continued increasing his wealth: "The man grew richer and richer until he was very wealthy."

Interestingly, in this verse, the Torah suddenly changes its manner of referring to Yitzchak. Throughout this entire narrative, it mentions Yitzchak by name. In this verse, however, the Torah refers to him as "the man" ("ha-ish"). Elsewhere in Chumash we find this pattern repeated. In next week's parasha, Parashat Vayeitzei, we read of Yaakov's accumulation of wealth while working for his father-in-law, Lavan. Here, too, the Torah consistently refers to Yaakov by name, until it describes his success and fortune: "The man grew exceedingly prosperous, and came to own large flocks, maidservants… " (30:43). Suddenly, the Torah chooses to omit Yaakov's name and refer to him instead as "the man." A third instance occurs in Parashat Bo, amidst the story of the Exodus, where we are told, "also Moshe the man ['ha-ish Moshe'] was much esteemed in the land of Egypt, among Pharaoh's courtiers and among the people" (Shemot 11:3). In all these three verses, a Biblical character who until now had been always mentioned by name is suddenly called simply, "the man." True, in the third instance Moshe is called "the man Moshe," but that is because the immediately preceding verse does not speak about Moshe. Therefore, this verse could not say merely, "the man," and had to specify, "the man Moshe." How are we to understand this phenomenon?

Rav Yaakov Yisrael Luria (rabbi of the Slonim community in Beitar), in his work, "Netivei Yeshurun," suggests a very simple explanation. The Torah seeks to emphasize that in all three instances, the power, wealth and prestige achieved by the individual in question did not affect his "ish" – the simple man within him. Often, people who rise to new heights of honor and greatness undergo a drastic change of character, to the point where they neglect basic, simple rules of conduct. In describing the ascent to greatness of Yitzchak, Yaakov and Moshe, the Torah underscores the fact that the "menstch" within them remained fully intact despite their newfound prestige and stature. Even as they achieve fame and notoriety, these great men never lost sight of the "simple things," and each remained an "ish" throughout his entire life.

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Towards the beginniof Parashat Toledot, we read of the birth of Yitzchak's and Rivka's twin boys – Esav and Yaakov. The Torah tells that Rivka, unaware of the fact that she had conceived twins, was surprised by the amount of movement she felt inside her womb. She went to "seek God" and was told that she was carrying two babies.

Today, of course, multiple fetuses are discovered via ultrasound already early in the pregnancy, and therefore all appropriate precautions and preparations for a multiple birth can be taken care of early on. Before the advent of this technology, however, such as in the time of Yitzchak and Rivka, couples expecting twins were unaware of the presence of twins until the birth. This gave rise to an interesting halakhic question addressed in the work "Pirchei Eliyahu." A case is recorded there of an expectant mother who hired a midwife to deliver her child for a given fee. The midwife came for the birth and, lo and behold, the woman delivered twins. The midwife claimed that had she known that she would have to deliver two babies, she would have charged double the rate, and she therefore demanded twice the agreed upon fee. The mother, of course, argued that she cannot be expected to pay the midwife more than the price they had agreed upon.

The "Pirchei Eliyahu" ruled that since the mother and midwife made no specific conditions in case of a multiple birth, they by default follow the common practice of that locale. Since in that region midwives did not charge more money for twin births, this midwife, in the absence of an explicit stipulation otherwise, cannot demand double wages for the double birth.

Rav Elyakim Dvorkes, in his "Bi-shvilei Ha-parasha," advances another reason why the mother would not have to pay a double fee in such a case. The Shulchan Arukh, in Choshen Mishpat 308, discusses the rights of a person who rents an animal for the explicitly stated purpose of transportation. Halakha outlines very specifically how much weight the renter may place on the animal's back, and generally this will depend on the precise nature of the agreement between the renter and the owner. The renter may not have the animal carry a heavier weight than he can assume the owner would have allowed based on the terms of the agreement. One rule in the Shulchan Arukh establishes that if they explicitly agreed that the animal is rented for a woman rider, then the renter may allow any woman to ride the animal, regardless of the woman's weight. The Shulchan Arukh adds, "even a pregnant or nursing woman." Why does he mention that a nursing mother may ride the animal? Unlike pregnant women, nursing women are generally no heavier than normal women. Why, then, does the Shulchan Arukh make a point of permitting the renter to allow a nursing mother to ride the animal? The Be'er Ha-gola there explains that the Shulchan Arukh means that a nursing mother may carry her child with her as she rides the animal. Although the terms of the agreement did not allow for multiple riders, once the owner agreed to allow "a woman" ride the animal, this implicitly includes a woman who must carry her baby with her.

What this perhaps shows, Rav Dvorkes contends, is that when a person commits to provide a certain service without specifying any limitations, then even an additional body to work with falls under the terms of the contract. The owner of an animal who leases it for "a woman" sanctions its use by any woman, even if she is obese or if she must nurse a baby as she travels. Similarly, a midwife who agrees to tend to a mother's birth commits herself to work with the woman regardless of the length or complexity of the labor, and even if it turns out to be a multiple birth.

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