The Israel Koschitzky
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Yeshivat
Har Etzion
PARASHAT
VAYETZE
Rav David
Silverberg
We read in Parashat Vayetze of Yaakov's arrival at the well outside the
city of Charan, where he met his cousin and future wife, Rachel, who worked as a
shepherd for the flocks of her father, Lavan (29:9).
The Ramban raises the question of why Lavan
assigned this task specifically to Rachel, the younger of his two daughters
(29:16), rather then to the older Leah.
The Ramban suggests two possible explanations, the first of which claims
that Leah's eyes were of a delicate nature ("ve-einei Leah rakot" – 29:17) and would easily suffer damage
through extended exposure to the sun.
In his second answer, the Ramban effectively negates the question by
contending that to the contrary, it was because of Rachel's youth that she was
assigned the responsibility of shepherding. Leah had already reached physical
maturity, and her father therefore preferred that she remain in or near the home
rather than attract the attention of immoral male shepherds. Rachel was still a child, and therefore
Lavan felt secure allowing her to tend to his flocks in the fields alongside the
other local shepherds. The Ramban
adds that on this basis we could perhaps justify Yaakov's otherwise questionable
gesture of kissing Rachel at the well (29:11); if Rachel was at this point a
young child, the kiss could be interpreted as a very innocent greeting and
expression of kinship.
Rabbenu Bechayei likewise advances this
theory, adding that Rachel was five years of age at the time of Yaakov's arrival
at the well. He suggests that for
this reason Yaakov offers to work for seven years before marrying Rachel
(29:18), in order to allow her to reach physical maturity and thus be suitable
for marriage.
This contention of the Ramban and Rabbenu
Bechayei stands in direct contrast to the view expressed in Seder Olam Rabba, which claimed that Rachel and Leah were
twins. According to the Ramban and
Rabbenu Bechayei, at the time of Yaakov's arrival Leah was at youngest an
adolescent while Rachel was still a young child, and thus they were clearly not
twins. Indeed, the Seder Olam writes explicitly that Leah and Rachel were
twenty-two when they married Yaakov, which means that they were fifteen when
Yaakov arrived in Charan seven years earlier. Needless to say, the Ramban and Rabbenu
Bechayei clearly did not subscribe to this view of the Seder Olam Rabba.
Incidentally, it should be noted that the
Vilna Gaon, in his glosses to the Seder Olam, suggests an emendation to the text whereby
Leah and Rachel are said to have been twenty-one, rather than twenty-two, at the
time of their marriage. He explains
the Seder Olam to mean that Leah and Rachel were born at
the time when Yaakov "stole" his father's blessing from Esav and fled from
home. As Rashi (28:11) famously
cites from the Midrash, Yaakov spent fourteen years studying Torah immediately
after leaving his home, and only then traveled to Charan. Rachel and Leah were thus fourteen years
of age when he arrived at the well, and married him seven years later, at the
age of twenty-one. This view is
mentioned as well in the Tosafist-period commentary Panei'ach Raza, which notes that the words "Rachel bito ba'a" ("his daughter Rachel is coming" – 29:6),
which are written in the context of Yaakov' s arrival at the well, have the same
numerical value as the phrase "Rachel bat y"d" ("Rachel is fourteen years
old").
Yet a third view concerning Rachel and Leah's age(s) at the time of their marriage appears in the Tanchuma Yashan (Vayetze, 12), which writes that the sisters were born at the same time as their cousins – Yaakov and Esav. According to the Tanchuma Yashan, the two sets of twins were born at the same time and their parents exchanged letters in which they agreed that the cousins should marry one another – Esav would marry Leah, and Yaakov would marry Rachel. (See also the famous comments of Bereishit Rabba cited by Rashi to 29:17.) Thus, Leah and Rachel were the same age as Yaakov and Esav, and married when they were sixty-three years old (see Rashi to 28:9).
In summary, then, we have seen three views with regard to this issue:
1) Ramban, Rabbenu Bechayei: Leah was several years older than Rachel; when Yaakov arrived at the well, Leah was already an adolescent (or perhaps even older), while Rachel was but five years old.
2) Seder Olam Rabba: Rachel and Leah were twins, and married Yaakov at the age of twenty-two (or twenty-one, according to the Vilna Gaon's reading).
3) Tanchuma Yashan: Rachel and Leah were twins and were the same age as Yaakov and Esav, and married at the age of sixty-three.
One possible
consequence of this discussion relates to the famous question of how or whether
it was permissible for Yaakov to marry two sisters, a clear violation of Torah
law. Chizkuni (29:28) claims
that Rachel and Leah were born to different mothers, and before Matan Torah it was permissible to marry two sisters
born to different mothers. This
theory clearly presumes that Leah and Rachel were not twins, and it thus appears
that Chizkuni did not subscribe to the aforementioned
view of the Seder Olam
Rabba and Tanchuma Yashan.
(Based on Rav Mordechai Frankel's Mayim Rabim, Parashat Vayetze)
******
Parashat Vayetze tells of the devious ruse performed by Lavan, Yaakov's
uncle, who agreed to allow Yaakov to marry his younger daughter, Rachel, but at
the wedding secretly brought him the older daughter, Leah. When Yaakov protested to Lavan the next
morning, Lavan explained, "This is not how it is done in our place – giving the
younger [daughter] before the older [daughter]" (29:26).
Interestingly enough, and most surprisingly, Tosefot in Masekhet
Kiddushin (52a) appear to cite Lavan's response as an authoritative halakhic
source. Tosefot tell of a case of a
man who gave an object of value to the father of two girls, declaring "Your
daughter is hereby betrothed to me."
It was of course unclear from this declaration which of the two daughters
the groom sought to betroth.
Rabbenu Tam, as Tosefot record, ruled that it may be presumed that the
groom had the older of the two girls in mind, because, as Rabbenu Tam explained,
"This is not how it is done in our place – giving the younger before the
older." Based on Lavan's claim in
justifying his scheme, Rabbenu Tam establishes that marrying off the older
daughter before the younger is the accepted norm. As such, if a groom betroths one of two
sisters without specifying which, he is presumed to have betrothed the older of
the two sisters.
The obvious question arises, why did Rabbenu Tam cite Lavan's comment to
Yaakov as an authoritative halakhic principle?
Rav Moshe Feinstein, as cited in Kol Ram (vol. 3, Parashat Vayetze), suggests a
possible explanation for Rabbenu Tam's ruling. Lavan's remarks were made in response to
Yaakov's complaint, "Why did you deceive me?" (29:25). Lavan explained to Yaakov that he was
not deceived, because, after all, local custom dictates that an older sister be
married before a younger sister.
Hence, it should have been obvious to Yaakov that it would be Leah,
rather than younger daughter Rachel, whom he would marry. What this demonstrates, Rav Moshe
suggests, is that the groom's mindset can be presumed to be in accordance with
conventional practice. At least in
principle, on the level of strict, technical legality, the assumption that
Yaakov should expect to marry the older daughter was a valid one. (It stands to reason that Rabbenu Tam
would agree that Lavan acted with unjustifiable cruelty in deceiving his
newly-arrived nephew, even if strictly speaking there were legal grounds to his
claim.) Rabbenu Tam therefore
applied the same principle to the case in question. Since common practice in that community
was for the older daughter to marry before the younger daughter, the groom can
be presumed to have had the older daughter in mind when announcing his ambiguous
betrothal.
Be that as it may, Tosefot proceed to cite Rabbi Menachem Mi-yuni as
disputing Rabbenu Tam's ruling, and maintaining that both daughters are to be
considered potentially betrothed to the groom, who must therefore give a
get to them both. The groom may then not marry either one
of them, as each could potentially have the status of achot ishto – his wife's sister – whom one may not
marry even after his wife's death or divorce. Tosefot record that Rabbenu Tam himself
retracted his decision and ruled that the groom must give a get to both sisters, as we do not presume that
he had the older sister in mind.
******
As discussed yesterday, the Torah in Parashat Vayetze tells of Yaakov's
intended marriage to Rachel, and Lavan's substitution of Leah in Rachel's
place. Lavan justified the
substitution on the grounds that local custom dictated that the older sister
should marry before the younger sister, and thus naturally Leah should marry
before Rachel (29:26). Yesterday we
addressed the possible halakhic ramifications of Lavan's remark, as perhaps
emerges from the view of Rabbenu Tam recorded by Tosefot in Masekhet Kiddushin
(52a).
A similar issue is discussed by Rav Moshe Feinstein, in his work of
responsa Iggerot Moshe (E.H. vol. 2, 1). Rav Moshe was asked to rule in a case of
a boy who had become engaged before his older brother. The older brother claimed that the
younger brother's marriage caused him great distress and embarrassment, and
demanded that the marriage be delayed until he – the older brother – found a
suitable mate and married. He
claimed that the respect owed to him as the older brother demanded that the
younger brother wait to marry until after the older brother's
marriage.
Rav Moshe ruled unequivocally that there is no basis to such a claim, and
a young man bears no obligation to delay marriage until after his older brother
marries, regardless of the angst and humiliation the older brother claims to
experience. He cites proof from the
Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Kiddushin (64b) of a father of two daughters,
one a bogeret (twelve years of age or older) and the
other a ketana (under eleven years of age). The case under discussion is where the
older daughter appointed her father as her shaliach (agent) to accept
betrothal for her from a man he chooses.
The father is thus authorized to accept betrothal on behalf of both his
older daughter – who specifically commissioned him to do so – and his younger
daughter, by virtue of her being a ketana. (Halakha empowers a father to accept betrothal on
his daughter's behalf while she is a ketana, even without her asking him to do
so.) The Gemara rules that if the
father accepts kiddushin from a man without specifying for which of
his daughters the betrothal is made, we may presume that it was made for the
younger daughter. Leaving aside the
reason why this should be so, it emerges clearly from the Gemara that a father
has the right to see to the betrothal of his younger daughter before that of his
older daughter. Apparently, Rav
Moshe deduces, Halakha allows a person to marry when the
opportunity presents itself, and does not require delaying marriage until after
the older sibling marries. (One
might, however, question this proof in light of the fact that the Gemara here
speaks only of betrothal, and not of marriage. It could be argued that even though the
younger sister may be betrothed before the older sister, she perhaps must delay
marriage under after the older sister marries.)
As Rav Moshe mentions, some require that a younger brother delay his marriage in such a case on the basis of a comment of the Shakh (Y.D. 244:13), who writes (citing the Bach) that an older brother's wedding takes precedence over that of a younger brother. But Rav Moshe dismisses this proof, noting that the Shakh clearly speaks of a case where both brothers had become engaged and the parents had to choose which wedding to conduct first. In this regard, precedence is given to the older brother. This does not mean that a young brother who has already found his mate must delay his marriage in deference to the older brother.
Rav Moshe concludes this response by addressing the claim that perhaps the younger brother should delay his wedding in order to spare the older brother the embarrassment he would experience as a result of being unmarried with a married younger brother. Rav Moshe rejects this contention for a number of reasons, including the argument that "it stands to reason that we cannot forbid a person from tending to his affairs and personal needs with the claim that somebody is embarrassed as a result, by the fact that he has not been similarly successful." While the Torah certainly forbids putting another person to shame, this does not mean that one cannot pursue personal success and contentment, out of concern for the feelings of those who might not enjoy the same degree of success. Thus, the younger brother is entitled to marry before his older brother.
******
The beginning of Parashat Vayetze tells of Yaakov's experiences as he fled from his brother, particularly as he slept along his journey in Beit-El. The Torah writes that Yaakov "took from the rocks of the area" and placed them around his head (28:11) before he went to sleep. The Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (91a) famously notes the seeming discrepancy between this verse – which suggests that Yaakov took several rocks – and the reference several verses later (28:18) to "the rock" that he had placed near his head. As Rashi (28:11) cites, the Gemara explains that the stones began quarreling with one another, each demanding the Yaakov rest his head upon it, and they therefore merged to form a single stone upon which Yaakov slept. (As noted by Tosefot there in the Gemara, as well as Ibn Ezra, the Radak and the Ralbag in their respective Torah commentaries, the straightforward reading of the first verse is that Yaakov took one rock "from the rocks of the area," and there is thus no contradiction between the two verses.)
Many different interpretations have been offered to explain the symbolic
significance of these stones and their merging into a single stone. Rav Yitzchak Kunstadt of Pressburg, in
his Luach Erez (published in
The lesson of these rocks, then, is that Torah life cannot be narrowly
and simplistically defined in terms of a single theme, message or ideal. One cannot constrict his religious
outlook to only one value, because the Torah's message is far too complex and
incorporates too many ideals to allow for such a narrow perspective. Our challenge is to integrate the
various values of the Torah into a single "rock," to afford equal importance to
each of these ideals, and work to "sustain the world" by committing ourselves to
the entire range of Torah values.
*******
We read in Parashat Vayetze of Yaakov's agreement with his uncle, Lavan,
whereby he would work seven years shepherding Lavan's sheep and then be given
the hand of his younger daughter, Rachel, in marriage. After the seven-year term of service,
however, Lavan brought Leah, the older daughter, to Yaakov instead of
Rachel. In response to Yaakov's
objection, Lavan agrees to give him Rachel, as well: "Complete the week of this
one [Leah], and we shall then give you this one [Rachel], as well, for the work
you will perform for me for another seven years" (29:27).
A number of commentators were puzzled by Lavan's use of the plural form
in this verse – "ve-nitena
lekha" ("we shall give you"). To whom was he referring besides
himself?
This question led several commentators – Rashbam, Radak and Ibn Ezra
(cited by the Ramban) – to suggest reading this verse as, "and this one [Rachel]
shall then be given to you, as well."
According to this reading, the word ve-nitena is the feminine conjugation of the passive
nif'al form, and it thus refers to Rachel's being
given to Yaakov. As noted by
Professor Nechama Leibowitz, however, this reading does not appear to
accommodate the syntax of the verse.
Specifically, the word zot ("this one"), which refers to Rachel, is
preceded by the word et, the untranslatable term that in Hebrew
often precedes a direct object.
According to this reading of the verse, however, Rachel is the subject,
rather than the object ("This one shall be given to you"), and thus the use of
the word et in reference to her is not
justified.
Others uphold the straightforward reading of the verse, and suggest
various approaches for Lavan's use of the plural form. The Ramban and Radak raise the
possibility that the use of the plural "we" in reference to oneself reflects a
formal, aristocratic style, and it therefore should not surprise us that Lavan
speaks of himself in this manner.
The Ramban then proceeds to present a different approach, which he
believes to be the correct explanation of this verse:
The correct [explanation] in my view is that
Lavan's words [are spoken] with cunning.
He said to Yaakov, "It is not done so in our place, for the local
residents would not allow me to do this, because they consider it a
disgrace. But complete this week
and I and all the local residents will give you this one, as well, for we will
all agree on the matter and give you honor and a celebration as we did the first
time."
According to the Ramban, the "we" in Lavan's
statement refers to himself and the local townspeople of whom he had spoken in
the previous verse, when he explained why he had substituted Leah for
Rachel. He claimed that it was
customary in his locale not to allow a younger daughter to marry before the
older daughter, and therefore he was unable to allow Rachel to marry
Yaakov. He was therefore compelled
to first have Yaakov marry Leah, and only then allow him to marry
Rachel.
Professor Nechama Leibowitz notes how Lavan's scheme as understood by the
Ramban is characteristic of charlatans and criminals, in that he cast the blame
on others. Rather than accepting
personal responsibility for his deception, Lavan claimed to be simply following
local custom, that he acted not as an individual, but rather as an innocent
member of a society that dictates conventions and norms. The lesson that emerges from the
Ramban's approach is that a person cannot always excuse himself with the claim
that he simply acts like everybody else, that his conduct is but a product of
the society in which he lives. At a
certain point, we must all assume personal responsibility for how we act, and
cannot always shirk responsibility by casting the blame on societal
norms.
******
Towards the beginning of Parashat Vayetze we read of Yaakov's famous
dream in Beit-El, in which he beheld a ladder and angels and heard God's promise
to protect him along his journey and return him safely to his homeland. The Torah describes Yaakov's
astonishment upon awakening: "Yaakov awoke from his sleep and said, 'Indeed, the
Lord is in this place, and I was unaware.'
He was frightened and said, 'How awesome is this place; this can only be
a house of God, and this is the gate of the heavens!'"
(28:16-17).
Leaving aside the precise meaning of the terms "awesome," "a house of
God" and "the gate of the heavens," it clearly emerges from Yaakov's response
that he was stunned specifically by the possibility of experiencing a prophecy
at that particular site. What
rattled Yaakov was not the fact that he beheld a prophetic vision, but rather
that such a vision could occur at this location ("the Lord is in this place…How
awesome is this place…"). How might
we explain this reaction of Yaakov to his discovery that his current location
was graced with some unique quality?
Shadal explains:
He criticized himself for having been
distressed over his flight [from his brother] and over his having to sleep along
the road, and for not trusting in God, and perhaps in his distress he cursed
that site. "This can only be…": I
did not sleep in a bad place, as I had thought, but rather it is as if I had
slept in a house of God and the gates of the heavens, for behold God has seen my
plight.
According to Shadal, when Yaakov was forced
to lie down and sleep along the road, he felt embittered over his plight. He resented having to flee from his
brother and travel all the way to Charan, a journey that required him to sleep
out in the open, on the ground, without proper provisions. Shadal goes so far as to speculate that
Yaakov perhaps even "cursed" the site where he had to sleep (e.g. "Look at this
awful place where I have to spend the night; rather than sleeping in a warm
house on a comfortable bed, I have to sleep in this horrible
place!").
But after beholding his prophetic vision, Yaakov came to the startling
realization that he "did not sleep in a bad place," that the site where he slept
was indeed a blessed place. This is
a place where God spoke to him, answered his prayers and promised him
protection. Yaakov in effect
exclaimed, in astonishment, "This is not a bad place at all – this is like the
house of God!"
A meaningful lesson emerges from Shadal's understanding of these
verses. Often in life we find
ourselves in situations and places which we would have much preferred to avoid,
challenges and difficulties which we would ideally never wish to confront. At times, however, we will discover,
like Yaakov, that these situations are really "the house of God, the gates of
the heavens," they somehow prove to be far more beneficial than we would have
ever imagined. Just as Yaakov was
surprised to discover that the dusty, rocky road to Charan could become "the
house of God," so can the unpleasant situations we sometimes confront actually
become positive experiences that, as in the case of Yaakov, give us strength and
confidence for the long journey ahead.
******
The Torah tells in the beginning of Parashat Vayetze of the prophetic
dream Yaakov beheld as he fled from
I am the Lord…the land upon which you lie I
shall give to you and your offspring.
And your offspring shall be like the dust of the earth…And behold I shall
be with you and protect you wherever you go, and I shall return you to this
land, for I shall not leave you until I have done that which I have spoken to
you.
(28:13-15)
The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 69) observes one curious omission from these promises to Yaakov, namely, that there is no mention here of parnasa – livelihood. God promises Yaakov that he will father a great nation, earn God's protection from harm, and eventually return to his homeland, but He does not promise adequate food, shelter and clothing. Interestingly enough, when Yaakov declares a vow upon awakening to consecrate one-tenth of his belongings if God fulfills these promises, he indeed makes mention of God giving him "bread to eat and clothing to wear" (28:20). In his dream, however, God excludes this critical element from His promise to Yaakov. The Midrash simply observes this point without explaining why God made no mention of parnasa in this prophecy.
Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda (
Rav Ginsburg then cites a different explanation of this Midrash in the
name of a work entitled Afikei
Yehuda. Livelihood differs from a person's other
needs in that it cannot be precisely measured. The term "livelihood" means something
else for each person; what one person considers a basic, elementary need is
looked upon by someone else as a luxury.
God therefore did not declare a promise to provide Yaakov with parnasa, as it has no objective definition, and is
determined only subjectively, based upon the particular perspective of the
individual. Indeed, the Midrash Tanchuma writes in explaining why God made no such
promise to Yaakov, "The Almighty said: If I promise him bread, what else might
he then request from Me?"
With this approach in mind, we might gain a clearer understanding of the
subsequent passage in Bereishit Rabba, where the Midrash cites the
dissenting view of Rabbi Assi: "He answered him with regard to
parnasa, as well, as it says,
'for I shall not leave you,' and 'leaving' refers only to parnasa, as the verse states (Tehillim 37:25), 'I
have not seen a righteous man who was abandoned, whose offspring ask for
bread'." According to Rabbi Assi,
God did, in fact, promise to provide Yaakov a sufficient livelihood, a promise
He expressed in the declaration, "for I shall not leave you." Rabbi Assi perhaps held that parnasa can, in fact, be defined in objective
terms. Even if God cannot promise
to provide a person with all his "needs," a subjective term that hinges on each
individual's standards, He can promise never to leave a person to fend for
himself. A parent, for example,
cannot promise to provide his child everything he wants, and perhaps not even
everything he needs. The parent
can, however, promise that the child will never be left alone, that he – the
parent – will always look out for him.
Similarly, even though God cannot give Yaakov an undefined promise to
provide him parnasa, He does declare "I shall not leave you,"
promising He will always accompany Him and ensure that he is cared for on one
level or another.