The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash
Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion
CHANUKA
By Rav David Silverberg
The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (23a) establishes that a person whose home features two entrances must light Chanukah candles by both entrances, so as to avoid suspicion on the part of onlookers who would otherwise see an entranceway without candles. Rather than allow for the possible misconception that he did not light Chanukah candles, one should light candles by all his entranceways. The Rama (671:8) rules that this halakha does not apply nowadays, when many people light Chanukah candles indoors, and thus an empty entranceway would not give rise to any suspicion of neglect with regard to this very important mitzva.
The
Ran (in Masekhet Shabbat) posited that when a person (in Talmudic times) lights
the Chanukah candles by the second entranceway to avoid suspicion, he does not
recite the berakha. Since this lighting serves merely to avoid
suspicion, and does not fulfill the actual mitzva of Chanukah
candles, it does not warrant the recitation of a berakha.
The Peri
Chadash (Y.D. 13:9), however, questions this ruling of the Ran in light of
another halakha enacted by the Sages to avoid suspicion, namely, the law
of ben paku'a. According to Torah
law, the slaughtering of a pregnant animal renders the fetus permissible for
consumption, and one may thus partake of the fetus' meat without first
slaughtering it. Nevertheless, the Sages
feared that if a person eats meat from a fetus without first performing shechita,
he will be suspected by onlookers of partaking of meat from an animal that had
not undergone slaughtering. They
therefore required slaughtering a ben paku'a before eating its meat,
and, according to most authorities (see Rashba, responsa, 1:625), one recites a
berakha when slaughtering the fetus, just as when slaughtering an
ordinary animal. This clearly demonstrates
that Halakha requires reciting a berakha even when performing a mitzva
act that serves merely to avoid suspicion.
Seemingly, then, one should recite a berakha when lighting Chanukah candles by the
second entrance to his home – in direct opposition to the Ran's position. (We discussed this question in our S.A.L.T.
series a number of years ago, when we cited an answer from the work Imrei Kohen; see www.vbm-torah.org/archive/salt-bereishit/11-8vayigash.htm.)
Rav Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach (as cited in Halikhot
Shelomo) suggested a number of
distinctions between the two cases, in defense of the Ran's ruling. For one thing, in situations requiring
lighting Chanukah candles by a second entrance, one should light these candles
immediately following his primary lighting by the first entrance. Naturally, then, the berakha recited over the initial lighting covers as well the second lighting,
which is performed immediately thereafter.
In the case of ben paku'a, however, when one slaughters the fetus
some time after slaughtering the mother, a new berakha is warranted.
According to this
explanation, the two cases of Chanukah candles and ben paku'a are
fundamentally comparable, but practically the halakha differs in the
situation of Chanukah candles because the second lighting is performed soon
after the first lighting.
Rav Shlomo Zalman then suggested a second, more fundamental distinction between the two cases. Halakha requires reciting a berakha when slaughtering a ben paku'a because the act of slaughtering achieves the precisely same goal as the slaughtering of an ordinary animal – it transforms forbidden meat into meat that is now permissible for consumption. Though a ben paku'a is forbidden for consumption before slaughtering only on the level of Rabbinic enactment, nevertheless, it has a status of issur (a forbidden item) that is lifted as a result of the shechita. Hence, this shechita has the same halakhic effect as any ordinary shechita, and thus requires a berakha. The same cannot be said about lighting Chanukah candles at a second entranceway. Once the first candles have been lit, the mitzva of Chanukah candles with respect to this house has been satisfactorily fulfilled. All that remains is to avoid suspicion on the part of pedestrians, and lighting for this purpose does not warrant the recitation of a berakha.
Tomorrow we will iy"H present two additional answers that Rav Shlomo Zalman suggested in response to the question raised by the Peri Chadash.
******
Yesterday,
we discussed a question raised by the Peri Chadash (Y.D. 13:9)
concerning the halakha requiring one to light Chanukah candles by all
entrances to his home, lest passersby see only one entrance and suspect the
homeowner of neglecting this mitzva.
(As we mentioned yesterday, this halakha does not apply nowadays,
since in any event many people light indoors, and not by the entranceway; see
below.) The Ran ruled that since the
lighting by the second entrance serves merely to avoid suspicion, and does not
actually fulfill the mitzva (which has already been fulfilled through
the initial lighting), one does not recite a berakha over the second
lighting. The Peri Chadash,
however, noted that in the case of ben paku'a (see yesterday's
discussion), where one slaughters a fetus solely for the purpose of avoiding
suspicion, Halakha indeed requires reciting a berakha. Seemingly, then, a berakha is mandated in cases where Chazal imposed an obligation for the purpose of
avoiding suspicion, and one should therefore recite the berakha when lighting Chanukah candles by a second entranceway.
Today we will present
two more answers suggested by Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach (as cited in Halikhot Shelomo) in defense of the Ran's position.
Firstly, Rav Shlomo
Zalman noted that the nature of the Rabbinic enactment differs in the case of
lighting Chanukah candles by a second entranceway. Although all of Chazal's enactments were
legislated in response to certain concerns, many enactments apply regardless of
whether this concern is relevant under the given circumstances. Very often in Halakha, obligations or
prohibitions legislated by the Sages remain in effect even in situations where
the factors that prompted the legislation are not applicable. In other situations, however, the enactment
is entirely contingent upon the circumstances, and a person is bound by the
given obligation or prohibition only in situations where the original concern
is relevant.
In the case of ben paku'a, Chazal forbade partaking of the fetus' meat
without slaughtering irrespective of the particular circumstances. Even in situations where nobody could
possibly suspect the individual of eating an ordinary animal that had not been slaughtered,
the prohibition remains in effect. With
regard to Chanukah candles at the second entranceway, by contrast, the
requirement is dependent upon the concern of suspicion. Indeed, as we mentioned yesterday, the Rama
ruled (O.C. 671:8) that nowadays an entranceway without Chanukah candles does
not give rise to suspicion, given that in any event many people light indoors,
and therefore this obligation does not apply.
This demonstrates that Chazal did not afford to this the lighting by the
second entranceway the status of the actual mitzva of candle lighting,
and hence one does not recite the berakha over this lighting.
Finally, Rav Shlomo
Zalman notes that the concern of suspicion is not identical in the two cases of
ben paku'a and the lighting of Chanukah candles. In the case of Chanukah candles at the second
entrance, Chazal were concerned simply for the individual's
reputation. With regard to a ben paku'a, however, they enacted a prohibition to prevent against the possible
misconception that one may eat meat without first slaughtering an animal. They sought to preserve not merely the
individual's reputation among his peers, but rather the integrity of the Torah
prohibition of eiver min ha-chai (partaking from a live animal). In this respect, the slaughtering of a ben paku'a very much relates to the general obligation of shechita and thus warrants a berakha. By
contrast, lighting Chaunkah candles by the second entrance does not serve any
purpose at all with regard to the laws of Chanukah. This lighting is performed in fulfillment of
the Rabbinic dictum ve-heyitem
nekiyim mei-Hashem u-mi-Yisrael
(taken from Bamidbar 32:22), requiring that one avoid situations where he will
be suspected of transgressing the Torah.
As such, this lighting does not mandate the recitation of the berakhot normally recited when lighting Chanukah candles.
******
As we have discussed
in our previous two editions of S.A.L.T., the Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (23a)
establishes that a person whose home features two entrances must light Chanukah
candles by both entrances, lest passersby see an entrance without candles and
conclude that the individual neglected the mitzva. The Rama (O.C. 671:8), as we saw, ruled that
this halakha does not apply nowadays, since in any event
many people light Chanukah candles indoors, and thus passersby who see an empty
entranceway will not come to suspect the homeowner of neglecting this
obligation.
The Sha'arei Teshuva (673:12) cites a ruling from the Shevut Yaakov (3:48)
whereby this halakha has application even in cases of a house
with but a single entranceway. The Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 673:2) rules that if one's Chanukah candles were extinguished
before they had burned for the minimum required duration, one is not required
to rekindle them (provided that they had initially been lit with enough oil or
wax to burn for the minimum duration).
The Shevut Yaakov claims that while one need not rekindle the
candles in such a case, he must leave the candles near the entranceway until
the minimum required period has passed, so as to avoid suspicion. In his view, just as the Sages required
lighting candles in all entranceways to avoid suspicion, so did they require leaving
the remnants of one's candles after they have been extinguished, lest
pedestrians mistakenly conclude that the individual has neglected the mitzva.
Rav Shlomo Zalman
Auerbach (as cited in Halikhot
Shelomo) disputed this ruling of
the Shevut Yaakov. He
understood this requirement to light at a second entranceway as applying only
at the time of lighting itself. The
obligation of Chanukah candles requires pirsumei nisa, publicizing
the miracle, and for this reason one must light in a manner that achieves the
greatest publicity and avoids any possible impression that candles were not
kindled. Chazal required lighting
in the second entrance as part of the obligation of pirsumei nisa, which
applies only at the time of lighting, and not thereafter. Hence, one is not bound by this halakha once he had already lit the candles, even if they were prematurely
extinguished.
Rav Shlomo Zalman
suggesting applying this theory concerning the requirement to light by the
second entrance to resolve a difficulty raised by the Beit Yosef (O.C. 671:8). The Gemara in
Masekhet Berakhot (8a, 61b) establishes that one should not pass in front of an
entrance to a synagogue during services without stepping inside, as this gives
the appearance of disinterest in participating in the service. If, however, the synagogue has several
entrances, one may pass by an entrance, as people will grant him the benefit of
the doubt and assume that he will be entering through a different
entrance. Why, the Beit Yosef asks, do we not apply the same rationale in the context of Chanukah
candles? Why do we not trust that people
will assume the individual has lit Chanukah candles by the second entrance?
Apparently, the halakha concerning Chanukah candles differs because of the interest in
achieving maximum pirsumei nisa.
Even though most people would give the benefit of the doubt, as we
assume in the case of walking past a synagogue, the prospect of some
pedestrians entertaining fleeting suspicions regarding the individual's candle
lighting suffices to mandate lighting in the second entrance. Since this requirement stems from the strict
demands of pirsumei nisa, we are more rigorous in insisting upon
avoiding misperceptions than in other similar contexts, such as passing by a
synagogue during prayers.
******
We have been discussing
this week the halakha mentioned in the Gemara (Shabbat 23a)
requiring that one light Chanukah candles on all doorways to his home that face
the public domain. Although the mitzva is, strictly speaking, fulfilled through the kindling of a candle in
one entranceway, Chazal feared that pedestrians who see a doorway
without candles might wrongly suspect the house's resident of neglecting this mitzva. They therefore required
lighting candles by all doorways to one's home.
The Rama (O.C. 671:8), as we've mentioned, ruled that this requirement
does not apply nowadays, when in any event many people light Chanukah candles
indoors.
This concern of Chazal may perhaps be better understood in light of a comment by the Rambam in his Iggeret Ha-shemad in describing the period of Greek oppression. The Rambam tells that beyond issuing decrees forbidding Jewish practices, the Greek authorities required Jews to leave their front doors open, denying them the possibility of observing the Torah in private. The Greeks understood that Jewish tradition could potentially survive and flourish even if it is restricted to the private realm of family life. They therefore denied the Jews their private life to ensure that their traditions could not be perpetuated to the next generation.
This historical account may shed some light on the theme of pirsumei nisa that is so dominant within the laws of Chanukah. We celebrate our victory over Greek oppression by fulfilling this mitzva as publicly as possible, by making every effort to publicize the survival of Torah. For this reason, perhaps, Chazal wanted to ensure that a home would not even give the appearance of neglecting this mitzva of Chanukah candles. Since the goal of this mitzva is to reverse the decree of the Greek oppressors, to celebrate our freedom to observe mitzvot openly and publicly, the Sages required that candles be lit by every entranceway, so that it is clear that mitzvot are observed in every Jewish home.
******
The
Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (21b) famously delineates the three
"tiers" of the obligation of Chanukah candles. The basic obligation, the Gemara establishes,
is ner ish u-veito, the kindling of a single flame in each home every
night of Chanukah. The second level, to
which the Gemara refers as mehadrin, requires that a candle be lit for
each member of the household; the Rishonim debate the question of
whether each member of the household lights, or one person lights a candle on
behalf of each member. The third and
final level, mehadrin min ha-mehadrin, requires the lighting of an additional
candle each night of Chanukah – one candle the first night, two on the second
night, and so on. (According to Beit Shammai, this level of observance requires lighting eight on the first night,
seven on the second, and so on.)
It is generally
understood that the term mehadrin in this context refers to the notion of hiddur mitzva, beautifying the performance of mitzva, a halakhic concept
that is discussed elsewhere in the Talmud and which applies in many areas of halakha. The Sages established a basic
level of performance as well as an additional level of hiddur, "beautification," whereby one achieves a higher standard of
mitzva observance. Just as one
fulfills the mitzva of tefillin at a higher level
by ensuring a high aesthetic standard, so does one fulfill the obligation of ner Chanukah at a higher level by lighting additional candles.
However, Rav Eliyahu
Baruch Shulman, in his work Binyan
Av (23), insightfully notes that
from Rashi's commentary to this sugya it appears that he understood the notion of
mehadrin differently. Commenting on the word ve-ha-mehadrin, Rashi writes, "ve-ha-mehadrin
achar ha-mitzvot" (literally,
"those who chase after mitzvot").
Rashi clearly interpreted the word mehadrin in this context
not as a derivation of the Hebrew word hadar, which refers to
beauty or enhancement, but rather as evolving from the Aramaic root h.d.r, which is equivalent to the Hebrew root ch.z.r., which means
"return" or "chase after."
According to Rashi,
then, the levels of mehadrin and mehadrin min ha-mehadrin
do not involve the enhancement of the basic mitzva of ner ish u-veito. Rather, Chazal established a separate obligation of ner Chanukah for those who
pursue mitzvot, who are constantly striving for additional
means of serving the Almighty through the performance of mitzvot. The kindling of extra candles
is not intended as an enhancement of the basic obligation, but rather a
separate mitzva altogether for those who long for opportunities
to perform mitzvot.
On the basis of
Rashi's comments, Rav Shulman suggests an explanation for why neither the Tur nor the Shulchan Arukh makes any mention of the basic obligation
of ner ish u-veito.
Seemingly, even though the Jewish people have adopted the standard of mehadrin min ha-mehadrin, we would expect the halakhic codes to at
least mention the basic level of obligation.
In fact, as Rav Shulman notes, this bears important halakhic
significance with regard to a case of a person who mistakenly lights fewer
candles than required according to the standard of mehadrin min ha-mehadrin,
for example, if one lights three candles on the fourth night. When he realizes his mistake and lights the
fourth candle, he does not recite a new berakha, since he has
already fulfilled the basic obligation of ner Chanukah (Peri Chadash, cited by Rabbi Akiva Eiger, responsa, mahadura tanina 13). Thus, even though Jews have accepted upon
themselves the higher standard of mehadrin
min ha-mehadrin, there is still significance
to the distinction between the basic mitzva and the higher standard. Why, then, did the Tur and Shulchan Arukh make no mention of the basic obligation?
Rav Shulman explained that the Tur and Shulchan Arukh likely adopted Rashi's understanding, that the mehadrin and mehadrin min ha-mehadrin represent not enhancements of the basic obligation, but rather a separate mitzva for those who "pursue" mitzvot. The Tur and Shulchan Arukh thus codified only the mehadrin min ha-mehadrin, because this is the only means of performance that bears significance. Indeed, they would likely dispute the Peri Chadash's ruling cited above, and maintain that if a person neglected to light the extra candles and then realizes his mistake, he would recite a berakha upon lighting the extra candles. Since the extra candles are required not merely as an enhancement of the basic obligation, but rather by virtue of the independent mitzva of mehadrin min ha-mehadrin, a berakha is warranted when lighting the extra candles. Thus, once Am Yisrael embraced the standard of mehadrin min ha-mehadrin, the basic obligation of ner ish u-veito no longer bears any practical relevance, and therefore it is not mentioned by the Tur or Shulchan Arukh.
******
The Rambam introduces the laws of Chanukah (Hilkhot Chanukah, chapter 3) by reviewing the history of the Chanukah story, after which he presents the obligation of Chanukah candles:
Because of this, the Sages of that generation established that these eight days…shall be days of joy and praise, and that we light during them candles in the evening on the entrances of houses to demonstrate and publicize the miracle… And lighting candles during them [these days] is a mitzva from the words of the Rabbis…
Rav Soloveitchik (as cited by Rav Michel Shurkin in Harerei Kedem) noted the seeming redundancy in Maimonides' description of this mitzva. Once he already wrote that the Sages of that generation enacted "that we light…candles in the evening," why must he then emphasize, "And lighting candles during them is a mitzva"?
Rav
Soloveitchik suggested that the Rambam viewed the obligation of kindling
Chanukah candles as a dual obligation.
Firstly, the lighting in and of itself constitutes an obligation to
commemorate the rededication of the
According
to Rav Soloveitchik's understanding, when Halakha permits one to light
inside one's home when lighting outdoors poses danger, it does so because
lighting Chanukah candles itself fulfills an obligation even if no publicity is
achieved. If one is unable to fulfill
the mitzva of publicizing the miracle, he can nevertheless satisfy the
other aspect of the obligation by simply lighting Chaukah candles indoors. Rav Soloveitchik thus contended that the
Rambam would dispute the ruling of the Rama (671:7) that when one lights
indoors, he must not light the Chanukah candles in the same area when he
normally lights candles for illumination purposes. According to the Rama, even when lighting
indoors, one must achieve some level of pirsumei nisa (publicizing of
the miracle) by lighting candles in an area where he does not normally kindle
lights. The Rambam, the Rav argued,
would maintain that this is unnecessary, since when one lights indoors he in
any event fulfills only the aspect of the obligation involving the
commemoration of the rededication of the
On
the basis of this analysis, Rav Soloveitchik suggests an explanation for
Rashi's otherwise verbose comments in Masekhet Sukka (46a). The Gemara there introduces the obligation to
recite a berakha upon seeing Chanukah candles if he himself is unable to
light. Rashi explains the case as
follows: "He did not light in his home, and he passes through the public
domain and sees it [a Chanukah candle] in Jewish doorways, for there is a mitzva
to place [the candles] in the entranceway – he must recite a berakha over the first sighting."
Why does Rashi find it necessary to emphasize in this context the fact
that Chazal required lighting specifically by the
doorway to one's home? Rav Soloveitchik
explained that birkat ha-ro'eh, the obligation to recite a berakha upon seeing Chanukah candles, clearly evolves from the aspect of pirsumei nisa, publicizing the Chanukah miracle.
Therefore, according to Rashi, one recites this berakha
only if he sees Chanukah candles lit by the entranceway to somebody's home, as
these candles fulfill not only the obligation of lighting per se, but also the
aspect of pirsumei nisa. If,
however, a person sees candles that were lit indoors, he would not recite a berakha. Since these candles were not
lit in fulfillment of the pirsumei
nisa obligation, and fulfill only
the independent requirement of the commemorative candle lighting, the concept
of birkat ha-ro'eh does not apply. Accordingly, Rashi emphasized that only when
one sees candles lit outdoors, towards the public domain, is he required to
recite birkat ha-ro'eh.
******
Many people have the
practice of reciting mincha early on Erev Shabbat Chanukah so that the
lighting of the Chanukah candles will occur after the recitation of mincha. The Sha'arei Teshuva (O.C. 679) cites one reason for this custom in the name of the
Maharash Abuhav (cited by the Chida, in Birkei Yosef), who
explained that our lighting of Chanukah candles corresponds to the daily
lighting of the menora in the Beit Ha-mikdash. The lighting of the menora was performed only after the offering of the daily tamid in the afternoon, and therefore our recitation of mincha, which corresponds to the afternoon tamid, must precede the lighting
of Chanukah candles.
The Chafetz Chayim, in his Sha'ar Ha-tziyun (679:7), cites a different explanation for
this custom from the Peri Megadim, who claimed that kindling the Chanukah
candles before reciting mincha would appear contradictory. Once a person kindles the Chanukah candles,
he has expressed the onset of nighttime; the Chanukah candles must be lit at
night, and hence if a person lights before sundown, he implicitly declares that
nighttime has begun. It would thus
appear contradictory to then recite the daytime mincha prayer, and the
custom therefore evolved to recite mincha before lighting Chanukah candles on Friday
afternoon.
The work Piskei Teshuvot (679:2) cites the Gaon of Provizna as noting the obvious difficulty with the Peri Megadim's reasoning, namely, that we light Shabbat candles after lighting the Chanukah candles on Friday afternoon. According to the rationale of the Peri Megadim, once a person kindles the Chanukah candles and thereby declares the onset of night, Shabbat had effectively begun and it should be forbidden to then light Shabbat candles or perform any other melakha. Undoubtedly, the initial obligation of Chanukah candles was enacted in such a manner that the Friday night lighting should be performed before the onset of Shabbat. Since the Rabbis obviously could not suspend the Shabbat prohibitions for the sake of lighting Chanukah candles, they established that the mitzva should be performed differently on Friday night than on the other nights. Whereas generally one lights the candles only once the new day has begun after sundown, on Erev Shabbat one lights the candles before the onset of the new day.
As far as the final halakha is concerned, many people do not make a point of reciting mincha before Chanukah candle lighting on Friday afternoon, and, as the Piskei Teshuvot cites, it is certainly preferable to recite mincha with a minyan after candle lighting than to recite mincha privately before candle lighting.