The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

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Yeshivat Har Etzion

VAYIGASH / CHANUKA

Rav David Silverberg

            In the Al Ha-nissim paragraph added to the amida and birkat ha-mazon during Chanukah, we tell that after the Jews' triumph over the Greeks, "they lit candles in Your sacred courtyards" ("ve-hidliku neirot be-chatzrot kodshekha").  The term chatzer ("courtyard") generally denotes an open area situated outside a home or building.  In the context of the Beit Ha-mikdash, it presumably refers to the azara, the open area outside the entrance to the heikhal, the actual building of the Temple.

            Accordingly, a number of writers wondered why we speak of the Jews' kindling the menora in the "courtyards" of the Temple.  The menora was situated inside the heikhal, together with the shulchan (table) and incense altar.  How can the Jews be said to have kindled the lights of the menora outside, in the azara?

            The Chatam Sofer, as recorded in his printed derashot, explains that the Chashmona'im indeed transferred the menora to the azara outside the Mikdash before kindling it.  As we read in Al Ha-nissim, the Greeks had profaned the Temple by filling it with statues and other idolatrous articles, and thus after the Chashmona'im's victory they "cleared out Your Sanctuary and purified Your Temple" (u-finu et heikhalekha ve-tiharu et mikdashekha").  The Chatam Sofer suggests that the Chashmonaim were unable to perform rituals such as kindling the menora inside the Mikdash until the purification process was completed, and they therefore moved the menora outside, to the Temple courtyard.  This approach is predicated upon the Rambam's ruling in Hilkhot Bi'at Mikdash (9:7) concerning the possibility of a non-kohen kindling the menora.  The Rambam writes that the kindling may be performed by a non-kohen, but since only kohanim are permitted inside the Temple, this is possible only if a kohen brings the menora outside to the courtyard, where a non-kohen then kindles the lamps.  This ruling clearly assumes that the menora may be transferred to the azara and lit there, and the Chatam Sofer claims that this is precisely what the Chashmona'im were compelled to do during the process of cleansing the Temple.

            In a generally similar vein, Rav Aharon Goldberg, in his work on the siddur entitled Shirat David (Cleveland, 2002), suggests that the Chashmona'im brought the menora outside into the courtyard in order to publicize the miracle of the oil.  Upon seeing that the candles continued to burn without depleting the limited supply of oil, they brought the menora to the azara so that everyone could look upon and marvel at this great miracle.

            Rav Baruch Epstein, in his work Barukh She-amar (p. 147), presents an entirely different – and somewhat startling – approach, claiming that the phrase be-chatzrot kodshekha in Al Ha-nissim does not refer to the kindling of the menora at all.  Rather, it refers to general, festive lights that were kindled in the courtyard of the Beit Ha-mikdash as part of the triumphant celebration of the Jews' victory.  The menora was lit inside the heikhal as usual, and the reference here in Al Ha-nissim is to other lights that were kindled for festive purposes.

SUNDAY

            The Rambam begins his presentation of the laws of Chanukah by briefly reviewing the history of the Greek persecution and the Jews' successful revolt.  In describing the kinds of oppression suffered by the Jews at the hands of the Greeks, the Rambam mentions "pashetu yedeihem be-mamonam" – the Greeks "cast their hands onto their [the Jews'] money" (Hilkhot Chanukah 3:1); meaning, the Greeks at the time stole from and cheated the Jews.

            A number of later writers addressed the question of from where the Rambam derived that the Greeks abused the Jews financially.  The Sages speak at length of the Greeks' campaign of religious persecution, but we do not find any explicit reference to theft and the like.  Rav Moshe Leiter, in his work Mamlekhet Kohanim, suggests a number of different approaches that one could take to identify a possible source for the Rambam's comment:

1)      A famous Midrashic passage in Bereishit Rabba (2:4), which appears as well in Megilat Ta'anit, tells that the Greeks issued a decree requiring every Jew who owned an ox to inscribe upon its horns the words, "I have no part in the God of Israel."  Rav Yaakov Emden, in his glosses to Megilat Ta'anit, explains that the Greeks enacted this decree in an effort to drive the Jews to financial ruin.  The Greeks understood that many Jews would be unwilling to make such an inscription on their cattle, and would prefer not to own livestock at all.  This would obviously preclude the possibility of farming, and the faithful Jews would thus be subjected to intolerable poverty.  In this manner, the Greeks indeed "cast their hands onto their money."

2)      The Ma'aseh Rokei'ach commentary notes that in other editions of Mishneh Torah, the text of this passage reads, "pashetu yedeihem BE-VATEIHEM," indicating that the Greeks intruded upon the Jews' homes, rather than steal their money.  If this is indeed the correct text, then the Rambam likely refers here to a point he mentions in his famous Iggeret Ha-shemad, that the Greeks forbade the Jews from closing their doors.  The Greeks sought to ensure that the Jews were not clandestinely engaging in mitzva observance, and to this end they denied the Jews their privacy by requiring them to keep their doors open at all times.  Accordingly, the Rambam here does not speak at all about the Greeks' attempts at financial abuse, and refers instead to one of the many means they employed to prevent the Jews of the time from observing the mitzvot.

3)      Rav Leiter further cites a theory found in a work entitled Le-ha'ir Le-horot U-le-haskil claiming that the Rambam refers here to the Greeks' decree outlawing the implementation of the Torah's civil law.  The Greek required Jewish courts to adjudicate on the basis of the Greeks' system of law, rather than Halakha.  In this manner, they indeed tampered with the Jews' property, in that property was frequently awarded to the litigant who would not have won the case according to the Torah's system of civil law.

4)      Finally, Rav Leiter notes that Sefer Ha-chashmona'im (book 1) mentions an incident where the Greek leadership seized money and valuables that had been earmarked for the Beit Ha-mikdash.  Accordingly, it is possible that the Rambam refers here not to the theft of private property, but rather to the appropriation of public funds that were intended for the enhancement of the Temple.

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            The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (23a) establishes the halakhic principle of hadlaka osa mitzva – the mitzva of Chanukah candles is performed through the act of lighting, and not by placing a lit candle by the doorway.  One ramification of this principle is that a person does not fulfill the mitzva if a child – who is not included in the obligation – lit the Chanukah candles.  Even if the person then placed the candles by the doorway, he has not fulfilled the mitzva, which is defined by the act of lighting.  He must therefore light additional candles by the doorway to satisfy his obligation.

            The Yad Ha-melekh commentary to the Rambam's Mishneh Torah (end of Hilkhot Chanukah) raises the question of why the Gemara reached a definitive conclusion on this issue without introducing the debate among the Tanna'im that appears in Masekhet Megila.  The Mishna there (2:4) records that whereas the majority opinion disqualifies the Megila reading of a child, such that the adults in attendance do not fulfill their obligation through his reading, Rabbi Yehuda maintains that a child's reading is valid.  Why, the Yad Ha-melekh asked, does the Gemara appear to assume that according to all opinions – including Rabbi Yehuda's – a child's lighting of the Chanukah candles does not fulfill the adult's obligation?  Why would a child be capable of reading the Megila on behalf of an adult, but not of lighting Chanukah candles on his behalf?

            The Yad Ha-melekh answers by postulating a novel theory concerning the obligation of chinukh (training in the performance of mitzvot before reaching adulthood).  Namely, this obligation does not apply where an expenditure of money is entailed.  Since no cost is involved in reading the Megila, a child is required by the obligation of chinukh to read (or listen to) the Megila; as such, he has the ability to read on behalf of adults, as well (according to Rabbi Yehuda's view).  When it comes to Chanukah candles, however, the performance of the mitzva requires materials that cost money, and hence this obligation does not fall under the rubric of the mitzva of chinukh.  By extension, then, the lighting of a child cannot fulfill an adult's obligation.

            The Keli Chemda (Keli Chemda – Inyanei Chanukah) challenged this theory of the Yad Ha-melekh on the basis of the Gemara's famous ruling in Masekhet Arakhin (2b) requiring that a child be trained in the mitzva of tefillin.  The Gemara establishes that once a child has reached the stage at which he can be trusted to treat the tefillin respectfully, he should begin wearing tefillin.  Acquiring tefillin certainly entails a considerable expense, and yet the Gemara nevertheless extends the obligation of chinukh to this mitzva, seemingly disproving the theory suggested by the Yad Ha-melekh.

            Rav Yisrael Natan Platsky, son of the Keli Chemda, suggests a possible defense for the Yad Ha-melekh by distinguishing between the mitzvot of tefillin and Chanukah candles.  Upon reaching the age of mitzva obligation a child must in any event somehow obtain tefillin.  And if, for whatever reason, his parents do not purchase tefillin for him, he, as a full-fledged halakhic adult, bears the personal responsibility to try and obtain tefillin.  Hence, purchasing tefillin for purposes of chinukh does not entail an additional expense; since a child must in any event acquire tefillin upon reaching adulthood, the acquisition of tefillin beforehand is not seen as an added expenditure.  The oil for Chanukah candles, however, is consumed immediately upon use; it cannot be saved for adulthood.  Necessarily, then, training in this mitzva as a child involves an additional expense, and hence, according to the Yad Ha-melekh, the Chanukah candles are not included under the chinukh obligation.  (We should note, however, that the Gemara in Arakhin speaks also of a child taking the four species on Sukkot, which would seem to resemble the oil for Chanukah candles in that they cannot normally be preserved for use in subsequent years.)

            Nevertheless, Rav Yisrael Natan upholds his father's objection to the Yad Ha-melekh's theory in light of a comment of Tosefot in Masekhet Chagiga (2a) regarding the sacrifices offered on the regalim (pilgrimage festivals).  Tosefot explicitly write that once a child has reached the age of chinukh, he must bring the sacrifices required on these festivals as part of his training in mitzva performance.  Clearly, Tosefot held that the chinukh obligation obtains even with regard to mitzvot that entail a financial expense, such as the purchase of animals for the festival sacrifices.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the Gemara's ruling in Masekhet Shabbat (23a) that a person does not fulfill his obligation to light Chanukah candles if a child kindles the lights in (or outside) his home.  As we saw, some Acharonim raised the question of why the Gemara does not hinge this issue on the debate recorded in the Mishna (Masekhet Megila 2:4) as to whether an adult fulfills his obligation of Megila on Purim by listening to its reading by a minor.  In both cases, we deal with a rabbinic obligation – Megila reading or Chanukah candle lighting – which one seeks to fulfill through the agency of a minor.  Seemingly, we should expect the halakha to be consistent in both instances.  Why, then, does the Gemara categorically disqualify the candle lighting of a child, without introducing the debate concerning Megila reading?

            The Keli Chemda suggested that the relationship between the two cases is subject to a debate among the Rishonim.  Tosefot in Masekhet Megila (24a) comment that Rabbi Yehuda's view, which allows for fulfilling one's obligation of Megila by listening to a child's reading, stems from the fact that Haman's decree to annihilate the Jews applied to young and old alike.  Generally, even Rabbi Yehuda agrees that an adult cannot fulfill his obligation through the agency of a minor, even when it comes to rabbinic obligations (regarding which both adults and children are obligated on the same level – the level of rabbinic enactment).  In the case of Megila reading, however, children and adults are deemed equal and thus a child's reading suffices to fulfill the obligation of adults.  The Keli Chemda contends that according to Tosefot's analysis, Rabbi Yehuda's ruling would not apply in the case of Chanukah candles.  The Greeks sought to obliterate the Jewish faith, not the Jewish people.  Had the Jews been prepared to abandon the Torah, they would not have faced any danger.  The Keli Chemda claims that since children are not included under the obligation of kiddush Hashem – to sacrifice one's life rather than forsake Judaism – the children were not, technically speaking, in a situation of danger during the Greek persecution.  Hence, unlike in the case of Purim, they are not obligated in the mitzvot of Chanukah on the same level as adults.  Therefore, even according to Rabbi Yehuda's view, an adult cannot fulfill the obligation of Chanukah candles through the lighting of a child.

            The Keli Chemda proceeds to demonstrate that this understanding of Rabbi Yehuda's position is not universally accepted.  The Ba'al Ha-ittur (in Hilkhot Megila) explains differently, claiming that Rabbi Yehuda viewed children and adults as bearing the precise same level of obligation with respect to all rabbinic commands.  Children's obligation in mitzvot generally stems from the rabbinic requirement of chinukh – that minors be trained in mitzva observance – which is no lower a level of obligation than the rabbinic requirement to read the Megila.  For this reason, the Ba'al Ha-ittur claims, Rabbi Yehuda allows a child to read the Megila on behalf of adults.  According to this approach, there should be no distinction made between Megila reading and Chanukah candles, and on Chanukah, too, Rabbi Yehuda should allow a minor to light on behalf of an adult.  Indeed, the Ran (Shabbat 10a in the Rif) cites the Ba'al Ha-ittur as allowing a child that has reached the age of training in mitzvot to light the Chanukah candles on an adult's behalf.  The Gemara, which ruled unequivocally that a child cannot light for an adult, refers only to children below the age of training in mitzvot, who are clearly not obligated at all in this mitzva and thus certainly cannot light on an adult's behalf.

            It thus emerges that according to Tosefot's view, Rabbi Yehuda's ruling regarding Megila reading would not apply to Chanukah candles, and for this reason the Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat makes no reference to Rabbi Yehuda's position.  According to the Ba'al Ha-ittur, by contrast, Rabbi Yehuda would, indeed, allow a child to light Chanukah candles for an adult, and this is in fact the Ba'al Ha-ittur's halakhic conclusion.  The Gemara in Shabbat makes no mention of Rabbi Yehuda's ruling because it refers only to children beneath the age of training of mitzvot; once a child reaches the age of mitzva training, then he can, in fact, light Chanukah candles on an adult's behalf.

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            We read in Parashat Vayigash that Yosef sent his brothers from Egypt to summon his father in Canaan and instruct him to relocate in Egypt, where Yosef, who served as the country's vizier, would support him during the remaining years of drought.  Pharaoh, upon hearing that Yosef's brothers were in Egypt, tells Yosef, "You are thus commanded [to instruct your brothers]: Do the following – take for yourselves wagons…and carry your father and come.  And your eyes shall not look sparingly upon your belongings, for the fat of all the land of Egypt is yours!" (45:19-20).  The Egyptian king ordered Yosef to provide wagons with which to transport their father, wives and children, and also offered them to fill their bags unsparingly with food from Egypt.

            The obvious question arises, why did Pharaoh introduce this gracious offer by declaring to Yosef, "Ve-ata tzuveita – "You are thus commanded"?  The expression tzivui ("command") is generally associated with a strict, compulsory order.  Why does Pharoah use this term here, in the context of his offering wagons and food?

            The Ramban explains, "He said this matter as a command to him knowing Yosef's ethical conduct, that he would not thrust his hand into the royal fortune… Pharaoh therefore figured that he might perhaps not wish to send his father anything…"  In other words, Pharaoh was well aware of Yosef's strict ethical standards which may have prevented him from taking goods from the royal treasury without a specific command from the king.

            Rav Yechezkel Levenstein (as cited in Mi-mizrach Shemesh) noted the meaningful lesson that emerges from the Ramban's comments.  The wealth in Pharaoh's treasury was, at this point in time, the product of Yosef's insight and skill.  It was he who prophetically foresaw the seven-year drought that would follow the seven plentiful years, and it was he who arranged and supervised the massive gain storage during the first seven years.  The fortune to which Yosef would have likely not allowed himself access was the result of his efforts; he could have easily justified availing himself of the assets of the royal treasury, especially for the purpose of assisting in the transportation of his saintly father.  Yet, Yosef exercised such meticulous care with regard to the property of others that he naturally denied himself access to the royal treasury for personal matters, until receiving an explicit command from Pharaoh himself.  Rather than saying, "Well, I deserve it," or "This property should really be mine anyway," Yosef showed respect to the property of others and did not presume any privileges or rights despite the fact that Egypt's wealth was amassed through his wisdom and efforts.

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            The Torah in Parashat Vayigash tells of Yaakov's resettlement in Egypt, and we read that along the way from Canaan, he stops in the city of Be'er Sheva where he brings sacrificial offerings to God (46:1).  The Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 94:4) presents a most surprising explanation for the purpose behind this stopover in Be'er Sheva, namely, that Yaakov went there to cut down the trees that his grandfather Avraham had planted many years earlier.  These trees were intended for use in constructing the Mishkan, and Yaakov, who foresaw that his descendants would build the Mishkan after leaving Egypt, brought the lumber with him as he left Canaan to resettle in Egypt.

            There is much room for thought as to the particular significance of the wood used for the Mishkan in the context of Yaakov's relocation in Egypt.  More generally, however, this passage in the Midrash demonstrates Yaakov's involvement in, and intensive focus on, lofty ideals and endeavors even during very personal, emotional experiences.  After twenty-two years of grieving, Yaakov suddenly learns that his son is alive and capable of sustaining him during the harsh drought that threatened the family's financial stability.  But as he makes his way towards Egypt to be reunited with Yosef and live his final years in peace, stability and serenity, his mind remains focused on the Mishkan, on his descendants' spiritual destiny.  Even during such moments of personal, emotional intensity, he did not lose sight of his lofty spiritual goals, aspirations and responsibilities.

            This is perhaps also the message underlying Rashi's comment later in this parasha (46:29) that Yaakov recited the shema as he embraced Yosef during their long-awaited reunion.  Even at this moment of personal joy, his heart and mind were entirely devoted to the service of the Almighty.

            Rav Avraham Yafhan of Nevarduk (as recorded in Ha-musar Ve-ha-da'at, published in Jerusalem, 5736) elaborated on this quality of Yaakov and noted how unfortunate it is that most of us do just the reverse: even while we ostensibly involve ourselves in avodat Hashem, our minds and hearts remained focused on our personal affairs.  Whereas Yaakov directed his attention towards his spiritual responsibilities even as he tended to personal matters, we direct our attention to our personal matters even as we tend to our spiritual responsibilities.  All too often, our performance of mitzvot is tainted by ulterior motives; and during tefilot and Torah study, our minds frequently wander onto our personal affairs.  The Midrashim cited above should remind us to approach all aspects of life as part of our responsibilities as ovedei Hashem, or, at very least, to ensure that the moments spent in avodat Hashem are indeed devoted purely for that purpose, and not for furthering our personal interests.

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            As the Torah tells in Parashat Vayigash, Yosef ordered his brothers to return to Canaan from Egypt to inform their father, Yaakov, that he is alive and rules over Egypt.  They were to then bring Yaakov to live in Egypt, where he would be sustained by Yosef during the drought that struck the region.

In delivering this message to Yaakov, Yosef says, "You shall dwell in the land of Goshen, and you shall be near me…" (45:10), expressing his plan that Yaakov and his family should reside specifically in the region of Goshen.  Later, when the family arrives in Egypt with all their property, Yosef prepares them for their meeting with Pharaoh and instructs them to inform the king that they work as shepherds, "in order that you shall reside in the land of Goshen" (46:34).  Yosef apparently afforded great importance to his family's settlement specifically in the area of Goshen.  How might we explain Yosef's insistence on having the family live in this particular region?

Rashi and the Radak (46:34) explain, very simply, that Goshen was well-suited for shepherding.  It apparently offered more fertile and verdant pasture land than other regions in Egypt, and Yosef therefore made a point of having his father and brothers settle in that district.  In a similar vein, Rabbenu Yosef Bekhor Shor explained that Goshen was generally a higher quality area and Yosef thus wished for his family to reside there and enjoy the very best the country had to offer.  (See also Abarbanel to 45:10.)

The Ramban (45:10) explains, somewhat ambiguously, "Yosef knew that his father would not want to remain in the land of Egypt [proper] where the royal capital was situated, so already now he sent to him that he would have him reside in the land of Goshen."  According to the Ramban, the appeal of Goshen was its remoteness.  He realized that Yaakov would prefer to live in the outskirts of Egypt, distant from the country's cultural and commercial centers, and therefore chose the land of Goshen for this purpose.

The Ramban likely had in mind the notion presented by Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch in his Torah commentary, where he emphasizes the importance of Benei Yisrael's relative seclusion in Goshen (46:34).  Rav Hirsch comments that Yosef saw the Egyptians' distaste for shepherds as his family's greatest asset, as it would help ensure the preservation of their national identity and ethical lifestyle.  He writes:

…for the disgust which the Egyptians had for their [Benei Yisrael's] calling…was the first means for the preservation of that race that was destined for an isolated path through the ages.  Until the spiritual moral morn dawns for the nations of the world, the barriers…which they have…raised against the Jews, have served to protect them from being infected by the barbarism and demoralization of the people in whose midst they were to have to wander for centuries.  That is why, here too, Joseph at once brought to the fore that aspect of his brethren which was unpleasant to the Egyptians with the expressed purpose of obtaining thereby for them, a separate province in which to settle.

Yosef thus chose Goshen not because of any intrinsic characteristic of that region, but due simply to its remoteness, which would allow Benei Yisrael to grow and develop independently as a separate nation.

            At first glance, one might question Yosef's selection of Goshen on the basis of a passage in Torat Kohanim commenting on the verse in Sefer Vayikra (18:3), "Do not follow the practices of the land of Egypt, in which you lived."  Torat Kohanim (cited by Rashi) infers from this verse that the conduct in ancient Egypt was more depraved than the conduct of any other nation of the time, and, furthermore, that "the place where Israel resided conducted themselves abominably more so than anyone else."  A number of super-commentators to Rashi (Siftei Chakhamim, Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi and others) explain that Torat Kohanim refers here to the native population of Goshen.  One might wonder why Yosef wanted his father and brothers to reside in this region, which was known for its particularly corrupt and debased culture, and why Yaakov would agree to reside there.

            The answer emerges clearly from the very next comment in Torat Kohanim: "And from where do we know that Israel's residence caused all this conduct?  As the verse states, 'do not follow…in which you lived'."  The Ra'avad explains this to mean that the people of Goshen – and the Egyptian population generally – became especially corrupt as a result of their enslavement of Benei Yisrael.  In accordance with the notion of aveira goreret aveira – one wrongful act leads to another – the Egyptians' crimes against Benei Yisrael bred further moral deterioration, until they became the most corrupt nation in the world, and the people of Goshen degenerated to the lowest stratum among the Egyptian populace.  Thus, the woeful moral condition of Goshen as described in Torat Kohanim surfaced only after Benei Yisrael's enslavement, and we therefore need not question Yosef's judgment in choosing this region for the area of his family's residence.