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The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Surf A Little Torah
PARASHAT TOLEDOT By David Silverberg Parashat Toledot tells of Yaakov's "purchase" of the birthright from his older twin, Esav. We read that Esav returns home from a hunt and asks Yaakov to share with him some of the stew he was preparing; Yaakov agrees on condition that Esav sells his birthright, and Esav consents. Many writers addressed the obvious question of whether Yaakov was justified in initiating this peculiar "transaction." At first glance, it appears that Yaakov capitalized on Esav's desperate hunger to seize the mantle of family leadership. How might we explain Yaakov's conduct? Among the many approaches taken in explaining this episode is that of the Ran, in his Derashot (2). The Ran builds upon the Gemara's comment (Masekhet Bava Batra 16b) that this event occurred on the day of Avraham's death. Yaakov cooked lentils (see 25:34 – "nezid adashim"), a food traditionally associated with mourning, in fulfillment of the halakha that after a relative's burial the mourners should be provided with food, rather than partaking of their own food. But as Yaakov involved himself in his family's needs brought about by Avraham's passing, Esav went about his business as usual. The ish sadeh ("man of the field" – 25:27), as he was described earlier, spent that day "in the field" (25:29), just as he spent most other days. And upon returning home, rather than concerning himself with the needs of his bereaved father, he asks Yaakov to serve him the lentils he was busy preparing for the mourners. What all this reflected, the Ran explains, is Esav's indifference towards, and disengagement from, his family background. He took no interest in the legacy of his grandfather, and therefore took no part in the family's bereavement, not even willing to disrupt his daily routine on the day of the burial. Seeing Esav's attitude, Yaakov demanded that Esav transfer to him the family birthright, the position of family leadership and of primary successor to his father and grandfather. Yaakov's request came as a natural response to Esav's indifference towards Avraham's passing, which reflected his willful detachment from the family legacy, which he thus no longer deserved to represent. On this basis the Ran explains Esav's response to Yaakov's offer: "Behold, I am going to die; why do I need the birthright?" (25:32). According to the Ran, Esav refers here not to actual death, but rather to the dangerous hunting activities in which he was engaged. (The Radak and Rashbam present this interpretation, as well.) He tells Yaakov, "I spend my days in the fields; I have chosen a fundamentally different lifestyle than that taught by my family heritage." He thus naturally exclaims, "Why do I need the birthright?" Why, he rhetorically asks, should he seek the position of family leader and primary inheritor of God's blessing to Avraham and Yitzchak, if he takes no interest in the teachings and values of this legacy? Thus, in the Ran's view, Yaakov did not take unfair advantage of his brother to seize the birthright. The transfer of this privilege occurred naturally, as a result of the contrast between Yaakov's strong sense of fealty to his father and grandfather, and Esav's utter disregard for his family background. Of course, this approach gives rise to the question of why the Torah concealed the critical information concerning the context of this transaction. According to the Ran's interpretation, the reader cannot begin to understand this narrative without knowing that this episode took place on the day of Avraham's funeral. Why does the Torah withhold this information from us, giving the impression that Yaakov abused his brother by denying him food until he relinquished his birthright privileges? Unfortunately, the Ran does not address this question. ****** The opening section of Parashat Toledot tells of Rivka's long-awaited conception and the difficult pregnancy she experienced. The Torah describes, "Va-yitrotzetzu ha-banim be-kirba" – "the children wrestled inside her" (25:22). The halakhic work Yam Shel Shelomo (Yevamot 9:10) derives from this verse – "Va-yitrotzetzu ha-banim be-kirba" – that as far as Halakha is considered, the noun ben ("child") can be ascribed even to a fetus, and thus a man or woman is considered a parent already at the time of conception. The fact that the Torah refers to Rivka's still unborn twins as banim demonstrates that a fetus can be described as a "child." The halakhic ramification of this principle is a situation of one who takes a neder (vow) that he will undertake a certain action when he "has a child." The Yam Shel Shelomo rules that a man who utters such a neder must comply with the terms of the vow once his wife conceives, even before the birth, since already at that point he "has a child." Rav Dov Bear Treivish (a leading rabbinic figure in Vilna during the time of the Vilna Gaon), in his Revid Ha-zahav, refutes the Yam Shel Shelomo's proof from this verse based on a comment by Ibn Ezra in Parashat Ki-Teitzei. The Torah (Devarim 22:8) requires that one who builds a home with an accessible flat roof must build a ma'akeh (parapet) around the roof, so as to prevent falling. In explaining this prohibition, the Torah writes, "and you shall not place bloodguilt upon your house, when the nofel ['faller'] falls from it." Ibn Ezra notes the obvious difficulty in this phraseology, in that the Torah refers to a potential "faller" with the term nofel, even though the person has not yet fallen. Ibn Ezra resolves this anomaly by establishing that the Torah will often refer to people and places based on their future description, and thus a person who might potentially fall in the future is called already now a nofel. He cites numerous examples to support his claim, including the common expression used in reference to capital punishment, "yumat ha-met" – "the dead person shall be put to death." Obviously, the perpetrator cannot be described as "dead" until after he is executed; nevertheless, the Torah refers to him as met even before the execution, based upon future developments. Among the examples cited by Ibn Ezra is this verse in Parashat Toledot – "Va-yitrotzetzu ha-banim be-kirba." Though he does not elaborate, Ibn Ezra clearly means that the Torah's reference to Yaakov and Esav as "children" even before their birth simply follows the Torah's normal rules of terminology, which permit describing a person based on his future condition. Accordingly, the Revid Ha-zahav writes, this description provides no proof that fetuses have the halakhic status of "children." The Revid Ha-zahav then proceeds to bring proof that to the contrary, Halakha does not consider fetuses "children." Towards the end of Parashat Ki-Teitzei (Devarim 25:5), the Torah introduces the mitzva of yibum, requiring one to marry his brother's widow in a case where "bein ein lo" – the deceased brother had no children. The Gemara (Yevamot 35b) cites a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish as to whether the obligation applies if the brother died without children but when his wife was pregnant. The Revid Ha-zahav notes that even Reish Lakish, who maintains that a fetus absolves the widow and her brother-in-law from the yibum obligation, does so only because the deceased brother will be considered as having a child once a healthy baby is delivered. Reish Lakish does not believe that the fetus is deemed a "child" and thus cancels the obligation of yibum; rather, he holds that once the infant is born and can be presumed healthy, the deceased is brother has had a child, rendering yibum inapplicable. It thus emerges that neither Rabbi Yochanan nor Reish Lakish held that Halakha affords the status of "child" to a fetus. Had they held such a view, then without question the presence of a fetus would cancel the obligation of yibum immediately and intrinsically, irrespective of the anticipation of a successful delivery. ****** Yesterday, we discussed the inference made by the Maharshal, in Yam Shel Shelomo (Yevamot 9:10), from the verse in Parashat Toledot (25:22), "Va-yitrotzetzu ha-banim be-kirba" –"the children [referring to Esav and Yaakov in their mother's womb] wrestled inside her." The Maharshal deduced from this verse that a fetus before birth can be considered the "child" of the expectant mother and father, and therefore if one makes a formal pledge to perform a certain act when "has a child," it becomes binding the moment his wife conceives. As we saw, the Revid Ha-zahav disagrees, noting (on the basis of Ibn Ezra's comments to Devarim 22:8) that the Torah perhaps refers to the fetuses as banim because of their anticipated future condition. This issue might affect another practical halakhic question, as well. Rav Avraham Levkovitz, in his annotation to the Revid Ha-zahav, mentions that the Hagahot Sha'ar He-chadash (a collection of notes on the Sefer Ha-ittur) cites a Karaitic authority who maintained that the Torah forbids slaughtering a pregnant animal (in opposition to the traditional view, which allows doing so). One who slaughters a pregnant animal effectively slaughters the fetus, as well, and thus, according to this Karaitic writer, violates the prohibition of oto ve-et beno – slaughtering an animal and its young on the same day (Vayikra 22:28). Such a ruling, of course, presumes that a fetus is already considered by Halakha the "child" of the parent animal. The Karaitic writer – like, le-havdil, the Maharshal – drew support for this assumption from our verse in Parashat Toledot, which speaks of Rivka's two fetuses as banim. The Hagahot Sha'ar He-chadash refutes this reasoning, by noting that, as mentioned earlier, the Torah very likely employs the term banim on the basis of their later status. (Rav Levkovitz notes that the Karaite's deductive reasoning may be flawed in any event, because it assumes that the prohibition of oto ve-et beno would apply to this case despite the fact that actual shechita is performed only on the mother animal. Some Acharonim indicate that one violates oto ve-et beno only by performing physical shechita on both animals.) Rav Shemuel Baruch Deutsch, in his Birkat Kohen, advances an intriguing theory, drawing a distinction in this regard between a father and mother. This distinction emerges from Rashi's comments in Masekhet Megila (13a), where the Gemara discusses the verse in Megilat Ester (2:7) that introduces Ester and twice makes mention of the fact that she had lost both parents. The Gemara explains this verse to mean that Ester's father died immediately upon her conception, and her mother died just after her birth. Thus, the first reference to the loss of her parents – "ki ein la av va-eim" – should be read to mean, "She never had a father or mother." Rashi comments, "When her mother conceived her father died – and thus she did not have a father from the moment he could have been called a father; and when her mother delivered her she died – and she was not able to be considered a mother." Rashi's formulation strongly suggests that a man is worthy of being called "father" the moment his wife conceives, whereas a woman earns the description "mother" only once she gives birth. Rav Deutsch notes that the legendary Rav Yosef Engel, in his Beit Ha-otzar, likewise suggests this distinction. It remains unclear, however, why Halakha would distinguish between father and mother in this regard. ****** The latter section of Parashat Toledot tells the famous story of Yitzchak's blessings intended for Esav but deviously seized by Yaakov. We read that Yitzchak instructs Esav to hunt game and prepare for him a meat meal, "so that my soul will bless you before I die" (27:4). Yitzchak here implies that his being served a meat meal was necessary for him to confer his blessing upon his son. The Maharam of Rutenberg (responsa, 345) and the Shibolei Ha-leket (1:23) explain that a feeling of joy and gratification is a necessary prerequisite for conferring a blessing, and on this basis they explain the practice in their communities that a kohen would not participate in the birkat kohanim blessing during his period of mourning. The sense of loss and anguish experienced during mourning disqualifies a kohen from blessing the congregation. By the same token, the Mordekhai, cited by the Rema (O.C. 128:44), maintains that an unmarried kohen does not participate in birkat kohanim, since a man cannot be truly considered "happy" without a wife. This issue is subject to considerable controversy and confusion. The Radbaz (responsa, 1:1) strongly denounces the practice documented by the aforementioned Rishonim. Interestingly enough, he bases his objection on a philosophical argument. The kohanim, he contends, are merely agents commissioned by the Almighty to confer His blessing. God, and only God, is the true source of this blessing to the congregation, and therefore it makes no difference whether the kohanim confer this blessing with an emotion of exuberant joy or amidst feelings of torment and anguish. Of course, this raises the question of why Yitzchak's situation was different, requiring that he attain a state of gratification before conferring his blessing to his son.
In any event, the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 128:43) rules that during
the first week of mourning, a kohen should leave the synagogue before the
kohanim are called for birkat kohanim. The Rema, however, records the practice
in his region ( A kohen who – Heaven forbid – finds himself in this situation should consult a competent halakhic authority for guidance. As for unmarried kohanim, the Rema, as mentioned, records the view of the Mordekhai that they do not participate in birkat kohanim, but adds that the widespread practice is for unmarried kohanim to indeed recite the blessing. The Mishna Berura explains that although an unmarried kohen cannot be said to be in a state of true joy, nevertheless, unlike a mourner, he cannot be said to experience sadness, or anguish, which would disqualify him for birkat kohanim. ******* Parashat Toledot tells of the birth of Esav and Yaakov. Esav, we are told, was born "admoni," which is generally interpreted to mean "red." (See Chizkuni, however, who translates the word differently.) The Radak writes that although all newborns have a somewhat reddish color, Esav was colored an unusually dark shade of red. The Da'at Zekeinim Mi-ba'alei Ha-Tosefot (as well Peirush Rabotenu Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot) cite from the Midrash that Yitzchak looked at Esav's unusual coloring and attributed it to a medical condition, to the fact that "his blood has not yet been fully absorbed." He therefore decided not to circumcise Esav, concerned of the procedure's effects on the child who was thought to be ill. Indeed, the Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (134a) records that Rabbi Natan once noticed the reddish color of a newborn and recommended that he not be circumcised until the color fades, because until then the blood has not been fully absorbed within the body. Yitzchak, too, did not perform the mila on the eighth day, and then decided that if Esav was not circumcised at this age, he might as well delay the circumcision until he reaches age thirteen, the age at which Yishmael underwent circumcision. However, when Esav turned thirteen, he refused to be circumcised, and thus remained uncircumcised his entire life. The Chatam Sofer likewise mentions that Esav did not undergo circumcision on his eighth day due to his father's medical concerns.
Rav Tzadok Ha-kohen of Support for Rav Tzadok's view may be brought from a famous Midrashic passage (Bereishit Rabba 76:9) that criticizes Yaakov for hiding his daughter, Dina, when he reunites with Esav so that Esav would not seek her hand in marriage. The Midrash writes that God responded, as it were, to Yaakov's decision by declaring, "You did not want to marry her off to a circumcised person – behold, she will be married to an uncircumcised person!" (The "uncircumcised person," of course, refers to Shekhem, who rapes Dina soon after Yaakov's reunion with Esav.) God explicitly refers to Esav as a mahul, a circumcised person, seemingly supporting Rav Tzadok's contention. One might respond, however, that mahul does not necessarily refer to circumcision. The Mishna in Masekhet Nedarim (31b) states that if one utters a neder (vow) that he will not derive benefit from mehulim – circumcised people – he may not derive benefit from any Jews, including those who have not been circumcised. Conversely, he may derive benefit from gentiles, even those who have undergone circumcision. The Mishna explains that mahul in the vernacular is usually synonymous with "Jew," and does not refer specifically to one who received a berit mila. Accordingly, we might explain the statement in the Mishna as referring to a Jewish man as opposed to a non-Jewish man, and it thus does not necessarily prove that Esav was circumcised. (Taken from Rav Moshe Fried's Ateret Shalom) ******* In the opening section of Parashat Toledot, we read of the transfer of the birthright from Esav to Yaakov, which Yaakov demanded in response to Esav's request that he feed him some of the food he was preparing. The Torah tells that Esav returned from the field and said to Yaakov, "Hal'iteini na" – "please pour for me" some of the food. Rashi explains the word hal'iteini as referring to the pouring of large amounts of food directly into someone else's mouth. He cites a Mishna in Masekhet Shabbat (155b) which employs this term in reference to feeding a camel. As we discussed in our S.A.L.T. series last year (available in the S.A.L.T. archives), several writers detected in this terminology an expression of Esav's lack of etiquette, dignity and self-respect. The word hal'iteini means not simply "pour for me," but probably a rough equivalent to "dump for me" or "throw over here," and it thus reflects Esav's unrefined and boorish character. Rav Moshe Leib Shachor, in his Avnei Shoham, notes that if, indeed, hal'iteini signifies Esav's incivility and coarse nature, then the word that immediately follows – "na," or "please" – seems wholly inconsistent with the tenor of Esav's remarks. If Esav really does speak so boorishly, why does he insert the word "please"? What more, later in the parasha, we find that Yaakov's use of this term while disguising as Esav led Yitzchak to suspect that he was not Yaakov. Commenting on Yitzchak's famous declaration, "The voice is the voice of Yaakov, but the hands are the hands of Esav" (27:22), Rashi explains that Yaakov had spoken politely to his father, kindly asking, "Please, go and sit and partake of my hunt" (27:19). Esav, however, when he returns from his hunt, shouts, "Get up, my father" (27:21), without saying, "please." It appears, then, that Esav was not accustomed to refined, courteous speech. How, then, do we account for the word na – "please" – in his request for food from Yaakov? Rav Shachor answers by suggesting a most novel interpretation of this verse. In Sefer Shemot (12:9), the Torah writes, "al tokhelu mimenu na" – one may not partake of the korban pesach (paschal offering) when it is na, which means not fully roasted. Accordingly, Rav Shachor suggests, we might interpret the word na here in Parashat Toledot as likewise referring to food that has not yet been fully cooked. Esav does not ask, "Please pour me," but rather "pour it to me half-cooked." The word na specifically emphasizes Esav's impatience and insistence that he be fed immediately, without waiting for the stew to fully cook, and it is thus entirely consistent with the connotation of the term hal'iteini. This also explains the final words in Esav's request – "ki ayeif anokhi" ("for I am weary"). Esav tells Yaakov to serve him the food as is, without letting it finish cooking, because he was famished and could not wait any longer. Rav Shachor adds that this may also explain why Esav asks Yaakov to serve him "min ha-adom ha-adom ha-zeh" – "from this red, red stuff." Why does he emphasize the food's color? Rav Shachor explains that Yaakov was preparing red lentils (see 25:34), whose red color gradually fades over the course of cooking. Esav asked that Yaakov give him the lentils in their current state, even before their redness fades, rather than waiting until they are fully cooked. ****** Commenting on the first verse of Parashat Toledot, Rashi, citing from Chazal (Midrash Tanchuma; Bava Metzia 87a), writes that the leitzanei ha-dor – the "cynics" of the time – doubted Yitzchak's miraculous birth at his father's advanced age. Capitalizing on the chronological proximity between Sara's conception and her abduction by Avimelekh in Gerar, these leitzanim scornfully attributed the pregnancy to the night Sara spent with Avimelekh, whom they claimed to be the father. After all, they argued, Avraham and Sara had lived together childless for so many years, and Sara finally conceived after her experience in Gerar. In this manner they sought to dismiss any miraculous, divine intervention. God therefore ensured that Yitzchak would very closely resemble his father, Avraham, thereby demonstrating to the world that Avraham indeed begot a son at the age of one hundred years. The question arises as to why God found it necessary to respond to the charges of these cynics. Why not let them blissfully bask in their stubborn denial of this miracle? Rav Mordechai Gifter, in his Pirkei Torah, suggests that the story told in this Midrash perhaps expresses the grave effects of cynicism. Mesilat Yesharim likens the cynic to a shield smeared with oil, which arrows strike and then instantly slip away. Nothing can stick to it; anything that lands on it falls right off. Similarly, the scoffer is immune to any inspiration. Ready, able and willing to dismiss any serious thought or message, the cynic holds a shield over himself and his surroundings, "protecting" himself and his peers from matters of religious importance and meaning. Anything he hears or comes upon is immediately rejected as nonsense; any otherwise inspiring figure is instinctively branded a charlatan. The cynic effectively reduces serious thought to objects of ridicule, and thus influences everyone in his vicinity to give no heed or consideration to matters that are, in truth, of supreme importance and value. God felt compelled to put an end to the wave of cynicism surrounding Yitzchak's birth because of the destructive effects it would have on the world in general, and on Avraham's descendants in particular. If the leitzanei ha-dor would have been allowed to continue spreading their disdainful allegations, even the believers would entertain doubts and one day start questioning Yitzchak's biological origins. The Almighty's response to the leitzanei ha-dor thus warns of the severe repercussions of cynicism, the reduction of serious and sublime matters to ridicule. Leitzanut adversely affects not only one's own attitude towards these matters, but also the ability of everyone around him to receive guidance and inspiration from the words of the Torah and its scholars. |