The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

ROSH HASHANA 5767

By Rav David Silverberg

            The first Mishna of the fourth chapter of Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b) establishes the halakha that, generally speaking, the shofar is not sounded on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on Shabbat.  During the times of the Mikdash, the shofar would be sounded in the Beit Ha-mikdash (and, according to the Rambam, throughout the city of Jerusalem) when Rosh Hashanah occurred on Shabbat, but nowhere else.  After the Temple's destruction, Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakai enacted – as part of a series of measures he legislated to commemorate the service in the Temple – that the shofar be sounded on Shabbat in communities with an established Beit Din (rabbinical court).  (Later this week we will iy"H discuss what kind of Beit Din is required for this halakha to apply.)

            The ensuing discussion in the Gemara records a famous exchange concerning the origins of the basic halakha suspending the mitzva of shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  The first view attributed this provision to a discrepancy between the two Biblical references to this obligation.  In Sefer Vayikra (23:24), the Torah speaks of Rosh Hashanah as a day of zikhron teru'a, or the "mentioning" of the shofar sound, whereas in Sefer Bamidbar (29:1), this festival is referred to as yom teru'a, a day of sounding the shofar.  The Gemara tries reconciling these two verses by distinguishing between Shabbat and weekdays.  When Rosh Hashanah falls on a weekday, it is observed as a yom teru'a, a day of sounding the shofar.  On Shabbat, we merely "mention" the shofar, we speak in our prayers about the themes associated with the shofar, but we do not actually blow the shofar.

            Rava, however, dismisses this theory, raising two objections.  For one thing, if the Torah itself suspended the sounding of the shofar on Shabbat, then this suspension should apply in the Mikdash, as well, and yet the Mishna stated clearly that the shofar was sounded in the Temple even on Shabbat.  Additionally, Rava contended, sounding the shofar entails no violation of the Shabbat laws, and the Torah would therefore not have to exclude Shabbat from the mitzva of shofar blowing.  Rava thus concludes, "From Torah law, it is permissible [to sound the shofar] on Shabbat, and it was the Rabbis who decreed [the suspension of shofar blowing on Shabbat]."  Rava explains this enactment on the basis of the famous concept known as gezeira de-Rabba, that the Sages suspended the performance of certain mitzvot on Shabbat out of concern that one might carry the given article in a public domain.  Chazal forbade sounding the shofar on Shabbat because they feared that a person might forgetfully bring the shofar to somebody who will teach him the skill of shofar blowing, in violation of the Shabbat prohibitions.  This easily explains the distinction the Mishna draws between the Temple and other areas: the kohanim administering in the Temple were generally very cautious ("kohanim zerizim heim") and could be trusted not to violate Shabbat by carrying the shofar.

            As noted by many writers, the Talmud Yerushalmi presents a parallel discussion and appears to accept the initial theory advanced by the Talmud Bavli, that the Torah itself legislated that the shofar not be sounded when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  The Yerushalmi addresses the first question raised by Rava, who asked why there would be a distinction between the Mikdash and other areas if the Torah itself forbade shofar blowing on Shabbat.  It responds by citing a comment by Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai, who took note of the juxtaposition in the Torah between the obligation of shofar blowing and the offering of the musaf offering on Rosh Hashanah (see Bamidbar 29:1-2).  Rabbi Shimon explained this juxtaposition as pointing to a unique status afforded to the Beit Ha-mikdash – the site of sacrificial offerings – with respect to shofar blowing, which is manifest in the application of this mitzva even on Shabbat, when it does not apply elsewhere.  Thus, according to the Yerushalmi, the Torah itself banned shofar blowing on Shabbat, and the same Torah allowed sounding the shofar on Shabbat in the Beit Ha-mikdash, where this mitzva assumes a higher stature of sorts.

            According to the conclusion of the Bavli, that Torah law allows and in fact requires sounding the shofar even when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat, the question arises as to how we might reconcile the conflicting verses of yom teru'a and zikhron teru'a.  If, as Rava concludes, before Chazal's decree Rosh Hashanah was observed as a yom teru'a regardless of the day of week on which it fell, then why in Sefer Vayikra does the Torah refer to this festival with the term zikhron teru'a?  This question was raised by Rav Baruch Halevi Epstein (author of the Torah Temima), in his work Barukh She-amar (p. 23).

            A most surprising answer to this question was suggested by one of the lesser known Rishonim, the Shibolei Ha-leket (294).  He claims that even according to the conclusion of the Talmud Bavli, that shofar blowing is suspended out of concern that one may carry it through a public domain, this halakha applies on the level of Torah law.  When the Torah speaks of Rosh Hashanah as a zikhron teru'a, it indeed refers to Shabbat and forbids blowing shofar on Shabbat due to the possibility of Shabbat violation.  According to the Shibolei Ha-leket's approach, this halakha presents us with a rare example of a gezeira min ha-Torah, a law enacted by the Torah to safeguard against a violation of another Torah law.  Generally speaking, it was Chazal who enacted laws to help ensure strict observance of the Torah's prohibitions.  In this instance, according to the Shibolei Ha-leket, the Torah itself banned shofar blowing on Shabbat to safeguard against Shabbat violations.

            Of course, this is not the view of Rava, whom the Gemara cites as explicitly relegating this halakha to the level of rabbinic enactment.  Nevertheless, the Shibolei Ha-leket understood that in conclusion the Bavli accepts the view of the Yerushalmi, that the Torah itself suspends shofar blowing on Shabbat, and the expressions yom teru'a and zikhron teru'a indeed refer to the different situations where shofar blowing is or is not warranted on Rosh Hashanah.

            Needless to say, the Shibolei Ha-leket's view does not represent the mainstream approach towards this halakha, and it is commonly accepted that it was Chazal who suspended the sounding of the shofar when Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbat.

******

            Yesterday, we discussed the Gemara's famous comments in the fourth chapter of Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b) concerning the two expressions used in the Torah in reference to the mitzva of shofar blowing on Rosh Hashanah – yom teru'a (Bamidbar 29:1) and zikhron teru'a (Vayikra 23:24).  The Gemara initially suggests that these expressions refer to two different scenarios: yom teru'a requires sounding the shofar when Rosh Hashanah falls on a weekday, and zikhron teru'a refers to the obligation to speak about the shofar, but not actually sound the shofar, when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  The Gemara (as understood by most commentators; yesterday we noted one exception) ultimately rejects this theory, and concludes that shofar blowing is suspended on Shabbat as a safeguard against Shabbat violation, and not due to this textual nuance.  This conclusion left us with the question of how to reconcile the two different references to the obligation of shofar blowing.

            One explanation, as developed by the Netziv in his Ha'amek Davar (to Vayikra 23:24), appears to emerge from the Gemara's discussion earlier in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (28a).  The Gemara cited a comment from one of the early Amora'im that if a person was force-fed matza on Pesach, he has fulfilled his obligation to partake of matza.  Even though he had no intention to fulfill the mitzva, the ingestion of matza that occurred suffices to render him in fulfillment of this mitzva, because, according to this view, fulfilling a mitzva does not require intent (mitzvot einan tzerikhot kavana).  Rava comments that in light of this halakha, we must similarly conclude that a tokei'a le-shir – a person who sounds the shofar on Rosh Hashanah as a musical instrument – fulfills his obligation of shofar blowing, despite the obvious absence of mitzva intent.

            In response to Rava's remark, the Gemara questions why it was necessary for him to explicitly state this extension of the aforementioned halakha concerning the forced consumption of matza.  Once it has been established that one can fulfill a mitzva even without intent, Rava should not have found it necessary to specify the application of this rule to the situation of tokei'a le-shir.  The Gemara explains, "One might have thought that in that case, the Torah said, 'Eat matza,' and he eat matza; but here, it says, 'Zikhron teru'a,' and this [person] is simply by chance [sounding the shofar]."  Rava made his remark because instinctively, one might not have extended this general rule – that mitzva fulfillment does not depend on a person's intent – to the mitzva of shofar.  The concept of zikhron teru'a requires reflecting upon the message of the shofar, and not merely sounding the shofar, and therefore intuitively, we would have concluded that the satisfactory fulfillment of this mitzva demands conscious intent.  (As the Netziv notes, Rashi presents a different understanding of the Gemara, which likely resulted from a different text in his edition of the Gemara.)

            Interestingly enough, it was the same Rava who, in the fourth chapter of Rosh Hashanah, dismissed the notion that zikhron teru'a refers to the suspension of shofar blowing when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  He quite possibly followed consistently with his own view, expressed in the discussion concerning tokei'a le-shir, that zikhron teru'a establishes the additional obligation to reflect and speak about the themes of the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, even when it falls during the week.

            Of course, the question remains as to why, according to Rava's conclusion, one who sounds the shofar for purely musical purposes fulfills his obligation.  If, as the Gemara comments, the Torah requires zikhron teru'a – reflecting about the message conveyed through the shofar – then it would appear that one who sounds the shofar without this awareness does not fulfill this obligation.  This question requires more comprehensive treatment in a separate context.

******

            This week we have been discussing the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b) concerning the halakha suspending shofar blowing on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on Shabbat.  Initially, the Gemara attributes this law to a discrepancy between the Torah's two references to Rosh Hashanah, as a yom teru'a (Bamidbar 29:1) – which suggests actually blowing the shofar – and a zikhron teru'a (Vayikra 23:24) – which implies that we must merely speak about the shofar.  The Gemara suggests that yom teru'a refers to standard occurrences of Rosh Hashanah, whereas zikhron teru'a refers specifically to a year on which Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  Ultimately, however, the Gemara dismisses this theory, and explains that it was Chazal who suspended shofar blowing on Shabbat out of concern for possible Shabbat desecration.  The Talmud Yerushalmi, by contrast, appears to accept the theory that the shofar is not sounded on Shabbat due to the Torah's description of Rosh Hashanah in one place as a zikhron teru'a.

            Some Acharonim raised a fairly simple question regarding this theory, based on a basic understand of the respective contexts of these two verses.  The reference to Rosh Hashanah as a zikhron teru'a appears in a section of Parashat Vayikra (in Parashat Emor) that is commonly called parashat ha-mo'adim – the section of the festivals.  This section is the fullest and most comprehensive presentation of the laws of the festivals, as it introduces nearly all the basic obligations that apply on the various occasions.  The term yom teru'a is found in Sefer Bamidbar (in Parashat Pinchas), where the Torah addresses one detail concerning the festivals, namely, the musaf offering.  It seems difficult to imagine that in the basic presentation of the festival laws, the Torah would speak specifically of a case where Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat, addressing the standard case only in the secondary context of the musaf sacrifices.  The question thus arises, how could the Gemara consider interpreting the term zikhron teru'a in Sefer Vayrika as a reference to the relatively rare occurrence of Shabbat Rosh Hashanah, when this context constitutes the Torah's primary presentation of the festival laws?

            The simplest answer, perhaps, is that the Gemara never intended to read the section in Parashat Emor as referring to a situation of Shabbat Rosh Hashanah.  Rather, the shift in terminology from zikhron teru'a to yom teru'a alludes to two different modes of observance that apply in different situations, but this allusion does not necessarily affect the context of the two verses.

            However, Rav Baruch Epstein, in his Torah Temima (Vayikra 23:24), suggests a more creative answer based on the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Shabbat (87b) that Benei Yisrael left Egypt on a Thursday.  Now the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 428:3) observes that Rosh Hashanah will always occur on the same day of the week on which the third day of Pesach had fallen six months earlier.  Thus, if the day of the Exodus – the 15^th of Nissan, or the first day of Pesach – was a Thursday, then Rosh Hashanah that year indeed fell on Shabbat.  It is thus only natural that when speaking to that generation, Moshe would address specifically this case, where Rosh Hashanah fell on Shabbat.

            Rav Aharon Lewin, in his Ha-derash Ve-ha-iyun, notes that the Torah Temima's answer presumes that already in that generation new months were determined based on a fixed calculation, and not upon the sighting of the new moon.  Had the onset of new months been determined based upon the testimony of witnesses to the sighting of the new moon, there is no guarantee that Rosh Hashanah would occur on the same day of the week as the third day of Pesach.  The Shulchan Arukh's calculation applies only when the Jewish calendar runs according to the fixed system that was designed when it became no longer possible to declare months on the basis of the monthly sighting of the new moon.  Apparently, Rav Lewin comments, the Torah Temima had in mind the view of Rabbenu Chananel (cited in – among other contexts – Rabbenu Bechayei's commentary to Parashat Bo), that during the period of travel in the wilderness Benei Yisrael determined new months based on the fixed calendar system, and not based on the sighting of the new moon.  Rabbenu Chananel claimed that the covering of the ananei ha-kavod ("clouds of glory") made it impossible to view the sky, and hence Benei Yisrael had no choice but to arrange a fixed calendar rather than hear testimony to the sighting of the new moon each month.

            Still, one might challenge the Torah Temima's theory on several counts.  For one thing, Moshe clearly presented the festival laws in Sefer Vayikra for posterity, and not merely for that generation, so the question remains why he would address specifically a case where Rosh Hashanah fell on Shabbat.  Furthermore, these laws were transmitted to Moshe in the Mishkan, after its inauguration on Rosh Chodesh Nissan, a full six months after the nation observed Rosh Hashanah on Shabbat.  Thus, even if we had reason to believe that this presentation would focus on that generation's particular observance, it should not have referred to the observance that had already occurred six months earlier.

******

            This week we have been discussing the theory raised by the Gemara in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b) that the term zikhron teru'a, with which the Torah describes Rosh Hashanah in Sefer Vayikra (23:24), refers specifically to a case where Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  In such a year, we merely make mention of (zikhron) the shofar, without actually sounding the shofar.  The Gemara ultimately rejects this view, concluding that the suspension of shofar blowing on Shabbat originates not from the Torah itself, but rather from Rabbinic enactment.  The Talmud Yerushalmi, however, as we have seen, accepts this interpretation of zikhron teru'a.

            Some writers raised the question of how this theory would accommodate the subsequent verse in Sefer Vayikra, which says regarding Rosh Hashanah, "Kol melekhet avoda lo ta'asu" – forbidding on Rosh Hashanah the activities forbidden on Yom Tov generally.  If the Torah speaks here specifically about a case where Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbat, there is no need to issue a separate prohibition against performing melekha on this day.  What more, the term melekhet avoda generally refers only to those activities forbidden on Yom Tov, as oppose to the word melakha, which denotes the full range of activities forbidden on Shabbat.  (As we know, certain activities, such as food preparation, are permissible on Yom Tov but forbidden on Shabbat.)  Why, then, would the Torah forbid on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah only melekhet avoda, and not melakha?

            The simplest answer would be – as discussed yesterday – that the Gemara did not actually suggest reading this section as referring to only this case, where Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  Rather, it sees within the term zikhron teru'a a subtle allusion to an instance when the shofar is not actually sounded, and it deduces that this occurs on Shabbat.

            A different answer was suggested by the editor of a memorial volume entitled Zekher Shelomo (published in Jerusalem, 5743), as cited in Rav David Mandelbaum's Pardes Yosef He-chadash (to Bamidbar 29:1).  According to the theory that the Torah here speaks specifically of Shabbat Rosh Hashanah, it is possible that the prohibition against melekhet avoda was necessary to cover the case of a violator who had forgotten that the day was Shabbat, but was aware that it was Rosh Hashanah.  Had the Torah not specified a prohibition of melekhet avoda on this day, the only prohibition in effect would be that of Shabbat, and thus a person who had forgotten about Shabbat and was aware only of Rosh Hashanah would not be liable to punishment for his violation.  The Torah therefore introduced a separate prohibition of melakhet avoda, establishing that melakha is forbidden on this day not merely because of Shabbat, but also because of Rosh Hashanah.  Hence, even if a violation occurred inadvertently as far as the Shabbat laws are concerned, if the individual was fully aware that he performed melakha on Rosh Hashanah he is liable to punishment.

            Interestingly, as the editor notes, this issue is subject to a debate between Abayei and Rava, recorded in Masekhet Chulin (101b), concerning a certain ruling issued by Rabbi Yossi Ha-gelili.  According to Abayei, Rabbi Yossi held that when Shabbat and Yom Tov coincide, only the Shabbat prohibitions apply.  If a person performed melakha on such a day aware only of its status as Yom Tov, he would not – according to Abayei's reading of Rabbi Yossi – be liable to punishment.  Rava disagreed, and held that both statuses take effect, and hence this violator would indeed be liable to punishment for violating Yom Tov.  The answer suggested above to explain the prohibition of melekhet avoda in the context of Shabbat Rosh Hashanah obviously presumes Rava's position, that the Yom Tov prohibitions indeed take effect when Yom Tov falls on Shabbat.  The Torah therefore found it necessary to specify a prohibition against performing melakhet avoda on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah independent of its status as Shabbat.  According to Abayei, this prohibition would be meaningless, given that the Yom Tov prohibitions do not take effect when Yom Tov falls on Shabbat.

Now recall from our discussions earlier this week that it was Rava who dismissed the notion that the verse of zikhron teru'a refers specifically to Shabbat Rosh Hashanah.  He advanced two arguments against the theory, primarily the claim that had the Torah itself suspended shofar blowing on Shabbat, this suspension would apply even in the Beit Ha-mikdash, and yet the Mishna rules that the shofar was indeed sounded in the Temple on Shabbat.  It is possible that had Rava subscribed to Abayei's view in Masekhet Chulin, that the Yom Tov prohibitions do not take effect on Shabbat, he could have raised yet another argument against this theory, on the basis of the melekhet avoda prohibition that the Torah introduces in the subsequent verse.  According to what we have seen, this prohibition can be explained only if we assume that the Yom Tov prohibitions apply when Yom Tov falls on Shabbat, and thus this prohibition is necessary to render a violator liable in a case where he forgot about Shabbat but remembered Rosh Hashanah.  Abayei's position, of course, does not lend itself to this approach, and this would have been yet another argument against the theory that zikhron teru'a refers to Shabbat Rosh Hashanah.  Rava, following consistent with his view in Masekhet Chulin, does not advance this argument, and resorts to other challenges against the theory concerning zikhron teru'a.

******

            We have been discussing the week the halakha that suspends the mitzva of sounding the shofar when Rosh Hashanah occurs on Shabbat.  The Gemara in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b) concludes that this provision originates not from the Torah itself, but rather from an enactment by Chazal who feared that a person might carry the shofar and thus violate the prohibition against carrying in a public domain on Shabbat.  For this same reason, Chazal suspended the mitzva of arba minim (four species) when Sukkot falls on Shabbat, as well as Megila reading when Purim occurs on Shabbat.

            Rashi, in his commentary to Masekhet Sukka (43a), raises the question of why the Gemara makes reference in this context only to the prohibition of ha'avara arba amot be-reshut ha-rabim – carrying four cubits in a public domain on Shabbat.  The prohibition against carrying on Shabbat actually consists of two laws: one may not carry four cubits in a public domain, and one may not carry an item from a private domain to a public domain, or vice versa.  The first prohibition is generally referred to as ha'avara, while the second prohibition, forbidding the transport of an item from one domain to another, is usually called hotza'a mei-reshut le-reshut (or just hotza'a).  As Rashi notes, in all instances where the Gemara mentions the suspension of shofar, lulav or Megila on Shabbat, it makes reference only to ha'avara, and not to hotza'a.

            Rashi answers that Chazal's primary concern was for a possible violation of ha'avara, because, quite simply, hotza'a is less frequent.  He gives two explanations for why ha'avara is more likely to occur than hotza'a.  Firstly, there are certain kinds of reshuyot (domains) that Halakha treats as neither a public nor a private domain, and carrying an item from one of these areas into a public or private domain thus does not constitute a Torah violation.  (It would, however, still be forbidden by force of Rabbinic enactment.)  Hence, if a person lifts an item from one of these areas and carries them into and through a public domain, he transgresses the prohibition of ha'avara – by virtue of his carrying in a public domain – but he does not violate hotza'a, since he did not carry the item from a private domain.  Such a case, Rashi writes, is relatively common, making the potential for ha'avara violations somewhat greater than that for hotza'a.

            Secondly, Rashi claims, one violates hotza'a only if he lifted the object in the private or public domain with the intent of carrying it into the other domain.  If a person lifted an object in his home with the intention of carrying it to another room inside the home, and while holding it he decided to bring it outside, he does not transgress the violation of hotza'a.  The akira ("uprooting") and the hanacha ("placement") must occur along the same continuum of intention for hotza'a to take place, and thus a person violates this prohibition only if he lifts the object intending to bring it to the other domain.  This constitutes a significant restriction on the hotza'a prohibition, thus rendering it less common than ha'avara.

            Tosefot cite Rashi's comments and take issue with the second reason he suggests for the relative infrequency of hotza'a.  While it is true that hotza'a requires lifting the object with the intent to bring it to the other domain, this condition applies to ha'avara, as well.  Namely, if a person lifts an item in a public domain with no intention to move it, and then, whole holding the object, he decides to walk with it four cubits or more, he has not transgressed ha'avara.  Thus, according to Tosefot, this restriction on the violation of hotza'a is equally relevant to ha'avara, and therefore we cannot point to this provision as a contributing factor to the greater incidence of hotza'a.

            As discussed by Rav David Mandelbaum in his Pardes Yosef He-chadash (Bamidbar 29:1), Rashi appeared to have distinguished between hotza'a and ha'avara in this regard, and maintained that one transgresses ha'avara even if he had not initially intended to carry the item.  The basis for this distinction is the different sources for these prohibitions.  Hotza'a is listed among the thirty-nine melakhot (categories of forbidden activity on Shabbat), all of which are modeled after the corresponding activities performed during the construction of the Mishkan.  Ha'avara, by contrast, as the Gemara mentions in Masekhet Shabbat (96a), has come to us strictly through oral tradition (hilkheta gemiri la), and not through the standard system of the thirty-nine melakhot.  Quite possibly, then, the two prohibitions operate on different conditions, and the initial intent that is indispensable for transgressing hotza'a is not necessary for ha'avara. 

Tosefot, by contrast, insisted on total parity between hotza'a and ha'avara.  They perhaps understood the oral tradition that established the ha'avara prohibition to mean that ha'avara is now to be included under the general category of "carrying" along with hotza'a, and thus the same guidelines that apply to hotza'a are binding with respect to ha'avara, as well.

******

            This week we have been discussing the halakha introduced by the Mishna in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (29b) suspending the mitzva of shofar blowing when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  The exception to this rule, the Mishna establishes, is the grounds of the Temple, where the shofar was sounded even when Rosh Hashanah occurred on Shabbat.  (According to the Rambam, the word Mikdash in this Mishna refers to the entire city of Jerusalem, and not just the actual precinct of the Temple.)  After the Temple's destruction, the Mishna adds, Rabban Yochanan Ben Zakai legislated that in commemoration of the Shabbat shofar blowing in the Temple, the shofar should be sounded on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah wherever a Beit-Din is present.  The Rambam explains (in Hilkhot Shofar 2:9) that Rabban Yochanan limited this practice to locales with a Beit-Din because its presence decreases the chances of Shabbat violation, the concern for which gave rise to the suspension of shofar on Shabbat in the first place.

            The Gemara discusses what precisely constitutes a "Beit-Din" for purposes of this halakha, and from the commentaries and rulings of the Rishonim four different positions emerge:

1)      Rashi (s.v. ela be-yavneh) held that the shofar is sounded on Shabbat only in the presence of a sanhedrin ketana, a 23-member court qualified to issue capital sentences.

2)      The Ritva cites a different ruling in the name of Rashi, restricting the Shabbat shofar blowing to the presence of the actual Sanhedrin, even after it moved out of Jerusalem.

3)      The Rambam views this halakha more flexibly, allowing the sounding of the shofar on Shabbat wherever an established Beit-Din convenes, even if it consists of only three members, like contemporary Batei-Din.  The Rambam does insist, however, that these three members are musmakhim, meaning, that they have received the formal ordination that was conferred from rabbi to student since Moshe Rabbenu.  Now this formal semikha was discontinued during the period of the Roman oppression, but the Rambam famously held (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 4:11) that it can be reinstated with the unanimous consent of all the scholars living in Eretz Yisrael.  Thus, at least in theory, it is possible even today for the shofar to be sounded when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.

4)      The most liberal interpretation of "Beit-Din," however, was that of the Rif, who held that any established Beit-Din can and must sound the shofar on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah, even after the discontinuation of semikha.  Sure enough, it is reported that the Rif himself had the shofar sounded on Shabbat in his community, where he presided over an established Beit-Din.  The Rosh, in discussing this position and practice of the Rif, claimed that the Rif applied it only to a "Beit-Din muflag ve-gadol be-doro" – a court that has achieved particular stature and prominence in its generation, as the Rif's Beit-Din appears to have earned.  The Rosh further noted that historically, no other Beit-Din ever adopted such a practice, not even among the Rif's most faithful adherents.  Needless to say, the accepted practice today is that the shofar is not sounded anywhere on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah, even in communities with the most prestigious rabbinical courts.

******

            The Gemara states in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (16b), "Any year in which [the shofar] is not blown in the beginning – it will experience evil in the end."  In other words, if the Jewish people fail to sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, at the outset of the year, they run the risk of suffering calamity, Heaven forbid, as the year progresses.  Tosefot cite the Behag as commenting, "Not when it occurs on Shabbat, but rather when some oness [circumstance beyond one's control] arises."  According to the Behag, this warning does not apply on a year when we do not sound the shofar because Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat; it refers to all other causes for not sounding the shofar.

            The Meshekh Chokhma (Vayikra 23:24) discusses this passage, as explained by the Behag, and its implications concerning the mitzva of shofar and the suspension of this mitzva when Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat.  It emerges from this Gemara that shofar blowing constitutes not only a mitzva, a commandment of a God, but also an intrinsically beneficial "tool."  A fundamental principle in Halakha establishes that oness Rachamana patrei – the Torah absolves a person from guilt and accountability if he fails to perform a given mitzva due to circumstances entirely beyond his control.  According to the Behag, however, Chazal warned of the consequences of failure to sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah even in situations of oness, where it was practically unfeasible.  Apparently, the Meshekh Chokhma reasons, the value of shofar blowing extends beyond its being a commandment of God, in that it brings our collective merit before the Almighty as we stand before Him in judgment.  The Meshekh Chokhma goes so far as to draw an analogy to an ill patient who, due to circumstances beyond his control, could not obtain the required drugs.  Of course, the patient will not be cured; regardless of why he could not obtain the medication, its absence results in the continued effects of his illness.  Similarly, the Meshekh Chokhma asserts, one forfeits the benefits of teki'at shofar regardless of the reasons why he could not perform this mitzva.  Other mitzvot are beneficial only insofar as they are divine commands, and therefore if a person had no practical means of fulfilling the mitzva, he does not face any negative consequences.  When it comes to shofar, by contrast, the effects are lost even in situations of oness.

            This theory gives rise to the obvious question of why the situation of Shabbat Rosh Hashanah should be any different.  According to the Meshekh Chokhma's understanding of the intrinsic benefits of shofar blowing, it would seem that these benefits are forfeited even when Halakha itself bars a person from sounding the shofar.

            The Meshekh Chokhma answers that refraining from shofar blowing on Shabbat Rosh Hashanah actually yields the same effect as sounding the shofar on a regular year.  The sounding of the shofar serves to invoke Benei Yisrael's merit stemming from the akeida, the event symbolized by the shofar.  Like Avraham and Yitzchak, Jews throughout the centuries have shown their willingness to sacrifice everything, to forego on all their personal concerns and desires, for the sake of fulfilling God's word.  Our sounding of the shofar brings the merit of this commitment and sacrifice before the Almighty and earns us atonement.  When Rosh Hashanah falls on Shabbat, we forego on this invaluable resource out of concern for a possible violation of Shabbat.  We are prepared to sacrifice this incomparable asset for the sake of God's honor, to preserve the sanctity of Shabbat.  This, itself, the Meshekh Chokhma writes, is "an extraordinary spiritual akeida and is effective in earning us atonement, just as the remembrance of the shofar atones."  Thus, by refraining from sounding the shofar, we display our willingness to sacrifice for God, and thereby we earn God's favor just as we would by actually sounding the shofar.

******

            Yesterday, we cited the Gemara's warning in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (16b) that evil may befall the Jewish people during the year if they fail to sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah: "Any year in which [the shofar] is not blown in the beginning – it will experience evil in the end."  We presented the approach taken by the Meshekh Chokhma, who understood this comment as a reference to the intrinsic power of shofar blowing in bringing our merit before God on our day of judgment.  This power is lost if we do not sound the shofar, even if this resulted from circumstances beyond our control.

            A somewhat different explanation is offered by the Rashash in his commentary to Masekhet Rosh Hashanah.  The Rashash suggested that if we do not sound the shofar on Rosh Hashanah, the Almighty will, Heaven forbid, bring upon us a crisis that requires the observance of a ta'anit tzibur, a public fast, which includes the sounding of the shofar (see Mishnayot, second chapter of Masekhet Ta'anit).  Thus, if we fail to blow the shofar in the beginning of the year, God sees to it that we will be forced to do so under less favorable circumstances, in response to crisis and calamity.

            We might further develop this approach in light of the Rambam's famous comments in Hilkhot Teshuva (3:4) concerning the purpose and symbolism of the shofar.  The blast of the shofar, the Rambam writes, is intended as a "wake-up call," to awaken us from our preoccupation with the havlei ha-zeman (the vanities of the world).  The natural human tendency is to become focused upon and drawn after the physical and material pleasures of life, which gradually leads to neglect of one's religious duties.  On Rosh Hashanah we are awakened from this spiritual slumber through the sounding of the shofar.  It reminds us of the higher purpose for which we were created and the need to redirect our focus and energies towards the service of God.

            The Rashash is perhaps teaching that if we do not hear the "wake-up call" of the shofar, then God must resort to a different means of "awakening."  Periods of crisis and hardship also have the effect of "awakening" a person from his spiritual slumber, reminding him of his vulnerability, his dependence on God for his very survival, and his unworthiness of God's protection and blessing.  If we are not awakened by the shofar as the year begins, if we do not shake ourselves free from the shackles of our mundane routine and natural preoccupation with vanity, then, Heaven forbid, we will find ourselves being awakened by the sounding of the shofar on a public fast, in a situation of crisis and hardship.

By heeding the shofar's call to teshuva as the year begins, we help ensure that no other "wake-up call" will be necessary throughout the rest of the year.

******

            The Gemara in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (33b) discusses a debate among the Tanna'im regarding which shofar sound to which the Torah refers with the term teru'a.  Abayei establishes that both views are based upon Onkelos' Aramaic translation of the word – "yabava."  This word appears in verb form much later in Tanakh, in Shirat Devora – the song of triumph sung by Devora after Benei Yisrael's victory over the Canaanite armies of Yavin and Sisera.  Devora employs the verb y.b.v. in describing Sisera's mother's cries as she waited in vain for her son's return from battle: "va-teyabev eim Sisera" (Shoftim 5:28).  By extension, then, the word teru'a refers to a sound produced by a person crying, and the Tanna'im debate how precisely this crying is meant to sound.

            A number of early sources cite a passage from the Talmud Yerushalmi whereby the crying of Sisera's mother forms the basis of another practice concerning shofar blowing – the one hundred blasts that we sound over the course of the service on Rosh Hashanah.  The Arukh, Rabbenu Chananel (end of Masekhet Rosh Hashanah) and Sefer Ha-pardes all cite the Yerushalmi as attributing this practice to "the one hundred wailing sounds wailed by Sisera's mother."  We sound one hundred shofar blasts to commemorate the one hundred cries of Sisera's mother as she awaited her son's return from battle, unaware that he had been killed.

            Rav Menachem Kasher, in his Torah Sheleima (Bereishit, chapter 23, note 17), notes the obvious difficulty in this comment ascribed to the Yerushalmi, that we seek to commemorate the cries of Sisera's mother.  The Bavli enlisted the verse from Shirat Devora merely for the purpose of defining the word yabava with which Onkelos translated the term teru'a; it did not point to any conceptual association between Sisera's mother and our sounding of the shofar.  The Yerushalmi, however, as cited by these Rishonim, considers this woman's cries worthy of honorable mention, of sorts, during shofar blowing on Rosh Hashanah, something which is very difficult to understand.

            Rav Kasher boldly suggests revising the text of this passage, changing the words eim Sisera – "Sisera's mother" – to imenu Sara – "our matriarch, Sara."  As Rav Kasher cites, numerous Midrashic sources tell of Sara's cries as the Satan falsely reported to her that Avraham had slaughtered her son as a sacrifice on Mount Moriah.  Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer (chapter 32) tells that when the Satan saw that he could not prevent Avraham from obeying God's command to sacrifice his son, he attempted to at least cause Avraham to regret this decision.  He therefore appeared to Sara and told her that Avraham had killed Yitzchak, and Sara wept and then died from the trauma of this false report.  Pirkei De-Rabbi Eliezer writes, "She cried three cries – corresponding to the three teki'ot."  This clause is understood more clearly in light of the parallel comments in a Midrashic manuscript entitled Or Ha-afeila cited by Rav Kasher: "They therefore established three cries in the teki'ot."  According to these (and other) sources, the crying sound of the teru'a is intended to correspond to – and, presumably, to commemorate – Sara's wails upon hearing the Satan's fictitious report of Yitzchak's death.

            It thus stands to reason, Rav Kasher argues, that the Yerushalmi cited by the aforementioned Rishonim viewed the one hundred shofar sounds as a commemoration not of eim Sisera, but rather of imenu Sara.  The akeida is, of course, one of the primary themes of the shofar, and it therefore seems far more likely that Chazal ordained that we bring to mind this event, rather than the cries of Sisera's mother.

            On this basis, Rav Kasher suggests a novel explanation of a perplexing remark earlier in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (16b), that we sound two series of shofar blasts (before and during musaf) in order to "confound the Satan."  This might mean that the additional shofar sounds discredit the Satan by bringing to mind Sara's death which resulted from his false report of Yitzchak's death.  It is as though we beseech God to ignore the Satan's prosecution because he is responsible for the death of our great matriarch Sara.

            The term "Satan," of course, is often interpreted as an allegorical reference to our yetzer ha-ra, man's evil inclination and sinful tendencies, the many obstacles a person confronts in his quest for spiritual perfection.  Sara's death upon hearing an inaccurate report about the akeida posed yet another challenge, another test of faith, to Avraham, whose "Satan" sought to make him regret his blind obedience to God, which led directly to his wife's death.  On Rosh Hashanah, when the results of our "Satan" – our yetzer ha-ra – come before God and call for a harsh decree against us, we bring to mind this incident as if to show the Almighty just how devious and unrelenting this "Satan" is.  We appeal for compassion by showing how vulnerable we are to the Satan's antics and ploys, and that our sincere desire is to faithfully serve God, even if we are occasionally misled by our sinful instincts.

            (For more conventional explanations of the Gemara's comment regarding our attempts to "confound the Satan," see the commentaries of Rashi, Tosefot and the Ran to this Gemara.)