Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT SHOFTIM

By Rav Yaakov Beasley

MOTZAEI SHABBAT

THE NATURE OF BIRCHOT haNEHENIN - part 6

We have been following with the Talmudic discussion on Berachot 12 that deals with case of a person who began reciting a blessing thinking that he was holding one type of food, but recognized his error halfway through the blessing, and finished with the proper conclusion for the food.  Rashi felt that the issue at hand was the person’s intentions.  The Rosh quotes the Ra’avad who argued that a blessing is never disqualified for a deficiency in the intention.  Instead, they interpret the Talmud as dealing with a case where the person concludes with two endings, immediately substituting the correct second ending upon concluding the first incorrect one. 

In a related case, the Rambam rules the following in Hilchot Berachot 8:11:

Should a person take a cup of beer in his hand, and begin reciting a blessing with the intention of saying “Shehakol Nihyeh biDvaro”, and instead err and say “Borei Pri haGafen”, he is not compelled to repeat the blessing. 

Similarly, if fruits that grow from the earth were placed before him, and he began reciting a blessing with the intention of saying “Borei Pri ha’Adamah”, and instead erred and said borei pri ha’eitz, he is not compelled to repeat the blessing. 

Similarly, if a cooked dish of grain was placed before him and he began reciting a blessing with the intention of saying “Borei Minei Mezonot”, and instead erred and said “haMotzi” he fulfills his obligation.

These decisions were rendered because at the time when he mentioned G-d’s name and His sovereignty, which are the essence of this blessing, he had the intention of reciting the appropriate blessing for this food.  Therefore, since the essence of the blessing was not recited in error, he is considered to have fulfilled his obligation and need not repeat it, although he erred at its conclusion.

The Raavad differs with the Rambam, and states that what was actually said is of paramount importance, and not just the intention that he had.  While the Rambam’s opinion is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (OC 209:1), there is a significant amount of contention around this decision, and most of the later authorities do not accept it (M.B. ibid)

The Rishon leTzion noted that the Rambam’s decision is inconsistent with a decision that he made earlier in Hilchot Kriyat Shema 1:8, the Rambam wrote, “Everything depends on the conclusion of the blessings.”  He suggests that in order to resolve the difficulty, there is a fundamental difference between the blessings recited before Shema and the blessings recited over foods.  The blessings before Kriyat Shema contain a chatimah (a concluding phrase that begins with ‘Baruch Atah Hashem’).  Therefore, saying the correct conclusion is of paramount importance.  However, the blessings that we recite over foods do not contain chatimot.  Therefore, what is significant is the mention, in the initial phrase of the blessing, of God’s name and his sovereignty.

SUNDAY

THE NATURE OF BIRCHOT haNEHENIN - part 7

Last week, we dealt with a question left unanswered by the Talmud (Berachot 12):  In a case where the person recited G-d’s name under a mistaken assumption as to what food he was holding, but recited the correct conclusion, do we follow the main part of the blessing (the mention of G-d’s name and sovereignty, which was recited under a mistaken assumption, thereby rendering the blessing invalid), or do we follow the conclusion of the blessing (which was correctly recited, and the blessing is considered acceptable)?   We saw two major opinions in the Rishonim in understanding this question.  Rashi understood that the issue at hand was does incorrect intention (kavana) cancel the blessing.  The Rosh disagreed, arguing that we never have a case where a lack of intention would negate a properly recited blessing. Instead, the Rosh understood the case as the Rif, where the person recited first the incorrect conclusion but quickly added the correct conclusion to the blessing. 

In addition, we brought an interesting case from the Rambam.  Rambam rules that when a person recites G-d’s name with the proper intention, but finishes with the incorrect conclusion (the opposite case of the Gemara above), that the blessings are valid.  His reasoning is as follows:

These decisions were rendered because at the time when he mentioned G-d’s name and His sovereignty, which are the essence of this blessing, he had the intention of reciting the appropriate blessing for this food.  Therefore, since the essence of the blessing was not recited in error, he is considered to have fulfilled his obligation and need not repeat it, although he erred at its conclusion. (Hilchot Berachot 8:11)

As mentioned last week, this ruling is challenged by the Raavad, who argues what was actually said is of paramount importance, and not just the intention that he had.  Although While the Shulchan Aruch rules in accordance with Rambam’s opinion (OC 209:1), this decision remains a source of contention, and is not accepted by most of the later authorities (see the Mishnah Berurah ibid.).

This week, we will attempt to explain the various rulings above, by delving into the underlying fundamental issues in Birchot haNehenin – how does the blessing serve to allow a person to eat of food, the previous relationship of the food to the person, and the role of intention in the realm of blessings (which may serve a different purpose than inother areas of halacha.)

MONDAY

THE NATURE OF BIRCHOT haNEHENIN – part 8

To understand the nature of the differing views regarding the laws of Birchot haNehenin, we will return to a fundamental question that we quoted last week in the name of the sefer Sha’ahuai Shmuel – what is the relationship of the person to the food before the blessing is recited?  Is the food itself inherently prohibited, and only if a blessing is recited does the food become permitted to be eaten (in Halachic terms, the blessing serves as a ‘matir’ – something that permits); or, we could suggest that the food never has the status of being prohibited to the person, rather it is simply an obligation on the person to recite a blessing.  According to both of these approaches, how do the mechanics of reciting the blessing work?

According to the second approach, which states that the food always was in the status of permitted to the person, and that only the decree requiring a blessing prevented it from being eaten, the mechanics are quite simple.  The Rabbis decreed that a blessing should be recited before the act of eating, and it logically follows that the person is required to recite the correct blessing that was established.

According to the first approach, however, that the food has a status of hekdesh (sacred property), and remains in a forbidden state until the person recites the blessing, we have to ask how the blessing accomplishes the chance in state?  What part of the blessing becomes the trigger, as it were, that releases the food from its forbidden state and makes it edible?  We can suggest that it is not so much the actual words that are recited by the person, but the fact that they represent the person’s internal recognition that he received sustenance from Hashem and expresses his feelings of dependence and thanks.

If this is correct, that the essential part of the blessing before the food is not the words recited but the intention and thoughts that underlie them, then we realize that the discussion about whether or not ‘mitzvot tz’richot kavana’ (is intention an essential part of fulfilling the commandments) is not relevant when trying to comprehend how the blessings work.  In other cases where a person recites a blessing, that blessing is not the primary act being performed.  For example, a person recites the blessing of ‘al netilat lulav’ upon picking up the lulav and etrog.  However, no one would suggest that the major part of the act is the recitation of the blessing, but the act of shaking the lulav.  Obviously, if we hold that the act of picking up the lulav does not require intention, then we could hardly disqualify the act if the blessing was not recited with the appropriate intention.  Even if we held that the act of picking up the lulav does require intention, it would not necessarily require that the blessing, which is secondary to the act, requires intention.  However, the role of the blessing before the food is different, which will be the topic of tomorrow’s discussion.

TUESDAY

THE NATURE OF BIRCHOT haNEHENIN –part 9

We are in the middle of a discussion about the difference between the blessings before food and other blessings.  Unlike other blessings, where the issue of intention is secondary to the performance of the act, in the case of birchot ha-nehenin, the act of eating the food is not the primary act – indeed, it is not a mitzvah at all.  The main concern is whether or not the blessing reflects the fact that the person who recited the blessing has recognized internally that he received sustenance from Hashem and is expressing his feelings of dependence and thanks through the blessing.  If so, then a person who does not recite the blessing with proper intention is not demonstrating the necessary recognition that would change the status of the food from its previously sacred status to a permitted one.

This approach helps us understand why if a person recites a blessing the blessing for beer while holding a cup of wine in his hand, the blessing is invalid, as he has not intended to thank Hashem for the food in front of him, and the food has not changed status from its forbidden state.  However, if a person would take the approach that the food always was in the status of permitted to the person, and that only the decree requiring a blessing prevented it from being eaten, then if the blessing is one of the appropriate blessings for the food as established by the Rabbis, then the blessing is ‘bediavad’ valid.  (This distinction can be found in the Rabbeinu Yonah at the end of ch. 1, Berachot, and th Aruch haShulchan 209:3).

WEDNESDAY

THE NATURE OF BIRCHOT haNEHENIN –part 10

With the understandings of birchot ha-nehenin developed above, we can now explain the controversial opinion of the Rambam that we brought earlier.  As mentioned previously, the Rambam wrote that when a person recites G-d’s name with the proper intention (for which food he was blessing over), but finishes with the incorrect conclusion, the blessings are valid, reasoning that at the time when he mentioned G-d’s name and His sovereignty, which are the essence of this blessing, he had the intention of reciting the appropriate blessing for this food.  Therefore, the essence of the blessing was not recited in error (Hilchot Berachot 8:11).  Since according to the Rambam, the food was comparable to hekdesh, it thus required intention at the time of the mention of Hashem’s name and sovereignty to remove its prohibited status and allow it to be eaten. 

This understanding of the underlying mechanics of the blessings helps us understanding the following ruling brought by the Mishnah Berurah (Orach Chayim 206:21):

If a person had recited the blessing over fish (whose blessing is Shehakol Nihyeh Bidvaro), and they brought him beer, which is considered a completely different species, then the person is required to recite another blessing (whose blessing is also Shehakol Nihyeh Bidvaro).  This is true, even though their blessings are equal, unless at the time of the person’s reciting the blessing over the fish, he explicitly had in mind to cover the beer as well.

Based on the approach that we have developed above, this ruling makes perfect sense. Even though the person recited a blessing correctly over fish, at the time when he was acknowledging God’s sovereignty, he only expressed a feeling of recognition and gratitude over what was directly in front of him.  Since beer is a completely different type of food, he did not yet express the necessary feelings that would permit that food to him.

We will finish tomorrow with a discussion of the Ra’avad’s pinion, and bring another case of contention where the two approaches to understanding the blessing differ.

THURSDAY

THE NATURE OF BIRCHOT haNEHENIN –part 11

We have been discussing two fundamental approaches to understanding the laws of blessings.  One approach states that until the person recites the proper blessing, the food is in a forbidden status to the person, and only through appropriate recognition of the Divine hand in providing sustenance through the recital of the appropriate blessing does the food become permitted to the person.  The other approach states that the food is always considered permitted to the person; however, the Rabbis decreed that before partaking of the food, a person must recite the appropriate blessing beforehand.  We have seen two practical ramifications between the two approaches.

In the first case, the Rambam rules that should a person recite G-d’s name with the proper intention (for which food he was blessing over), but finishes with the incorrect conclusion, the blessings are valid.  The Rambam argued that since at the time when he mentioned G-d’s name and His sovereignty (the essence of this blessing), he had the intention of reciting the appropriate blessing for this food, the blessing was minimally effective.  This reflects the first approach to understanding the blessings that we have delineated above.  However, this ruling is rejected by the Ra’avad, who argues that since the blessing recited was incorrect (despite having the proper intention for the first section), the person must recite another blessing.  This approach dovetails nicely with the second approach above, which argued that birchot ha-nehenin are a Rabbinical decree, and since the decree was not properly fulfilled, the blessing was invalid.

The second case where the two approaches differ was the Mishnah Berurah’s ruling that when a person has recited the blessing over fish (whose blessing is Shehakol Nihyeh Bidvaro), and they brought him beer, a completely different species, he is required to recite another blessing (whose blessing is also Shehakol Nihyeh Bidvaro), even though their blessings are equal, unless at the time of the person’s reciting the blessing over the fish, he explicitly had in mind to cover the beer as well.  According to the Ra’avad, this ruling is illogical, as the person has already fulfilled the rabbinical decree to recite the proper blessing.  However, this ruling dovetails nicely with the Rambam’s approach, since at the time when he was acknowledging God’s sovereignty, he only expressed a feeling of recognition and gratitude over what was directly in front of him.

A final case of contention between the two opinions is that of eating a forbidden food (the Rambam mentions rabbinic ally prohibited food such as ma’aser rishon that has not yet had terumah separated, ya’in nesech, and states that it is a ‘kal vehomer’ for Torah prohibited foods – Laws of Blessings 1:19) .  Since the food is forbidden, there is no way that a person could appropriately recognize the Divine hand in providing sustenance over a food that Hashem had forbidden, a person could not recite a blessing over it.  However, the Ra’avad rules that despite the forbidden nature of the food, since a person wishes to benefit from it, he is required to fulfill the rabbinical decree to recite a blessing beforehand.

FRIDAY

SALT – A Thought for Parshat Shoftim

Our parsha begins "Judges and officers shall you appoint in all your gates which HaShem, your God gives you ...” Traditionally, this verse conveys the obligations upon the Jewish people to establish a legal system when they inhabit the Land of Israel, consisting of both a judicial branch, and police who are able to enforce the judges rulings.  However, for many centuries, as the Jewish people have lived in exile, the ability to understand this verse in its simple meaning has been neglected. Therefore, the commentators attempted to find relevant meanings within these words that are applicable for all times.

One of these approaches was that suggested by the Sefat Emet (5631) in the name of his grandfather.  The gates, he suggests, are the gateways to Hashem.  The very fact that we have access and the ability to approach Hashem is in itself a gift from Hashem.  The Sefat Emet continues with his own interpretation.  The gates refer to the senses, where we receive information.  We are responsible to place judges and guards at each of these – to ensure that what we see, what we sense, what we hear, is appropriate.  The important factor, he suggests, is that this process of clarification and judging is done with a feeling of ‘yishuv hada’at’, of clear relaxed thinking, as opposed to natural and habitual behavior.  Four years later, the Seat Emet elaborated upon this point, suggesting that the judges refer to ‘chochma uda’at’, the logical and intellectual faculties of a person.  Most times, they can be relied upon to provide us with the necessary contemplation to properly ascertain the proper path.  However, there are times when, through a lack of ‘yishuv hada’at’, a person is unable to arrive at a proper conclusion is to what the right behavior is.    Then, we require officers, whether peer pressure, Torah strictures, or prior commitments, must be present to coerce a person in the right direction.  Only through these factors, first the use of our contemplative faculties in a calm manner, and the appropriate use of strictures when necessary, is a person able to approach the ‘gate to Hashem’.