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In Parashat Vaetchanan, Moshe reviews the Ten Commandments presented to Benei Yisrael at Sinai. The tenth of these Commandments is that of "lo tachmod," the prohibition against "coveting." What precisely does this prohibition entail?

Two disputes between the Rambam and Ra'avad concerning this prohibition reflect their different attitudes towards the very nature of lo tachmod. In Hilkhot Gezeila 1:9, the Rambam rules: "Whoever covets and pressures him [the owner] until he ultimately purchases it from him, even if he gives money, he violates lo tachmod." The Rambam then adds that one is not liable for punishment at the hands of the Bet Din (rabbinical court) for violating lo tachmod because it falls under the category of "lav she-ein bo ma'aseh." That is, the actual violation does not involve a concrete action. A general principle in halakha dictates that only when violating through a definite action can one be liable for punishment by Bet Din.

The Ra'avad disputes two points mentioned by the Rambam. First, he imposes a significant qualification on the scope of this prohibition, requiring that the owner ultimately sells the item question under coercion. If he eventually agrees to the sale, even under duress, the buyer has not violated the prohibition of lo tachmod (though obviously what he did was improper). Only if the owner persists in his refusal and the buyer forcefully executes the "sale" has the latter violated lo tachmod. The Ra'avad disputes the Rambam's second point, as well, as to why Bet Din cannot administer punishment for the violation of lo tachmod. Whereas the Rambam, as we have seen, attributes this to the absence of a concrete action during the violation of this prohibition, the Ra'avad suggests a different basis. He places lo tachmod under the category of "lav ha-nitan le-tashlumin" - meaning, the violation can be rectified through compensatory payment. For example, a thief is not liable for court-administered punishment, despite his having violated the prohibition against stealing, because he can rectify his actions by returning the stolen money or goods. Similarly, a violator of lo tachmod can undo his crime by returning the object and receiving his money in return. The Ra'avad disputes the Rambam's explanation, that lo tachmod does not entail a concrete action, claiming that indeed a coerced purchase is as concrete an action as one could possibly perform.

The Maggid Mishneh (as understood by Rav Chaim Ozer Grodzenski, in his Achiezer 1:22:6) explains that these two issues debated by the Rambam and Ra'avad directly relate to one another, and both result from these Rishonim's understanding of lo tachmod. According to the Rambam, lo tachmod prohibits the desire for the object itself, and the efforts invested to attain it. True, one does not violate the prohibition unless he ultimately receives or seizes the item, but this constitutes a condition to the violation, rather than the violation itself. Essentially, the prohibition is transgressed by one's general covetous attitude. Therefore, we cannot point to a single, concrete act as the violation of lo tachmod. For this same reason, one can violate lo tachmod even if the owner ultimately acquiesces. Since the attitude, rather than the actual seizure, is what lo tachmod entails, it makes no difference whether ultimately force is required to effectuate the "sale."

The Ra'avad, by contrast, views lo tachmod as a corollary to the prohibition against theft. The Torah here adds that the prohibition against taking the property of another applies even if the thief renders payment for the object he seizes. As lo tachmod, according to the Ra'avad, essentially amounts to a special form of theft, it most certainly involves a definite, concrete action - the act of seizing the object. Similarly, one cannot violate this prohibition if the owner ultimately agrees to the sale. Since lo tachmod is a type of theft, once the owner agrees to relinquish rights to the given item, the buyer cannot be considered in violation of lo tachmod.

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Yesterday we discussed the prohibition of lo tachmod - "You shall not covet" - the final of the Ten Commandments, which Moshe repeats in Parashat Vaetchanan. We noted that the Rambam and Ra'avad (Hilkhot Gezeila 1:9) appear to debate the basic nature of this prohibition. The Ra'avad views lo tachmod as a form of theft; even if one pays for the object he forcefully takes, he is nevertheless considered a thief of sorts. The Rambam, by contrast, understands lo tachmod as forbidding the general covetous attitude towards the property of others. Although the violation cannot be formally transgressed until one successfully gains acquisition of the object - forcefully or otherwise, essentially it is the coveting itself that the Torah prohibits.

This debate will yield several interesting ramifications beyond the two issues discussed yesterday. Today we will discuss the application of the halakhic principle of "i avid lo mehani" to this context. A famous debate is recorded in Masekhet Temura (5-6) as to whether one effectuates a status change when halakha forbids one from doing so. The Torah forbids one from attempting to transfer the status of hekdesh (sacred property) from one animal to the next ("temura"). If one goes ahead and does so, the Torah specifically stipulates that the second animal indeed receives the status, while the original animal does not lose its status. Abayei and Rava debate what would happen in parallel cases in other contexts, where the Torah does not specifically stipulate what the results of the forbidden activity are. The Maggid Mishneh on the aforementioned passage in the Rambam asks how this issue would affect lo tachmod. According to the Rambam, one violates lo tachmod even if the owner ultimately acquiesces and agrees to the sale. However, the Maggid Mishneh notes, halakha generally follows the position of Rava that forbidden changes of status do not take effect ("i avid lo mehani"). Accordingly, one who seeks to acquire a given object, in violation of lo tachmod, should not obtain legal ownership even should he pressure the owner into the sale. From the Rambam, however, it is clear that this is not the case: despite the violation of lo tachmod, the sale is nevertheless effected. How can this transaction take effect if it is prohibited by the Torah?

The Maggid Mishneh explains based on an exception to this general rule noted by the Gemara there in Masekhet Temura. The Gemara there writes that the Torah explicitly makes an exception to this general rule of "i avid lo mehani" in situations of theft. Although the thief clearly violates the Torah when taking the property of another, nevertheless under certain circumstances (such as when he effects a physical change in the object - "shinuy") he attains legal ownership over the stolen item. The Maggid Mishneh suggests that this same provision stipulated with regard to theft would apply to lo tachmod, as well.

The Minchat Chinukh (38:2) notes the obvious difficulty with this answer: why should a provision unique to theft apply to lo tachmod? We might add that according to the Maggid Mishneh himself, as discussed yesterday, the Rambam denies any connection between these two prohibitions, of theft and coveting (as opposed to the Ra'avad, who relates the two). How, then, could the Maggid Mishneh extend a idiosyncratic quality of theft law to include cases of lo tachmod, as well?

It would seem, however, that we may easily resolve the Maggid Mishneh's question far more simply. When the Gemara speaks of "i avid lo mehani," that a forbidden status change does not take effect when one violates the given prohibition, this applies, by definition, only to instances where the attempted status change itself is prohibited. According to the Rambam, however, as we have seen, it is not the actual seizof the object that lo tachmod forbids. Rather,it prohibits the general attitude of longing to own that which belongs to others. The Torah obviously does not prohibit purchasing items from other people; it prohibits applying pressure to the owner to sell. Therefore, the discussion in Masekhet Temura has no bearing on lo tachmod, since the change of status itself is not the focal point of the Torah's prohibition.

(Based on an article by Rav Mordechai Carlebach of the Mir Yeshiva Kollel)

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A famous Midrash draws an association between the three contexts in Tanakh where we find the term, "Eikha." The word first appears in Parashat Devarim (1:12), when Moshe describes his inability to single-handedly lead the nation, which had become such a multitude. The second instance is Yeshayahu's exclamation in response to the corruption of his time, "How [eikha] has she become a harlot, the faithful city… " (Yeshayahu 1:21). Finally, after the Temple's destruction, Yirmiyahu opens the book of Lamentations by crying, "Eikha yasheva vadad" - how has Jerusalem sat alone!

What does the Midrash seek to convey through this association between these three verses?

Rav Yaakov of Lisa, the author of the famous "Netivot ha-Mishpat" on Shulchan Arukh - Choshen Mishpat, suggests an interesting explanation in the introduction to his commentary on Megilat Eikha entitled, "Palgei Mayim." In this passage, Chazal trace the unparalleled devastation and tragedy suffered by Am Yisrael specifically to the nation's previous greatness and noble stature. The "Eikha" wailed by Yirmiyahu actually has its roots in Benei Yisrael's "glory days" during the time of Moshe Rabbenu. It is specifically because of the unique relationship that Benei Yisrael established with the Almighty that made such a traumatic collapse possible. This concept is spelled out explicitly by the prophet Amos (3:2): "You alone have I singled out of all the families of the earth - that is why I will call you to account for all your iniquities." Am Yisrael's distinction transforms otherwise tolerable transgressions into a grave violation of their bond with the Almighty. Accordingly, the prophet Yeshayahu, employing the term, "Eikha," expresses his astonishment at the nation's moral deterioration: "How has she become a harlot, the faithful city that was filled with justice, where righteousness dwelt - but now murderers." Specifically the "eikha" of Moshe, the grandeur and nobility that Am Yisrael had achieved, makes their corruption and iniquity all the more tragic, and all the more severe. Finally, Yirmiyahu exclaims, "How does she sit lonely - the city once great with people!" Because of the "eikha" of Moshe - the great heights that the nation had reached, Benei Yisrael must now hear the "eikha" of Yirmiyahu.

On Tisha B'Av we mourn not only for what occurred, but for what could have occurred but did not. What is so tragic is not only the destruction that we suffered, but the glory and grandeur that we could have enjoyed. As we know, Chazal trace the roots of Tisha B'Av way back to the sin of the scouts. It was Tisha B'Av when the nation heard the spies' discouraging report and wept. As Rabbi Menachem Leibtag has pointed out, it follows from this Midrash that according to the original plan, Benei Yisrael were to have begun their final march to Eretz Yisrael the following day - on Tisha B'Av itself. For generations thereafter, Am Yisrael would have celebrated the ninth of Av as the day when God fulfilled His promise to the patriarchs, that He will bring their descendants to the Promised Land. In effect, Tisha B'Av would have marked the culmination of the freedom celebrated on Pesach. Tragically, Tisha B'Av was transformed into a day of national mourning, when we lament the many missed opportunities we had to restore our relationship with the Almighty and realize our national destiny.

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In the section from Sefer Yirmiyahu read as the haftara for Tisha B'Av, the prophet rhetorically asks, "Al ma avda ha-aretz" - "Why is the land in ruins?" (Yirmiyahu 9:11). The prophet then responds, "Because they forsook My Torah I had set before them." In what has become a famous and oft-quoted passage, the Gemara (Masekhet Nedarim 81a) presents a startling explanation of God's response to this question. This "forsaking" of the Torah of which God speaks actually refers to "she-lo berkhu ba-Torah techila" - that Benei Yisrael neglected to recite the birkat ha-Torah, the blessing required every morning before studying Torah. Many writers, scholars and "darshanim" throughout the centuries have expressed their wonder at this remarkable interpretation of the verse. The Temple was destroyed and the nation driven to exile because they neglected this berakha, which, according to many Rishonim (the Ramban being a notable exception) is not even required by Torah law?!

One beautiful explanation appears in a somewhat surprising source - the generally halakhic commentary of the Taz on the Shulchan Arukh (in the context of birkat ha-Torah - O.C. 47:1). Clearly, the Taz writes, God unleashed His anger against Benei Yisrael for other, more severe transgressions. The prophets and Chazal make it clear that Am Yisrael committed several serious sins rendering them deserving of exile. The verse in Yirmiyahu, however, asks a different question. Since there was so much Torah study among the people during the time of the destruction, why did this merit not protect them from harsh decrees? To this the Almighty responds, "she-lo berkhu ba-Torah techila" - they did not recite the berakha over Torah learning. In this berakha we bless God for the mitzva of "la-asok be-divrei Torah" - to "deal" with words of Torah. The Taz notes that we do not speak of "li-lmod Torah" - to study Torah, but rather "la-asok," to deal with, to occupy ourselves in, the words of the Torah. He suggests that this berakha refers not to the academic pursuit itself, but rather the intensive engagement in learning, the toil, perspiration, exertion, tireless devotion, and uncompromising standards. In Chazal's words, "the words of Torah are maintained only within one who kills himself over them." This was missing during the time of the destruction. Benei Yisrael learned, but were not committed; they studied, but refused to apply themselves intensively. They preferred comfort and relaxation over the pressure and diligence required to master the Torah.

This lackadaisical attitude, the Taz argues, made it impossible for the people's Torah to protect them. God can overlook our wrongdoing if we make a sincere, concentrated effort to learn and improve. If we approach our heritage with a sense of indifference, if we choose instead the path of comfort and relaxation, we cannot claim to be truly committed to Torah. One need not ignore the Torah entirely to be legitimately accused of "forsaking" it; anything short of maximum effort "la-asok be-divrei Torah," to occupy ourselves in Torah learning, is inadequate.

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Yesterday, we looked at the famous comment in Masekhet Nedarim (81a) that appears to attribute the destruction of the Temple to a seemingly minor offense on Benei Yisrael's part - that they did not recite birkat ha-Torah, the blessing recited every morning before learning Torah. The Ran, in his commentary to Masekhet Nedarim, cites from Rabbenu Yona what has become perhaps the most common understanding of this Gemara. The people's neglect of the berakha before learning reflected the relative unimportance with which they viewed it. They treated Torah study like other activities in which they were involved, as just one of their many pursuits. Just as musician does not recite a berakha before tuning his guitar, so did Benei Yisrael see no purpose in reciting a special berakha before beginning their Torah learning.

We may perhaps enhance our understanding of this Talmudic passage by taking a closer look at the verse on which it is based. As we saw yesterday, the Gemara here addresses two verses in Sefer Yirmiyahu (9:11-12): "Why is the land in ruins, laid waste like a wilderness, with none passing through? The Lord r: Because they forsook the Torah I had set before them." According to the Gemara, "they forsook theTorah" refers to the people's having neglected the recitation of the birkat ha-Torah. Significantly, however, the verse does not speak about the destruction of the Temple itself. Rather, it asks as to why the land has been destroyed. The Malbim on this verse indeed explains that the prophet's question, "Why is the land in ruins?" relates specifically to the desolation to which God subjected the Land of Israel. True, Benei Yisrael sinned and were thus deserving of punishment, to come under foreign rule and suffer oppression at the hands of their enemies. But why, rhetorically asks the prophet, did God drive them from their land and leave Eretz Yisrael in a state of total neglect and ruin?

To this God responds, "Because they forsook My Torah." The sins themselves would warrant punishment, but they would not call for the destruction of God's land. However, once Benei Yisrael fail to recite birkat ha-Torah - as Rabbenu Yona explains, they fail to recognize the singularity and unique sanctity of the Torah, then they have no need for the singular, uniquely sacred Land of Israel. God reserved His special land for those who will adhere to His special laws. If we fail to appreciate how special these laws are, then we lose our God-given right to His special land.

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The opening verse of Megilat Eikha laments the fate of Jerusalem, that "a city once great with people" which "was great among nations" has now "become like a widow." The image of a "widow" to describe Jerusalem is clear: it refers to a sense of loneliness, a happy, fulfilled life of contentment suddenly turned to aloneness and uncertainty. Accordingly, the verses that follow describe the city's having been betrayed by the nations to whom it had looked for comfort and support.

However, this metaphor may have a secondary, more subtle connotation, as well, as suggested by the "Sefer ha-Chayim," cited in the anthology "Likutei Batar Likutei" on Megilat Eikha. (Brief bibliographical note: This volume was compiled by Rabbi Shemuel Alter of Brooklyn, NY and published in 1960. In his introduction to this volume of the "Likutei Batar Likutei" series, the author writes that he had recently spent a month in the hospital, during which time the doctors saw no chance for his survival. He attributes his miraculous recovery to the importance of his work of compiling commentaries on Tanakh and the Aggada sections of the Talmud.) The Sefer ha-Chayim suggests that the verse likens Jerusalem to a widow who, with the passage of time, gradually overcomes her grief and begins seeking a new partner. She ultimately dresses herself up in an attempt to find favor in the eyes of men, hoping to remarry. Similarly, Benei Yisrael are "widowed," their unique relationship with the Almighty has been shattered. The prophet foresees that with the passage of time Benei Yisrael will seek alternate sources of comfort and meaningfulness; as they live among other peoples, they will ultimately resort to the norms and culture of their host nations and turn their back on their past.

If indeed the image of the widow bears this connotation, then the Megila portrays the destruction and exile as but the beginning of Am Yisrael's trouble, rather than the culmination. It initiated the process of Benei Yisrael's estrangement from the Almighty. The realities of exile inevitably threaten the nation's insularity and cultural and religious independence.

This brings to mind a verse in Sefer Devarim, towards the end of the "tokhecha," Moshe's lengthy description of the curses that will befall Benei Yisrael as a result of their disobedience: "The Lord will scatter you among all the peoples from one end of the earth to the other, and there you shall serve other gods, wood and stone, whom neither you nor your ancestors have experienced" (Devarim 28:64). Targum Onkelos and Rashi interpret the clause, "you shall serve other gods" as referring to Benei Yisrael's subjugation to idol worshippers, rather than actual pagan worship. Along similar lines, Rav Sa'adya Gaon understood the "service" mentioned here to mean chores forced upon Benei Yisrael involving the needs of pagan worship. Rabbenu Yosef Bekhor Shor, however, appears to interpret the verse somewhat literally. In his commentary to this verse, he refers us to a Gemara in Masekhet Avoda Zara 8a, that comments, "Benei Yisrael in the Diaspora worship idols with purity." The Gemara explains that although Diaspora Jewry do not actually engage in pagan worship, their social interaction with the idolaters, necessitated by the reality of exile, amounts to paganism. The specific example employed by the Gemara is Jews attending a family celebration of a gentile. Even if they eat their own food from their own utensils with their own stewards, the Jewish guests are still considered, on one level, as involved in idol worship.

According to Rabbenu Yosef Bekhor Shor, this phenomenon is included in the curse of exile. Like the widow described earlier, Benei Yisrael ultimately, by necessity, adapt themselves to their new reality and gradually acculturate, if not assimilate. In Megilat Eikha, Yirmiyahu bemoans not only the tragedy he witnessed with the destruction of the Temple, but the calamity that will slowly develop over the years of exile - the loss of Benei Yisrael's cultural independence, and their acculturation among the nations of world made necessary by their banishment from Zion.

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Amidst his admonition to Benei Yisrael in Parashat Vaetchanan, Moshe calls on Benei Yisrael to always remember Ma'amad Har Sinai, the Revelation at Sinai (see 4:9). Moshe proceeds to describe this momentous event, and then shifts his discussion to a warning against the worship of idols. The point of transition between these two topics is Moshe's expression of concern that the memory of Ma'amad Har Sinai would lead Benei Yisrael to attribute physical qualities to the Almighty: "Be most careful - for you saw no shape when the Lord your God spoke to you at Chorev [= Sinai] out of the fire. Lest you act wickedly and make for yourselves a sculptured image in any likeness whatever" (4:15-16). Moshe felt it necessary to impress upon the nation the absence of any physical quality to God, and to remind them that at Sinai they did not see any physical image that they could, Heaven forbid, confuse with the image of God Himself.

In the middle of this lengthy exhortation on the topic of idolatry, Moshe interjects a seemingly irrelevant issue - that the Almighty forbade him from entering into the land together with Benei Yisrael: "The Lord was angry with me on your account and swore that I should not cross the Jordan and enter the good land that the Lord your God is assigning you as a heritage" (4:21). Why does Moshe introduce this topic amidst his discussion of the evil of idolatry?

Rav Meir Simcha ha-Kohen of Dvinsk, in his Meshekh Chokhma, explains how the barring of Moshe's entry into the land relates to the theological issue of paganism. Rav Meir Simcha writes that God could not allow Moshe to enter the land because of how the younger generation, those who were born and raised in the wilderness, viewed him. Having grown in the supernatural environment of the wilderness, with Moshe leading them and providing their needs miraculously, they could not easily distinguish between Moshe and He in whose Name he performed these miracles. Upon their entry into Eretz Yisrael, the nation would have to develop a country within the natural order and pray to and serve God, acknowledging Him as the Master of the natural world. The concern arose that for this generation, such an existence would be impossible if Moshe would accompany them. They had grown so dependent on him that they would view him as the independent source of their blessings and success.

Moshe enlists this concern of the Almighty as an example of the dangers of paganism. That God would forbid Moshe from entering the land in fear of Benei Yisrael's misconception of him as a supernatural force testifies to the thof idolatrous influences. The nations of the ancient world could not associate the natural forces with their origin - the single Creator. They viewedphenomena such as sunlight and rainfall as independent forces. Moshe here emphasizes the need to attribute all natural forces to God alone, and to recognize that they, as well as Moshe Rabbenu himself, are but messengers of God, and do not function independently.

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