SALT - PARASHAT VAETCHANAN

by Rav David Silverberg

MOTZAEI SHABBAT

            Parashat Vaetchanan includes the first paragraph of the shema, which the Torah requires reciting each morning and evening.  The Torah specifies that this text must be recited “when you sit in your home” (6:7), which the Gemara (Berakhot 11a and elsewhere) explains as a reference to involvement in divrei reshut – ordinary matters.  The shema obligation applies only when a person “sits in his home,” meaning, when he is otherwise occupied by ordinary activities.  When, however, a person is oseik be-mitzva – when he is involved in mitzva matters – then he is exempt from the obligation of shema.  This inference constitutes one of the sources found in the Talmud for the famous principle known as “oseik be-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva” – one who is currently involved in a mitzva is exempt from other mitzvot.

            Rav Yosef Engel, in his Gilyonei Ha-Shas, cites a surprising comment from Rabbenu Tam’s Sefer Ha-yashar in explaining this passage in the Gemara: “[When one is involved] in a mitzva matter he is exempt from the shema recitation, and he is similarly exempt from any mitzvat asei she-hazman gerama.”  Rabbenu Tam appears to limit the principle of oseik be-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva to the specific case of a “mitzvat asei she-hazman gerama” – an affirmative command that applies only at specific times.  We are familiar with this category of mitzvot from the famous rule that exempts women from these kinds of mitzvot (with many exceptions).  Interestingly enough, Rabbenu Tam maintained that a person involved in a mitzva is exempt from another mitzva only if that other mitzva belongs to the category of mitzvat asei she-hazman gerama.

            Rav Yosef Engel questions Rabbenu Tam’s view in light of the concept of “peruta de-Rabbi Yosef” mentioned on several occasions in the Talmud (see Bava Kama 56b).  This halakha refers to a case where a person discovered a lost object, brought it home, and, while caring for the object as he waited for the owner to come retrieve it, a needy person approaches him asking for charity.  In light of the principle of oseik be-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva, the individual is exempt from giving charity, as he is preoccupied with the needs of the lost object.  Rabbi Yosef ruled that in light of this exemption, a person watching a lost object has the legal status of a shomer sakhar – a paid guardian.  Since he profits as a result of his guarding the lost object, his level of accountability is that of a shomer sakhar.

            Clearly, the mitzva of giving charity applies at all times, and thus cannot be considered a mitzvat asei she-hazman gerama.  And yet, the Gemara exempts a person caring for a lost object from the obligation of charity, seemingly indicating that the oseik be-mitzva exemption applies to all mitzvot, and not only those bound to a specific time-frame.

            In defense of Rabbenu Tam, Rav Yosef Engel speculates that Rabbenu Tam perhaps meant that the scope of the oseik be-mitzva exemption depends on the nature of the mitzva in which the individual is currently involved.  Namely, a person involved in a time-bound mitzva is exempt only from other time-bound mitzvot, whereas somebody performing a mitzva that is not bound by time is exempt from all mitzvot.   Therefore, in the case of caring for a lost object – a mitzva which is clearly independent of any particular time-frame – one would indeed be exempt from all mitzvot, including charity.  It is only when one is involved in a time-bound mitzva that his exemption is limited to other mitzvot asei she-hazman gerama.

            Clearly, however, Rabbenu Tam’s comments remain difficult to understand.

David Silverberg

SUNDAY

            Toward the end of Parashat Vaetchanan, Moshe tells Benei Yisrael that their special status as God’s treasured nation is not a function of their numbers: “It is not because you are more numerous than all other nations that the Lord desired you and chose you – for you are the smallest of all nations” (7:7).

            According to the plain reading of the text, this verse’s final clause – “for you are the smallest of all nations” – serves as the proof for the verse’s main clause – “It is not because you are more numerous than all other nations that the Lord desired you.”  As if to say, “It can’t be that God chose you because of your numbers, because, after all, you are actually a very small nation.”  However, the Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (89a) presents a homiletic reading of this verse, whereby the phrase, “for you are the smallest of all nations” explains the reason for why God loves and chose Am Yisrael: “The Almighty said to Israel: I love you, because even at the time when I bestow greatness upon you, you lower yourselves before Me.”  According to this reading, the Torah speaks here not of Am Yisrael’s small numbers, but of their humility, and it is on account of this quality that they were selected by God.  The Gemara proceeds to cite examples where Avraham, Moshe and Aharon showed humility and considered themselves lowly despite the high stature to which they were raised, as well as instances where enemies of Am Yisrael – Pharaoh and Nevukhadnetzar – prided themselves for their achievements.  God chose Am Yisrael specifically because they “are the smallest of all nations” – because even when they rise to great heights of power and achievement they recognize their lowly stature in relation to the Almighty.

            Rav Yehuda Leib Ginsburg, in his Yalkut Yehuda, notes the significance of the Gemara’s interpretation of this verse in light of its context.  In the previous verses, the Torah warns Benei Yisrael against allowing their children to marry the Canaanites (7:3-4) and admonishes them to destroy all idolatrous articles (7:5).  It then concludes, “For you are a sacred nation to the Lord your God; the Lord your God chose you to be a treasured nation for him out of all other nations on the face of the earth.”  The Torah speaks here of the importance of remaining separate from other peoples, both socially and religiously.  Within the context of this theme, of Am Yisrael’s designation and distinction from other peoples, we are reminded that “you are the smallest of all nations,” that we have been chosen specifically because of our humility.  Our status as “a sacred nation to the Lord your God” must not lead to hubris, to an arrogant sense of entitlement and intrinsic superiority.  To the contrary, our status was earned as a result of our sense of humble submission to the Almighty and constant awareness of our lowliness with respect to the world’s Creator.

MONDAY

            In Parashat Vaetchanan Moshe admonishes the people to obey the Torah’s commands, and, in a number of instances, uses two verbs to describe the kind of compliance expected of them: sh.m.r. (“keep” or “guard”) and a.s.t. (“do” or “perform”).  Toward the beginning of the parasha (4:6), for example, Moshe instructs, “U-shmartem va-asitem.”  The term “asitem” quite clearly refers to the actual performance of the mitzvot.  The precise meaning of shmartem, however, is less clear.  Rashi, based on the Sifrei, explains that the verb sh.m.r. in this context denotes study, as opposed to practice.  Whenever Moshe exhorts Benei Yisrael to “guard” and “perform” the Torah’s commands, he refers to the study (“shmartem”) and practical observance (“asitem”) of these laws.

            Why is the verb sh.m.r. used in reference to study?  Why does the Torah speak of learning as “guarding” or “protecting”?

            Rav Chayim Chavel, in his annotation to Rashi’s commentary, cites the Sefer Ha-zikaron as explaining that sh.m.r. is used in this context to mean protecting one’s knowledge from forgetfulness: “He warns with regard to the Oral Law and its halakhot – that it should be fluent in our mouths and guarded upon the wall of our hearts such that we do not forget it.”  Moshe speaks of learning as “guarding” because we are to master the material to the extent that it is firmly entrenched in our memories and “protected” from the risk of being forgotten.

            In a slightly different vein, we might suggest that learning is the means by which a tradition is preserved.  When we study Torah, we are helping to sustain it and ensure its eternal preservation.  In this sense, study helps protect the Torah from being forgotten from Am Yisrael.

            Rav Matis Blum, in his Torah La-da’at, suggests a much different theory to explain the definition of sh.m.r. as learning.  We read in Sefer Bereishit (37:11) that Yaakov, upon hearing Yosef’s dreams of royalty, “shamar et davar” (literally, “kept the matter”).  Rashi interprets the verb “shamar” in that verse to mean “anticipation.”  Yaakov knew that Yosef’s prophetic dreams would materialize, and he anxiously anticipated the time when this would happen.  The verb sh.m.r. in reference to Torah study may perhaps assume a similar meaning.  A person studies in anticipation of observing and performing.  The use of this verb may perhaps underscore the inextricable link between study and practice, the concept of “li-lmod al menat la’asot” (“learning for the purpose of observing”).  Despite the fact that Torah study certainly has intrinsic value independent of its facilitating observance, nevertheless, the student must constantly aspire and anxiously anticipate the opportunities to practically apply the laws and concepts he learns.  The term sh.m.r. thus refers to study for the purpose of observance, the sincere desire that every Torah student must feel to not only master Torah knowledge, but to apply that knowledge in everyday life.

TUESDAY

            The Torah tells in Parashat Vaetchanan (4:41-43) that Moshe, before his death, designated three cities in the region of Eiver Ha-yarden that would serve as arei miklat – cities of refuge for inadvertent killers.  Earlier, toward the end of Sefer Bamidbar (chapter 35), God commanded that six such cities be designated, three in Eiver Ha-yarden – the region which would be permanently settled by the tribes of Reuven, Gad and half of Menashe – and three across the Jordan River, in the mainland of Eretz Yisrael.  As Moshe would die before crossing the river into Eretz Yisrael, he designated only the three cities in the Eiver Ha-yarden region which would serve Reuven, Gad and Menashe.  The remaining three cities – which served the other tribes – would be designated later, after Moshe’s death and the subsequent conquest of Eretz Yisrael (Sefer Yehoshua, chapter 20).

            The Gemara in Masekhet Makot (10a) takes note of the fact that when listing the three arei miklat designated by Moshe, the Torah first mentions the city of Betzer, which served the area settled by the tribe of Reuven.  The Gemara comments, “Why did Reuven earn the privilege of being listed first in the context of rescuing?  Because he was the first to involve himself in rescuing.”  As Yaakov’s sons plotted to kill their brother, Yosef, it was Reuven who intervened to rescue him.  He advised the brothers to cast Yosef into a pit, rather than actively killing him, with the intention of later retrieving Yosef.  And although events did not unfold as Reuven had planned (as Yosef was ultimately sold into slavery), Reuven is nevertheless credited with saving his younger brother’s life.  The Torah pays tribute to his efforts by listing his tribe’s ir miklat – which served to rescue killers from the victims’ relatives – before the other tribes’ cities of refuge.

            This association drawn by the Gemara, between Yosef and the inadvertent killer threatened by the victim’s family, may shed light on one of the important themes underlying the institution of arei miklat.  Yosef was despised and held in contempt by his brothers, who conspired – almost unanimously – to eliminate him.  Reuven, however, went against the trend and advanced the unpopular cause of protecting Yosef.  According to one view in the Midrash (Bereishit Rabba 84), Reuven acted out of a sense of responsibility and leadership: “Rabbi Nechemya said: Reuven said, ‘I am the firstborn, and the failure will be attributed only to me’.”  Representing the lone voice of reason amid the other brothers’ call for violence, Reuven courageously opposed his brothers’ scheme by devising a plan to rescue Yosef from death.

            The rotzei’ach be-shogeig, the individual who accidentally murdered, was, like Yosef, despised and held in contempt by society.  As we discussed several weeks ago in our S.A.L.T. series to Parashat Masei, specifically the Levites’ cities were chosen to serve as the arei miklat because the Leviyim could be expected to treat fugitives with sympathy and sensitivity.  Most people would not look kindly upon the idea of welcoming accidental killers into their communities.  The role of the arei miklat required the type of courage displayed by Reuven, the moral conviction to oppose popular sentiment and lend a hand to rescue and assist the ostracized members of society who deserve a chance to succeed.

            Arguably the most famous story associated with the destruction of the Beit Ha-mikdash is the incident of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza (Gittin 55b-56a), where an invitation intended for Kamtza, a close friend of the host, accidentally reached Bar Kamtza, the host’s adversary.  The host angrily humiliated Bar Kamtza and had him forcefully removed from his celebration, and Bar Kamtza, in response, persuaded the Roman authorities that the Jews were plotting a revolt, thus leading to Jerusalem’s destruction.

            The Maharal of Prague famously noted that the Gemara appears to cast the blame for this event on both Kamtza and Bar Kamtza (“Jerusalem was destroyed because of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza”).  Although Kamtza played no role in this particular incident, the Maharal explained, he evidently played a crucial role in creating the kind of social atmosphere that allowed this travesty to occur.  It appears that he and the host belonged to an elitist, wealthy clique that looked down upon commoners like Bar Kamtza.  We might speculate that the host felt dishonored by Bar Kamtza’s presence at his celebration, which was reserved for “members only,” for those wealthy and classy enough to join his social circle.  The tragedy of Kamtza and Bar Kamtza was thus caused by the exclusiveness that pervaded Jewish social life at the time.  As the Gemara emphasizes, the rabbinical leaders present at the celebration did not intervene to save Bar Kamtza from humiliation.  There was no “Reuven” who arose to oppose the majority trend and show acceptance and compassion for the innocent outcast.

            The institution of arei miklat should perhaps remind us to show acceptance, understanding and friendship even to Jews who have been neglected or rejected by the mainstream.  It urges us to display the courage exhibited by Reuven, to resist social pressures and lovingly and compassionately care for the “Bar Kamtza’s” among us who have not yet found their place in Jewish society.

WEDNESDAY

            On Tisha B’Av, we observe the same five prohibitions of “inui” (“affliction”) that apply on Yom Kippur, abstaining from food and drink, wearing leather shoes, bathing, marital relations, and applying ointments.  The Rambam, in presenting the Tisha B’Av laws (Hilkhot Ta’aniyot 5:10), explicitly draws this association between Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur, as he writes after listing the prohibitions of Tisha B’Av, “like Yom Kippur.”

            There is, however, one small difference between the prohibitions of Tisha B’Av and those that apply on Yom Kippur, at least according to the Rambam.  On Tisha B’Av, Halakha forbids applying ointment only if it provides physical enjoyment; it is permissible to apply ointment for medicinal or hygienic purposes (Rambam, ibid; Shulkhan Arukh O.C. 554:15).  With regard to Yom Kippur, however, the Rambam rules that all kinds of sikha (ointment) is forbidden, even for purposes other than physical enjoyment (Hilkhot Shevitat Asor 3:9).  Other Rishonim rule differently, and the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 614:1) follows the lenient position.

            In light of the distinction drawn by the Rambam between Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur with regard to the scope of the sikha prohibition, one might wonder why he emphasized the connection between the two.  As mentioned, the Rambam states that these five activities are proscribed on Tisha B’Av “like Yom Kippur,” suggesting a parity of sorts between the two observances.  Yet, the Rambam himself clearly distinguished between the two with regard to the laws of sikha.

            Rav Binyamin Sorotzkin, in his Nachalat Binyamin, suggests that the Rambam equates the Tisha B’Av observance with only one of two aspects of the Yom Kippur prohibitions.  Once we delineate two separate aspects of Yom Kippur, and show how these aspects differ regarding the prohibition of sikha, we can explain that the Rambam compared Tisha B’Av to only one of the aspects of Yom Kippur, thus accounting for the practical difference between the two occasions with respect to sikha.

Curiously, Chazal derive the prohibition of sikha on Yom Kippur from two different sources.  In Masekhet Yoma (76), the Gemara proves that refraining from ointment falls under the category of inui from the fact that Daniel refrained from ointment during his three-week period of mourning (Daniel 10:3).  However, the Mishna in Masekhet Shabbat (86a) establishes that “sikha ke-shetiya” – applying ointment is halakhically equivalent to drinking (as both entail the absorption of liquid into the body) – based on a verse in Sefer Tehillim (109:18).  Possibly, Rav Sorotzkin suggests, these two sources refer to two different aspects of sikha.  The Mishna, which speaks of sikha as a subsidiary of drinking, forbids sikha as an extension of the prohibition against drinking.  Applying ointment is considered equivalent to drinking, and it would thus be forbidden even if it does not provide any enjoyment.  In Yoma, however, the Gemara establishes that avoiding sikha is an expression of inui.  Naturally, from the perspective of this halakha, the prohibition would apply only to situations of physical enjoyment.

            These two different halakhot forbidding sikha on Yom Kippur reflect two different aspects of the Yom Kippur observance.  In addition to the restrictions of inui, it appears, eating and drinking are proscribed independent of any physical enjoyment.  Halakha forbids ingesting food and drink not only because of the requirement of “affliction,” but also due to a separate, inherent prohibition against eating and drinking.  This is the inescapable conclusion we must reach from the Rambam’s position forbidding even sikha that does not provide enjoyment.  It is forbidden because it resembles drinking – and drinking is forbidden on Yom Kippur regardless of the enjoyment it provides.

            Thus, sikha is forbidden on Yom Kippur for two reasons: 1) it is equivalent to drinking, which is objectively forbidden on Yom Kippur; 2) it provides physical enjoyment, which is forbidden on Yom Kippur.

            Accordingly, we may understand why the Rambam compared the observances of Tisha B’Av and Yom Kippur despite the difference between them with regard to sikha.  The Rambam compared the restrictions of Tisha B’Av only with the inui aspect of Yom Kippur, and from this perspective, only enjoyable sikha is forbidden.  He did not intend to compare Tisha B’Av with the objective prohibition against eating and drinking on Yom Kippur, which is unique to that occasion.  The Rambam thus justifiably described the Tisha B’Av observances as “like Yom Kippur” despite the fact that the two occasions differ from one another with respect to sikha performed for purposes other than physical enjoyment.

THURSDAY

            In the prophecy read as the haftara on Tisha B’Av morning, Yirmiyahu rhetorically asks, “For what reason was the land made desolate, laid waste like the wilderness, with no inhabitants?” (Yirmiyahu 9:11).  Yirmiyahu then records God’s unequivocal response: “Al ozvam et Torati asher natati lifneihem” – “On account of their abandoning my Torah, which I had presented to them.”

            The Gemara in Masekhet Nedarim (81) famously interprets God’s response – “al ozvam et Torati” – as referring to Benei Yisrael’s neglect of the obligation of birkat ha-Torah.  According to the Gemara, the people failed to recite the berakha which Halakha requires that we recite each day before studying Torah.  The Ran explains, “Meaning, Torah was not important enough in their eyes to be worthy to recite a berakha over it, for they did not engage in it for its own sake.  As a result, they disregarded its berakha.”  The land’s destruction, according to the Gemara, was the result of the people’s failure to recognize the importance and value of Torah learning.  The expression of this mistaken attitude was the neglect of birkat ha-Torah, the berakha recited before Torah learning.

            Rav Binyamin Sorotzkin, in his Nachalat Binyamin, comments that we may gain deeper insight into the Gemara’s discussion by drawing an analogy to the laws of berakhot over food.  As the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 204:7) rules, one recites a berakha before drinking only if he derives physical enjoyment from the drink.  For example, if one drinks a flavorful beverage, or if a person drinks water for the purpose of quenching thirst, a berakha is required.  A berakha is not recited, however, when a person drinks water to dislodge a food particle caught in his throat or to alleviate a cough.  Since the water is not flavored, and it is not drunk for the purpose of quenching thirst, it does not provide any physical enjoyment and thus one would not recite a berakha in such a case.

            Rav Sorotzkin suggests explaining the Gemara’s comments concerning birkat ha-Torah along these lines.  The people did not recite the berakha before studying because they derived no enjoyment from it.  Having lost their appreciation for the intrinsic value and worth of the devar Hashem, the people at the time could not “taste” the “flavor” of Torah learning.  They did not recite a berakha just as one does not recite a berakha over water drunk to dislodge a food particle – because it did not provide any enjoyment.

A famous verse in Tehillim (34:9) instructs, “Ta’amu u-re’u ki tov Hashem” – “Taste and see that the Lord is good!”  We are urged to not only “see,” and recognize with our minds the significance of Torah and mitzvot, but also “taste” and experience the incomparable joy of gratification of involvement in Torah.  It was when Am Yisrael lost sight of the significance of Torah learning that they were unable to experience the joy of Torah, which, in turn, ultimately led to their abandonment of the Torah and the tragic calamities which we unfortunately continue to mourn each year.

David Silverberg

FRIDAY

            Toward the beginning of Parashat Vaetchanan, we read the famous verse, “And you, who are attached to the Lord your God, are alive – all of you – this day” (4:4).

            The Gemara in Masekhet Ketubot (111b) raises the question of what Moshe means when he speaks of “attaching” oneself to God.  Obviously, this could not be taken in the literal sense of physical attachment.  The Gemara explains that Moshe refers to “attaching” oneself to God by associating with Torah scholars.  By placing oneself in a position where he has regular exposure to righteous figures, he will, in effect, be “attached” to the Almighty Himself.

            According to the peshat (plain) reading of the verse, however, it must be understood in the context of the preceding verse: “Your own eyes saw what the Lord did at Ba’al Pe’or, that every man who followed Ba’al Pe’or – the Lord your God destroyed him from your midst.  But you, who are attached to the Lord your God, are alive…”  Moshe here recalls the tragic incident of Ba’al Pe’or (Bamidbar 25), where a divine plague killed 24,000 members of the nation in response to their sexual and ritual involvement with the nation of Moav.  Speaking to the survivors of that deadly plague, Moshe describes them as “attached” to God, in contrast to those who worshipped the Pe’or idol.

The incident of Ba’al Pe’or was orchestrated by Moav for the purpose of luring Benei Yisrael to immorality and idolatry.  As the Midrashim describe, the Moabites enticed Benei Yisrael by setting up markets with attractive merchandise, sold by attractive women.  Many men succumbed to the pressures, with the result being one of the major catastrophes related in the Torah.  Moshe here emphasizes that those who were “deveikim” – “attached” – to God remained steadfast in their commitment even in the face of lures and temptations.  He contrasts those who “followed after Ba’al Pe’or” (“asher halak acharei Ba’al Pe’or”) with those who remained “attached” to God.  Benei Yisrael had all been devoted to God, but some “went after” (“halakh”) the lures of Moav, while others were “deveikim” – glued to Torah devotion such that these lures were incapable of detaching them from God.

            We must aspire to not only perform and observe the Torah, but also “attach” ourselves to Torah, to become emotionally rooted to this commitment so that it cannot be shaken.  Only this kind of firm attachment to God and Torah can ensure our ability to withstand the wide range of pressures that we confront each day and which threaten to lure us away from religious observance.

David Silverberg