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PESACH
By Rav David Silverberg
PESACH
MOTZAEI
The Pesach Haggada cites a berayta that momentarily entertains the possibility of allowing one to fulfill the annual obligation of sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim as early as Rosh Chodesh Nissan (Yakhol mei-Rosh Chodesh, talmud lomar "ba-yom ha-hu" ). Ultimately, of course, the Haggada concludes that this mitzva applies only on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan. The Torah introduced the sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim obligation by stating, "You shall tell your son on that day" (Shemot 13:8), implying that this mitzva applies only "on that day," the day of the fifteenth of Nissan, when the Exodus occurred. Nevertheless, the question arises as to why the berayta would even consider the possibility that the mitzva takes effect already earlier. What would have led us to allow one to perform sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim already from the beginning of Nissan, two weeks before Pesach?
Rav Avraham Danzig (author of Chayei Adam), in his Toledot
Adam commentary to the Haggada, suggests that Chazal conceived
of such a notion on the basis a different verse in the context of sippur
yetzi'at Mitzrayim. Several
verses prior to the aforementioned verse of Ve-higadeta le-vincha ("You
shall tell your son
"), Moshe instructs Am Yisrael that upon their
arrival in
The berayta concludes, of course, that the obligation to tell the story of the Exodus begins only on the night of Pesach. The later reference to ba-yom ha-hu ("on that day") dispels the possible misconception that "you shall observe this service in this month" speaks of sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim. Rather, it refers strictly to the korban pesach, and the emphasis on "this month" thus does not relate to sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim at all.
Although Chazal ultimately dismiss this notion, it is noteworthy
that according to the Chayei Adam they considered interpreting the
term avoda as a reference to sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim, just as
this word is used in reference to prayer.
This likely reflects the nature of this mitzva in the eyes of
Chazal as a type of religious service resembling prayer. Indeed, the Mishna Berura
(473:71) cites the Shela as admonishing that one recite Maggid with a sense of awe and reverence,
reminiscent of the aura and mindset required during prayer. Likewise, the Zohar describes the presence of the Shekhina at the seder as we tell of the miracles of the Exodus,
further reinforcing the prayer-like atmosphere that must characterize sippur yetzi'at Mitzrayim.
The aforementioned berayta in the Haggada, as understood by the Chayei Adam, may perhaps be seen as a halakhic source
for this notion of sippur yetzi'at
Mitzrayim constituting a form of
prayer, as we reverently give praise to the Almighty for the miracles of the
Exodus.
SUNDAY
At the heart of the Maggid section of the seder, the Haggada expounds upon the verses of mikra bikkurim, the declaration recited by farmers when bringing their first fruits to the Temple, in which they briefly recount the story of the Egyptian bondage and the Exodus (Devarim 26:5-8). The Haggada goes through this section one word or clause at a time, citing in reference to each a corresponding verse from elsewhere in Tanakh that somehow clarifies or enhances our understanding of the given word or phrase. Essentially, it is through the reading/study of this section of the Haggada that we fulfill the mitzva of sippur yetzi'at mitzrayim, to tell and discuss the story of the Exodus. (It is both ironic and unfortunate that this section of Maggid is generally recited more quickly, and understood and discussed much less, than the other, far less central sections of Maggid.)
The first verse of mikra bikkurim describes Benei Yisrael's
development in
The Orchot Chayim (commentary to the Haggada by Rav Aharon of Lunel) explains that the Haggada understood this verse in Yechezkel as referring to the famous Midrashic tradition that after Pharaoh's decision to kill the newborn males, the Israelite women began delivering their infants in the orchards. Miraculously, the ground opened and a team of angels cared for and raised the newborns until they reached maturity, at which point they would emerge from the ground and join their families. The comparison to the growth of plants refers to the Israelite children who, like vegetation, emerged from underground where they had been miraculously raised.
One might, however, question this approach in light of the fact that the
verse speaks here of Benei
Yisrael's growth in
We might suggest a different approach, claiming that va-rav refers to Benei Yisrael's reaching the stage of what we might term
"national maturity." As mentioned
earlier, this verse in Yechezkel speaks of the foundling growing to physical
maturity, the stage at which a young man or woman desires to establish
independence and build a home and family of his/her own. Perhaps, the prophet describes here the
emergence of Benei
Yisrael's sense of nationhood as
their numbers increased in
Thus, the description of va-rav is a natural outgrowth of the first term
used in this verse in describing Benei Yisrael goy, which, as mentioned, is taken as a
reference to their distinctiveness.
As a result of their distinctive conduct and culture in
MONDAY
In describing Benei Yisrael's departure from
One answer, perhaps, emerges from an explanation given by Rav Simcha
Bunim Sofer (grandson of the Chatam Sofer) to this verse, in his work
Shevet Sofer. The Shevet
Sofer explains that the Torah's emphasis on Benei Yisrael's carrying
their matza on their shoulders is to be understood in light of the next
verse: "And the Israelites did as Moshe had said they asked the Egyptians for
silver and gold utensils and garments."
Upon leaving
Quite understandably, then, this verse mish'arotam tzerurot be-simlotam al
shikhmam particularly when
understood in context of the subsequent verse u-Venei Yisrael asu ki-dvar Moshe reflects a critical theme of the Exodus,
our transition from servants of Pharaoh to servants of God. The image of Benei Yisrael carrying their matza on their shoulders expresses the primary
purpose of yetzi'at
Mitzrayim, and is thus indeed
worthy of reenactment each year as we reflect upon the eternal meaning and
significance of this event for our lives and identity as
Jews.
TUESDAY
Day 1
On the evening prior to the Exodus, Benei Yisrael were commanded to slaughter the paschal sacrifice and smear some of its blood on the lintel and doorposts of their homes (Shemot 12:22). The Midrash (Shemot Rabba 17:3) comments that the lintel and two doorposts allude to the three patriarchs Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov in the merit of whom Benei Yisrael were granted freedom from Egypt.
Rav Yitzchak Waldshein, in his word Torat Yitzchak, insightfully notes the added significance of this verse's formulation in light of the Midrash's comment. In instructing Benei Yisrael to apply the blood to their doorframes, Moshe employs the term ve-higatem, which generally means either "touch" or "reach." If, indeed, the lintel and doorposts symbolically represent the three patriarchs, then the word ve-higatem assumes much deeper meaning and significance, as it alludes to the aspirations that were to drive Benei Yisrael at this moment of yetzi'at Mitzrayim. On the one hand, all that God could reasonably expect from them at this stage, after over two centuries of exposure to, and even involvement in, Egyptian paganism (as is famously described in Sefer Yechezkel, chapter 20), is to "touch" their patriarchs, to identify with them on some level. Indeed, just several verses earlier (Shemot 12:21), Moshe orders Benei Yisrael, "Mishkhu" "Withdraw" which, as Rashi famously cites from the Mekhilta, refers to the formal rejection of idolatry. Benei Yisrael are called upon to dissociate themselves from their Egyptian neighbors and taskmasters, and to "touch," to emotionally and theologically identify with, Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov. In order to merit redemption, they must renounce their allegiance to Egyptian beliefs and declare their allegiance to the God of their patriarchs.
In addition, however, Moshe demands as well the second meaning of ve-higatem that Benei Yisrael "reach" the "lintel" and "doorposts," that they aspire to the spiritual greatness that characterized the three patriarchs. Even if they are currently capable of merely "touching" that level of achievement, they must nevertheless commit themselves to a lifetime of growth and aspirations to "reach" that standard. Benei Yisrael were not required to suddenly leap to the level of their patriarchs in order to merit redemption, but it was demanded that they harbor such ambitions, that they never feel content with merely "touching" greatness, and instead commit themselves to the lifelong effort to "reach" the stature of Avraham, Yitzchak and Yaakov.
David Silverberg
Wednesday
Day 2
On the sixteenth of Nissan, a special offering was brought in the Beit Ha-mikdash (in addition to the daily tamid offering and the musaf offering of Pesach) to which Chazal commonly refer as the korban ha-omer. This offering is so named because it included an omer-worth of grain, the first grain harvested from the season's crop (see Vayikra 23:9-13). Indeed, the Torah itself refers to this offering as the "offering of the omer that is waved" (omer ha-tenufa Vayikra 23:15).
One might ask why the term omer is chosen as the title of this offering. After all, this term refers merely to the volume of grain required, seemingly a detail of peripheral importance to this mitzva. Why would Chazal afford such centrality to this measurement that it has become the name by which this offering is referred? In truth, the same question can be asked regarding the mitzva of sefirat ha-omer, which we begin on the sixteenth of Nissan, the day of the omer offering. This mitzva requires simply counting forty-nine days beginning from the sixteenth of Nissan. Why do we refer to this counting as sefirat ha-omer, as if this entire period is integrally bound to the korban ha-omer?
Rav Yosef Salant, in his work Be'er Yosef (as cited by Rabbi Benjamin Yudin http://torahweb.org/torah/2005/moadim/ryud_sefira.html), suggests that the significance of the korban ha-omer lies in its relationship to another context in which this measurement appears the manna. As we read in Sefer Shemot (16:16), an omer of manna fell each day for each member of Benei Yisrael; this was the volume of each individual portion of manna. More revealingly, we read in Sefer Yehoshua (5:11-12) that it was on the sixteenth of Nissan when Benei Yisrael for the first time ate from the produce of Eretz Yisrael instead of the manna after crossing the Jordan River. On the same day when the korban ha-omer is brought, the daily omer of manna was replaced by the natural produce of Eretz Yisrael. What might this connection between the korban ha-omer and the manna reveal about the nature of this offering?
The Be'er Yosef explains that the korban ha-omer offering, which expresses our gratitude to the Almighty for a successful crop, also serves to draw an equation of sorts between the annual crop and the heavenly manna. By offering an omer of grain on the sixteenth day of Nissan, the day on which the manna was replaced by natural produce, we declare that we perceive the omer of grain as similar to the omer of manna. Although the omer of manna originated from the heavens and the omer of grain originates from the earth, in truth, they both originate from the same source the Almighty. The omer of grain appears to grow from the ground as a result of human effort and initiative, but in reality, it is God who provides us with our sustenance, just as He provided Benei Yisrael with manna in the wilderness.
For good reason, then, the term omer is chosen to characterize the essential nature and purpose of this offering and the period that follows. As the harvest season begins, we are to perceive each omer of grain as nothing more or less than an omer of manna sustenance provided for us directly by the Almighty Himself.
David Silverberg
Thursday
Day 3
The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (21b) cites a debate concerning the prohibition against hana'a from chametz deriving benefit from chametz even without eating it. According to Chizkiya, this halakha emerges from a verse towards the end of Parashat Bo (13:3), "ve-lo yei'akhel chametz" ("chametz shall not be eaten"). The passive form in which this verse is written ("shall not be eaten" as opposed to "you shall not eat") indicates to Chizkiya that even other forms of benefit from chametz such as selling is forbidden.
As the Gemara notes, Chizkiya's inference from this verse runs in opposition to a rule established by Rabbi Avahu that in all instances, unless indicated otherwise, a Biblical prohibition against eating a given food includes as well all forms of hana'a. According to Rabbi Abahu, then, we have no need to infer the hana'a prohibition of chametz from the verse of lo yei'akhel chametz, since the prohibition against eating chametz itself entails a prohibition against deriving any form of benefit from chametz, as well.
In light of this debate, many Acharonim were troubled by the
Rambam's formulation in establishing the prohibition of hana'a from
chametz, towards the beginning of Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (1:2). He cites there Chizkiya's inference from
the verse lo yei'akhel chametz, implying that generally, a Biblical
prohibition against eating cannot necessarily be extended to include other types
of hana'a. Yet, in Hilkhot
Ma'akhalot Asurot (8:15), the Rambam cites the principle established by Rabbi
Avahu, that all issurei akhila (prohibitions against eating) include as
well as issur hana'a (prohibition against other forms of benefit) unless
indicated otherwise. The question
thus arises, if the Rambam accepts Rabbi Avahu's general principle, what
compelled him to cite Chizkiya's source for the issur hana'a of chametz?
If all prohibitions against eating are presumed to include as well a
prohibition against other kinds of benefit, why must the Rambam cite a special
source to establish the prohibition against deriving benefit from chametz?
The Ran (cited by the Lechem Mishneh), who raises this question against the
Such an approach, however, is clearly very difficult to accept. For one thing, the Gemara clearly casts
Chizkiya and Rabbi Avahu as representing two conflicting views ("u-feliga de-Rabbi Avahu").
Furthermore, it is not at all clear why the
The Torah Temima (Shemot, chapter 13, note 15), cites these comments of the Ran and adds that where the Biblical origin of a given law is of no practical, halakhic consequence, the Rambam will always cite the clearer and more straightforward source. However, besides the points raised above, we should note that there may, indeed, be a practical difference between the views of Chizkiya and Rabbi Avahu. Tosefot (Pesachim 23b) cite from the Rash Mi-Shantz that Chizkiya and Rabbi Avahu would likely disagree concerning the status of chametz nuksheh (chametz that is not easily edible) and ta'arovet chametz a mixture containing chametz. The Gemara (Pesachim 43a) derives the prohibition to partake of these forms of chametz from a separate verse ("kol machmetzet lo tokheilu" Shemot 12:20). Seemingly, according to Rabbi Avahu, like all prohibitions of eating, this prohibition would naturally apply to other forms of benefit, as well. Chizkiya, however, does not subscribe to the general rule extending eating prohibitions to other forms of benefit, and thus these forms of chametz would perhaps, in his view, be permissible for other forms of benefit. Thus, it is likely that this debate will, in fact, yield practical ramifications, and we therefore cannot easily dismiss this inconsistency in the Rambam, as the Torah Temima had suggested.
Indeed, other Acharonim suggested various different approaches to resolve this difficulty, as we will iy"H discuss in the coming days.
David Silverberg
Friday
Day 4
Yesterday, we introduced the question raised by many Acharonim
concerning the prohibition against hana'a deriving benefit in a manner
that does not entail eating from chametz. The Rambam, in Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Asurot
(8:15), cites the general rule that a prohibition against eating a given food is
presumed to extend as well to other forms of benefit a rule recorded
throughout the Talmud in the name of Rabbi Avahu. In Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (1:2),
however, he feels compelled to cite a special verse as the source for the
hana'a prohibition of chametz.
Why did he cite a special source, if in any event all prohibitions
against eating are naturally extended to the derivation of other forms of
benefit?
Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, in his work Even Ha-azel, suggests an explanation based on a passage
in the Talmud Yerushalmi (Orla 3:1) concerning Rabbi Avahu's principle. The Yerushalmi challenges Rabbi Avahu's
rule on the basis of the prohibition against chadash newly-harvested grain that is forbidden
for consumption until the second day of Pesach. Although chadash is forbidden for consumption, other forms
of benefit from chadash are permissible seemingly disproving
Rabbi Avahu's rule, that every prohibition against eating is presumed to include
other forms of benefit. The
Yerushalmi responds that chadash is exceptional because of its temporary
nature. Chadash grain, as opposed to most other forbidden
foods, is not permanently forbidden; it becomes permissible on the second day of
Pesach. This exceptional feature
sets it fundamentally apart from other forbidden foods, and thus the standard
rule, that extends prohibitions against eating to other forms of benefit, does
not apply to chadash.
(The Bavli in Masekhet Pesachim 23a raises this question, as well, and
offers a different explanation.)
The Yerushalmi's contention gives rise to the question of how the Gemara
in Masekhet Pesachim (21b) applied Rabbi Avahu's rule to chametz.
This prohibition, too, extends for a limited period of time the week of
Pesach and therefore should not be subject to Rabbi Avahu's rule. Seemingly, given the limited timeframe
of this prohibition, it should not be automatically extended to include other
forms of benefit. Apparently, the
Even Ha-azel suggests, the Yerushalmi worked off the
assumption that Rabbi Avahu followed the view of Rabbi Yehuda (Pesachim 28b),
who held that chametz that a Jew had possessed during Pesach is
forbidden even after Pesach on the level of Torah law. Halakha generally follows the view of Rabbi Shimon,
who held that this prohibition applies only on the level of Rabbinic
enactment. Rabbi Yehuda, however,
maintained that the Torah prohibition of chametz forbids eating chametz even after Pesach (if it had been owned by
a Jew during Pesach). If Rabbi
Avahu subscribed to this position of Rabbi Yehuda, then he perhaps classified
chametz under the category of permanent, rather
than temporary, prohibitions. If
so, then he would apply to chametz the rule extending the prohibition against
eating to include other forms of benefit.
As mentioned, however, Halakha follows Rabbi Shimon's view, that Torah law does not forbid chametz after Pesach. Hence, according to the accepted Halakha, chametz indeed belongs to the same category as chadash the category of temporary prohibitions. As such, Rabbi Avahu's rule cannot be applied to chametz, just as, according to the Yerushalmi, it cannot be applied to chadash. The Rambam therefore felt compelled to cite a different source for the prohibition against deriving benefit from chametz on Pesach.
It should be noted that if, indeed, the Rambam's view is based upon this passage in the Yerushalmi, as suggested by the Even Ha-azel, then a much simpler approach emerges. Earlier, we parenthetically mentioned that the Bavli, too, notes that one may derive general benefit from chadash despite the prohibition against eating it, seemingly disproving Rabbi Avahu's theory. Unlike the Yerushalmi, however, which attributes this anomaly to the temporary nature of the chadash prohibition, the Bavli responds differently, citing a verse as establishing the permissibility of other forms of benefit from chadash. The Bavli apparently felt that Rabbi Avahu's rule applies equally to temporary and permanent prohibitions, and therefore, had it not been for the Torah's implication to the contrary, we would, indeed, apply this rule even to chadash. It thus emerges that the Bavli and Yerushalmi debate the applicability of Rabbi Avahu's principle to temporary prohibitions, and it therefore stands to reason that the Yerushalmi would not apply this principle to chametz. Conceivably, then, the Rambam followed the Yerushalmi's position and thus could not establish the prohibition against general forms of benefit from chametz as a natural outgrowth of the prohibition against eating chametz. For this reason, he felt compelled to cite a special source for the prohibition against deriving other forms of benefit from chametz.
David Silverberg
Motzaei Shabbat
Day 5
Today we will continue our discussion of a question that has been raised
concerning the prohibition against deriving general benefit from
chametz on Pesach. There is a general rule, cited in the
Gemara in the name of Rabbi Avahu, that whenever the Torah forbids eating a
given food it forbids as well deriving other forms of benefit, unless indicated
otherwise. Despite this rule, the
Rambam (Hilkhot Chametz U-matza 1:2) cites a separate verse as the source for
the prohibition against deriving hana'a (general benefit) from
chametz on Pesach, and many
Acharonim addressed the question of why a separate
verse is necessary.
Rav Hersh Yaar, in his work Chamudei Tzvi (New York, 1966), suggests a "pilpulistic"
answer based on the Rambam's comments in Sefer Ha-mitzvot (lo ta'aseh 187) concerning the prohibition of
basar be-chalav (meat and milk). The Rambam there establishes that when
the Torah forbids both eating and deriving other forms of benefit from a given
food, these two prohibitions should be listed as a single mitzvat lo ta'aseh among the 365 Biblical prohibitions. The reason, he explains, is that eating
is but one form of hana'a, and thus a prohibition banning eating and
deriving benefit from a given food item essentially amounts to but a single
prohibition. The Rambam then
anticipates the question as to why, if this is the case, the Torah presents
separate verses to introduce the prohibitions against eating and deriving
general benefit from meat with milk.
If, indeed, eating and hana'a are to be seen as essentially one and the
same, why did the Torah issue separate commands forbidding eating and deriving
other forms of benefit from basar
be-chalav? The Rambam answers that the prohibition
of basar be-chalav is exceptional in this regard because the
Torah forbids even abnormal ingestion of meat with milk, which does not provide
any enjoyment. (The example he
gives is swallowing a scalding piece of meat with milk that burns one's
throat.) Since the prohibition
against eating meat with milk applies even to forms of ingestion that do not
provide any enjoyment, it would not necessarily follow that other forms of
deriving benefit are included in this prohibition. The presumed link between eating and
other forms of benefit exists only if eating is proscribed as a form of benefit;
where eating is forbidden even in the absence of enjoyment, then such a
prohibition cannot necessarily be presumed to extend to other forms of
benefit. For this reason, the
Rambam explains, the Torah had to introduce a separate prohibition against
deriving general benefit from basar be-chalav.
On this basis, Rav Yaar suggests, we can perhaps explain why the Rambam
invokes a separate verse to establish the prohibition against deriving general
benefit from chametz on Pesach. He cites earlier scholars who claimed
that in cases where the Torah forbids eating even a tiny morsel of a given food,
it is likewise forbidden to ingest that food in an unusual manner. Since the halakhic definition of
"eating" implies a certain minimum quantity (generally assumed to be a ke-zayit), in cases where even less than this amount
is forbidden, the prohibition must relate to the ingestion of food, and not to
the formal act of eating. Hence,
even unusual means of ingestion would be proscribed in such instances. Chametz, of course, may not be eaten on Pesach in
any quantity, as the Rambam rules in Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (1:7). According to the aforementioned theory,
it emerges that the prohibition against eating chametz must therefore apply even to abnormal means
of ingestion. Thus, in light of the
Rambam's comments in Sefer
Ha-mitzvot, the extension of this
prohibition to forms of hana'a other than eating cannot be intuited, as
the prohibition of chametz, like meat with milk, applies even where
there is no enjoyment. For this
reason, Rav Yaar suggests, the Rambam found it necessary to cite a separate
verse as the source for the prohibition against deriving general benefit from
chametz, as this prohibition cannot be naturally
intuited from the prohibition against eating chametz.
David Silverberg
Sunday
Day 6
Yesterday, we briefly mentioned the halakha forbidding the consumption of even
minuscule quantities of chametz on Pesach; no minimum amount of chametz is required to render one in violation of
the chametz prohibition.
At first glance, it appears that chametz is no different in this regard from any
other forbidden food. A famous
passage in Masekhet Yoma (73b) cites a debate between Rabbi Yochanan and Reish
Lakish concerning chatzi
shiur whether or not one
transgresses a Torah violation by eating forbidden foods in a quantity that does
not render one liable to punishment.
Generally speaking, one is liable to punishment for eating forbidden
foods only if he eats an amount of a ke-zayit (though for some prohibitions a different
amount is required). Nevertheless,
according to Rabbi Yochanan, one who eats less than this amount has nevertheless
transgressed a Torah prohibition, despite the fact that he is not liable to
court-administered punishment. This
is, in fact, the accepted view.
Surprisingly, however, the Rambam, in Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (1:7),
cites a verse from the Torah's discussion of Pesach as the Biblical source for
the law forbidding the consumption of even small amounts of chametz.
Despite the general rule of chatzi shiur, which establishes a Torah prohibition
against eating any amount of forbidden foods, the Rambam nevertheless found it
necessary to invoke a special source for this provision as it applies to
chametz on Pesach. This peculiarity was noted already by
Rav Yosef Karo, in his Kesef
Mishneh commentary in Hilkhot
Chametz U-matza.
The Mishneh
Le-melekh cites Rav Levi Ben
Chaviv as suggesting that chametz perhaps differs from other forbidden foods
due to its temporary nature.
According to one view cited in Masekhet Yoma, the chatzi shiur provision is derived from a verse in the
context of the prohibition against eating forbidden animal fat ("kol chelev" Vayikra 7:23), which establishes a
paradigm for all other forbidden foods.
Rav Levi Ben Chaviv contends that this law cannot be extended to
chametz on Pesach, which features the lenient
quality of a specified timeframe.
This unique feature sets chametz apart from standard forbidden foods, and
therefore we cannot apply the rule of chatzi shiur to this prohibition. For this reason, the Rambam found it
necessary to cite a separate source for the provision forbidding the consumption
of even small quantities of chametz on Pesach.
One might, however, challenge this approach in light of the fact that the
Gemara speaks of the rule of chatzi shiur in the context of the prohibition against
eating on Yom Kippur. In fact, the
Talmud's primary discussion of chatzi shiur takes place in Masekhet Yoma, in reference
to the laws regarding the Yom Kippur.
Of course, food on Yom Kippur, like chametz on Pesach, is forbidden only temporarily,
and yet the Gemara nevertheless applies to Yom Kippur the standard rules of
chatzi shiur.
The Noda Bi-yehuda (Tanina, O.C. 53; also in Tzelach, Pesachim 44a) suggests a much different
approach. According to one view in
Masekhet Yoma, the principle of chatzi shiur is predicated upon the possibility of the
small amount combining with another small amount to comprise a full quantity of
forbidden food. In principle, the
Torah forbids only the consumption of a complete quantity (usually a ke-zayit) of forbidden food, and not less than this
amount. However, if one eats a
lesser amount, the possibility still exists that he may eat yet another small
amount, such that in total he will have consumed a complete quantity, and for
this reason it is forbidden to eat even a lesser amount. According to this reasoning, it would be
permissible to partake of a small amount of forbidden food if the given
prohibition is about to expire. On
Yom Kippur, for example, it would, according to this view, be permissible to eat
a small amount a few moments before the fast's end, when there is no longer
enough time to complete the full amount forbidden on Yom
Kippur.
Similarly, the Noda Bi-yehuda observes, this view would allow eating a small amount of chametz in the final moments of Pesach, as there is no possibility of completing the full amount of ke-zayit. The Rambam, however, held that by virtue of the inference from the verse he cites, small amounts of chametz are forbidden for consumption on Pesach intrinsically, and not merely due to the possibility that these amounts might ultimately combine with other small amounts. In his view, chametz is forbidden in any quantity even in the final moments of Pesach, when there is no longer any possibility of eating a complete ke-zayit which the Torah forbids. For this reason, the Rambam was compelled to cite an independent source for this provision, rather than relying on the standard principle of chatzi shiur.
David Silverberg
Monday
Motzaei Chag
The Torah reading for the seventh day of Pesach, which is taken from
Sefer Shemot, tells the story of keri'at Yam Suf, the splitting of the
The commentators address the question of when Benei Yisrael made
such a statement to Moshe back in
Rashi explains (based on the Mekhilta) that Benei
Yisrael refer here to their harsh condemnation of Moshe after Pharaoh
responded to his initial demand for freedom by increasing their workload. The Torah tells towards the end of
Parashat Shemot (5:20-21) that after Pharaoh announced the new decrees, Moshe
and Aharon were confronted by a delegation from Benei Yisrael who cried,
"May the Lord look upon you and judge
"
Transparently implicit in this condemnation is the demand that Moshe and
Aharon let Benei Yisrael continue working as slaves in
Ibn Ezra points to a different exchange between Moshe and the people as
the basis for Benei
Yisrael's claim at the sea. After Pharaoh's new decree to intensify
the workload, God appears to Moshe and bids him to convey to Benei Yisrael the famous "four expressions of redemption"
reassuring them of their imminent freedom and the end of their suffering (Shemot
6:2-8). The Torah then tells that
when Moshe presented these reassurances to the people, "they did not listen to
Moshe, due to shortness of spirit and hard labor" (6:9). It was at this point, Ibn Ezra contends,
that Benei Yisrael pleaded with Moshe not to pursue his
campaign for freedom.
One might question both these approaches in light of the fact that
Benei Yisrael here recall rejecting Moshe with the
argument that "it is preferable for us to serve
The Ramban adopts a much different approach to this verse, speculating,
surprisingly enough, that Benei
Yisrael voiced these complaints to
Moshe as they prepared to leave
Alternatively, one might suggest, quite simply, that Benei Yisrael had never actually voiced such an argument
to Moshe. Although they had, for
the most part, embraced Moshe's leadership and supported his efforts on their
behalf, beneath the surface they harbored serious doubts as to the prospects and
results of these efforts. On more
than one occasion they entertained the possibility that perhaps they were better
off continuing to live their familiar life as slaves rather than embark on the
ambitious and heretofore uncharted road to freedom and nationhood. Their complaints to Moshe at the sea are
recollections not of what they had actually said to him in
David Silverberg