PARASHAT MIKETZ / CHANUKA

by Rav David Silverberg

            Amidst its discussion of the laws of Chanukah candles, the Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (21a) cites a dispute as to whether or not to equate the requirements of the oil and wicks used for this mitzva with those that apply to the lighting of Shabbat candles. Meaning, do we disqualify for use on Chanukah the oils and wicks listed in the second chapter of Masekhet Shabbat as disqualified for use as Shabbat candles? Generally, the oils and wicks disqualified for Shabbat candles are invalid because they do not produce a steady, consistent flame, and we are thus afraid that one may tilt the candle – in violation of Shabbat – to try and fix a flickering flame. Do we apply this standard to Chanukah, as well?

The Gemara brings three opinions. According to Rav Huna, one cannot use on Chanukah any oil or wick disqualified for use as Shabbat candles. The Gemara explains that this position results from two assumptions. First, Rav Huna maintains that "kavta zakuk la" – if the Chanukah candle is extinguished, one must rekindle it. Therefore, Halakha requires one to use only those oils and wicks that produce a steady flame, so as to lessen the possibility that it will be extinguished, a situation we wish to avoid given the risk that the individual will fail to rekindle the extinguished flame. Hence, Rav Huna applies to Chanukah candles the same standards that apply to Shabbat candles, in the interest of ensuring a steady flame.

However, this reason would apply only on weeknights; on Friday night, of course, one would not rekindle his Chanukah candles if they are extinguished, as this would constitute a Shabbat violation. Nevertheless, Rav Huna applies the standards of Shabbat candles to Chanukah candles even Friday night. The Gemara explains that this position stems from a different ruling of Rav Huna, namely, one may make personal use of Chanukah candles while they burn. Therefore, the concern arises that one will tilt a flickering Chanukah candle to ensure sufficient light for him to read or perform some other activity requiring light. For this reason, Rav Huna requires using wicks and oils that will produce a steady flame even on Friday night.

            Rav Chisda, representing the second view, argues with Rav Huna on the first point; in his view, during the week one may light Chanukah candles with oils and wicks disqualified for use as Shabbat candles. He maintains "kavta ein zakuk la" – one need not rekindle a Chanukah candle that has been extinguished. Once one has performed the act of lighting, he has fulfilled the mitzva, come what may (provided, of course, that the flame took hold of the wick, and that he supplied enough oil or used a long enough wax candle for the fire to last the minimum required time). Therefore, according to Rav Chisda, we do not require one to go to lengths to ensure a particularly steady flame, since even if it is extinguished he need not rekindle it. On Shabbat, however, Rav Chisda agrees with Rav Huna that since one may make personal use of the Chanukah candles, we require oils and wicks suitable for Shabbat candles so as to ensure a steady flame.

            The third view, which is accepted as Halakha, is cited in the name of either Rav Matna or Rav, and claims that we never apply the standards of Shabbat candles to Chanukah candles, even on Shabbat. On the one hand, this view agrees with Rav Chisda that one need not rekindle the Chanukah candles if they are extinguished, and we therefore do not demand the standards of Shabbat candles. However, regarding the second issue, of making personal use of the Chanukah candles, this position argues with Rav Huna and Rav Chisda, and forbids personal use of the candles. Therefore, we have no reason to fear that one may tilt a flickering candle to stabilize the flame, and thus even on Shabbat we do not apply to Chanukah candles the strict requirements of Shabbat candles.

            Tomorrow we will iy"H analyze this dispute further.

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            Yesterday we presented the three views in the Gemara (Shabbat 21a) as to whether the wicks and oils used for Chanukah candles must meet the same requirements as the wicks and oils used for Shabbat candles. As we saw, this debate stems (at least partially) from different opinions regarding the issue of "kabta," whether one must rekindle the Chanukah candles should they be extinguished after lighting. One view (Rav Huna) maintains that one must, indeed, rekindle the candles in such a case, and we therefore require lighting with oils and wicks the produce a steady flame – as we do on Shabbat – so as to avoid a situation requiring rekindling. According to the other opinion (Rav Chisda and either Rav Matna or Rav), one need not rekindle a Chanukah candle that extinguishes, and therefore we do not apply the standards of Shabbat candles to Chanukah candles.

            The Penei Yehoshua, in his commentary to this Gemara, raises a question concerning the scope of the equation between Shabbat candles and Chanukah candles according to the first position – Rav Huna. It is clear from the Gemara that the issue at hand is whether we require on Chanukah a consistent, steady flame as we do on Shabbat. However, there is one type of oil disqualified for use as Shabbat candles for an entirely different reason: "shemen sereifa." Shemen sereifa is oil that had been designated as teruma (the required gift to a kohen) and subsequently became tamei (ritually impure). Halakha requires that teruma oil that became tamei must be entirely burned; it may not be used for any other purpose (though a kohen may derive benefit from the light of the fire kindled with shemen sereifa). The Gemara (Shabbat 23b) explains that shemen sereifa may not be used on Shabbat, given the concern that in the interest of completing the mitzva to burn the shemen sereifa, one may forget that it is Shabbat and tilt the lamp to accelerate the burning process (a Shabbat violation). Now on the weekdays of Chanukah, this concern obviously does not arise. Yet, Rav Huna appears to disqualify for use on Chanukah all oils invalid for use as Shabbat candles – including shemen sereifa. But why would shemen sereifa be unfit for use on Chanukah, if the reason for its disqualification on Shabbat does not apply?

            One answer to this question, suggested by Rav Hersh Yaar in his "Chamudei Tzvi" to Sefer Bereishit (New York, 1957), emerges from the precise opposite question Rav Yaar cites in the name of the "Sha'ar Efrayim." The Sha'ar Efrayim approaches the same issue from the opposite direction. According to the second view in the Gemara, as mentioned, we do not apply to Chanukah candles any of the qualifications that apply to Shabbat candles. The Sha'ar Efrayim asks, however, why this second opinion does not disqualify shemen sereifa for use as Chanukah candles. After all, since Halakha requires destroying this oil, we should apply the rule known as "ketutei mikhtat shiurei" – anything requiring destruction is not considered as having a halakhic "shiur" (quantity). Thus, for example, an etrog that came from a tree of orla (within the first three years of planting), from which one may not derive any benefit and must therefore be destroyed, is not considered as being the minimum required size for the mitzva of etrog on Sukkot. Similarly, the Sha'ar Efrayim asks, we should disqualify shemen sereifa for use on Chanukah because given the requirement to destroy it, it lacks the prerequisite "shiur" – enough oil to last while people walk in the streets ("ad she-tikhleh regel min ha-shuk").

            Before answering the Sha'ar Efrayim's question on the second view in the Gemara, let us point out that it automatically resolves the Penei Yehoshua's question on the first view in the Gemara. Rav Huna perhaps disqualified shemen sereifa for use on Chanukah for this very reason – the issue of "ketutei mikhtat shiurei." Since the oil must be destroyed, it is halakhically cas lacking the necessary quantity for Chanukah candles.

            Now let us return to the second view in the Gemara. Why does this position permit all oils – including shemen sereifa – for use as Chanukah candles? Why do these Amoraim overlook the factor of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei"?

            Rav Yaar resolves this difficulty by citing a comment from the work "Sha'ar Ha-melekh" on the Rambam, to the effect that when a given object must be burned only mi-de'rabbanan (by force of rabbinic enactment), the principle of "ketutei mikhtat shiurei" does not apply. Only when Torah law requires destroying a given object do we consider it as lacking a halakhic "shiur." When, however, an object requires destruction mi-de'rabbanan, its status is not effected; Chazal require destroying it, but this does not change the essential status of the object.

            If we accept this theory of the "Sha'ar Ha-melekh," Rav Yaar writes, then we are but one step away from explaining why the second view in the Gemara permits the use of shemen sereifa on Chanukah. We need only to find some basis to claim that shemen sereifa requires burning only mi-de'rabbanan, and we have neutralized the factor of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei." Sure enough, the Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (16) cites the position of Rav that the very concept of "tum'at mashkin" – that liquids can contract tum'a, was legislated by Chazal. As far as Torah law is concerned, only solid food can become tamei; liquids become tamei only by force of rabbinic enactment. According to this view, shemen sereifa - teruma oil that contracted tum'a, requires burning only mi-de'rabbanan, and thus the law of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" would not apply. And, interestingly enough, Rav himself, according to one version of the Gemara in Shabbat, is one of the Amoraim who permit the use of all oils on Chanukah. We now understand why he allows using even shemen sereifa: since oil can become tamei only mi-de'rabbanan, it requires burning only mi-de'rabbanan, and we thus do not apply the law of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" and one may therefore use shemen sereifa on Chanukah.

            Rav Huna, apparently, was of the opinion that liquids become tamei even according to Torah law, and therefore "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" remains a factor, and shemen sereifa is thus disqualified for use on Chanukah.

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            Yesterday, we discussed the issue as to whether or not one may light Chanukah candles with "shemen sereifa" – oil that was given to a kohen as teruma (the gift one must give a kohen from his produce) and then became tamei (ritually impure). Halakha requires that this oil be burned, and it may not be used in any other manner. Conceivably, therefore, as we discussed, we should apply to this issue the rule of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" – namely, an object Halakha requires to destroy is not considered as having a "shiur," an actual quantity. Since one must provide Chanukah candles with a certain minimum amount of oil, one would not, perhaps, fulfill his obligation by using shemen sereifa, since it lacks the minimum required amount. As we saw, some have attributed this position to Rav Huna (in Masekhet Shabbat 21a). Others, however, maintain that one may light Chanukah candles with shemen sereifa. In fact, the Talmud Yerushalmi says so explicitly towards the end of Masekhet Terumot, and the Rambam codifies this ruling (Hilkhot Terumot 11:18). Apparently, this opinion believes that the factor of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" is irrelevant to the situation of using shemen sereifa for Chanukah candles. Why?

In yesterday's discussion, we encountered one possible reason why "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" might not apply to this case. According to Rav (Pesachim 16), oil and other liquids become tamei only on the level of de-rabbanan (rabbinic enactment), and some authorities maintain that we do not apply "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" to items requiring destruction only mi-de'rabbanan. If we combine these two assumptions, it emerges that shemen sereifa may be used for Chanukah candles.

Today we will consider another reason why "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" would not come into play regarding this issue, one which is raised by several Acharonim cited by the Sedei Chemed (Ma'arekhet Chanukah, 3). They argue that "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" does not necessarily apply whenever Halakha requires a shiur in the performance of a mitzva. It applies only when the shiur is required as a formal prerequisite for the object's qualification for use. For example, an etrog must be of a certain size in order to be valid for use on Sukkot. Therefore, if Halakha requires the destruction of a certain etrog (such as an etrog from orla, or if an etrog tree was worshipped by idolaters), it may not be used for the mitzva. In other instances, however, Halakha demands a minimum size or quantity not as an objective criterion, but rather to practically facilitate the performance of the given mitzva. An example of this appears in the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Yevamot (103b) concerning chalitza – the ritual performed by a childless widow whose brother-in-law chooses not to marry her in fulfillment of the mitzva of "yibum." This ritual entails the woman's removal of the brother-in-law's shoe. The Gemara cites a debate as to whether a chalitza is valid if the shoe used was conclusively determined to have tzara'at (a form of "leprosy" on clothing) and thus requires destruction. At first glance, we should apply to this case the halakha of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei"; the shoe must be large enough to cover the majority of the brother-in-law's foot, and a shoe requiring destruction is not considered as containing a shiur. And yet, Halakha follows the view validating a chalitza performed with a shoe with tzara'at. Some Acharonim (including Rav Soloveitchik – see "Reshimot Shiurim" to Masekhet Sukka, pp.149-150) explain that "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" does not apply in this case, because the minimum shiur required does not pertain to the inherent validity of the shoe as a mitzva object. Rather, the act of chalitza must involve removing a shoe from the foot; in order for this to occur, the shoe must first be worn on the foot – and Halakha defines "wearing" a shoe as the shoe covering the majority of the foot. Thus, this shiur is a practical, rather than formal and objective, requirement, and "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" therefore does not apply. (One view in the Gemara there disqualifies a chalitza performed with such a shoe, and Rashi explains this position as based upon the rule of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei." This position, which has not been accepted as Halakha, perhaps argues with this entire assumption and applies "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" in all instances where a specific shiur is required.)

Some Acharonim apply this same line of reasoning to the oil used for Chanukah candles. Although Halakha indeed requires a specific quantity of oil – enough to last a half-hour, this is a practical requirement. Meaning, one has the obligation to publicize the miracle, and he must therefore light candles for a given duration of time (a half-hour). As a natural consequence of this obligation, he must obviously supply sufficient oil to keep the candle burning for this period of time. But this does not constitute a formal halakhic prerequisite for the oil's validity for use as Chanukah oil. It is rather but a practical measure that results naturally from the mitzva of pirsumei nisa (publicizing the miracle). Therefore, we would not apply "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" to the oil of Chanukah candles. (Yesterday we saw that Rav Huna in Masekhet Shabbat perhaps disqualifies shemen sereifa for Chanukah candles because of "kitutei mikhtat shiurei"; he perhaps adopts the aforementioned position in Masekhet Yevamot that applies "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" to the chalitza shoe.)

            We should note that Rav Shemuel Shmelke Taubes, in his notes to Masekhet Shabbat (printed among the commentaries in the back of the standard editions of the Talmud), suggests yet another reason why "kitutei mikhtat shiurei" would not apply in this case, one which relates to the particular halakhic status of shemen sereifa.

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            A famous Midrash in Bereishit Rabba remarks that the phrase in the second verse in the Torah – "with darkness over the surface of the deep" – refers to the Greek Empire, "which darkened the eyes of Yisrael with their decrees." This association between the Greeks and "darkness" is well established, and emerges from the Chanukah story itself: the single jug of pure oil that burned for eight days clearly parallels the victory of the light of Jewish faith over the darkness imposed upon it by the Selucid Greeks. It is worth noting, however, the precise terminology employed by the Midrash in describing the efforts of the Greeks to eradicate Judaism: "they darkened the eyes of Yisrael." The Midrash does not speak of the Greeks creating "darkness," or making the Jews' lives "dark." Rather, they "darkened the eyes" of the Jewish people. To what exactly does this refer?

            Perhaps this terminology reveals to some extent the approach taken by the Selucids in their campaign against the Jewish religion. Their tactic was simple: to obscure the Jews' vision and prevent them from seeing the truth. They did not legislate against the practice of Judaism for the sake of tyranny or oppression, as did the Romans several centuries later. Rather, they sought to diminish the importance of Jewish religion in the eyes of the Jews to the point where the Jews themselves would decide to abandon their tradition. The Greeks darkened not the Jewish world, but the Jewish "eyes" – their vision, their perspective, their outlook. They flooded the Jewish communities of Israel with a culture emphasizing human power and grandeur as opposed to divine strength, human self-sufficiency as opposed to dependence, the glory of the human body as opposed to modesty. Their hope was that the Jews, surrounded by the pervading culture and ideology, would naturally lose their grip on their own traditions and embrace the Greek lifestyle and ideals.

            In the "al ha-nissim" paragraph added to our prayers and birkat ha-mazon on Chanukah, we mention that the Greeks longed "le-hashkicham Toratekha" – "to make them [the Jews] forget Your Torah." Rav Chayim Friedlander, in his "Siftei Chayim," explains this to mean that the Greeks tried "to lure Yisrael to cherish and love Greek wisdom in their hearts, and they would thereby make them forget the Torah, for forgetting and memory depend mainly on the person's desire. Something a person wants and longs for – he remembers well; that in which he is disinterested, he forgets." The Greeks were confident that by bombarding Benei Yisrael with Greek sophistication and "advanced" culture, they could attract the Jews to their side and lure them away from Judaism. They would lose interest in the laws and knowledge of the Torah, preferring instead the works of Socrates and Aristotle. As we know from the history of the Chanukah story, their efforts were very successful. But on Chanukah we celebrate the fact that there remained a small jug of pure oil, a core group of faithful Jews who rejected and resisted the contaminating efforts of their Greek occupiers, and rekindled the darkness that had overtaken the eyes of the Jewish people: "You handed the mighty unto the weak; the many unto the few, the impure unto the pure."

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            Parashat Miketz begins with an account of Pharaoh's dreams that, in his mind, urgently required interpretation. He dreams first of seven lean, emaciated cows devouring seven large, hardy cows, and then beholds a similar vision of seven beaten sheaves of grain consuming seven fresh, healthy sheaves. The Torah tells that when Pharaoh awoke, "his spirit was agitated" (41:8); so troubled he was by these dreams that he immediately summoned his advisors and magicians in an attempt to uncover the dream's meaning. Only once he invited Yosef to interpret the dream did the Pharaoh feel that the dream's true meaning had been revealed.

            What about Pharaoh's dream caused him such grief, and why did only Yosef's interpretation satisfy him?

            Rav Shimon Schwab suggests that Pharaoh, to his credit, understood the symbolic significance of the meek and feeble overpowering the strong and mighty. Egypt was the unquestioned superpower of its day, the strongest empire with the most stable economy and most impressive cultural achievements. Perhaps most importantly, Egypt enjoyed the constant supply of water provided by the Nile River, which would regularly overflow its banks and fill the streams and brooks dug all around it, allowing for easy and reliable irrigation. (See Rashi to the first verse of Parashat Miketz.) Egypt always felt confident in its power and stability as a result of this water supply. Many centuries later, the prophet Yechezkel mocks the Pharaoh for his arrogant self-confidence in the Nile's waters: "Thus said the Lord God: I am going to deal with you, O Pharaoh king of Egypt, mighty monster, sprawling in its channels, who said, my Nile is my own; I made if for myself" (29:3). Yechzekel then conveys God's warning to Pharaoh: "I will put hooks in your jaws, and make the fish of your channels cling to your scales; I will haul you up from your channels… And I will fling you into the desert" (29:4-5).

            The dream of the cows and sheaves indicated to Pharaoh that his strength and power would soon diminish. Like the sturdy cows and healthy sheaves, he is now threatened by a force he always felt capable of controlling and subduing. This is why Pharaoh awoke in panic. He was suddenly shown that his strength and power mean nothing, that regardless of one's stature and might, he can easily fall prey to even those far weaker than he. Pharaoh was frightened and begged his advisors to tell him precisely who or what threatens him and how to confront the danger.

            But Pharaoh could not accept any of the interpretations. Chazal (cited by Rashi to 41:8) claim that Pharaoh's advisors suggested that the dream indicated the birth and subsequent death of seven daughters. But Pharaoh understood that the true interpretation involved the particular message of the weak overpowering the mighty, the feeble destroying the stalwart. He therefore accepted and found comfort only in Yosef's interpretation, which spoke of Egypt's legendary agriculture crumbling into pieces by the ravages of famine. Yosef pinpointed precisely the danger confronting the empire and informed Pharaoh specifically how he should prepare, thereby raising himself to the position of viceroy, and saving Egypt and the entire region from starvation.

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            Parashat Miketz tells the story of Yosef's rise to power in Egypt, followed by the famine that ravages the region and brings Yosef's own brothers before him to ask to purchase grain. Yosef, whose true identity remains a secret even to his brothers, accuses them of working as spies, takes Shimon hostage, and orders them to return to Canaan and bring back the youngest brother, Binyamin. The brothers, not suspecting that the Egyptian viceroy understands their language, attribute their travails to their mistreatment of Yosef: "Alas, we are bring punished on account of our brother, because we looked on in his anguish… " (42:21). At this point, the eldest brother, Reuven, makes a puzzling and even disturbing comment: "Then Reuven spoke up and said to them, 'Did I not tell you: Do no wrong to the boy? But you paid no heed. Now comes the reckoning for his blood."

            Two questions immediately arise from Reuven's remark. First and foremost, what did Reuven possibly think he could contribute with such a statement? Does this not sound like a childish, "I told you so"? Secondly, Reuven appears to speak dishonestly. He did not, according to the Torah's account (37:21-22), urge his brothers to "do no wrong." He advised them to cast Yosef into a pit and let him perish there rather than actively killing him. True, his intentions, as the Torah itself emphasizes, were to later save Yosef from the pit. But, as far as we know from the Torah's account, he never tells this to the brothers.

            Regarding the second question, we might explain that the narrative in Parashat Vayeshev omitted details of the brothers' discussion in decidingwhat to do with Yosef. It is very likely that Reuven lobbied on Yosef's behalf and urged his brothers not to do him harm; in the end, he managed to persuade them to at least refrain from killing him directly, which he had hoped would allow him to save Yosef later.

            But why would specifically Reuven come to Yosef's defense? In fact, if any brothers had a "score to settle" with Yosef, it was Reuven. As the firstborn, he deserved the honor and distinction his father bestowed upon Yosef. Why, then, was it Reuven who argued on Yosef's behalf?

            The answer to this question is given by Rabbi Nechemya, cited by the Midrash Bereishit Rabba in Parashat Vayeshev (84). According to Rabbi Nechemya, Reuven had vested interest, so-to-speak, in the fulfillment of Yosef's dreams of leadership. As we know from Sefer Divrei Ha-yamim I (5:1), Reuven forfeited his right to the birthright as a result of his sin with his stepmother, Bilha (according to Chazal, he moved his father's bed out of Bilha's tent), and Yaakov transferred the birthright to Yosef. Reuven thought that perhaps he was ousted not only from the birthright, but from the developing Nation of Israel, as well. Yosef, however, dreamt of twelve sheaves of grain and twelve stars bowing down to him – indicating that Reuven retains his membership in the family.

            We may speculate, then, that Reuven disagreed on fundamental grounds with his brothers as to how they should respond to Yosef's dreams of leadership, and how they should deal with Yosef in general. The brothers were appalled by Yosef's aspirations and saw his dreams as a threat to the family and the nation in the process of formation. Reuven, by contrast, pinned his hopes on Yosef's dreams, as their fulfillment would mean his eternal inclusion within the family of Israel despite his grave transgression. Indeed, when Reuven returns to the pit and discovers that Yosef is gone, he declares, "What am I to do" (37:30) – which Chazal (Midrash Lekach Tov) explain to mean, "I thought I had found a remedy to the incident of Bilha, but now, what am I to do?" Yosef's absence meant for Reuven the loss of hope for his future membership in the family. Reuven therefore argued all along that the brothers should accept Yosef, and that his dreams are indeed prophetic, whereas they insisted that his dreams pose a threat to the family and he must be eliminated.

            With this in mind, we may now return to the harsh exchange between Reuven and his brothers in our parasha. As the brothers recognize the fact that they are now punished for their mistreatment of Yosef, Reuven sees this as an opportunity for vindication, to prove to his brothers the correctness of his stance in his fundamental dispute with his brothers. True, Reuven does, in effect, say, "I told you so," but this relates to a longstanding difference of opinion on the crucial issue as to whether Yosef's dreams were to be seen as prophecy or as just his megalomaniac aspirations of power. The brothers' travails in Egypt proved that Reuven was correct in his opposition to the other brothers' position, they should not have persecuted Yosef, and that somehow, Yosef's dreams may yet be fulfilled.

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            In Parashat Miketz, we read that Yaakov sends his remaining sons to Egypt to purchase grain from the Egyptian vizier, who, unbeknownst to them, is none other than their missing brother, Yosef. Yosef accuses them of coming to Egypt to spy the country, and demands that they bring their youngest brother, Binyamin, as proof of their innocence. He keeps Shimon as prisoner in Egypt to guarantee the other brothers' return. But Yaakov refuses (initially) to allow Binyamin to join his brothers; having lost his first son from Rachel, Yaakov refuses to put Rachel's only other son, Binyamin, in a situation of danger.

            As Yaakov's sons try convincing him to allow Binyamin to go, Reuven, the oldest, employs a strikingly peculiar means of persuasion: "You may kill my two sons if I do not bring him back to you. Put him in my care, and I will return him to you" (42:37). Chazal, cited by Rashi (to 42:38), note the absurdity of this promise. Rashi writes, "He [Yaakov] did not accept Reuven's comments. He said: This is a foolish firstborn! He says he will kill his sons – are they only his sons, and not my sons?!" Reuven's pledge to kill his own sons, Yaakov's grandchildren, if he fails to bring Binyamin back safely, appears to defy reason. What possible explanation could there be for Reuven's offer?

            Rav Menachem Kasher (in Torah Sheleima) cites two approaches to understanding Reuven's promise. The "Minchat Yehuda" suggests that Reuven did not actually "offer" to kill his sons, but rather made this remark as an oath of sorts. It is as if he had said, "I am so confident that I can bring Binyamin back that I would be willing to bet my sons' lives on it." Others, such as the Taz (in his "Divrei David Turei Zahav") and the Chatam Sofer (in Torat Moshe and in responsa, O.C. end of 208), claim that Reuven promises to forfeit his sons' right to a share in Eretz Canaan, which he allegorically describes as "death."

            We may, however, suggest a different explanation. In the previous verse, Yaakov responds to the brothers' report of their experiences in Egypt. He wails, "You have bereaved me! Yosef is no more and Shimon is no more, and now you would take away Binyamin; these things always happen to me!" Why does Yaakov point an accusing finger at his sons, claiming that they "bereaved" him? Rashi writes: "This shows that he suspected that they killed him or sold him like [they did to] Yosef." Indeed, according to Rashi, Yaakov has begun entertaining thoughts of suspicion against his sons. Twice his sons have come to him and claimed that one of their brothers has disappeared or been captured. He cannot but wonder whether these nine brothers have taken some part in the loss of the other two.

            It is in response to this suspicion, perhaps, that Reuven declares, "You may kill my two sons if I do not bring him back." He tells his father that he can be trusted with Binyamin, and if he does not bring him back safely, then this will confirm Yaakov's suspicions that the brothers – himself in particular - eliminated Yosef and Shimon. Reuven then decrees his own sentence if this should indeed occur: he should lose his two sons, as punishment for, according to Yaakov's theory, having killed or sold his two brothers.

            If this is correct, then Reuven here also sends an encoded message to his brothers. He in effect says, "Father, you can trust me with Binyamin; I do not kill or sell my brothers." Yesterday, we suggested (based on Midrashim) that Reuven and his brothers had been entangled in a fundamental dispute as to how to respond to Yosef's dreams of leadership over the family. Whereas Reuven argued for the brothers' acceptance of Yosef, they, of course, vehemently decided upon his elimination. Reuven here subtly – or not so subtly – emphasizes to his brothers that he, unlike them, can be trusted with Binyamin, and Yaakov has no reason to suspect him as he suspects the others.