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by Rav David Silverberg

Many commentators have noted the grammatical inconsistency in the first verse of Parashat Re'ei: "See, I present before you today a blessing and curse." Moshe opens this sentence in the singular form ("re'ei" - see) but continues in the plural form – "lifneikhem" ("before you"). The Kotzker Rebbe famously explained that the perception of a given reality as either a blessing or curse will differ from one person to the next. Moshe presents the blessing and curse "lifneikhem" – to all of Benei Yisrael, to the entire nation, but to each person individually he declares, "re'ei." Every individual must take his own, personal look at the choices before him, he must decide what is a blessing and what is a curse, and choose accordingly.

What emerges from this explanation of the Kotzker Rebbe is that we are often unable to determine what in our lives is a blessing and what is a curse. A person can have wonderful blessings in his life without ever knowing it.

In the context of this discussion, Rav Yissachar Frand cited a powerful insight from Rav Kook zt"l concerning a famous passage in the Gemara, in Masekhet Ta'anit (30b). The Gemara promises that whoever mourns for the destruction of the Temple "will earn the privilege of seeing its joy." If one mourns the loss the Beit Ha-mikdash, he is promised to one day experience the joy of redemption. Many have asked, why does the Gemara promise the mourner that he will have the merit of experiencing "its joy"? Surely it should suffice for this individual to simply see the rebuilt Temple and city of Jerusalem. Why do Chazal emphasize the "joy" of Jerusalem? Rav Kook explained that even when it comes to the reconstruction of the Beit Ha-mikdash and the final redemption, not everyone will react with joy and celebration. Only those with the proper perspective, with an appreciation for what the Temple meant and means for the Jewish people and their relationship to the Almighty, will rejoice with the rebuilding of Jerusalem and the Temple. Naturally, then, those who mourn while the Mikdash lay in ruins, who grieve over the loss of our Temple, they are the ones who will, speedily and in our days, experience the joy and celebration of the redemption.

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Parashat Re'ei includes a discussion of the mitzva of tzedaka: "If there is a needy person among you, one of your kinsmen in any of your settlements in the land the Lord your God is giving you, do not harden your heart and shut your hand against your needy kinsman" (15:7). Surprisingly, this verse, as well as the concluding verse of this section – "open your hand to the poor and needy kinsman in your land" (15:11) – refer specifically to life in Eretz Yisrael ("in the land the Lord your God is giving you"; "in your land"). At first glance, it seems as though the Torah restricts the mitzva of tzedaka to the Land of Israel – hardly a tenable qualification. Undoubtedly, we are enjoined to assist and support the poor of our nation wherever they may be, regardless of geographic location. Why, then, does the Torah refer specifically to Eretz Yisrael when presenting the mitzva of tzedaka?

The Ramban, commenting on the second of two verses cited above, suggests that the term "be-artzekha" ("in your land") refers not to the geographic area of Eretz Yisrael, but rather to any Jewish community; it is as if the Torah had written "in your settlements" rather than "in your land." But even if we accept the Ramban's explanation of this verse, it fails to resolve the first verse we cited, which reads, "one of your kinsmen in any of your settlements in the land… " Here, the verse already mentions "any of your settlements" before "be-artzekha." Additionally, "in the land the Lord your God is giving you" clearly refers to Eretz Yisrael itself, rather than Jewish communities in other countries.

Other commentators, therefore, suggest different explanations. Rabbenu Bechayei, in the first of his two approaches, explains that this verse serves as a source for a famous principle established by the Ramban in several places in his commentary (Bereishit 26:5; Vayikra 18:25; Devarim 11:18), that all the Torah's mitzvot apply primarily in Eretz Yisrael. The Ramban claims that outside the land, we observe mitzvot only to ensure that they will not be forgotten upon our return to the land, where they once again become full-fledged obligations. Therefore, the Torah speaks of the mitzva of tzedaka specifically as it applies in Eretz Yisrael, since it is only there where it, like all mitzvot, primarily applies. Rabbenu Bechayei does not explain, however, why the Torah would choose to introduce this principle specifically in the context of the mitzva of tzedaka.

Rabbenu Bechayei then suggests a second explanation, as well. In this section, the Torah warns against withholding charity before the onset of the shemitta year, which cancels all debts. A potential lender is likely to refuse loan requests shortly before the sabbatical year since he risks losing the money forever. The Torah therefore warns those with money to provide loans to the needy even if they run the risk of seeing the debt cancelled with the onset of shemitta. Rabbenu Bechayei suggests that the verses here convey an additional warning, as well – to give charity even in Eretz Yisrael during the sabbatical year, when agricultural activity is forbidden and all produce becomes ownerless. A person might feel that once the Torah already denies him exclusive ownership over his own produce, and forbids him from tilling his land, not to mention the prohibition against collecting debts, he is surely exempt from the obligation of giving charity. The Torah therefore reinforces the obligation of charity in Eretz Yisrael, when the application of other laws may have led one to conclude that the mitzva of tzedaka does not apply.

An entirely different approach is taken by the Sifrei, and adopted as well by the Tur, in his "Peirush Ha-arokh" (though the Sifrei makes its comment on the first of the two verses mentioned, and the Tur, on the second verse). According to the Sifrei, the Torah inserts the term "be-artzekha" to introduce the law granting precedence to the poor of Eretz Yisrael over the poor of other locations. As the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 251:3) rules, when distributing tzedaka, one must give priority to the poor of Eretz Yisrael over the poor of other locales (though the poor in one's own community take precedence over the poor in Eretz Yisrael – Shakh, Y.D. 251:6). The Sifrei extracts this halakha from the reference to Eretz Yisrael in these verses. This reference is intended not to restrict the obligation of charity to the Land of Israel, but rather to afford priority to the poor of Eretz Yisrael over the poor of other geographic locations.

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As we discussed yesterday, the Torah in Parashat Re'ei introduces the mitzva of tzedaka, to grant financial assistance to those in need. The Torah concludes its discussion of this obligation with an intriguing verse that appears to be offering a reason behind this seemingly self-understood mitzva of charity: "For there will never cease to be needy ones in your land; I therefore command you: open your hand to the poor and needy kinsman in your land" (15:11). Several questions arise from this verse. Firstly, as mentioned, the underlying reason for this mitzva seems obvious. Does not sensitivity to the needs of others constitute a central pillar of Judaism? Must the Torah provide us with rational, theological arguments to justify the responsibility cast upon the "have's" to assist the "have-not's"? And secondly, the reason provided by the Torah seems hardly persuasive. Why does the constancy of the phenomenon of charity yield a specific obligation to address it? If the values of sensitivity and kindness do not warrant such an obligation, then why should the fact that "there will never cease to be needy ones" give rise to this mitzva? We mightadd that this is not the first instance where the Torah discusses the mitzva of tzedaka. We first encounter this obligation much earlier, in Parashat Behar: "If your kinsman, being in straits, comes under your authority, you shall support him, [even] a resident alien, and let him live by your side" (Vayikra 25:35). Why did the Torah not inform us of the "reason" behind this mitzva already there, when the obligation is first introduced?

The Netziv, in his commentary to the Sifrei, claims that the Sifrei had these problems in mind when it made its comments on this verse. As cited by Rashi, the Sifrei remarks, "I give you sound advice, for your own good." The Netziv explains that the Sifrei, troubled by the "reason" for the tzedaka obligation mentioned in the verse, reinterprets the verse as presenting not an obligation, but rather "sound advice." This verse does not provide the theological basis for the mitzva of charity, but rather explains on a very basic, simple level why it is in mankind's best interest to give charity. Since poverty will always plague society on one level or another, it behooves us to address this problem seriously by committing ourselves to support and assist the poor.

But this interpretation itself requires explanation. What is the meaning behind this "sound advice"? Why is it not enough for the Torah to command us with regard to tzedaka, that it feels the need to advise us, as well?

The Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Aharon Lichtenstein shlit"a, explains the Sifrei by distinguishing between two different aspects of the mitzva of tzedaka – the personal, and the societal. In Parashat Behar, the Torah focuses its attention on the personal aspect. The personal suffering of another human being casts a burden of responsibility upon his kinsmen to come to his assistance. We are enjoined to show concern and sensitivity to the troubles experienced by our brethren and do what we can to alleviate their pain. Here, in Parashat Re'ei, the Torah addresses a different element – the broader context of this mitzva, to which the Sifrei refers as "sound advice." The Rosh Yeshiva described tzedaka as not only a personal obligation to our fellow in need, but as a societal challenge and responsibility, an integral part of mankind's ongoing effort to perfect the world. "For there will never cease to be needy ones in your land." Among the major challenges that has always confronted society is the phenomenon of poverty, the plight of the disadvantaged, the problem of how to most effectively and justly provide the underprivileged with their basic needs. Beyond the personal obligation of each individual to assist those in need, society at large bears a joint, communal responsibility to seriously address the existential problem of poverty.

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Parashat Re'ei discusses the laws of shemitat kesafim – the cancellation of debts during the shemita ("sabbatical") year. The Torah writes: "Every seventh year you shall practice remission of debts. This shall be the nature of the remission: every creditor shall remit the due that he claims from his fellow… " (15:1-2). A creditor is forbidden from claiming debts from his borrowers after the shemita year. The Shulchan Arukh (C.M. 67:1) rules that nowadays, when the agricultural laws of shemita and yovel do not apply at the level of Torah obligation (since the majority of the Jewish people do not live in Eretz Yisrael), the law of shemitat kesafim likewise does not apply according to Torah law. Nevertheless, Chazal instituted that the prohibition against claiming debts past the shemita year still applies nowadays, on the level of rabbinic enactment. The Rema adds, however, that many authorities felt that this prohibition does not apply at all nowadays, even on the level of rabbinic enactment, and therefore those who claim debts after the shemita year need not be criticized for doing so. In any event, it is commonly assumed that the prohibition does apply, but we nevertheless allow creditors to continue claiming their debts through the writing of a "pruzbul" – a document by which the creditor formally transfers his debts to the authority of the local Bet-Din, who then has the power the collect the debts.

Besides the prohibition against claiming debts after shemita, the Torah also forbids a potential lender to refuse a loan out of concern for the onset of the shemita year. The verse in Parashat Re'ei reads: "Beware lest you harbor the base thought, 'The seventh year, the year of remission, is approaching,' so that you are mean to your needy kinsman and give him nothing" (15:7). The Torah requires a person with means to lend money as usual even as the shemita year approaches.

The question has been raised as to whether or not this prohibition, too, applies nowadays, even should we assume that the shemitat kesafim prohibition applies. Since the cancellation of debts applies only on the level of rabbinic enactment, perhaps one cannot nowadays violate the Torah prohibition of refusing a debt because of the imminent onset of shemita. This is indeed the position of Rav Yechiel Michel Tuketchinsky, in his work "Sefer Ha-shemita." He strongly objects to the position he cites in the name of the "Bekhor Shor," who claims that even nowadays refusing a loan violates this Torah prohibition. How, he asks, can one violate a Torah prohibition related to shemita if shemita nowadays does not apply on the level of Torah law?

Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l, in his "Minchat Shelomo" (1:47), comes to the defense of the position of the "Bekhor Shor." He argues that the prohibition against refusing a debt must be seen from a much broader perspective, as a prohibition against refusing to assist another due to what Rav Shlomo Zalman describes as "false, imaginary concerns." In the instance of shemitat kesafim, this means that one must trust that he will be rewarded for assisting the needy lender despite the debt's cancellation. When seen in this perspective, it makes little difference, Rav Shlomo Zalman claims, whether shemitat kesafim applies on the level of Torah law or due to rabbinic enactment. Either way, one who refuses to offer a loan out of concern for its cancellation during the shemita year violates this Torah prohibition, since he unnecessarily turns away another Jew during his time of need.

Rav Shlomo Zalman adds that not in all situations of refusal does a potential lender violate this prohibition. According to one view in the Talmud, the remission of debts takes effect even on a ten-year loan. Even if the lender and borrower stipulate from the outset that the former has ten years to repay his debt, such that shemita will undoubtedly cancel the loan before its expiration, the cancellation takes effect. What would happen, then, if someone in need requests a ten-year loan from a banker, and the banker refuses, knowing that shemita will undoubtedly fall during that ten-year period and hence his money will be lost? Has he violated this prohibition, by virtue of his refusal to assist another out of fear of shemitat kesafim? Obviously, Rav Shlomo Zalman notes, the banker in this situation does not violate the prohibition. Since shemita will definitely cancel a ten-year loan, a request for this loan is the functional equivalent of a request of a charitable gift, and clearly no prohibition applies against refusing to give someone a generous gift.

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Yesterday, we discussed the obligation of shemitat kesafim, the remission of debts during the shemita, or sabbatical, year. As we saw, this halakha does not apply according to Torah law when the other law of shemita – "shemitat karka" - does not apply. "Shemitat karka" refers to the prohibition against agricultural activity during the shemita year, which applies at the level of Torah obligation only when the majority of Am Yisrael dwells in the Land of Israel. Nowadays, when most Jews live outside the land, the agricultural shemita laws apply only by force of rabbinic enactment. Therefore, shemitat kesafim likewise does not apply nowadays at the level of Torah law (and, as we saw yesterday, some authorities maintain that it does not apply at all, even by force of rabbinic enact). Chazal (Masekhet Gittin 36a) derive this association between shemitat karka and shemitat kesafim from a verse in Parashat Re'ei: "Ve-zeh devar ha-shemita shamot… " ("This shall be the nature of the remission… remit"). The expression "ha-shemita shamot" is understood by Chazal as an allusion to two "shemitot," the two laws of the shemita year – the agricultural and the financial. This implies a link between these two halakhot, a link practically manifest in the dependence of one upon the other; hence, the remission of debts takes place only when the agricultural prohibitions are in effect.

This link between the two areas of shemita laws emphasizes the apparent thematic connection between them. The very fact that shemitat kesafim and shemitat karka apply together on the seventh year already points to an inherent connection between them, as does the common term "shemita" shared by both halakhic institutions ("SHEMITAT karka"; SHEMITAT kesafim"). This connection is magnified by the fact that one cannot apply in the absence of the other. Wherein lies this fundamental relationship between shemitat karka and shemitat kesafim?

Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch, in his commentary to Parashat Re'ei, explains this connection based on a speculative analysis of the term "shemita." While admitting the difficulty in definitively ascertaining the precise meaning of the root "sh.m.t.," Rav Hirsch suggests that it refers to slipping away, letting something leave one's possession and grip. Shemitta requires one to forego on that which is rightfully his to demonstrate his recognition of God's ultimate ownership over all his possessions. He must therefore return his fields to the Almighty, as it were, by refraining from tilling the land, and he likewise releases his grip on funds owed to him, acknowledging that everything he owns is in effect the property of God.

In a slightly different vein, we might suggest that shemitat karka and shemitat kesafim require one to ease his grip on the two basic categories of objects upon which man yearns to exert power: the earth, and other human beings. Agricultural work signifies man's efforts to control and manipulate the earth, whereas lending money establishes the creditor's control over the borrower: "A borrower is a slave to the one who lends" (Mishlei 22:7). By remitting debts, the borrower not only foregoes on money owed to him, but also loses the sense of control he had held over the lender.

This understanding may help explain the connection between the laws of shemita and those of yovel. As discussed in Parashat Behar, on the fiftieth, "jubilee" year, all indentured servants go free, regardless of how much time they had spent in their master's service. The other unique law of yovel requires the return of all lands to their original owners. Based on what we have seen, it turns out that the two laws of yovel express in more intensive form the themes represented by the two laws of shemita. On shemita, one proclaims God's ownership over the earth by refraining from agricultural activity; on yovel, he goes even further – he actually surrenders his purchased property, renouncing his personal real estate acquisitions. Correspondingly, on shemita a creditor must release the grip he holds over his debtors, acknowledging that ultimately he has no power over other human beings; on yovel, a master must express this theme by setting free his indentured servant, recognizing that he cannot exert unlimited control over another person.

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Among the mitzvot discussed in Parashat Re'ei is ma'aser sheni, requiring a farmer to bring one-tenth of his produce to Jerusalem and partake of it there (14:22-26). The Torah introduces this mitzva with the command, "Aser ta'aser" – "Set aside a tenth." A famous Talmudic passage in Masekhet Ta'anit (9a) presents a homiletic reading of this phrase, by which it means, "Aser bishvil she-tit'asher" – "Tithe in order that you will become wealthy." According to Rabbenu Chananel, Chazal felt compelled to offer a homiletic reading of the verse in order to explain the seemingly unnecessary double expression of "aser ta'aser." The extra emphasis implied by this phrase indicated to the Sages that there lies beneath the surface of this verse a message beyond the straightforward command to tithe. They therefore extracted from this phrase the notion that tithing one's produce yields great reward and bestows upon the individual the blessing of wealth and prosperity.

How does ma'aser sheni achieve this goal? Why does one deserve additional wealth for fulfilling this mitzva?

In truth, it appears from Tosefot's comments on this Gemara that the homiletic reading of "aser ta'aser" does not refer to ma'aser sheni at all. The Gemara's reading of this verse not only rewords the phrase "aser ta'aser," but takes it entirely out of context, as well. Commenting on this Gemara, Tosefot cite the Sifrei, which interprets this verse as the source for the halakha of "ma'aser kesafim" – tithing all of one's income. Noting the seemingly superfluous word "kol" ("all") in this verse ("Aser ta'aser et kol tevu'at zarekha" – "Set aside a tenth of ALL the yield of your sowing"), the Sifrei understands this word as adding the obligation to tithe all of one's income, beyond the mitzva to tithe one's crop. From here evolves the widespread practice of donating one-tenth of one's earning to charitable causes. By bringing this comment of the Sifrei in the context of this Gemara, Tosefot imply that in their view, the Gemara's homiletic interpretation of the verse reads it as referring not to ma'aser sheni, but to ma'aser kesafim – charitable donations made from one's income.

Thus, the Gemara teaches that counterintuitive as it may seem, one actually becomes richer by setting aside a percentage of his earnings for charity. At first glance, this means that in reward for giving charity a person is blessed with abundant wealth and success.

Rav Shimon Schwab, however, is cited as suggesting a different interpretation of this Gemara. When the Gemara speaks of one becoming "wealthy" as a result of donating charity, it refers to "wealth" as understood by the mishna in Pirkei Avot: "Who is wealthy? He who is content with his lot." The Gemara teaches that one should tithe his earnings in order that he becomes "wealthy" – meaning, content. One who accustoms himself to giving generously will develop within himself a sense of contentment, he will experience relief from the insatiable appetite for wealth that often plagues the human being. The more one gives, the more he overcomes man's natural tendency to incessantly take, and he thereby becomes truly "wealthy" – someone who feels content with what he has and does not feel the constant need to earn more.

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The final section of Parashat Re'ei contains a discussion of the festivals of the Jewish calendar. In describing the observance of the festival of Pesach, the Torah naturally mentions the prohibition against the consumption of the chametz and the obligation to eat matza throughout the seven days of Pesach: "You shall not eat with it [the paschal offering] chametz; for seven days, you shall eat upon it matzot, bread of affliction, for you departed from the land of Egypt hurriedly, so that you may remember the day of your departure from the land of Egypt as long as you live" (16:3). For the most part, this verse is easily understood: on Pesach we refrain from chametz and restrict ourselves to unleavened goods so as to commemorate the haste in which the Exodus occurred, which denied Benei Yisrael the opportunity to bake proper bread before their departure. The question arises, however, as to the meaning of the final clause of this verse: "so that you may remember the day of your departure from the land of Egypt as long as you live." To what does this clause refer? What was or should be done "so that" we remember the Exodus throughout our lives?

Rashi explains that this clause modifies the previous verse and first section of this verse – namely, the obligation of the paschal sacrifice and matza. The annual observance of these mitzvot helps ensure that the memory of the Exodus will remaalive eternally within the hearts and minds of the Jewish people.

Seforno claims that this phrase refers to the introductory phrase of this section – "Shamor et chodesh ha-aviv" (literally, "Guard the month of spring" – 16:1), which Chazal interpret as an obligation to arrange the calendar such that Pesach occurs during the springtime (see Rashi). The effort involved in calculating the solar and lunar cycles to ensure proper correspondence between them serves as an effective reminder of the Exodus – the commemoration of which requires that the lunar month of Nissan falls shortly after the vernal equinox.

Rav Sa'adya Gaon, in his commentary to this verse, adopts an entirely different interpretation. Commenting on the words, "Lema'an tizkor" ("so that you may remember"), Rav Sa'adya Gaon writes, "Ve-zakhor" ("and remember"). As Rav Yosef Kapach zt"l explains in his annotation to Rav Sa'adya's commentary (in the "Torat Chayim" Chumash), Rav Sa'adya Gaon understood this clause as an independent imperative. It does not explain any previous command or information, as the term "lema'an" ("so that… ") normally denotes, but rather introduces a new obligation, to remember the Exodus throughout our lives. Indeed, the well-known mishna towards the end of the first chapter of Berakhot, which we recite as part of our reading of the Haggada on Pesach, appears to view this verse as the source for the mitzva to verbally recall the Exodus every day.

Yet another interpretation of this verse's final clause is suggested by Rav Shimshon Refael Hirsch. Rav Hirsch claimed that the final clause flows naturally from the clause immediately preceding it: "for you departed from the land of Egypt hurriedly, so that you may remember... " At the long-awaited moment of emancipation, the newly freed slaves did not act freely at all. Almost paradoxically, Benei Yisrael were forced into freedom, they were driven by force out of Egyptian bondage. The significance of this "chipazon" (hurriedness), Rav Hirsch explains, is that at the moment of Yetziat Mitzrayim, no one, not even the emancipated slaves, was free. God brought about the redemption in such a manner "so that you may remember the day of your departure… as long as you live" – so that we shall forever remember the true meaning and significance behind the Exodus. We did not leave Egyptian bondage into freedom. Rather, God freed us from the yoke of Egypt so that we can take upon ourselves the yoke of Heaven; we were freed from our service of Pharaoh to enter the service of the Almighty. The haste with which we departed from Egypt, our lack of freedom even at our moment of liberation, helps ensure that we will never forget the eternal message of the Exodus – that our freedom from man was achieved only for us to enter the service of God.

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