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Moshe urges us in Parashat Shoftim, "Tzedek tzedek tirdof" - "you shall pursue justice." For some reason, Moshe sees fit to repeat the word "tzedek" in the verse. What did he mean to convey through the repetition? Did he add an extra word merely for emphasis?

The Ibn Ezra offers three explanations. First, he explains that the verse here demands honesty whether it serves to the benefit or detriment of the individual. Specifically in the courtroom setting, litigants presenting their case must speak the truth, whether it will help them or work against them in the course of the proceedings. Secondly, Ibn Ezra suggests that the Torah teaches through this repetition that no matter how many times one must appear in court, he must tell the truth each and every time. Finally, he suggests that the extra "tzedek" comes merely for the purpose of emphasis.

The Ramban, by contrast, explains that the two words refer to two different parties - the judges and the litigants. The pursuit of "tzedek" by the judges refers of course to truthful adjudication and sentencing. Regarding the litigants, pursuing justice entails ensuring honest litigation by seeking a reputable court known for its commitment to truth. The Ramban then proceeds to offer a Kabbalistic interpretation from the Midrash of Rav Nechunya Ben Hakaneh.

A different approach is taken many years later by Rav Simcha Bunim of Pashischa. He suggests that Moshe here calls for not merely truth, but genuine truth. Meaning, very often an individual can "prove" the authenticity of his legal or religious distortions from our sources. He can justify his corrupt ideas by finding some flimsy basis somewhere within tradition. We are bidden to pursue absolute truth, to probe the ancient texts objectively in search of the correct path without preconceived notions or a priori ideas which we seek to substantiate. We must pursue not only "tzedek" - truth itself, but "tzedek tzedek" - sincere and genuine truth.

*****

As the army of Benei Yisrael would go to battle, the kohen would stand before the troops and exempt from duty several groups of people, as detailed in this week's parasha. The final group sent home consisted of those who were afraid. The kohen would say, "Is there anyone afraid and disheartened? Let him go back to his home, lest the courage of his comrades flag like his." Rashi cites a dispute among the tannaim (in the mishna in Sota 54a) as to the nature of the fear spoken of in this verse. Rabbi Akiva adopts the straightforward meaning, that the kohen here refers to the fear of battle. Apparently, the Torah feared a lowering of morale should a segment of the army dread the battlefield. Rabbi Yossi Hagelili disagrees, and claims that fear here means fear of sin. The kohen sends home those who feared the repercussions of sins they had committed.

The Rebbe of Kotzk raises a difficulty regarding Rabbi Yossi Hagelili's interpretation. As the Gemara in Sota (44b) explicates, Rabbi Yossi Hagelili exempted from war those who have committed any sin at all, including violations of rabbinic ordinances. The Gemara gives the example of one who speaks in between the placing of his tefillin shel yad and tefillin shel rosh. Although no Torah violation has been committed, the soldier nevertheless returns home from military service. (The mishna presents a more moderate version of this view, that of Rabbi Yossi, who holds that only Torah violations exempt one from war.) If this is true, asks the Kotzker, then how big could the Jewish army have possible been? Who among the soldiers could honestly claim innocence from any and every possible wrongdoing and confidently head out to battle? According to Rabbi Yossi Hagelili, who did not turn back when the kohen exempted sinners? What more, Rashi a few verses earlier cites the Gemara's interpretation of the kohen's opening words to the troops, by which he guarantees them divine assistance even if the only merit they have earned is that of the recitation of shema. If this is their only source of merit, they obviously have been neglecting the Torah. How, then, were they allowed to go out and fight if all sinners were ordered to head back?

The Kotzker therefore reinterprets Rabbi Yossi Hagelili's words, "those who were afraid of sins on their hands." Certainly, not everyone who once sinned left battle. The people to whom the kohen speaks are people who still feel distress over previously committed sins. They have since repented, but the memories of their past iniquities continue to haunt them and have wedged themselves into the soldiers' consciences, to the extent that they are still distraught and discouraged. Such a person, says the Kotzker, "does not have the strength to strengthen himself in the path of God." If an individual dwells too much upon the past, he cannot bring himself to ensure a better future. To be sure, one must recall his previous mistakes in order to take the necessary precautions to avoid their recurrence. At a certain point, however, the sinner is expected to pick himself up and move forward with confidence and pride. Therefore, the one whose mind is still plagued by past errors cannot join Benei Yisrael in battle.

Granted, the timing of this d'var Torah is somewhat skewed, as we stand on the brink of Rosh Chodesh Elul, a time when we are called upon to review our mistakes of the previous year. Nevertheless, it behooves us to bear in mind this critical message of the Kotzker Rebbe. Our focus during the days of awe must relate to the future and the necessary changes in our routine. Our recollection of the previous year must serve the specific purpose of ensuring a more successful year ahead.

*****

Towards the end of Parashat Shoftim and into the beginning of Parashat Ki-Tetze, the Torah discusses various halakhot relevant to warfare. Chapter 20 begins with the kohen's monologue to the soldiers before battle and continues with the guidelines of taking booty and the prohibition of cutting fruit trees while mounting a siege. Next week's parasha, Ki-Tetze, begins with the special permission granted to take a female fugitive as a wife.

Amidst these sections appears one portion that appears to have little, if anything, to do with warfare. Parashat Shoftim ends with the intriguing halakha of "egla arufa." Should a corpse be found between two cities, the leaders of the closer city are to conduct a procedure by which they affirm their innocence from the crime and offer a sacrifice to atone for the murder. Why would the Torah interrupt the discussion of wartime guidelines with this procedure of "egla arufa"?

An insightful explanation is cited in the name of Rav Yaakov Ruderman zt"l. Warfare often desensitizes those involved to the supreme value of human life. When soldiers are trained to kill, the danger arises that they will lose proper perspective regarding the sanctity of every human soul. Therefore, amidst its discussion of wartime procedures, the Torah saw fit to insert the halakha of "egla arufa," by which the elders of the city reaffirm their awareness of the immense loss suffered when even a single John Doe is found dead.

A similar approach is advanced to explain Chazal's association of this halakha with Yosef. The Midrash relates that just prior to his fateful departure to check on his brothers, Yosef studied the laws of "egla arufa" with his father, Yaakov. Some have suggested that the relevance of this halakha to Yosef's farewell to his father involves leadership. However unknowingly, Yosef left his father on his way to becoming viceroy of the largest empire of the world at that time. It is only befitting, then, that the final words of Torah heard from his saintly father spoke of the halakha of "egla arufa," the inherent value and sacred quality of every individual. Leaders often fall into the trap of overlooking the needs of individuals. preoccupied they are with issues concerning broad segments of their constituency's population that they can easily ignore the cries of the widow, the wails of the ill and the frustrations of the poor. Yosef overcame these challenges even upon his ascent to power, because he always carried with him the eternal lesson of the "egla arufa."

*****

Parashat Shoftim both begins with and is named after the mitzvah of establishing a judicial system. The judges themselves are commanded to hear and decide cases honestly, as stated both in the verses here and in Vayikra 19:15. Several Acharonim have noted the implication of the Yerushalmi towards the beginning of the sixth chapter of Berakhot that judges recite a berakha before sitting down to hear a case. The Talmud Yerushalmi reports that Rav Chagai and Rav Yirmiya came to "Bei Chanvata," at which point Rav Chagai proceeded to recite a berakha. The Gemara then embarks on a discussion regarding the halakha of "birkhot hamitzvah," that the performance of a mitzvah is to be preceded by a berakha. The conventional understanding of the term "Bei Chanvata" is a Bet Din, thus indicating that judges must recite a "birkat hamitzvah" before fulfilling the mitzvah of adjudicating. Such a notion, however, flies in the face of common practice as well as an explicit ruling of the Rashba (Shut HaRashba, vol. 1, 18) that no "birkat hamitzvah" is required for this mitzvah of hearing cases of Torah law.

The first and simplest approach to resolving this issue is to reinterpret the term "Bei Chanvata." This becomes even easier in light of the controversy surrounding the authenticity of this version of the text. Shut Torat Refael (2) cites a variant version of the term - "Bei Chatata," which means that these two rabbis did not go to hear a trial, but rather to prepare the purifying waters of the red heifer (called the "mei chatat"; hence, "Bei Chatata"). Another differing text reads "Bei Chatuna," implying that they went to a wedding hall to fulfill the mitzvah of rejoicing together with the bride and groom. (This, of course, raises the question of why no one ever considers reciting a berakha for this mitzvah at weddings.) Either of these readings obviously undermines the relevance of this Yerushalmi to the issue of reciting a berakha before presiding over legal cases.

Other Acharonim, however, concede that the Yerushalmi speaks of legal proceedings and thus offer different explanations for why Rav Chagai recited a berakha. The Maharitz Chayot (cited by the Chatam Sofer in Shut O.C. 54) notes that the reason offered by the Rashba why judges do not recite a berakha before hearing a case is because the litigants may not accept the ruling. The Maharitz Chayot explains that should the litigants refuse the Bet Din's ruling, the court must then revert to coercive measures to enforce its decision. Specifically, the court has the power to confiscate the assets of the party who was found to owe his counterpart money and hand them over to the rightful owner. In such an instance, the court has not completed its duties until such time as the funds are forcefully transferred to the litigant in whose favor the court ruled. Now the halakha is that we do not recite a birkat hamitzvah over an act which does not itself constitute the completion of the mitzvah's fulfillment. For example, we recite a berakha before taking the lulav, since nothing more is required to fulfill the mitzvah. We do not, however, recite a mitzvah over the preparation of the lulav, since the mitzvah is not completed until we actually hold the four species in our hand. Therefore, judges cannot recite a berakha upon assuming the bench, since they do not know whether or not this current activity will constitute the final fulfillment of the mitzvah.

Herein lies the basis of the discrepancy between common practice and that of Rav Chagai in the Yerushalmi. We know from other sources (see, for example, Tosafot Sukka 46a, "ha'oseh") that the Yerushalmi generally requires a berakha before even a preparatory act of a mitzvah. For example, the Yerushalmi rules that one should recite a berakha when preparing the lulav for use. Therefore, consistent with the Yerushalmi's general ruling requiring berakhot even before a mitzvah's final execution, Rav Chagai recited a berakha upon assuming the judge's chair. Since, however, we rule in accordance with the Bavli, that no birkat hamitzvah is recited unless the activity at hand constitutes the completion of the mitzvah, Rav Chagai's practice will not influence our custom in this regard. (Rav Yosef Shaul Nathanson, however, rejects this approach - see Sho'el U'meishiv Mahadura Revi'a, 3:28.)

*****

Parashat Shoftim introduces the concept of royalty in Benei Yisrael. It speaks of the appointment of a king and several halakhot pertaining thereto. Among the mitzvot applicable to the Jewish king is that he must write a Sefer Torah and keep it with him at all times. Rashi cites Chazal's clarification that the king must, in fact, write two Sifrei Torah (Sanhedrin 21b). The first remained in the palace, while the other accompanied the king wherever he went.

Why were two distinct Sifrei Torah necessary? Why couldn’t the king simply keep one Sefer Torah with him at all times, within and without of the palace?

A beautiful answer appears in the work Chamudei Tzvi by Rav Hersh Yaar. The two Sifrei Torah of the king reflect the two distinct elements of his personality that must be engendered. One Sefer Torah remains in the palace, representing the king's private life. The other Torah accompanies the king when he leaves the palace, symbolizing the character he takes on in public. In ruling his nation, the king must be strong, resolute and confident. He must boldly uphold justice and truth and courageously fight corruption and evil. When retreating to his palace, however, the king must pull out a much different Sefer Torah, that of humility and self-scrutiny. In the privacy of his personal chamber, the king, like everyone else, must constantly review his conduct in an honest and self-effacing effort to perfect his character. These are the two Sifrei Torah that the Jewish king must study continuously throughout his reign.

*****

Among the halakhot established in Parashat Shoftim regarding the Jewish king is that he must be just that - a Jewish king. Benei Yisrael are warned not to appoint a king of a different ethnicity. Even proper converts to Judaism may not assume the throne. The Gemara in Kiddushin 76b and elsewhere expands this rule to other positions of religious leadership; they are open only to those born to Jewish parents. From the Torah's double expression, "som tasim" in the context of the appointment of a Jewish king, Chazal derive that the rule forbidding kings of gentile ethnicity applies not only to the kingship, but to other religious appointments, as well. The Gemara then cites Rav Yosef's comment that one born to a gentile father may be appointed to positions of leadership, so long as his mother was Jewish. The implication of the Gemara, therefore, is that a Jewish king requires a Jewish mother, but not a necessarily a Jewish father.

Tosafot (Sota 41b), however, rule otherwise. Surprisingly, they claim that the allowance for the appointment of one with a gentile father applies only to general leadership positions. The Jewish king, however, must be born to two Jewish parents. (Tosafot's position is based upon the Gemara there in Sota.)

Some Acharonim have questioned Tosafot's view based on the Tanakh. In Melakhim I, Rechavam inherits the throne from his father, Shlomo, despite the fact that his mother was Na'ama the Amonite (obviously not a Jewess)!

The Chatam Sofer (Shut, O.C. 12) answers based on the halakha providing for a son's inheritance of the throne from his father. The Chatam Sofer claims that the prohibition of appointing a king of non-Jewish origins applies only to the actual appointment of such a king, but not to the king's reign itself. Therefore, if someone becomes king automatically, without a formal appointment - such as in a case of an heir-apparent - no prohibition exists. The Jewish people were instructed that when they select an individual to begin a royal dynasty, he must be born to Jewish parents. However, should a Jewish king marry a convert - as Shlomo did - his son from this marriage may nevertheless inherit the throne whereas he requires no formal appointment from the people. Once Shlomo passed away, the scepter passed automatically to his son, Rechavam, without a formal appointment. Since the Torah's prohibition outlaws only the appointment of a king from gentile ethnicity, but not the reign itself of such a king, no violation was involved in Rechavam's ascent to the throne.

*****

The widespread custom throughout Am Yisrael is to blow the shofar daily throughout the month of Elul. The Tur (O.C. 581) mentions two reasons for this practice. Firstly, the shofar blast (hopefully) stirs our hearts to teshuva in anticipation of the Days of Awe. Secondly, we seek to "confuse" the Satan by blowing even before the onset of the obligation of shofar. (See Masekhet Rosh Hashanah, top of 16b.) Unlike our practice today, the Tur mentions that the prevalent custom amongst Ashkenazic communities was to blow the shofar twice each day during Elul - by morning and by night. Rav Moshe Feinstein (Iggerot Moshe, O.C. vol. 4, 21), however, redefines the word "erev" (evening) in the Tur. Given Chazal's assertion that during the nighttime hours (until midnight) God's attribute of justice, rather than mercy, is in force, it cannot be that communities blew the shofar at night. Rav Moshe speculates that "erev" here refers to late afternoon, after the mincha prayers, rather than evening. He cites the Chayei Adam 138:1 who similarly understands "erev" in this context as a reference to mincha-time.

One could question Rav Moshe's assumption that shofar could not be blown at night since these hours are not suitable for appeasing the Almighty. According to the first reason for the practice mentioned in the Tur, that the shofar blast stirs people's souls and moves them towards repentance, then there appears to be no reason to distinguish between day and night. The shofar blowing serves not as a direct petition to the Almighty (as it perhaps does on Rosh Hashanah itself), but rather as a mechanism by which the congregants will hopefully be inspired to repent. According to the second reason, too, the basis for not blowing at nighttime is less than obvious. Rashi in Masekhet Rosh Hashanah 16b explains the "confusion" of the Satan as referring to our love of the mitzvah. Chazal instituted additional shofar blowing beyond the minimum requirement so that we demonstrate our zeal and passion for God's mitzvot, thereby silencing the prosecution against us in the Heavenly Tribunal. If this is indeed the reason for blowing during Elul, then clearly the blowing does not serve as a form of supplication but rather as a manifestation of our love towards the commandments. As such, it would appear, there would be no reason not to blow at night, as well.

In any event, communities today generally blow the shofar only once a day during Elul, after the shacharit services. Rav Moshe suggests two possible reasons why the custom developed to blow specifically at shacharit, rather than mincha. Firstly, far more people come to the synagogue for shacharit in the morning than for mincha in the afternoon. In order to ensure the maximum-size audience for the blowing, the custom emerged to blow specifically after shacharit. Secondly, he suggests that the sounding of the shofar serves a far more critical need in the morning, just before people leave for work. The hope is that they will be inspired to scrutinize their behavior, and this inspiration will impact their conduct as they go about their business throughout the day. Therefore, blowing the shofar in the morning is more important than blowing in the late-afternoon or evening.

Although we do not blow the shofar in the afternoon, the original custom recorded by the Tur does yield practical halakhic ramifications even today. Rav Moshe rules that should a synagogue for whatever reason neglect to blow shofar one morning during Elul, they should blow that same day after mincha. Although the original custom of blowing twice daily is no longer followed, it nevertheless remains as a "backup plan," if you will, should the congregation miss shofar blowing in the morning.

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This shiur is provided courtesy of the Virtual Beit Midrash, the premier source of online courses on Torah and Judaism 14 different courses on all levels, for all backgrounds.

MakeJewish learning partof your week on a regular basis - enroll in the
Virtual Beit Midrash

(c) YeshivHar EtzioAll rights reserved to Yeshivat Har Etzion

Yeshivat Har Et
Alon Shvut, Israel, 90433
office@etzion.org.il