The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

SUKKOT

By Rav David Silverberg

SUKKOT

MOTZAEI

            The Torah writes in introducing the mitzva of arba minim (the "four species" taken on Sukkot), "You shall take for yourselves on the first day a fruit from the citron tree, branches of palm…" (Vayikra 23:40).  The Midrash Tanchuma famously comments that the Torah's reference to the first day of Sukkot as yom ha-rishon ("the first day") alludes to something more than its position vis-à-vis the other days of the holiday.  Namely, this term hints to this day's status as rishon le-cheshbon avonot, which literally means, "the first for the calculation of sins."  It appears that the onset of Sukkot marks the beginning of the new record of transgressions, which had (hopefully) been wiped clean five days earlier, on Yom Kippur.  The obvious question arises, in what sense does Sukkot begin the new account of sins?  Why is it assumed that people will suddenly begin committing misdeeds specifically with the onset of Sukkot?

            Rav Baruch Yitzchak Yissachar Leventhal, in his Birkat Yitzchak (Jerusalem, 5706), suggests a possible explanation based on an oft-quoted theory advanced by the Gaon of Vilna concerning the word cheshbon.  According to the Gaon, this term, when used in the context of divine judgment, refers to one's accountability not for wrongful acts, but rather for the missed opportunities for performing mitzvot while committing those acts.  Beyond the punishment one deserves for his wrongdoing, he is culpable as well for having squandered the time he spent engaged in wrongdoing.  During that time, he committed an act that itself warrants punishment, and also forfeited the opportunity to utilize those moments for meaningful and productive activity.

            It is in this sense, Rav Leventhal suggests, that Sukkot marks the beginning of – in the words of the Midrash – cheshbon avonot, the "cheshbon" of one's sins.  The mitzva of sukka is unique in that it encompasses the entirety of one's existence.  A person fulfills this mitzva simply by living life in the sukka, through eating, sleeping, conversing, reading, or relaxing.  This mitzva affords one the opportunity to be involved in avodat Hashem even without performing any intrinsically religious act; no matter what he does in the sukka, he has fulfilled a mitzva and thus served his Creator.

            On Sukkot, then, more so than during any other time, a sinner bears guilt not only for the wrongful act itself, but for the lost potential of the moments he spent involved in wrongdoing.  Since Sukkot grants the opportunity to perform a mitzva at every moment, even while engaging in otherwise mundane activities, the "cheshbon" – the culpability for lost opportunities – is particularly severe during this festival.  "Rishon le-cheshbon avonot" thus means that Sukkot represents the extreme manifestation of the concept of cheshbon, the prospect of punishment for not only the act of sin itself, but also for the mitzvot that could have been performed at that moment.

            Sukkot thus expresses the notion that life must not be compartmentalized into the two distinct realms of mitzva and reshut, of spiritual and mundane.  The laws and ideals of the Torah pervade all of a person's existence, to the point where he should live his entire life as he does on Sukkot – serving God even while going about his normal routine.  This theme is similarly represented by the mitzva of arba minim, which requires that we hold various types of vegetation.  This perhaps conveys the message that even handling fruits and other plants, cultivating the earth and working for a livelihood, must become part of a person's avodat Hashem.  By applying and observing the laws and values of the Torah even in the workplace, and throughout one's daily routine, he transforms his entire life into a sukka, infusing it with meaning, value and substance.

SUNDAY

            The Gemara in Masekhet Sukka (27a-b) cites a debate between Rabbi Eliezer and the other Sages as to whether one may build and use a new sukka during Chol Ha-mo'ed of Sukkot.  According to Rabbi Eliezer, a sukka that had not stood at the onset of the festival is not suitable for use during Sukkot.  Therefore, if one builds a new sukka during Chol Ha-mo'ed, it may not be used for fulfilling the obligation of sukka.  The majority view, which has been accepted as Halakha, rejects this condition and maintains that one may fulfill the mitzva with a sukka that was initially built only during Chol Ha-mo'ed.

            The berayta that records this dispute emphasizes that Rabbi Eliezer's position applies only to a new sukka.  He concedes that if one built a sukka before the onset of the festival and at some point it collapsed, he may rebuild it on Chol Ha-mo'ed and then use it for the mitzva of sukka.

            This berayta clearly works off the assumption that building a sukka during Chol Ha-mo'ed of Sukkot is not forbidden by virtue of the prohibition against melakha – certain types of constructive activity – on Chol Ha-mo'ed.   The issue here relates purely to the question of whether or not a sukka must have existed at the onset of Sukkot to qualify for use in fulfillment of the mitzva.  As far as the general laws of building on Chol Ha-mo'ed are concerned, no prohibition is entailed.

            Interestingly, however, we find one view among the halakhic authorities that significantly restricts this halakha.  The Chafetz Chayim, in his Bei'ur Halakha (637:1), cites the Ma'amar Mordekhai as commenting, "It is clear that this applies where one does not have to do something forbidden to be done on Chol Ha-mo'ed due to [the prohibitions of] building and dismantling."  According to the Ma'amar Mordekhai, this entire discussion relates to cases such as where the sekhakh fell down, thus disqualifying the sukka, and one needs merely to return the sekhakh to its place.  But if the sukka collapsed completely, and one must begin rebuilding walls and the like, then he may not rebuild the sukka, due to the prohibition against building on Chol Ha-mo'ed.  In the view of the Ma'amar Mordekhai, the mitzva of sukka does not override the prohibition against building on Chol ha-mo'ed.  Therefore, one may rebuild a sukka only if this does not entail activities forbidden by force of this prohibition.

            The Bei'ur Halakha, however, dismisses this view, noting that the Gemara speaks not only of cases where a sukka became disqualified, but also of building a new sukka on Chol Ha-mo'ed.  (Recall that the only issue involved the possible requirement that a sukka had been standing since the onset of the festival.)  He explains that building for purposes of a mitzva is permissible on Chol Ha-mo'ed, just as Halakha permits writing tefillin and mezuzot on Chol Ha-mo'ed, despite the general prohibition against skilled writing (see Shulchan Arukh O.C. 545:3).  This is the view of several other prominent authorities, as well, including the Kaf Ha-chayim (O.C. 637:4) and the Avnei Neizer (O.C. 2:23), as cited approvingly by Rav Ovadya Yosef (Chazon Ovadya – Sukkot, p. 50).

            It should be noted that later, in Siman 640, the Bei'ur Halakha rules that one may build a sukka on Chol Ha-mo'ed even if he already has a sukka but wishes to build a larger sukka for the purpose of hosting an affair.  Despite the fact that the individual already has a viable sukka with which to fulfill the mitzva, he is permitted to construct a larger sukka during Chol Ha-mo'ed.

MONDAY

            The Gemara in Masekhet Sukka (22b) cites a berayta that addresses the issue of how thick one may make the sekhakh of his sukka.  The berayta comments that even if the sekhakh is thick "resembling a house" to the point where the stars cannot be seen through it, the sukka is valid for use on Sukkot.  If the sekhakh is so thick that even the sunlight cannot be seen through it, even so Beit Hillel allows using the sukka, whereas Beit Shammai rules stringently in such a case.

            Accordingly, the Shulchan Arukh rules (O.C. 631:3) that a sukka is valid even if the sekhakh does not allow for peering into the sky from the sukka.  He does, however, mention that ideally the sekhakh should be arranged such that one can see through it the larger stars in the sky, but not the smaller stars.  This ruling contrasts with the comments of the Sefer He-yerei'im, who writes (123) that one may "cover it [the sukka] as he wishes so long as it appears as a sukka; but with boards…it is actually like a house, and is invalid."  The Yerei'im allows placing sekhakh "as one wishes," provided that it does not resemble a house, suggesting that even le-khatechila – ideally – one may make the sekhakh as thick as he wishes.

            The Rishonim address the similar issue of whether one may make sekakh thick enough to prevent rainwater from entering the sukka.  The Mordekhai, in the first chapter of Masekhet Sukka (732), writes that this issue is subject to a debate between Rashi and Rabbenu Tam surrounding a passage in the Gemara (Sukka 8b).  The Gemara there rules that one may use on Sukkot a shack built for shelter by shepherds and outdoor watchmen, provided that it had been built "for the purpose of shade."  According to Rabbenu Tam, this condition excludes a shack with a roof thick enough to protect its inhabitants from rain.  One may use such a shack as a sukka if the covering protects only from the sun, but not if it is so thick that it protects even from the rain.  Rashi, however, explains differently, claiming that the Gemara requires that the hut had been constructed for shelter, and not simply for privacy.  According to Rashi, it appears, the sukka is valid regardless of the degree of shelter it provides, even if it shields its inhabitants from the rain, so long as it was constructed for the purpose of shelter, rather than privacy.  We should add that from the aforementioned remarks of the Yerei'im it appears that he, too, would allow using a sukka even if the sekhakh is thick enough to prevent rain from entering the sukka.

            Neither the Shulchan Arukh nor the Rema make mention of Rabbenu Tam's position, suggesting that thick sekhakh does not disqualify a sukka, even if it shields the sukka from rain.  This is indeed the view taken by numerous authorities, including Rav Ovadya Yosef, in his Chazon Ovadya – Sukkot (pp. 35-36).  Nevertheless, the Mishna Berura (631:6) writes that one should not use such a sukka unless he has no other sukka and he cannot, for whatever reason, remove some of the sekhakh to make it thinner.

TUESDAY

            The Magen Avraham (627:2) cites the Aguda as ruling that if one uses wooden planks as sekhakh for his sukka and nails the planks into the frame of the sukka, the sukka is invalid.  Nailing planks into the sukka renders the structure a dirat keva – a permanent residence – as opposed to a dirat arai – a temporary residence – and the sukka thus may not be used.

            Rav Ovadya Yosef, in his Chazon Ovadya – Sukkot (p. 36), notes that one might challenge this view in light of an incident recorded by several Rishonim (Ravya 611, Or Zarua 2:285) involving Rabbenu Tam.  It is told that Rabbenu Tam's brother-in-law constructed a sukka using wooden planks which he nailed into the frame as sekhakh, and Rabbenu Tam forbade him from using the sukka because rainwater could not enter the sukka.  As we saw yesterday, Rabbenu Tam was of the opinion that if rainwater cannot penetrate the sekhakh of a sukka, the sukka may not be used for the mitzva.  Rabbenu Tam's recorded objection to his brother-in-law's sukka indicates that he deemed it invalid solely due to the sekhakh's thickness; the use of nailed planks as sekhakh did not seem to trouble Rabbenu Tam.  Seemingly, then, nailing planks onto the top of the sukka and using them as sekhakh would not render the sukka invalid.  Indeed, the work Piskei Teshuvot (siman 629, note 62) cites the Ha-elef Lekha Shelomo as allowing the use of nailed wooden planks as sekhakh, provided that rainwater can enter the sukka.

            It should be noted, however, that Tosafot (Sukka 2a) similarly disqualifies a sukka made in this manner, as cited by the Chafetz Chayim in Sha'ar Ha-tziyun (633:6), and it thus appears that there is some debate among the Rishonim on this issue.  Indeed, both the Sha'ar Ha-tziyun and Arukh Ha-shulchan (629:32) rule that one should not nail the sekhakh into the sukka, as this lends the sukka a degree of stability and "permanence" that disqualifies it for the mitzva.  Furthermore, as noted by Piskei Teshuvot, if the planks are incapable of remaining in place without the nails, then the sukka is disqualified in any event because the sekhakh is supported by objects that are eligible for tum'a (ritual impurity).  Halakha generally accepts the view that just as the sekhakh itself may not be made from materials susceptible to tum'a (such as nails), so may the sekhakh not be supported by such materials.  Hence, if the nails are needed for holding the planks in place, and without the nails the planks could not remain atop the sukka, then the sukka is certainly invalid according to all opinions.

WEDNESDAY

            The Gemara in Masekhet Sukka (28b) cites the following berayta: "All seven days [of Sukkot], a person makes his sukka [his] permanent [residence] and his house [his] temporary [residence].  How is this done…He eats, drinks and spends his time in the sukka and learns in the sukka."  The berayta essentially states that one must transform the sukka into his primary place of residence during Sukkot, and thus all the activities he normally performs in his home should be performed in the sukka.

            A number of writers took note of the conspicuous and somewhat jarring omission of sleep from this list of activities.  A number of sources in the Gemara indicate that one is strictly obligated to sleep in the sukka during Sukkot (assuming that weather and health conditions allow for doing so), and it thus seems peculiar that the Mishna would exclude sleep from its description of the mitzva of sukka.  The Rema was indeed sensitive to this question: the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 639:1) cites this berayta, and the Rema adds sleep to this list in his glosses to the Shulchan Arukh.

            The work Damesek Eliezer (a study aid and commentary to the Bei'ur Ha-Gra) suggests that this question underlies an otherwise ambiguous remark of the Vilna Gaon in his commentary to the Shulchan Arukh.  The Gaon cites the Rema's insertion of the word ve-yashen ("and sleeps") into the Shulchan Arukh's list of activities, and then writes, "As stated in se'if 2."  Sure enough, the Shulchan Arukh in se'if 2 codifies the obligation to sleep in the sukka during Sukkot.  The question, however, arises as to what the Gaon sought to add or clarify with this remark.  The Damesek Eliezer explains that the Gaon refers here to the distinction drawn by the Shulchan Arukh in se'if 2 between the obligations of eating and sleeping in the sukka.  Whereas Halakha allows partaking of small snacks outside the sukka, any amount of sleep – even a quick nap – must take place in the sukka.  By drawing our attention to this halakha, the Gaon wished to emphasize the uniquely stringent nature of the obligation to sleep in the sukka, which sets it apart from the other activities that require a sukka.  In this way, he sought to answer the question as to why sleep was omitted from the list cited in the Shulchan Arukh, thus necessitating an insertion by the Rema.  The berayta – and, subsequently, the Shulchan Arukh – omitted sleep from this list because it stands separate and apart from the other obligations.  Only sleep features the unique stringency that even temporary engagement in this activity must not occur outside the sukka.  Hence, the author of the berayta saw fit to exclude sleep from his list of activities requiring a sukka, lest one mistakenly compare sleep with the other sukka obligations.

            Tomorrow we will iy"H present a different approach that has been suggested to answer this question.

THURSDAY

            Yesterday, we discussed a question that arises from a passage in Masekhet Sukka (28b) that defines the mitzva of dwelling in the sukka.  The Gemara cites a berayta listing a number of activities that one must perform in the sukka – eating, drinking, spending time, and studying" – but curiously omits sleeping.  The obligation to sleep in the sukka is clearly established in several contexts in Masekhet Sukka, yet it is absent from the berayta's list of activities that must be done in the sukka during Sukkot.

            The Gaon of Rogatchov, in his Tzofnat Pa'nei'ach (Hilkhot Sukka 6:2), advanced a novel theory to resolve this difficulty.  He contended that one does not fulfill the mitzva of sukka by sleeping in the sukka, which involves no action and occurs in a state of unconsciousness.   The Rogatchover formulated the theory in terms of a distinction between the mitzva of dwelling in the sukka and a prohibition against dwelling outside a sukka.  In his view, going to sleep outside the sukka transgresses the prohibition against dwelling outside the sukka, but sleeping in a sukka does not fulfill the mitzva of dwelling in a sukka.  Since one cannot fulfill a mitzva in a state of unconsciousness, we cannot speak of the fulfillment of a mitzva during sleep.

            This theory, the Tzofnat Pa'nei'ach claimed, explains the omission of sleep from the berayta's list of activities that one must perform in the sukka.  The berayta refers here only to the kiyum mitzva – fulfilling the obligation of sukka, which one does not achieve by sleeping in the sukka.  Thus, although Halakha strictly forbids sleeping outside the sukka, sleeping has no place in the context of this berayta.

            The Rogatchover added that this theory could also resolve a number of other difficulties raised by earlier scholars.  Most famously, perhaps, a number of Rishonim struggled to explain why Halakha does not require reciting a berakha before going to sleep in a sukka, just as one does before eating in a sukka.  Once we assume that sleeping in the sukka merely avoids a prohibition, but does not fulfill a mitzva, this is easily understood.  We recite berakhot before performing a mitzva, but not before performing an action whereby we avoid transgressing a prohibition.

            However, Rav Simcha Bunim Londinsky, in his Sukat Chayim (Lakewood, 5766), questions the Rogatchover Gaon's theory in light of the Mishna's opening comment to the second chapter of Masekhet Sukka: "One who sleeps underneath a bed in the sukka does not fulfill his obligation."  If a person sleeps under a bed in a sukka, he is not considered to have slept underneath the sekhakh, and, as such, he has failed to fulfill the mitzva of sukka.  The Mishna's formulation – "does not fulfill his obligation" – clearly implies that there indeed exists an "obligation" of sleeping in the sukka.  Seemingly, then, we must conclude that beyond the prohibition against sleeping in the sukka, there is also a mitzva to sleep in the sukka, in direct contradistinction to the theory proposed by the Tzofnat Pa'nei'ach.

FRIDAY

            Diaspora communities, which observe the second day of Sukkot as a Yom Tov, read for this day's haftara the eighth chapter of Sefer Melakhim I, which tells of the inauguration of the first Bet Ha-mikdash during the time of King Shelomo.  We read in this narrative that the kohanim brought the aron to its place inside the kodesh ha-kodashim – the innermost sanctum of the Temple (8:6).  Two verses later (8:8), we are told that "the heads of the poles [of the aron] were seen from the kodesh," yet at the same time, "they were not seen outside."  The Talmud (Yoma 54a) explains that the ends of the poles protruded against the parokhet, the curtain that separated between the two interior chambers.  Thus, although the poles could not actually be seen, their impression was very noticeable to the kohanim in the kodesh looking at the parokhet.

            Rav Mendel Hirsch, in his commentary to the haftarot, cites from his father, Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch, two possible approaches as to the symbolic meaning of this arrangement.  Firstly, Rav Hirsch suggested that the protrusion of the poles perhaps signified "that the Torah was not to find its fulfillment within the narrow confines of the Temple, but that it was always awaiting its bearers who dedicate their lives to be its home."  The visible extension of the poles beyond the confines of the kodesh ha-kodashim gave the ark the appearance of attempting to push its way outside the constricted area of this sanctum.  The Torah – symbolized by the aron – "begs" to be released from its cramped quarters and to shed its light upon mankind.

            Rav Hirsch then suggests a second approach, whereby the poles' protrusion served as a sobering foreshadowing of the ultimate fate of the ark:

…that the time would come when the building would lie in wreckage and ruin, the curtain torn to tatters, and the people would again have to take the Ark of the Covenant of the Torah of their God on their shoulders and carry the Torah through the world, through the ages, through the wilderness.

The poles pushed against the aron as a warning that the ark might once again be removed from the glorious Mikdash and be forced to wander about until Am Yisrael deserve to have the building restored and the ark returned to its permanent home.

            Rav Yehuda Ginsburg, in his Musar Ha-nevi'im (Sefer Melakhim I), suggests a different possible explanation, namely, that the visible protrusion of the poles was intended to remind the kohanim in the Temple of the aron each and every day.  Yom Kippur was the only time when a kohen (the kohen gadol) would enter the kodesh ha-kodashim and actually see the ark.  Had the poles not been visible through their protruding against the curtain, the kohanim would have likely forgotten about the ark's presence the rest of the year; they would have gone about their routine in the Mikdash without an awareness of the aron, which represented God's presence.  The aron was therefore situated such that the poles of the ark would be visible at all times, and thus the kohanim would remain constantly aware of the aron and the divine presence as they performed the avoda (service) in the Temple.

            Rav Ginsburg proceeds to apply this concept to all Am Yisrael: it is insufficient to be cognizant of God only on Yom Kippur, when we all enter the kodesh ha-kodashim, so-to-speak.  His presence must be an important part of our lives all days of the year, and be part of our awareness as we go about our own avoda each and every day.

David Silverberg

MOTZAEI

            The haftara for Shabbat Chol Ha-mo'ed Sukkot is the prophecy of Gog U-Magog, found in Sefer Yechezkel (38).  Yechezkel foresees the time when a certain empire named Magog, led by a ruler named Gog, will descend upon the Land of Israel to wage war against the Jewish people that had been assembled from across the globe to its ancient homeland.  God warns that He will respond with vengeance and defeat Gog and his allies through a host of supernatural disasters (see 38:22).  Some commentators associate the war foreseen here with the final prophecy of Zekharya (chapter 14) that is read as the haftara for the first day of Sukkot, and which similarly tells of an alliance of nations that will descend upon Jerusalem and ultimately suffer a crushing defeat.

            The connection between this war and the festival of Sukkot, as noted by Rav Menachem Bentzion Zaks (in Menachem Tziyon – Yerach Ha-eitanim), emerges from a passage in the Yalkut Shimoni (653).  Commenting on the verse, "You shall dwell in sukkot for seven days" (Vayikra 23:42), the Yalkut states that the mitzva of sukka alludes to the sukka spoken of by the prophet Yeshayahu (4:6): "And there shall be a sukka for shade by day and for refuge and shelter from downpours and rain."  The Yalkut explains that at some point in the future, nations will wage war against Am Yisrael in the Land of Israel, and the Almighty will fight on Am Yisrael's behalf while providing a protective "sukka" over them all throughout.  Our observance of this mitzva thus relates to the supernatural protection God will provide during the battles and bloodshed that will precede the Messianic era, and for this reason, perhaps, we read the prophecies describing these wars as the haftarot on Sukkot.

            Rav Zaks suggests an additional basis for this connection, as well.  He cites the Radak (without providing a source) as suggesting that the names "Gog" and "Magog" are etymologically related to the Hebrew word gag, or "roof."  A roof is a firm, sturdy, manmade structure that offers a person protection and a sense of security and comfort.  The thematic symbolism of gag directly contrasts to that of a sukka, a makeshift, temporary structure that offers no protection from the elements.  (As we saw earlier this week, Rabbenu Tam disqualified a rainproof sukka for the mitzva.)  The empire of Magog, as depicted by Yechezkel, is characterized by an arrogant sense of self-sufficiency, and overconfidence in man's independent capabilities, achievements and prowess.  It is a nation that believes it can achieve its goals through its own resources of talents and willpower, that it is can survive and endure under the sturdy, robust "roof" it has built for itself.

            The mitzva of sukka, of course, conveys the precise opposite message, as it brings to mind the period of wandering in the wilderness, when Benei Yisrael lived entirely under God's supernatural protection.  The fragility and instability of the sukka remind us that our efforts and initiative, while certainly indispensable, are worthless without God's ongoing support and protection.  Thus, the apocalyptic confrontation between Magog and Am Yisrael is, essentially, a reflection of the ever-present conflict between the notion of gag – human self-reliance – and that of the sukka – our sense of dependence on the Almighty – and this perhaps accounts for the connection between Sukkot and the battle of Gog U-magog.

David Silverberg

SUNDAY

            Some have the practice upon leaving the sukka for the final time at the end of Sukkot (or Shemini Atzeret) to offer a prayer that in the merit of the mitzva of sukka they should earn the privilege of "dwelling in the sukka of the hide of the livyatan."  (Rav Yaakov Emden, in his commentary to the siddur, cites two versions of this prayer: "Yehi ratzon she-nizkeh lei-shev be-sukat oro shel livyatan"; "yehi ratzon milefanekha…ke-shem she-kiyamti ve-yashavti be-suka zu kakh ezkeh lei-shev be-sukat oro shel livyatan.")

            The concept of the livyatan ("Leviathan") appears in several contexts in the Midrash and Talmud, where it is described as a fearsome creature that came into existence at the time of creation and will be fed to the righteous at some point in the future.  This appears with some variation in the Gemara (Bava Batra 74b) and Midrash Tanchuma (Parashat Shemini, 7).

            To understand the particular relevance of the livyatan to the mitzva of sukka, we should perhaps consider a different Midrashic passage, a comment that appears in the Pesikta De-Rav Kahana (201): "Whoever fulfills the mitzva of sukka in this world – the Almighty will, in the future, give him a share of the sukka of Sedom."  The meaning of this passage likely relates to the theme of histapkut be-mu'at – feeling content even while possessing little.  The experience of leaving one's sturdy, furnished house and residing in a humble, makeshift sukka is perhaps intended – at least in part – to put wealth and prosperity into proper perspective, and to remind us of the secondary importance of material benefits.  While poverty is not looked upon as a virtue, we are urged to feel content even during hard times, when we are given little with which to live.  The specific obligation of simcha on Sukkot signifies the importance of experiencing genuine joy and satisfaction even when we must dwell in a "sukka," when we cannot achieve the wealth we would ideally want.

            The city of Sedom is commonly associated with selfish, egocentric greed and ruthless aggression.  Life in Sedom was characterized by the endless and unrelenting pursuit of wealth, without regard to any other value or concern for any other people.  The Pesikta De-Rav Kahana thus promises that one who fulfills the mitzva of sukka in this world, who internalizes the ideal of histapkut, will reap the rewards in the next world by enjoying the luxury of Sedom.  Even if in this world it appears that fortune is won through aggressive tyranny, in the next world it is specifically those who understood the message of the sukka who will enjoy prosperity and fortune.  (This is not to say, of course, that the luxuries and benefits of the next world are in any way similar or comparable to those of this world.)

            The livyatan, perhaps, corresponds in this sense to the nature and character of Sedom.  The Gemara tells in Masekhet Bava Batra (ibid.) that had the male and female livyatan reproduced, "they would have destroyed the entire earth."  This creature represents – like Sedom – the quality of ruthless aggression and greed that knows no bounds; as the Talmud depicts, it threatened to consume the entire earth in its wanton, unrestrained pursuit of gratification.  The image of the livyatan being slaughtered for the righteous perhaps symbolizes the ultimate triumph of restraint and discipline over insatiable greed.  Particularly, as the Pesikta De-Rav Kahana indicates, it is those who faithfully observe the mitzva of sukka, whose lives reflect the ideal of histapkut and succeed in tempering the instinctive craving for wealth with humility and discipline, who have defeated the livyatan and will be rewarded with the delights of the world to come.

David Silverberg

MONDAY

            The Mishna in Masekhet Sukka (51a-b) describes the simchat beit ha-sho'ieva celebration that was held in the Beit Ha-mikdash each night during the festival of Sukkot.  This celebration included an inspiring display of torches that, according to Mishna, illuminated not only the area of the Temple, but the entire city of Jerusalem: "There was no courtyard in Jerusalem that did not shine from the light of the bet ha-sho'eiva."  Interestingly enough, the wicks for the torches were produced from the tatters of old mikhnesayim (underpants) and belts of the kohanim.

            Rav Yehuda Ginsburg, in his Musar Ha-mishna (Denver, 1939), cites those who explain this choice of materials as based upon the concern of immodest behavior during the simcha beit ha-sho'eiva celebration.  Chazal speak of the mikhnesayim worn by the kohanim as serving to atone for sexual misconduct, and their belts earned the nation forgiveness for improper thoughts.  The use of these garments for the preparation of the torches used in the Sukkot celebration reflected the importance of guarding against promiscuous thought and behavior during festive occasions such as the simchat beit ha-sho'eiva.

            Additionally, however, it might be suggested that underlying these torches is an important message borne out by the transformation of mikhnesayim into sources of illumination.  The mikhnesayim, which were worn underneath the kohen's other garments, perhaps represent privacy and concealment, the part of a person that is kept discreet and hidden from the public eye.  It is specifically this material that was used to produce a brilliant light that shone and cast its radiance upon the entire city of Jerusalem as part of the celebration of Sukkot.  The Mishna perhaps teaches that very often, it is specifically how a person conducts himself in private that allows him to "illuminate" his surroundings and profoundly impact upon his peers and society at large.  One need not serve in a public capacity to make a significant contribution and exert influence.  Even the mikhnesayim – the mitzvot one performs in the quiet privacy of his own home and within his own family – are capable of shining their light upon others and leaving an indelible imprint and lasting impact upon a person's community, Am Yisrael, and the world at large.

David Silverberg

TUESDAY

            The Gemara in Masekhet Sukka (46b-47a) discusses the question of whether Jews in the Diaspora must sit in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret.  Although the festival of Shemini Atzeret is certainly independent of Sukkot and as such does not require a sukka, the question nevertheless arises as to whether we would apply on Shemini Atzeret the concept of sefeika de-yoma.  Diaspora communities generally celebrate an extra day of Yom Tov on all the festivals to commemorate the extra day that was observed by remote communities in ancient times, when new months were determined based upon the sighting of the new moon.  Months would extend for either twenty-nine or thirty days, depending on when the new moon was sighted.  Remote communities would not receive word about when the new month began until late in the month, and they thus were unsure as to which day should be celebrated as a festival.  Jews in these areas therefore celebrated two days of Yom Tov, and in commemoration, Diaspora Jews observe two days even now, when we follow the fixed-calendar system.

            The Gemara thus raises the question of whether on Shemini Atzeret, which is also the day after the final day of Sukkot, Diaspora communities must observe the mitzva of sukka.  Just as they observe a Yom Tov on the day following a festival, given their uncertainty as to which day to celebrate, perhaps they must similarly observe the mitzva of sukka on Shemini Atzeret, the day following the final day of Sukkot.

            The Gemara cites a debate between Rav and Rabbi Yochanan in this regard, and records two different traditions in understanding the debate.  According to one version, both Amora'im agree that in the Diaspora one must reside in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret, and they disagree as to whether a berakha is recited.  The second tradition, by contrast, taught that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan disagreed as to whether one must reside in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret altogether, and even Rav, who required residing in the sukka, did not require reciting a berakha over the sukka on Shemini Atzeret.  The Gemara concludes its discussion with the famous ruling that one must, indeed, reside in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret in the Diaspora, but no berakha is recited.

            The Ritva, commenting on this discussion, asserts that the Gemara speaks here only of Diaspora communities nowadays, who observe the second day of Yom Tov merely as a commemoration.  In ancient times, when remote Jewish communities were in fact uncertain as to which day to celebrate, the question of sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret constituted an actual safek de-orayta – a doubt concerning a Torah obligation.  Given the possibility that Shemini Atzeret was in fact the seventh day of Sukkot, remote communities were unquestionably required to observe the mitzva of sukka on that day.  Hence, this question arose only once the fixed-calendar system was implemented, at which point the observance of the second day in the Diaspora became purely commemorative.

            The Arukh La-ner questioned the Ritva's theory in light of the Rambam's comments in Hilkhot Kiddush Ha-chodesh (5:3) concerning the history of the fixed-calendar system.  Based on the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah (20-21), the Rambam writes that the system of kiddush al pi re'iya – declaring new months based on sightings of the new moon – continued well into the Amoraic period, as late as the times of Abayei and Rava.  Now Rav and Rav Yochanan, authors of the respective opinions cited in the Gemara, lived well before Abayei and Rava.  (To put this into historical perspective, Abayei and Rava were students of Rabba, who was a student of Rav Yehuda, who was a student of Rav.)  Clearly, then, Rav and Rav Yochanan lived at a time when the kiddush al pi ha-re'iya system was still in use.  It certainly stands to reason that at this point nobody anticipated the establishment of a fixed calendar and a commemorative observance of a second day of Yom Tov in the Diaspora.  It is thus difficult – or impossible – to imagine that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debated the issue of sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret after the fixed-calendar system was put into use.

            On the other hand, the Ritva supported his claim with quite a compelling argument: before the fixed-calendar system, remote communities faced a genuine safek de-orayta and were therefore, seemingly, strictly required to sit in the sukka, thus rendering the Gemara's entire discussion superfluous.

            Tomorrow we will iy"H present possible answers to this question.

David Silverberg

WEDNESDAY

            Yesterday, we presented the question raised by the Arukh La-ner concerning the Gemara's discussion in Masekhet Sukka (46b-47a) of the status of the sukka obligation in the Diaspora on Shemini Atzeret.  The Gemara cites divergent views on the matter, which led the Ritva to conclude that the Gemara refers here only to the period following the establishment of the fixed-calendar system.  Once the fixed calendar was implemented, Diaspora communities observe a second day of Yom Tov only to commemorate the two-day observance by remote communities in ancient times, who were unsure as to which day was declared as Rosh Chodesh.  The Gemara thus addresses the question of whether this commemoration includes sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret to commemorate the ancient communities' practice of sitting in the sukka on this day, out of concern that it may have been the final day of Sukkot.  In ancient times, however, the remote communities clearly faced a situation of halakhic doubt and were therefore unquestionably required to sit in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret, lest it was actually the seventh day of Sukkot.  The Arukh La-ner noted that Rav and Rabbi Yochanan, whom the Gemara records as debating the issue of sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret, lived well before the establishment of the fixed calendar system.  It thus seems difficult to explain their debate as referring solely to the period after this system was implemented.  On the other hand, if we explain the Gemara as referring to ancient times, we must respond to the Ritva's argument that in those times there could be no question regarding the obligation of sukka in remote communities on Shemini Atzeret.

            Rav Aharon Wieder, in his work Tzeva Aharon, initially suggests resolving this difficulty on the basis of the Rambam's famous position concerning the status of sefeikot – halakhic doubts.  In a number of contexts in Mishneh Torah, the Rambam advances the claim that as far as Torah law is concerned, when situations of doubt arise one is entitled to assume the lenient possibility.  In the Rambam's view, the famous rule of safek de-orayta le-chumra, requiring that one act stringently in situations of halakhic doubt, was enacted by Chazal.  According to Torah law, one may act leniently in cases of a doubt involving a Biblical prohibition or obligation.

            According to the Rambam, then, we might claim that the remote communities who were unsure about the day of Yom Tov were not required to observe a second day.  This practice, it seems, was an extraordinary measure of stringency enacted by the Sages, and was not mandated by Torah law.  Accordingly, we could – in opposition to the Ritva – claim that the Gemara in fact speaks of the time before the fixed calendar.  The observance of a second day of Yom Tov itself constituted a unique stringent measure, and Rav and Rabbi Yochanan debated the question of whether this measure included as well sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret.

            However, as Rav Wieder proceeds to note, this solution is negated by a comment of the Minchat Chinukh (301:1).  According to the Minchat Chinukh, even according to the Rambam's position regarding sefeikot the remote communities were required by Torah law to observe a second day of Yom Tov.  Many Acharonim have demonstrated that the Rambam makes an exception to his rule in cases of ikba isura (or "chatikha achat mi-shetei chatikhot"), where a person confronts a situation that was known to have involved a forbidden item.  For example, if a person had before him a bowl of forbidden fat and a bowl of permissible food, and he cannot recall from which he had eaten, he is required by Torah law to bring an asham (guilt offering), since forbidden food was clearly involved, even if he is unsure as to whether has had transgressed.  Similarly, the Minchat Chinukh contends, since Yom Tov assuredly occurred on one of the two days in question, the communities were required on the level of Torah obligation to observe both as Yom Tov.  We thus remain with the question of why the status of sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret during the time of Rav and Rabbi Yochanan was subject to debate.

            Rav Wieder then suggests a different answer, on the basis of a theory developed by (among others) Rav Tzadok Ha-kohen of Lublin, in his famous Meishiv Tzedek treatise on the subject of the sukka obligation in the Diaspora on Shemini Atzeret.  Rav Tzadok argues that in truth the fixed calendar as we know it was used much earlier, well before the time of Abayei and Rava, even though the Sanhedrin continued to declare months on the basis of testimony to the sighting of the new moon.  Indeed, Rashi explicitly writes in his commentary to Masekhet Beitza (4b) that Rabbi Asi used the fixed calendar system, and Rabbi Asi – a student of Rabbi Yochanan – lived well before Abayei and Rava.  Evidently – as the Chatam Sofer discusses at length in his chiddushim there in Masekhet Beitza – there was a period of overlap, when both the fixed-calendar system and the testimony of new-moon sightings were used for determining new months.  The fixed calendar was thus known and widely used already in the period of Rabbi Asi, despite the fact that the Sanhedrin continued hearing testimony.

How precisely the two systems coexisted requires some further clarification, but in any event, this easily resolves the difficulty raised concerning the Ritva's comments.  Rav and Rabbi Yochanan indeed debate the issue of sitting in the sukka on Shemini Atzeret after the establishment of the fixed calendar, which was already widely used at that time, even though the Sanhedrin continued the system of hearing testimony until the times of Abayei and Rava.

David Silverberg

Additional SALT divrei Torah can be found at:

http://www.vbm-torah.org/salt-chagim.html

Chag sameach.