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In the middle of Parashat Vayishlach (chapter 34) we find the story of the rape of Dina, Yaakov's daughter, at the hands of Shekhem - the son of the governor of the city bearing that name. In response to this crime, Yaakov's sons devise a scheme to avenge their sister's honor. When Shekhem meets with Yaakov and his sons to request Dina's hand in marriage, the brothers express their consent on condition that the entire male population of Shekhem undergoes circumcision. The men of Shekhem agree, and while they were recovering from the procedure, Shimon and Levi capitalized on the people's disadvantaged physical condition, and killed the city's male population and seized the women, children and property.

This narrative concludes with a brief exchange between Yaakov and these two sons concerning the propriety of their violent reaction to Dina's defilement. Yaakov berates his sons, exclaiming, "You have brought trouble on me, making me odious among the inhabitants of the land, the Canaanites and the Perizites; my men are few in number, so that if they unite against me and attack me, I and my house will be destroyed" (34:30). Shimon and Levi, however, insisted on the justness of their course of action: "They answered, 'Should our sister be treated like a harlot?'"

Wherein lies the precise point of dispute between Yaakov and his sons?

At first glance, this exchange seems to revolve around the age-old conflict between principles and pragmatism. Yaakov, seemingly, disapproved of his sons' conduct only because of its practical results - the enmity of the surroundings peoples. Shimon and Levi, however, felt that practical considerations cannot interfere with the immediate need to avenge the honor of Dina and the family. The reaction of the land's inhabitants, which concerned Yaakov, does not change the fact that Dina had been treated dishonorably; a proper response was thus in order.

Clearly, however, Yaakov's condemnation of the attack against Shekhem stems from far more substantive concerns than its pragmatic repercussions. As Rav Michael Rosenweig notes in an article on this subject ("The Principled Pursuit of Principle" - www.torahweb.org/torah/2001/parsha/rros_vayishlach.html), Yaakov's vehement reaffirmation of his stance much later in his life proves that his rejection of his sons' violence was a matter of principle, rather than practicality. Just prior to his death, in addressing each of his sons, Yaakov takes the opportunity to once again condemn Shimon and Levi's violent behavior: "Shimon and Levi are a pair; their weapons are tools of lawlessness. Let not my person be counted in their assembly... for when angry they slay men... " (49:5-6). Despite the fact that the brothers' vigilantism does not appear to yield the hostility Yaakov had feared, he nevertheless reiterates his firm objection to their scheme. And here he speaks not of the practical repercussions of violence, but rather of the inherently problematic nature of "tools of lawlessness."

How, then, can we understand the argument between Yaakov and his sons?

To a large extent, this issue hinges on a fundamental debate between the Rambam and the Ramban concerning the halakhic implications of Shekhem's crime and his constituents' indifference to it. The seven Noachide laws binding upon all mankind include the obligation of "dinim" - the institution of a legal system. According to the Ramban, this obligation entails the establishment of a comprehensive system parallel to the halakhic system of civil law. Thus, the population's failure to respond accordingly to Shekhem's crime did not violate the obligation of "dinim," since they still followed a system of civil law, however imperfectly it was implemented. Shimon and Levi, therefore, overstepped halakhic bounds by executing the city's population in avenging the family's honor. They erred in reacting to the situation rashly and impulsively, without ensuring the halakhic propriety of their actions.

According to the Rambam, however, the basis for Yaakov's condemnation is far less clear. In Hilkhot Melakhim (9:14), the Rambam claims that the mitzva of "dinim" obligates every community to enforce the other six Noachide laws. The city of Shekhem thus violated this obligation by failing to prosecute Shekhem for his abduction of Dina - a violation of the Noachide law forbidding theft and kidnapping. But if this is correct, then why did Yaakov object to his sons' reaction? Weren't the people of Shekhem liable to the death penalty for their flagrant violation of one of the Noachide laws?

Rav Rosensweig suggested that in the Rambam's view, this incident demonstrates that technical, halakhic permissibility does not necessarily justify or sanction extreme measures. In his words, Yaakov here "projects the principle that halakhic conformity alone is not always sufficient to justify radical conduct when other halakhic principles and values are at risk." When reaching important decisions - not to mention those of life and death - one must recognize the complexity of the situation and take into account the broad range of issues involved, a process that often entails adjudicating between conflicting interests and values. The fact that the people of Shekhem violated a precept that the Rambam deems a capital offense did not mean that Shimon and Levi acted properly. Yaakov argued that the long-range repercussions of their violent response, the inherent - and not merely pragmatic - importance of maintaining a reputation of integrity and magnanimity, outweighed his sons' intrinsically altruistic ambition to protect the family's honor. Interestingly, in his deathbed castigation of Shimon and Levi, Yaakov condemns in the same breath these brothers' assault on Shekhem and their cruelty to their brother, Yosef (see Rashi, 49:6). In both instances, Shimon and Levi's narrow, single-issue focus blinded them to the broader range of concerns and considerations, resulting in their extreme, unbalanced response to the situation at hand.

It turns out, then, that whereas the Ramban understood Yaakov's response as an objection to a clear-cut halakhic error, according to the Rambam, Yaakov criticizes his sons for their failure to consider the broader range of concerns. Halakhic decision making requires slow, patient and thorough analysis of the multiple considerations at stake, and may never be conducted through a single-minded focus on only one of values or ideals involved.

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In Parashat Vayishlach, the Torah introduces the prohibition against eating the "gid ha-nasheh" (sciatic nerve), a law commemorating the injury Yaakov suffered in that part of the body during his struggle against a mysterious assailant, as recorded in this parsha. (See 32:24-32).

As we discussed in our S.A.L.T. series to this parasha a number of years ago (www.vbm-torah.org/archive/salt-bereishit/08-5vayishlach.htm), this prohibition features a certain peculiarity, in that according to one view, "ein be-gidin be-notein ta'am." Meaning, the gid ha-nasheh cannot be considered edible food, and yet the Torah still forbade its consumption. Generally speaking, a person can violate an "issur akhila" (a prohibition against eating something) only by partaking of an edible food item forbidden by the Torah. Here, however, according to one view in the Gemara, a person violates the Torah prohibition of gid ha-nasheh by eating something inedible. This view is indeed codified by the Rambam (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Asurot 15:17) and yields several halakhic ramifications. For example, as the Rambam there comments, a gid ha-nasheh does not emit any taste into a mixture. Generally, a morsel of forbidden food that falls into a pot of hot, permissiblforenders the entire pot forbidden for consumption even after its removal, because of the taste emitted into the mixture. A gid ha-nasheh, however, is not considered food and does not have taste; therefore, if it falls into permissible food, the food may be eaten after the gid ha-nasheh's removal from the pot.

Likewise, the Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (89b) indicates that if we assume this principle of "ein be-gidin be-notein ta'am," then a person who partakes of the gid ha-nasheh of hekdesh - an animal consecrated as a sacrifice - is not punished for having eaten sacrificial meat. He is liable to punishment only for violating the prohibition of gid ha-nasheh, but not for transgressing the prohibition against partaking of hekdesh. Since Halakha does not consider the gid ha-nasheh part of the animal's meat, the prohibition against eating hekdesh does not apply to it.

According to the Rambam, there is one exception to this rule. In Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Asurot (8:6), the Rambam explicitly rules that one who partakes of the meat of a korban ola (burnt offering) is punished by the court twice - once for violating the prohibition of gid ha-nasheh, and a second time for having eaten meat of a sacrifice. The Rambam thus distinguishes between a korban ola - which is completely burnt on the altar - and other sacrifices with regard to the application of the prohibition of gid ha-nasheh. Generally, when a person eats the gid ha-nasheh of a korban forbidden for consumption, he is not considered in violation of the prohibition against eating hekdesh; regarding an ola, however, he is. What rationale underlies this distinction?

The "Or Samei'ach" explains that the nature of the prohibition against eating meat of an ola differs fundamentally from the prohibition against eating other sacrificial meat. When it comes to other sacrifices, partaking of forbidden meat violates the prohibition of "me'ila" (loosely translated as "misuse"), which is generally defined as stealing from the property of hekdesh. A person who eats forbidden sacrificial meat has not transgressed an "issur akhila" - a prohibition against eating per se, but has rather stolen from the property of the Mikdash. This explains, for example, why the prerequisite shiur (amount) for violating the prohibition of me'ila is a "shaveh peruta" - a certain monetary value, whereas the minimum amount of forbidden foods is generally determined based on physical volume (usually a "ke-zayit"). Me'ila means stealing from hekdesh, and therefore to violate this prohibition one must steal a significant monetary value; prohibitions involving specifically eating, by contrast, require one to perform a significant act of eating, determined based on the volume of ingested food.

Herein, claims the "Or Samei'ach," lies the basic difference between the ola and other sacrifices. Regarding the ola, the Torah issues a specific prohibition against partaking of its meat. In the context of the "minchat kohein" (the meal offering brought by the kohanim), the Torah writes, "Every meal offering of a kohen shall be a whole offering [meaning, entirely burnt on the altar]; it shall not be eaten" (Vayikra 6:16). The Torat Kohanim, as well as the Gemara in Masekhet Makot (18b), interpret this verse as establishing a general prohibition against partaking of any sacrifice which the Torah requires burning in its entirety upon the altar. This prohibition, unlike me'ila, constitutes a direct "issur akhila": one who partakes of meat of the ola has not only stolen from hekdesh, but has also eaten forbidden food.

This explains why one is punished twice for eating the gid ha-nasheh of an ola, but only once for eating the gid ha-nasheh of other sacrifices. Regarding other sacrifices, as discussed, the prohibition involves only me'ila. Since we do not consider the gid ha-nasheh edible food, it is valueless, and thus not subject to the prohibition of me'ila. When it comes to a korban ola, however, the Torah forbids eating itself, irrespective of the issue of stealing from hekdesh. Therefore, eating the gid ha-nasheh of an ola is tantamount to eating the gid ha-nasheh of other forbidden meat, such as of a neveila (meat of an animal that did not undergo halakhic slaughtering). The Rambam explicitly rules that one who eats the gid ha-nasheh of a neveila violates the prohibition against eating neveila, despite the fact that it is not formally considered "food." The reason, as the Acharonim explain (see the aforementioned piece in the S.A.L.T. archives), stems from the concept of "achshevei" - meaning, the moment the Torah forbade partaking of the gid ha-nasheh, it rendered it a type of food with respect to "issurei akhila." Hence, as the Rambam rules, a person who eats the gid ha-nasheh of a korban ola receives two punishments - for the prohibition of gid ha-nasheh, as well as for the prohibition of partaking of meat from an ola.

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The Torah tells in Parashat Vayishlach (35:22), "While Israel [Yaakov] stayed in that land, Reuven went and lay with Bilha, his father's concubine." Many commentators, including Rashi, Ibn Ezra and Chizkuni, follow the Gemara's novel interpretation of this verse in Masekhet Shabbat (55b), which significantly lessens the severity of Reuven's transgression. According to the Gemara, Reuven did not actually engage in an illicit relationship with his stepmother. Rather, after Rachel's death, recorded just several verses prior to this account, Yaakov moved his bed into Bilha's tent, thereby establishing that Bilha, Rachel's maidservant whom she gave to Yaakov as a wife, has now become his primary wife. Reuven saw this decision as an affront to the honor of his mother, Leah, and therefore took bold action to defend his mother's honor: he personally moved Yaakov's bed from Bilha's tent into Leah's tent. Reuven thus sinned by meddling in his father's personal affairs, a grave infringement on his father's honor, but certainly far less severe than an illicit relationship with his stepmother.

The Peirush Ha-Tur cites two other explanations of this verse that mitigate the severity of Reuven's act. First, the Tur cites Rabbenu Yehuda Ha-chasid as reading the verse to mean that "Reuven went" away from his family, because Yaakov "lay with Bilha" - meaning, he decided to move his bed into Bilha's tent. Thus, Reuven did not even interfere in his father's affairs, but simply abandoned the family to protest his father's decision. The Tur then brings a different approach, which the Netziv adopts in his commentary to Parashat Vayechi, that Reuven slept in Bilha's tent all night long in order to prevent Yaakov from coming to sleep with her. The Tur arrives at this reading from the peculiar syntax of the verse. Normally, the Torah describes marital relations with the term "va-yishkav IM" ("slept with"). In this verse, however, the Torah employs the word "et" to mean "with," rather than "im." The Tur suggests that this syntax is used because Reuven did not sleep "with Bilha" in the sense of intimate relations, but rather slept with her in the same room.

A minority of traditional commentators upholds the straightforward reading of this verse, that Reuven in fact had relations with Bilha. This group of commentators includes the Radak and Rabbenu Yosef Bekhor Shor.

Is there any textual support for the Gemara's contention, that Reuven did not actually engage in relations with Bilha?

The Gemara there draws evidence for this interpretation from the conclusion of the verse: "vayihyu benei Yaakov sheneim asar" ("and Yaakov's sons numbered twelve"). The Torah's emphasis in this context on the number of Yaakov's sons suggests that despite the unfortunate incident that had just transpired, Yaakov nevertheless had twelve sons equal in stature. Quite clearly, had Reuven actually slept with his stepmother, he would have forfeited his status as an equal member of Yaakov's family. On this basis, the Gemara proves that Reuven committed a far less severe transgression than engaging in adulterous relations.

Secondly, recall that the Tur noted the unusual phraseology in this verse - "vayishkav et" - suggesting that Reuven did not actually engage in relations wi.

Rabbi Shlomo Kovitz (of the Frisch School in Paramus, NJ) suggests an additional textual basis for the Gemara's reading, namely, the juxtaposition between the account of Reuven's sin and the immediately preceding verse. Just prior to this narrative, the Torah writes, "Israel journeyed on, and pitched his tent beyond Migdal Eder." The word "ohalo" ("his tent") in this verse is spelled in an unusual fashion, with a letter "hei" at the end of the word, as if it would read, "ohala" - "her tent." We find this same spelling of this word earlier in Sefer Bereishit, in Parashat Lekh-Lekha (12:8), concerning Avraham's settlement east of Bet-El. Rashi there explains that the Torah spells the word as if it reads "her tent" because Avraham first pitched "her" - Sara's - tent before pitching his own tent. Presumably, Rashi would apply the same approach in our context, and this verse would thus mean that Yaakov first pitched his wife's tent before his own. Of course, such a reading would indicate that Yaakov at this point selected one of his remaining three wives (Rachel had just passed away) as his primary wife, and pitched her tent first, before setting up his own. The fact that the Torah then immediately tells of Reuven's act might suggest that it somehow relates to Yaakov's recent designation of one his wives as his primary wife. This, perhaps, serves as another clue to the fact that Reuven does not commit adultery, but rather protests his father's decision to establish his permanent residence in Bilha's tent.

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Parashat Vayishlach tells of Yaakov's return to Eretz Canaan, upon which he purchased a lot and settled in the outskirts of the city of Shekhem. The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 11:8; Pesikta, 11) comments that Yaakov arrived at the outskirts of Shekhem shortly before Shabbat on a Friday afternoon, and he made a point of demarcating the "techumin" - the boundaries around his encampment within which walking is permitted on Shabbat. Halakha forbids walking on Shabbat beyond two thousand amot ("cubits") outside one's city or town. Yaakov therefore ensured to clearly mark the boundaries around his area, beyond which point he and his family were forbidden from walking.

Interestingly, whereas regarding Yaakov Chazal mention the observance of this halakha of "techumin," with regard to Avraham they emphasize a different obligation - "eiruv tavshilin." The law of "eiruv tavshilin" involves a situation of Yom Tov that occurs on Erev Shabbat. Should a person wish to make preparations for Shabbat on Yom Tov, he must first prepare some food for Shabbat before Yom Tov begins. The Gemara in Masekhet Yoma (28b) emphasizes Avraham's observance of this halakha, remarking that Avraham observed the entire Torah, "and even 'eiruv tavshilin'."

The obvious question arises, why do Chazal underscore Avraham's observance of "eiruv tavshilin," and Yaakov's observance of the laws of "techumin"?

Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen, in his "Meshekh Chokhma," suggests that these comments by Chazal reflect the different approaches taken by these two patriarchs. Avraham found himself alone in his belief in monotheism; the entire world had embraced pagan beliefs, and his was a lone voice promoting the belief in a single God. Therefore, as Chazal describe, he exerted himself in the dissemination of his faith and became an influential, public figure. Midrashim speak of the people he and Sara converted to monotheism in Charan, and of the hotel he established in Be'er Sheva for the specific purpose of attracting travelers and speaking to them about monotheism. The Meshekh Chokhma suggests that Chazal allegorically refer to these efforts as Avraham's observance of "eiruv tavshilin." Literally, "eiruv tavshilin" means "mixing cooked foods." Avraham involved himself in the "mixture" of peoples. He made the effort to meet different kinds of people, from different places, with different lifestyles and beliefs, in order to spread the truth of the Almighty to as large and diverse an audience as possible.

Yaakov Avinu, however, lived in the post-Avraham era, when monotheism had already become a widely recognized theology, albeit with but a small number of devoted adherents. Now was the time to concentrate on building and developing Am Yisrael - the nation that would represent God and teach the world through example. Rather than active proselytizing, Yaakov and his descendants must focus their energies inward, on the cultivation of the Nation of God. He therefore "established boundaries," symbolic of a degree of isolation that was now required. Yaakov wanted his family to live separately and independently so that the Nation of Israel can develop based on the values of its patriarchs, unaffected by the pervading culture and beliefs. Therefore, as opposed to Avraham, who devoted his life to "eiruv tavshilin," to active engagement with peoples of other faiths, Yaakov concentrates on "techumin" - his family's isolation and independence.

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In the middle of Parashat Vayishlach, we read of the death and burial of Devora, the nursemaid of Rivka (35:8). Rashi, in his commentary to this verse, explains that Rivka had sent Devora to bring Yaakov back home from Charan, and Devora died as she accompanied Yaakov on the way home. The Ramban, however, argues that Rivka would not have sent such an elderly woman on so far a journey to bring Yaakov home; she would have sent a younger servant. He therefore explains that Devora, who had accompanied Rivka many years earlier on her initial trip to Canaan to marry Yitzchak (see 24:59), at some point returned home to Charan. Alternatively, the Ramban suggests, Devora was not the same nurse who accompanied Rivka to Canaan. In any event, he writes, Devora joined Yaakov as he returns to Canaan, perhaps in order to care for Rivka, who was now an elderly woman.

Why does the Torah mention the death of Devora? According to the Ramban, we must accept the Midrash's comment that at the time of Devora's death, Yaakov received word of another death - that of his mother, Rivka. The Midrash explains that the Torah never explicitly records Rivka's death because of the disrespectful burial she received. Since her husband was blind and Yaakov was away in Charan, Esav was the only family member who attended her funeral. This may have prompted people observing such a burial to utter humiliating comments about Rivka, bemoaning the fact that Rivka's only legacy is the corrupt and ruthless Esav. She was therefore given a private, nighttime funeral so as to protect her honor. Due to the dishonorable nature of her burial, the Torah does not explicitly record her death. The Ramban claims that for this reason the Torah mentions the death of Devora, to provide a context in which to allude to Rivka's death.

The Da'at Zekeinim Mi-Ba'alei Ha-Tosafot cites a Midrash associating Devora, Rivka's nursemaid, with the other, far more famous Devora - the prophetess who led Benei Yisrael to triumph over the Canaanite king Yavin during the period of the Shoftim (see Shoftim 4-5). In introducing Devora the prophetess, the verse writes in Sefer Shoftim (4:5) that she "would sit under the Palm of Devora... " According to the Midrash cited by the Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot, this palm was actually the "alon" (oak) under which the nursemaid Rivka was buried, as recorded here in Parashat Vayishlach. Why would the Midrash draw such an association between Devora the nursemaid and Devora the prophetess?

Perhaps the answer lies particularly in the stark contrast between these two personalities. Devora the prophetess was a woman of wealth, prominence, leadership, and, of course, spiritual insight. In fact, Rashi, in his comments to the aforementioned verse in Sefer Shoftim, interprets that verse as a reference to Devora's vast holdings in the palm-rich region of Jericho and other areas. And in the following verse, she summons Barak, the nation's military general, and orders him to launch an offensive against the Canaanites. This woman of power and authority contrasts sharply with Devora the nursemaid, whose most prominent feature appears to be her anonymity. The Torah leaves with hardly a clue as to her identity. saw, the Ramban is unsure whether she was in fact the nurse mentioned in Parashat Chayei-Sara, who accompanied Rivka to Canaan. And in the Midrashim, we find two views as to whether she was Rivka's mother or aunt. In any event, the Torah tells us nothing about her, other than her name and profession.

For this very reason, perhaps, the Midrash draws a connection between these two women. As prominent and influential as Devora the prophetess was, she nevertheless "sat under the Palm of Devora" the nursemaid. She made a point of retaining a soft, gentle, humble demeanor, even as she took the reins of leadership in an attempt to restore stability to an anarchy-stricken nation. She found the way of being both a "nevi'a" (prophetess) and a "meineket" (nursemaid) - a woman of intellect and authority on the one hand, and, on the other, of simplicity, sensitivity and compassion.

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Parashat Vayishlach tells of Yaakov's nighttime wrestle against a mysterious assailant on the night prior to his dreaded reunion with Esav. After this encounter, the Torah tells, "The sun shone for him... " (32:32). The Gemara (Chulin 91b) records that Rabbi Akiva discussed this verse with Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua, as they went to the butcher shop to purchase meat for Rabban Gamliel's son's wedding. Rabbi Akiva noted the verse's peculiar implication that the sun shone only "for him" - for Yaakov, and not for anyone else. How could this be? He answered that indeed, the sun rose earlier for Yaakov than for the rest of the world, to pay him back, so-to-speak, for the early sunset he encountered when he initially fled Canaan (see Rashi to 28:11).

While Rabbi Akiva's discussion of this verse in itself is basically clear, the emphasis on the context of this discussion requires some explanation. The Gemara records Rabbi Akiva as commenting, "I asked Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Yehoshua in the meat market of Ima'um, as they went to purchase an animal for Rabban Gamliel's son's wedding... " Why is this information significant? Furthermore, why would the difficulty in this verse come up in conversation on the way to the meat market?

Rav Menachem Benzion Zaks (son-in-law of Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank zt"l), in his work, "Menachem Tziyon," suggests a fascinating approach to understanding this account. As we know from other Talmudic and Midrashic passages, Rabbi Akiva lived in the aftermath of the Second Temple's destruction and the failed revolt led by Bar-Kokhba against the Roman government. This was a time of terrible persecution against the Jews, particularly against Torah scholars, and in fact Rabbi Akiva himself was ultimately tortured to death by the Roman authorities. Furthermore, we know from the famous story told at the end of Masekhet Makot, as well as from other passages, that Rabbi Akiva sounded the voice of optimism amidst the gloom and despair that pervaded the Jewish communities of Eretz Yisrael during this time. The story told here, Rav Zaks suggests, serves as yet another example of Rabbi Akiva's attempts to instill some hope and encouragement within an otherwise despondent rabbinic leadership. As the three sages prepared for Rabban Gamliel's son's wedding, they could not help but wonder whether such an event deserves celebration. For what purpose were couples marrying and begetting children? Why should we celebrate Jewish continuity, if the Jews will just suffer ongoing persecution at the hands of the Roman authorities, who committed themselves to the destruction of Torah Jewry?

Rabbi Akiva therefore reminded his colleagues of the story of Yaakov, who, like his descendants under Roman rule, suffered persecution at the hands of "saro shel Esav" - the "heavenly angel" representing Esav and the nation of Edom. He, too, was dealt a painful and debilitating blow during the darkness of exile. Eventually, however, "the sun shone for him." Just as it appeared as though the sun set early as he was driven into exile, that he was pursued by darkness and despair, so did the sun rise early for him, did he experience the dawn of salvation and deliverance with his successful triumph over his enemies.

In this way, Rabbi Akiva hoped to alleviate the hopelessness that had begun to overtake the Jews of his time, and guarantee them of the rising sun of redemption that will drive away the darkness of exile and persecution.

*****

Parashat Vayishlach tells the story of the city of Shekhem, which Shimon and Levi - two of Yaakov's sons - destroyed in revenge for the rape of their sister, by the city's prince, also named Shekhem. Dina's brothers deceived the people of Shekhem by offering their consent to allow Shekhem to marry Dina, on condition that the males of the city undergo circumcision. The verse states, "On the third day, when they were in pain, Shimon and Levi... took each his sword, came upon the city unmolested, and slew all the males" (34:25). Why does the Torah emphasize that this occurred on "the third day" after the people's circumcision?

The mishna in Masekhet Shabbat (86a; 134b) derives from this verse that the third day after circumcision is a particularly painful and dangerous time. (See also Rashi to 18:1.) Shimon and Levi specifically scheduled their assault for the third day, knowing that the males of Shekhem would find themselves in an especially precarious physical condition on that day. The halakhic ramification of this medical fact, the mishna posits, is that if a child underwent circumcision on Thursday, then on Shabbat - the third day - the infant's needs override the Shabbat prohibitions. Thus, for example, one may heat water on that Shabbat in order to wash the area of the mila to prevent infection. This halakha is codified in the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 331:9).

The Tashbatz, cited by the Beit Yosef and Shakh (Y.D. 265), arrives at an interesting stringency based on this halakha. Essentially, this halakha says that whenever a person undergoes circumcision, we know from the outset that he will face a life-threatening situation two days later, on the third day. Presumably, therefore, we should, in theory, try to avoid performing circumcisions on Thursday, as doing so would often necessitate the violation of Shabbat two days later. Just as Halakha forbids embarking on an oceanic journey on Thursday or Friday, as this might necessitate the violation of Shabbat two days later (see O.C. 248:1), so should we forbid circumcisions on Thursday, so as to avoid the need to violate Shabbat. Of course, in most cases we cannot schedule a berit mila; if a healthy child is born on a Thursday, Torah law requires performing the circumcision the following Thursday, and clearly the concern for Shabbat violation two days later will not warrant delaying the mila. (After all, if a child is born on Shabbat, the mila itself override the prohibitions of Shabbat!) However, the Tashbatz argues, this rule will take effect with respect to the circumcisions of converts. The conversion process entails a number of stages, including circumcision. Now unlike in the case of a Jewish newborn, when it comes to a prospective convert we are not bound to a specific day. Therefore, the Tashbatz argues, a convert should not be circumcised on Thursday, since doing so will likely result in the need to violate Shabbat two days later.

Rav Shmuel Barukh Deutsch, in his "Birkat Kohen," insightfully infers from this ruling of the Tashbatz a halakha relevant to a seemingly unrelated topic. Strictly speaking, Halakha permits Shabbat desecration for purposes of saving a Jewish life, but does not allow violating Shabbat to save the life of a gentile. (Practically, halakhic authorities allow doctors to violate Shabbat to administer medical care to even non-Jews facing a life-threatening situation, due to the potentially disastrous consequences of refusing to treat non-Jews patients on Shabbat. See Iggerot Moshe 4:49 and Yabia Omer 8:38.) Now the Tashbatz assumes that when a prospective convert undergoes circumcision on Thursday, we may violate Shabbat for his medical needs two days later. Significantly, however, the convert does not attain the status of a Jew until after immersion in a mikva, which does not until after he has fully recovered from his mila (see Shulchan Arukh, Y.D. 268:2). It thus turns out that the Tashbatz sanctions violating Shabbat to save the life of a convert who has been circumcised, despite the fact that he has not completed the conversion process. Although he has yet to attain the formal status of a Jew, we nevertheless apply to him the laws of Shabbat as if he were a Jew.