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Just prior to his long-feared, though ultimately peaceful, reunion with Esav, Yaakov Avinu comes under attack by an unknown assailant, clearly an angel of sorts. As we know, Yaakov defeats the angel but suffers a debilitating blow to the leg. Commentators throughout the ages have uncovered for us the rich symbolism of this episode, the image of the Jew "left alone" (32:25) in exile, struggling against enemies and ultimately prevailing, regardless of the serious wounds inflicted. In the end, the "sun shines for him" (32:32), marking the end of the long darkness of exile and the dawning of redemption.

The centrality of this event within Parashat Vayishlach is perhaps indicated by one of the two customary selections for this parasha's haftara. Whereas some communities read the brief book of Ovadya on Shabbat Parashat Vayishlach, others have the practice of reading the section "Ve-ami telu'im" in Hoshea 11:7-12-12. (A third practice recorded is to read the immediately following section in Hoshea, "Va-yivrach Yaakov sedeh Aram.") The choice of Sefer Ovadya is rather clear, as it speaks entirely of the ultimate victory of Yaakov's descendants over those of Esav. Though the middle section of Parashat Vayishlach deals with Yaakov's experiences as he returns to Eretz Canaan, the primary theme, which dominates both the beginning and end of the parasha, involves his struggle with Esav. Thus, Sefer Ovadya appears as a natural choice for this parasha's haftara. The selection from Hoshea, however, bears but one parallel to Parashat Vayishlach: it briefly recounts the incident of Yaakov's wrestle with the angel. Why did the custom evolve to prefer this prophecy over the book of Ovadya? Rav Soloveitchik zt"l is cited as interpreting this practice on the basis of the centrality of this episode within Parashat Vayishlach. It forms the very backbone and establishes the primary theme of this parasha. Why?

The Rav explained that in Parashat Vayishlach Yaakov struggles against two enemies, who essentially are one in the same: Esav and the mysterious angel. On the surface, these two battles bear very little resemblance. Esav harbors enmity towards Yaakov, it seems, for a very clear reason: a rage of jealousy. Yaakov cheated him out of his birthright and father's blessing, and Esav wants revenge. This is how Yaakov and his parents approached Esav's threat from the very beginning. Rivka told Yaakov to flee until Esav's wrath has subsided, at which point she would call him back (27:44-45). The threat cannot last forever, since jealousy naturally fades with time. Yaakov likewise suspects that he can assuage his brother's hard feelings with a generous bribe (32:14-22) and respectful bows (33:3,6,7). The angel, by contrast, emerges from the dark and, without any discernible motive or goal, attacks. Yaakov valiantly responds, though he has no idea why or for what he must fight. However distinct these two battles appear, Chazal clearly view them as one and the same. The angel was none other than the "sar," the angelic representative, of Esav and his following. We learn here that even the clear battles against our enemies, those which appear to involve specific, tangible conflicts - theology, territory, resources, etc. - actually conceal a much more generic hatred, which the Jew will never understand but must somehow confront. Thus, the primary struggle in Parashat Vayishlach is the fight against the angel, as this confrontation reveals the true nature of the seemingly intelligible battle against Esav.

A famous Midrashic dictum claims that "halakha yedu'a hi she-sonei Esav le-Yaakov" - it's common knowledge that Esav despises Yaakov. Hatred for Am Yisrael has always existed, but in so many different forms. We do not and cannot understand why nor can we necessarily point to the proper protective measures to avoid it. All we can do is trust that ultimately the "sun will shine," and Yisrael, as Yaakov is here renamed, will prevail.

*****

At the dramatic, conciliatory meeting between Yaakov and Esav in Parashat Vayishlach, Yaakov implores Esav to accept the gift he had prepared for him. Responding to Esav's initial refusal, Yaakov employs a peculiar expression, one which the commentators debate how to understand: "Please, no; if you would do me this favor, accept from me this gift, for I have seen your face like having seen the face of God, and you have received me favorably" (33:10). We present here several of the interpretations offered by the commentators.

Many writers understood "the face of God" as a reference to the angel with whom Yaakov had wrestled just prior to his reunion with Esav, whom Chazal identify as Esav's heavenly angel. Rashi, for example, explains that Yaakov expresses his sentiment that seeing Esav is as significant to him as the vision of the angel. Yaakov chooses this reference, Rashi explains, to warn his brother that just as he overcame his angel, so can he overcome him should Esav resume hostilities. The Radak explains along these lines, as well.

The Ramban argues, claiming that Yaakov actually compares his reunion with Esav to "seeing God." Yaakov invokes this analogy as part of his plea that Esav accept his gift. Just as the Almighty Himself accepts the offerings of those who come to see Him, so should Esav. Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson (Divrei Shaul, Mahadura Revi'a) adds a noteworthy insight onto the Ramban's approach. Esav explained his refusal on the basis of "yesh li rav" - that he has plenty and does not need Yaakov's gift. Yaakov therefore reminds his brother that even the Almighty Himself, who is all powerful and owns everything in the universe, willingly accepts the gifts of those who seek His compassion and kindness. Therefore, Esav's fortune should not lead him to turn down Yaakov's gift. The Yismach Moshe explains similarly, adding that we bring offerings to God for our own benefit, rather than for His, as man cannot possibly "benefit" the Almighty. Yaakov thus indicates to Esav that he should accept the gift for Yaakov's benefit. Oddly enough, neither of these two Acharonim note that this interpretation is found already in much earlier writings, in the commentary of the Abarbanel. The Abarbanel also explains the beginning of this verse on the basis of this approach. Yaakov implores Esav, ".. if you would do me this favor, accept from me this gift… " Yaakov stresses that Esav should accept the gift as a favor to Yaakov, rather than for his own needs.

Rav Sa'adya Gaon posits yet a third interpretation of the word "Elokim" (literally, God) in this verse: respected people. Yaakov thus claims that he considers Esav a dignitary; he should therefore accept Yaakov's offering, as those visiting noblemen customarily bring gifts. This appears to be the understanding of Targum Onkelos, who translates here the word, "Elokim" as "ravrevaya," the Aramaic word for dignitaries. The Seforno, as well, adopts this approach.

Masekhet Sofrim (4:5) rules that the word "Elokim" in this verse is "chol," meaning, it does not refer to God and may therefore be pronounced as "elohim." Obviously, this halakhic ruling would accommodate only the first and third approaches. According to the Ramban, the word here in fact does refer to God and must therefore be pronounced, "Elokim."

*****

Parashat Vayishlach features the famous, mysterious wrestle between Yaakov and an anonymous, nighttime assailant. Incapable of overpowering his opponent, the attacker deals a blow to Yaakov's thigh, dislodging his hip. The Torah writes that in commemoration, Benei Yisrael observe a prohibition against eating the "gid ha-nasheh," the sciatic nerve. Therefore, those preparing kosher meat must perform a procedure called "nikkur," the removal of the entire gid ha-nasheh from the animal.

Rav Yehonatan Eibshitz, in his legendary work, "Kereiti U-pleiti" (64), records a bizaincident that occurred when he lived in Prague, the cof which baffled many later Torah scholars. A certain professional "menaker" (one responsible for the removal of the gid ha-nasheh) claimed that the commonly accepted identification of the gid ha-nasheh was wrong. The sinew the Torah had in mind when issuing this prohibition was in fact a different sinew from the one generally assumed. He traveled throughout western Europe meeting with rabbinic scholars (of which there were many in 18^th-century Europe) trying to persuade them. No one could convincingly refute his claims until he arrived in Prague and met with Reb Yehonatan. Reb Yehonatan noted that the nerve in question is found only in male animals and showed the man the Semag (Sefer Mitzvot Gadol) who writes explicitly, "[The prohibition of] gid ha-nasheh applies regarding both males and females." At that point, Reb Yehonatan records, the man retracted his claim.

As indicated, Reb Yehonatan's response left later Acharonom astonished at what appears to be the mistake of an untrained schoolchild. As he lists and discusses each mitzva, the Semag, like other works of this genre, always writes whether or not this mitzva applies equally to men and women. Thus, when he writes regarding the gid ha-nasheh prohibition that "it applies regarding both males and females," he clearly referred to Jewish men and women; both must observe this prohibition. It does not at all refer to male and female animals!!

Some of the answers given to this difficulty claim that an error or misunderstanding of some sort led to all the confusion. In contemporary times, Rav Yehuda Nachshoni speculates that Reb Yehonatan intentionally uttered a foolish comment in order to reveal the man's own ignorance. This "menaker" fell straight into Reb Yehonatan's trap, accepting his argument without realizing for a moment that it was sheer nonsense.

Also somewhat recently, an American rabbi claimed to have a copy of a "Kereiti U-pleiti" published in 5523 (1763) containing corrections penned by Reb Yehonatan himself. Sure enough, the author supposedly erased the acronym "Semag" and wrote in its place an acronym consisting of the letters, "samekh," "hei," "nun." This refers to the work, "Seder Hilkhot Nikkur," a compendium of laws related to the removal of the gid ha-nasheh, which indeed rules that the gid ha-nasheh is found in both male and female animals.

Others have raised a similar claim that the acronym should read, "samekh," "hei," "gimmel," referring to the Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, rather than the "Semag" - the Sefer Mitzvot Gedolot.

Despite these suggestions at revisiting the actual circumstances or record of this event, some Acharonim resort to traditional methods of "lomdut" or "pipul" to resolve this difficulty. They assume that Reb Yehonatan in fact intended to cite the Semag's ruling (which is universally accepted) applying this prohibition to both genders. Somehow, this disproved the theory presented by this "menaker." The Chatam Sofer (Y.D. 69) explains that generally speaking, Torah prohibitions (as opposed to some positive commandments) apply to both men and women. However, when logic and reason so dictate, a prohibition addressed to "Benei Yisrael" will be understood as directed specifically to "benei" - the males, and not the females. (The Chatam Sofer cites as an example "Benei Aharon" in Vayikra 21:1; see Rashi there.) If the gid ha-nasheh of which the Torah speaks refers to a sinew found only in male animals, there would perhaps be some basis for distinguishing between men and women, applying the prohibition only to men. The fact that the Semag assumes without any apparent hesitation that this prohibition - like most other prohibitions - applies regardless of gender thus proves that the gid ha-nasheh must be found in both male and female animals. Otherwise, we would have reason to restrict the term "Benei Yisrael," used in the context of this prohibition, to men.

*****

As we discussed yesterday, Parashat Vayishlach introduces the prohibition against eating the gid ha-nasheh (the sciatic nerve of animals). One of the interesting halakhic features of this prohibition is the principle (codified by the Rambam in Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot 4, though subject to a dispute in the Talmud) known as "ein be-gidin be-notein ta'am." This means that halakha does not consider this particular sinew edible food. It is not like the animal's meat, but rather an inedible part of the animal. Generally speaking, one cannot violate the prohibitions relevant to eating by ingesting substances not classified by halakha under the formal category of food. (This does not apply to the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. As the Torah never directly prohibited eating onYom Kippur, but rather required "inuy," self denial, the ingestion of non-edible items qualifies as a violation of this prohibition.) This prohibition against eating the gid ha-nasheh, however, marks an exception to this rule. The Torah specifically forbids its consumption, despite its falling outside the technical category of food.

This principle yields several interesting ramifications, such as in a case of one who eats the gid ha-nasheh of a non-kosher animal. According to Rabbi Shimon (in Chulin 101a), whose view has been accepted, the prohibition never included non-kosher animals. Thus, one who eats the gid ha-nasheh of a non-kosher animal would not violate the prohibition introduced in Parashat Vayishlach against eating a gid ha-nasheh. At first glance, however, we would think that such an individual would violate the prohibition against eating the meat of non-kosher animals. In light of this principle, though, this is not the case. Since we do not define the gid ha-nasheh as edible food, one cannot violate standard prohibitions through its consumption. The Torah introduced a specific prohibition against eating the gid ha-nasheh of kosher animals; when eating the gid ha-nasheh of non-kosher animals, one has violated neither this prohibition (which applies only to kosher animals) nor that of eating non-kosher meat (as the the gid ha-nasheh is not considered meat).

Based on this, the Acharonim express their bewilderment over a ruling of the Rambam (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot, 8) regarding kosher animals who were not properly slaughtered ("neveilot" and "tereifot"). The Rambam rules that one who eats the gid ha-nasheh of such animals is liable for two punishments: one for partaking of an animal that had not been properly slaughtered, and a second punishment for eating a gid ha-nasheh. Does this not directly contradict the accepted principle that halakha does not consider the gid ha-nasheh edible meat? How can one violate the prohibition of partaking of a "neveila" by eating something that we do not consider food?

The Minchat Chinukh (281) writes a convincing answer to this difficulty, noting that he arrived at this resolution during his youth and it earned the praise of leading Torah scholars. He bases his answer on the halakhic principle of "achshevei," by which we categorize certain activities based on a subjective standard. Theoretically, one who knowingly eats non-edible material has demonstrated his consideration of that item as food. Quite simply, if he did not consider it food, he would not have eaten it. It follows, then, that one should be liable for eating the non-edible parts of non-kosher food. However, in such a case we invoke a different principle: we never assume sinful intent when assessing one's intentions. We do not assume that the individual considered the given item food, since doing so would render him in violation of a prohibition! Instead, we work on the assumption that despite his having partaken of forbidden material, he did not consider it food.

This line of reasoning, argues the Minchat Chinukh, resolves the difficulty with the Rambam. One who intentionally eats the gid ha-nasheh of a kosher animal clearly has no qualms about violating the Torah's strictures as far as this act of consumption is concerned. We therefore cannot invoke the assumption discussed earlier, that he dnot view the gid ha-nasheh as edible food. He clearly is not interested whether or not he violates the To's prohibitions. Therefore, we revert back to the original assumption, that his consumption testifies to his viewing this item as edible food. Consequently, he is punishable for the prohibition against partaking of a "neveila," as well, for in such a case we may presume his consideration of the gid ha-nasheh as actual food.

*****

Over the last two days we have encountered some intriguing features of the prohibition against eating a sinew called the gid ha-nasheh, commemorating the blow Yaakov suffered at the hip during his wrestle with the angel. Today we will see the surprising view of Rav Shlomo Ha-kohen of Vilna, in the introduction to his work of responsa, Binyan Shelomo.

The theory in question relates to the specific point which this prohibition is meant to commemorate. What about Yaaokv's injury must we remember through this mitzva? The Tur raises two possibilities. First, he likens this prohibition to the common custom to fast on the yartzheit of one's parent. A degree of self denial expresses one's grief over the demise of a loved one. Somewhat similarly, we refrain from a part of the animal as an expression of sorrow over the suffering of Yaakov Avinu. Most commentators, however, take the opposite approach, that this prohibition celebrates Yaakov's victory in one form or another. In fact, the Tur himself raises a second possible explanation, that the halakha of gid ha-nasheh commemorates Yaakov's miraculous triumph. The Sefer Ha-chinukh explains based on the historical meaning and symbolism behind this entire episode. Yaakov's victory over his mysterious assailant symbolizes Am Yisrael's ultimate defeat of its enemies. Just as Yaakov suffered only a single injury - debilitating as it was, so will Benei Yisrael experience pain and suffering during exile but prevail. The halakha of gid na-nasheh comes to remind us of this most critical promise, that we will endure in spite of the painful injuries incurred through the process of exile and redemption.

Rav Shlomo of Vilna posits a somewhat different theory. He cites earlier sources to the effect that this angel, identified by Chazal as Esav's heavenly angel, weakened Yaakov's progeny through this successful thrust to the hip. This blow enabled Esav's descendants to destroy the Bet Ha-mikdash and subject Yaakov's offspring to physical and spiritual oppression. Seeing that the could not overpower Yaakov right there and then, the angel dealt a debilitating blow that would allow him to inflict further harm in future generations. This, claims Rav Shlomo, is the meaning of the Midrash that claims that the dust kicked up in the air during Yaakov's wrestle with the angel rose to God's heavenly Throne. Esav's angel caused a slight defect, as it were, in God's throne by injuring Yaakov's descendants, the Almighty's representatives in the world. The gid ha-nasheh, where Yaakov was injured, thus represents this wound inflicted on God's manifestation in the world. We reflect this loss by refraining from eating this particular part of the body.

On this basis, Rav Shlomo of Vilna concludes that in the Messianic era, when Yaakov's victory over Esav will be once and for all complete, partaking of the gid ha-nasheh will become permissible. As God's Kingdom will be universally established, recognized and unchallenged, the gid ha-nasheh will lose its meaning and significance; Benei Yisrael will have no spiritual Achilles' Heel to be symbolized through the gid ha-nasheh. The prohibition will therefore no longer apply.

Other Acharonim strongly disagree. Most notably, the Sedei Chemed cites several proofs against this theory. For example, he points out that both the Rambam and the Ramban, in their respective listings of the mitzvot, on matter of principle do not include in the list any mitzva that will not apply forever. Yet, they list the prohibition against eating the gid ha-nashe as one of the 365 prohibitions in the Torah. Apparently, the Sedei Chemed writes, this prohibition will remain in force even after the coming of the Mashiach, may he come speedily and in our days.

*****

As we've mentioned on several occasions throughout our S.A.L.T. series this week, Chazal identify the mysterious man/being who attacked Yaakov in the middle of the night as "Saro shel Esav," Esav's heavenly angel. One source, however, appears at first glance to indicate otherwise. Pirkei D'Rabbi Eliezer 36 writes that when the angel changed Yaakov's name to Yisrael (32:29), he responded to Yaakov's request that the angel reveal his name (despite the fact that the Torah records this request as occurring only after the name change). The angel gave Yaakov his own name, Yisrael - this was the angel's name!!

So, who was this "Yisrael"? Was this not Esav's heavenly angel?

We can perhaps explain this Midrash by taking a closer look at the entire encounter. Assuming this was, in fact, Esav's "sar," what did he want? Why had he come? One direction taken on this issue suggests that this struggle involved the blessing that Yaakov had stolen from his brother. Recall that Yaakov had fled Canaan upon learning that Esav wished to kill him for seizing the blessing intended for himself. Now, in Parashat Vayishlach, Yaakov returns to Canaan without this issue having been resolved. What will happen? Has Esav forgotten and forgiven, granting Yaakov the birthright, or does he remain committed to his pledge to fight his brother to the death to retrieve the blessing? Esav's angel thus confronts Yaakov just as he crosses into Canaan. Yaakov overpowers the angel and does not let him free "until you bless me." What blessing does Yaakov want? He demands here confirmation of the blessing that he received from his father through deception. Esav's angel must now bring this conflict to an end, by formally conceding defeat and acknowledging Yaakov's right to the blessing. He therefore gives Yaakov his own name, the name of Yisrael. Many commentators explain that whereas "Yaakov" connotes trickery and deceit, "Yisrael" refers to straightforward dominion and authority. This authority that Esav had presumed to be his own, Yitzchak's blessing of, "you shall be master over your brother," is now formally transferred to Yaakov.

Yaakov therefore declares, "For I have seen God face to face, and my life has been saved" (32:31). This statement clearly corresponds to his prayer earlier in the parasha (32:12), "Please save me from the hand of my brother, from the hand of Esav." Yaakov now realizes that he not only survived a late-night attack by a stranger, but his original prayer for deliverance from Esav has been answered. The issue of the birthright has been resolved, Yaakov has won the title of "Yisrael" that Esav had until now held as his own.

*****

Parashat Vayishlach concludes with a presentation of Esav's lineage. This section begins by listing his wives, which include two Hittite women, Ada and Ahalivama (36:2). Rashi identifies Ahalivama as Yehudit, whom we met earlier, in Parashat Toledot, as one of Esav's Hittite wives (26:34). Rashi explains the discrepancy in her name by claiming that her real name was Ahalivama. Esav changed her name to Yehudit in order to mislead his parents into thinking that she rejected idolatry. Apparently, "Yehudit," which of course means "Jew," symbolizes the rejection of paganism. Obviously, this presents a serious problem. We call ourselves "Yehudim," Jews, because we descend from the Southern Kingdom that was led by the tribe of Yehuda, whose territory was thus named Judea. Now when Esav married Ahalivama, Yaakov had not even married yet, let alone begotten his fourth son, Yehuda. How, then, did the name "Yehudit" signify the opposition to paganism? (See Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky, in his "Emet Le-Yaakov.)

We have no choice but to explain that this term bore significance even before the birth of Yehuda. To identify the source of this significance, we need only to note the origin of Yehuda's name. Upon his birth, his mother, Leah, declares, "This time Iwill thank God" ("ha-pa'am odeh at Hashem" - 29:35). The name Yehuda thus means the expression of gratitude, or the recognition of the Almighty as solely responsible for evin the universe. From Rashi it clearly emerges that this very point lies at the heart of monotheism and marks the fundamental distinction between it and idolatry.

We may perhaps gain a clearer understanding of this point by considering the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Berakhot 7b. The Gemara there claims that no one ever thanked the Almighty until Leah did upon Yehuda's birth. Many commentators have struggled to understand the Gemara's intent. Could it be that no one ever expressed gratitude to God before Leah delivered her fourth child? On one level, this Gemara will always remain an enigma: it's hard to imagine that Leah introduced a new dimension of gratitude that Avraham, Yitzchak or Yaakov never expressed. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to identify this new dimension of Leah's thanksgiving. Some have claimed that whereas many of her predecessors thanked God for supernatural or extraordinary events, Leah represented a constant acknowledgment of God's kindness, as manifest even in ordinary occurrences. We may add that at all her other births, Leah issued a declaration explicitly referring to her status vis-א-vis Yaakov, she was thankful specifically for the "promotion" she earned as a result of her having borne children. This time, she makes no mention whatsoever of her husband's affection for her; she states simply, "This time I will thank God." It appears as though at this point Leah achieves a generic sense of appreciation for God's goodness, irrespective of any specific acts of kindness.

Appropriately enough, then, our nation is referred to as "Yehudim." The pagans worshipped their gods in order to extract the given benefit: they worshipped the rain god to give them rain, the wind god to avoid harsh storms, the ocean god to allow ships safe passage, and so on. They served gods only to the extent to which it would advance their own interests. As "Yehudim," we represent the ideal of appreciation the Almighty's greatness in its own right, acknowledging that He is Master over the universe and the source of all goodness and blessing in the world.

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