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SALT –
PARSHAT BO
By Rav
David Silverberg
MOTZAEI
In the opening verse of Parashat Bo, God speaks to Moshe and reiterates
what He has mentioned already on several occasions throughout the Exodus
narrative, namely, that He has “hardened” Pharaoh’s heart. The issue of this “hardening”
constitutes among the more famous philosophical discussions among Jewish
thinkers regarding the story of the plagues and the Exodus from Egypt. God’s intervention in Pharaoh’s
decision-making abilities, as implied by this term, seems to run in direct
opposition to the fundamental doctrine of human free will. Moreover, as indicated in this first
verse of Parashat Bo – “for I have hardened his heart and the heart of his
servants, in order that I may place these miracles of Mine in his midst” – God
“hardened” Pharaoh’s heart for the specific purpose of punishing him. By denying Pharaoh the ability to obey,
God makes the king deserving of harsher punishments, which then allow God to
present greater displays of His unparalleled might. Needless to say, this seems hardly
just.
The Rambam (Hilkhot Teshuva 6:3, Shemoneh Perakim, chapter 8)
famously answers that God will at times punish a sinner by denying him the
ability to repent. Pharaoh had
committed such grave offenses against Benei Yisrael by enslaving and
persecuting them, that God saw fit to punish him by “hardening” his heart such
that he would continue to stubbornly refuse to free the Hebrew slaves, rather
than repenting and earning forgiveness.
Ibn Ezra, in a terse remark in his commentary later in this
parasha (10:20), seems to present a surprisingly simple explanation of
God’s “hardening” of Pharaoh’s heart.
He writes, “As the Sages said: ‘One who wishes to be contaminated – he is
assisted’.” According to Ibn Ezra,
it appears, there was nothing unusual about God’s treatment of Pharaoh. The “hardening” of which the Torah
speaks was simply an example of the principle taught to us by Chazal that
God helps a person follow the direction he wishes to take. Those who sincerely desire to obey and
observe will be helped in their quest for spiritual achievement, whereas those
who prefer following the path of sin will find this path easily traversable and
free of obstacles. And this,
according to Ibn Ezra, is what happened to Pharaoh. God did not intervene in any special
way; rather, Pharaoh had consciously decided to enslave and torment Benei
Yisrael, and the Almighty, true to the fundamental tenet of free will,
allowed and helped him execute this decision. The “hardening” of Pharaoh’s heart was
thus simply the normal method by which God assists human beings in fulfilling
their goals – in whichever direction they choose.
It emerges that whereas the Rambam understood this phenomenon as the
suspension of free will, Ibn Ezra saw it as facilitating free will. Free will demands that a person have the
opportunity to pursue good or evil, and God therefore assisted Pharaoh in his
conscious effort to pursue the path of despotic tyranny, rather than interfering
to help him repent.
(See also Rav David Horowitz’s
discussion at
http://yutorah.org/lectures/lecture.cfm/730429/Rabbi_David_Horwitz/Parashat_Va-Era:__the_Antinomy_of_Free_Will_and_God’s_Predestination)
SUNDAY
The Torah in Parashat Bo presents the basic laws regarding the
preparation and consumption of the korban pesach, including the law known
as notar, which in fact applies
to all sacrifices. This halakha forbids leaving sacrificial meat over past
the final time in which it may be eaten, and requires that if such meat is left
over, it must be burned (12:10).
The Mishna in Masekhet Shabbat (23b) establishes that notar meat (or
any other consecrated food that must be burned) may not be burned on Yom Tov, and the
Gemara cites a number of different reasons for this halakha. One view claims that the Sages inferred
this law from the aforementioned verse in Parashat Bo, which twice mentions the
phrase, “ad boker” (“until
morning”). This indicated to
Chazal that one
who leaves over meat from the korban pesach must wait until the second morning –
that is, the morning of the second day of Pesach – to burn the leftover meat. The Sages thus deduced that burning
notar is forbidden on the first day of Pesach, which is Yom
Tov, and must be delayed until Chol
Ha-mo’ed. Another view in the Gemara explains this
halakha differently, claiming that the mitzva to burn notar simply cannot override the prohibition
against burning items on Yom
Tov. Melakha (forbidden
activity) is prohibited on Yom Tov by virtue of both a lo ta’aseh
(negative command) as well as a
mitzvat asei (affirmative command) to observe a day of
rest. And a basic halakhic
principle establishes that although normally a mitzvat asei can
override a Torah prohibition, it cannot override a prohibition that entails both
an asei and a lo ta’aseh. As such, the mitzvat asei of
notar does not override the
mitzvat asei and mitzvat lo ta’aseh of Yom Tov
observance.
The Chatam Sofer, in his Torah commentary, notes a
discrepancy in the Rambam’s discussion of this issue. In his commentary to the Mishna there in
Masekhet Shabbat, the Rambam cites the first explanation given – the inference
from the phrase ad boker in this verse. However, in his commentary to the Mishna
in Masekhet Pesachim (83a), which discusses notar in the context of the laws of the korban
pesach, the Rambam mentions the second approach, namely, the fact
that the notar obligation cannot override the Yom Tov
restrictions.
The Chatam Sofer ultimately leaves this discrepancy unresolved,
but he briefly proposes an intriguing theory to explain why the Rambam may have
mentioned different reasons in these different contexts. Tosefot in Masekhet Kiddushin (34a) cite
a view claiming that in some situations, a mitzvat asei does have the
capacity to override a conflicting mitzvat lo ta’aseh that also entails a
mitzvat asei. Namely, if the
individual in question is exempt from the mitzvat asei associated with
the mitzvat lo ta’aseh, that lo
ta’aseh will give way to the
conflicting asei. For example, women are generally exempt
from mitzvot asei she-ha’zeman gerama – “time-bound” affirmative
commands. Hence, if a certain Torah
prohibition entails both a mitzvat lo ta’aseh and a time-bound mitzvat
asei, as far as a woman is concerned, this prohibition involves only a lo
ta’aseh. As such, for her, this
prohibition would indeed give way to a conflicting mitzvat asei.
Accordingly, as Tosefot note, adherents of this theory would likely allow
a woman to burn notar on Yom
Tov. If we accept the second
explanation for the prohibition against burning notar on Yom
Tov, that the mitzvat asei cannot override the asei and
lo ta’aseh of Yom Tov observance, then this prohibition would not
apply if we can eliminate the mitzvat asei of Yom Tov
observance. And since this mitzvat asei is clearly a “time-bound” obligation, it
could be suggested that women bear only the lo ta’aseh of Yom Tov, and they would therefore be allowed to
burn notar on Yom Tov.
According to this premise (which, incidentally, Tosefot flatly reject),
the Chatam Sofer
suggests, we can easily resolve the discrepancy between the two contexts in the
Rambam’s commentary. In Masekhet
Shabbat, the Mishna deals with the laws of Shabbat candle lighting, which is
customarily performed by women (though the obligation applies equally to men and
women). If the Mishna in this
context forbids burning notar on Yom Tov, then it must assume the
first reason mentioned earlier, namely, the inference from the term “ad
boker.” According to the second
reason, as we saw, women would be allowed to burn notar on Yom Tov.
For this reason, the Chatam Sofer suggested, the Rambam
there in Shabbat was forced to resort to the second reason. In Pesachim, however, he cited the first
reason, which he apparently preferred.
As mentioned, the Chatam
Sofer eventually dismisses this
theory. Among other arguments, he
questions the assumption that women are exempt from the mitzvat asei of Yom Tov observance, and
are bound only by the mitzvat lo ta’aseh forbidding melakha.
He contends that the principle exempting women from “time-bound”
mitzvot asei should apply only to obligations, and not
to prohibitions which the Torah formulates as a mitzvat asei.
MONDAY
As mentioned yesterday, the Torah in Parashat Bo presents the prohibition
against leaving over the meat of the korban pesach until morning, and the obligation to
burn any meat that one did leave over (12:10).
In explaining the reason behind this mitzva, the Sefer Ha-chinukh suggests that it
relates to the theme of royalty that runs throughout many of the laws and
customs that apply on the night of Pesach.
Leaving food over for the next day signifies poverty, or at least a
degree of financial insecurity. The
wealthy person has no qualms about finishing all the food on his table, because
he has no reason for concern about the availability of adequate supplies for the
following days. As part of our
celebration of freedom, we conduct ourselves in a manner reflecting royal
wealth, and we therefore leave nothing behind. We complete all the meat of the
sacrifice, as though we, like kings, have no reason for concern about tomorrow’s
meals.
We may, however, suggest the precise opposite approach – that this
halakha relates to a much
different theme of Pesach, the theme of haste and the pressure-ridden exit from
Egypt. In the very next verse, God
commands Benei Yisrael, “And thus shall you eat it [the paschal
sacrifice]: your loins girded, your shoes on your feet, and your staff in hand;
and you shall it hastily…” This
verse explicitly commands Benei
Yisrael to eat the korban pesach hastily, with an awareness that at any
moment they would be bidden to take leave of Egypt. God did not want Benei
Yisrael to eat in a relaxed setting, as though they had as much time
as they needed, but rather with a certain degree of haste and pressure. Possibly, the command in the previous verse,
which forbids leaving meat over until morning, also relates to the need for a
hasty meal. This prohibition
forced Benei Yisrael to go about the pesach meal quickly, without dawdling,
and thus contributed to the aura of vigor and haste that was to characterize the
rituals observed that night.
Although Benei Yisrael were now
entering freedom, they were still obliged to act with zeal and alacrity, to keep
to a tight schedule and keep things moving – just as they did during their years
of servitude. This theme is further
underscored by the obligation of matza and the strict prohibition of
chametz, which commemorate the nation’s hasty, even frantic, departure
from Egypt. The reason for this
emphasis on speed and haste, perhaps, is to remind Benei Yisrael that
they were not leaving Egypt to become “free” in the superficial sense of the
term, so that they have the luxury and freedom to act however they please,
without commitments or obligations.
The Exodus marked simply the transition from the service of Pharaoh to
the service of the Almighty.
Therefore, God saw to it that the meal celebrating this event would be
characterized specifically by pressure and vigor, with an eye on the clock and a
sense of subservience to our new Master.
TUESDAY
Parashat Bo introduces the laws of Pesach, foremost among which are the
requirement and prohibition, respectively, of matza and
chametz. As we know from the
seder, the Haggada explains the matza obligation as
intended to commemorate Benei Yisrael’s hasty departure from Egypt, as
the Torah famously writes, “They baked the dough which they took from Egypt as
unleavened cakes, rather than leaven, for they were driven from Egypt and were
unable to delay” (12:39).
However, as many writers have noted throughout the ages, there appears to
be more to matza and chametz than the nation’s hurried departure
from Egypt. For one thing, God had
commanded them to partake of matza already before the plague of the
firstborn and the Exodus (12:8; granted, as mentioned yesterday, this command,
too, could be attributed to the interest in saving time). Moreover, the especially strict nature
of the chametz prohibition would seem to reflect a far more fundamental
message than the commemoration of the haste with which the Exodus unfolded. Indeed, Chazal occasionally speak
of the evil inclination as the se’or she-be’isa – “the leaven in the
batter” – indicating that they viewed “leaven” as somehow symbolic of the human
being’s evil impulses.
Bread consists of two primary ingredients, flour and water, which
correspond to the two components of a person – body and soul. Independently, neither flour nor water
has the capacity to ferment and produce leaven; this possibility arises only
when they are mixed, at which point they can result in either matza or leavened bread. Likewise, body and soul are
independently incapable of sin. A
body without a soul is lifeless and cannot act at all, and a soul without a body
has no possibility of being tarnished.
But the fusion between body and soul, like the mixture of flour and
water, has the potential to produce both “matza” and
“leaven.”
Significantly, partaking of matza on Pesach constitutes a Torah
obligation. Seemingly, if the Torah
had wanted us to avoid chametz on Pesach, it should have commanded us to
avoid mixing water and flour altogether.
Yet, not only does it allow eating unleavened bread – it requires us to
do so! Indeed, the Torah sees the
fusion between body and soul as the ideal, not a compromise. “Who is mighty? He who restrains his inclination.” The Torah does not expect us to
eliminate our evil inclination, but rather to restrain it, to harness it, to
channel our human instincts in the proper direction. The challenge of Torah Judaism is not to
separate the flour and the water – but rather to mix the two together, to live
both a physical and spiritual life in a manner that results in “matza,” without any
“leaven.”
How does
one ensure that this fusion does not result in “leavening,” in inappropriate and
sinful excesses?
Halakha teaches
that when preparing matza for Pesach, one must ensure not to allow the
dough to “rest” without being handled for even a minute. From the moment the dough is mixed with
the water, the batter must be kneaded and worked continuously to avoid
fermentation, until it is placed in the oven. This perhaps reflects how the human
being can avoid spiritual “fermentation,” the potential harm caused by his
internal mixture of body and spirit: by remaining occupied at all times with
constructive activity. It is when
the “kneading” stops, when a person is idle and does not properly fill his time,
that the dough can “ferment” and turn into “chametz.” By assuming challenges and
responsibilities, and committing ourselves to meeting those challenges and
fulfilling those responsibilities at the very highest standard, we ensure that
the “dough” inside us has no opportunity to “rest,” and we thereby avoid the
se’or she-be’isa that is the root of sinful
behavior.
(Based on an article by Rav Yaakov
Filber)
WEDNESDAY
Parashat Bo introduces the basic laws relevant to the korban
pesach (paschal offering), including the obligation to eat the meat of the
sacrifice: “They shall eat the meat on this night” (12:8). The Talmud (Berakhot 9a) records a
famous debate as to whether this verse allows partaking of the korban
pesach throughout the night, or only until chatzot (midnight as
defined by Halakha).
According to all views, however, the korban pesach differs in this
respect from other kodashim kalim – sacrifices of which the one bringing
the offering may partake.
Generally, when a person brings a sacrifice of which he is allowed to
partake, he may eat the sacrificial meat immediately that day, and thereafter,
until the end of the next day. The
exception to this rule is the korban toda (thanksgiving offering), of
which one may partake only during that day and through the night. The korban pesach, however, is
not eaten on the day of its offering – the 14th of Nissan – but
rather that night, and, according to one view, it may be eaten only until
midnight.
This extraordinary feature of the korban pesach gives rise to the
question of whether it nevertheless belongs to the category of kodashim
kalim, or if it constitutes an entirely separate and independent kind of
sacrifice. One might conclude on the basis of the
unique time restrictions that korban pesach stands separate and apart from the standard
framework of sacrifices, and should be classified as such. Alternatively, one may view these
restrictions as an exceptional feature that does not undermine this korban’s status as a sacrifice like other
kodashim kalim.
Rav
Menachem Kasher addresses this question in his Torah
Sheleima (vol.
12, appendix 7), where he cites a number of sources indicating that indeed, the
korban
pesach has the
status of kodashim
kalim, despite
the unusual time restrictions that apply.
First, the Mikhelta
De-Rashbi explains
the verse, “You shall say [to your son], ‘It is a paschal offering
[zevach
pesach]”
(12:27) as referring to the proper intention one must have as he prepares the
sacrifice. The
Mekhilta
comments, “All one’s actions [in preparing the sacrifice] shall be for the sake
of an offering [zevach]…all
one’s actions shall be the for the sake of a pesach.” In other words, the Mekhilta
requires one to have two intentions while tending to the sacrifice: “for the
sake of an offering” and “for the sake of a pesach.” Rav Kasher suggests that the
Mekhilta refers
to the two aspects of the korban pesach. In addition to its unique quality as
serving to commemorate the Exodus, the korban pesach is also a
zevach, a standard kodashim
kalim sacrifice. This duality is reflected in the
halakhic requirement (according to the Mekhilta De-Rashbi) to have both statuses is mind while
offering the korban
pesach.
Another
indication to this effect is a comment of the Sifrei in
Parashat Korach (to 18:17). The
verse there in Korach establishes the sacred status of the firstborn of certain
animals, requiring that it be offered as a sacrifice with its fats offered upon
the altar. The Sifrei infers
from a phrase in that verse that it refers also to the korban pesach.
(The Sifrei mentions ma’aser beheima in this
context, as well.) According to the
Sifrei, the Torah there in Parashat Korach – amidst its discussion of the
sacrifice of firstborn cattle – establishes the requirement to offer the fats of
the korban pesach upon the altar, a detail that the Torah
does not mention here in Sefer Shemot.
This association implicitly drawn between the korban pesach and other sacrifices strongly suggests that
the korban pesach – despite its unique features – indeed
belongs to the standard rubric of kodashim
kalim.
Finally, the Tosefta (Pesachim 4:7) addresses the
case of one who slaughters the korban pesach with the intention of
eating its meat already on the day of the fourteenth, without waiting until that
night. Generally, when any stage of
the sacrifice is performed with the intention of eating its meat at a time when
this is forbidden, this intention invalidates the sacrifice – a law known as
pigul. At first glance, we
would apply this halakha to a korban pesach that was slaughtered
with the intention of eating its meat before it becomes suitable for
consumption. Interestingly enough,
however, the Tosefta rules that the korban pesach is not invalidated
through this intention. This halakha, as Rav Kasher explains, beautifully
reflects the dual nature of the korban pesach. The provision that it must be eaten
specifically at night stems from its unique status as a paschal offering. Its second status, however, as
kodashim kalim, allows – in principle – partaking of its meat already
during the day of the 14th of Nissan. The law of pigul applies to the
korban pesach only with respect to its second status – as
regular kodashim kalim – and according to this status, the meat
may eaten during the day of the 14th. Therefore, if the sacrifice is
slaughtered with the intention of eating its meat during the day, it does not
become invalidated, even though, practically speaking, one may not partake of
the sacrificial meat until nighttime.
THURSDAY
As we mentioned yesterday, the Talmud in Masekhet Berakhot (9a) records a
famous debate concerning the obligation to partake of the korban pesach, a mitzva which the Torah introduces in Parashat Bo:
“They shall eat the meat on this night” (12:8). According to Rabbi Akiva, this verse –
as the straightforward reading suggests – allows partaking of the sacrificial
meat all night, until morning.
Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, however, rules more stringently, claiming that
one may eat the meat of the korban
pesach only until chatzot (midnight as defined by Halakha).
Tosefot raise an obvious question regarding the view of Rabbi
Elazar. The Torah writes explicitly
in this context, “You shall not leave over from it until morning, and that which
is leftover until morning – you shall burn by fire” (12:10). In this verse, the Torah clearly
designates the morning of the fifteenth of Nissan as the “deadline” for
partaking of the korban pesach meat, as it forbids leaving meat over
until morning. If, as Rabbi Elazar
contends, the meat becomes forbidden for consumption already at chatzot, then
the verse should forbid leaving meat over until at chatzot, and not until
morning.
Tosefot’s answer to this question perplexed later writers. Tosefot suggest that Rabbi Elazar read
this verse as follows: “Do not do anything such that it would become leftover by
morning, for if it is not eaten by chatzot, you will be unable to eat it or burn
it at night…and it will therefore remain until morning.” In other words, the Torah here forbids
allowing the meat to become notar (“leftover”) in the morning. One violates this prohibition by failing
to eat the meat by chatzot, which then inevitably results in the meat’s
obtaining the status notar in the morning. Since one may not eat the meat past
chatzot, and Halakha allows burning leftover meat only in
the morning, meat that was not consumed before chatzot will invariably
become notar in the morning and will require
burning.
Many later writers challenged Tosefot’s reading of the verse in light of
the halakha discussed earlier this week, which forbids burning
notar on Yom Tov (Shabbat 23b). As we saw, although the meat becomes
notar in the morning after the pesach ritual, the burning may take
place only on the morning of the next day – the 16th of Nissan. If so, then Tosefot’s proposed reading
of this verse seems very difficult to accept. According to Tosefot, when the Torah
says, “You shall not leave over from it until morning,” it means, “You shall not
leave over from it past chatzot – because you will then have to burn it
by morning.” The Torah, however,
could not make such a statement – because even in the morning the meat may not
be burned. (Instinctively, we might
have responded that Tosefot perhaps interpret the term “morning” in this phrase
as a reference to the morning of the next day – the16th of
Nissan. However, from the Gemara’s
discussion of this verse, it emerges clearly that Rabbi Elazar understood
“morning” to mean the morning of the 15th.)
The Melo Ha-ro’im commentary advanced a novel theory to explain
Tosefot’s comments, one which relates to a separate issue regarding the
observance of Pesach at the time of the Exodus. This verse appears amidst God’s
instructions to Benei Yisrael in preparation for their departure from
Egypt. It is quite possible, the Melo Ha-ro’im suggests, that the restrictions of
Yom Tov did not apply that year, as Benei Yisrael had yet to receive the
Torah. Hence, they were, indeed,
permitted to burn their leftover sacrificial meat on the morning of the
15th of Nissan. Since
they were not yet bound by the Yom Tov prohibitions, no halakhic
violation was entailed in burning meat on Yom Tov, and they were
therefore allowed to burn leftover meat from the korban pesach already the next morning. If so, then Tosefot are quite correct in
saying that by leaving the meat over past chatzot one would cause the meat to become
notar and subject to burning immediately in the
morning.
It should be noted that this theory rests upon a certain exegetical
assumption. As the Melo
Ha-ro’im himself acknowledged, God’s instructions to Benei Yisrael for the night of the Exodus are followed by
a discussion of the Pesach observance for all times (12:14-20). This section includes the
prohibition against performing melakha (forbidden activity) on the
first and seventh days of Yom Tov (12:16). The Melo Ha-ro’im’s hypothesis presumes that this discussion
was intended only for subsequent generations, and not for the year of the
Exodus.
We should also note that this discussion relates to the issue of why
Halakha forbids
burning sacrificial meat on Yom Tov. The Melo Ha-ro’im’s theory presumes the position (that we
encountered earlier this week) which claims, quite simply, that the mitzva of burning notar does not have the halakhic weight to
override the prohibition against burning materials on Yom
Tov. However, according
to another view (in Masekhet Shabbat 23b), the Sages inferred this halakha from this very verse in Parashat Bo that
deals with the burning of leftover korban pesach meat.
This view quite clearly assumed that even in the year of the Exodus it
was forbidden to burn notar on the morning of the 15th of
Nissan, as it infers this prohibition from this verse, which deals with the
night of the Exodus itself. Thus,
the Melo Ha-ro’im’s contention, that Benei Yisrael were
allowed that year to burn leftover meat on the 15th of Nissan,
presumes the other possibility, that attributes the prohibition against burning
notar on Yom Tov to the relative strength of the Yom Tov prohibitions.
FRIDAY
Yesterday, we discussed the ruling of Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya, as
recorded in the Gemara (Berakhot 9a), that the meat of the korban pesach may not
be eaten past chatzot
(midnight as defined by Halakha) on the night of Pesach. This view is in contrast to Rabbi
Akiva’s position, which allows partaking of the sacrificial meat until
morning. As we saw, Tosefot
questioned Rabbi Elazar’s view in light of the Torah’s command in Parashat Bo
concerning the korban pesach, “You shall not leave over from it until
morning, and that which is leftover until morning – you shall burn by fire”
(12:10). The Torah forbids leaving
meat over “until morning,” clearly implying that one may partake of the meat
throughout the night.
The Or Samei’ach (end of
Hilkhot Chametz U-matza) suggested a possible answer to this question based upon
the dual nature of the korban pesach, which
we discussed earlier this week. As
we saw, while the paschal offering certainly features a number of unique
qualities, it also belongs to the general rubric of kodashim kalim –
sacrifices of which the one bringing the offering may partake. The Or Samei’ach thus
suggests that as far as the pesach’s status
as kodashim kalim is
concerned, its meat may be eaten until morning – even according to Rabbi
Elazar. From this perspective, the
korban pesach
resembles the korban toda
(thanksgiving offering), which may be eaten on the day of its offering and
throughout the following night.
(Other kodashim kalim may be eaten also on the following
day.) It is only the second aspect
of the korban pesach – its unique status as a paschal
sacrifice – that requires its consumption before chatzot. Accordingly, the Or Samei’ach proposes, we might claim that while Rabbi
Elazar requires eating the sacrifice before chatzot, it does not technically become notar – leftover meat – until morning. Since from the perspective of the
standard kodashim kalim status the meat may be eaten until morning,
the meat does not assume the formal status of notar until that point – despite the fact that,
as a practical matter, one may not eat the meat past chatzot. Therefore, the Torah speaks of the meat
becoming notar only in the morning.
However, the Or Samei’ach immediately dismisses this possibility,
noting the Gemara’s comment in Masekhet Pesachim (71a) which states explicitly
that korban pesach meat becomes notar already at chatzot according to Rabbi
Elazar.
The Rashash (Rav Shmuel Strashon), in his commentary to Masekhet
Berakhot, suggests a much different approach to reconcile Rabbi Elazar’s view
with this verse. Quite simply, the
Rashash contends that at times the word boker
(“morning”) can refer to chatzot. He draws proof to this otherwise dubious
theory from the Gemara’s discussion in Masekhet Yoma (20b) concerning the
terumat ha-deshen ritual – the cleaning of the altar each morning in the
Beit Ha-mikdash. The Torah (Vayikra 6:2) indicates that
this should take place in the “boker,” and the Gemara claims that the
period to which the Torah refers begins already at chatzot. Conceivably, then, we may similarly
interpret the word boker in the context of notar as referring to
chatzot. It is thus possible that Rabbi Elazar
understood this verse to mean, “You shall not leave over from it until
chatzot.”
Interestingly enough, and unbeknownst to the Rashash, there is a
Midrashic source supporting his contention. Rav Menachem Kasher, in his Torah
Sheleima to this verse, cites a passage from a manuscript entitled
“Yalkut Albichani” that writes explicitly that “boker” in this
verse refers to chatzot. Rav
Kasher notes that this interpretation likely reflects the view of Rabbi Elazar,
who forbade eating meat of the korban
pesach past chatzot, and it thus easily resolves the difficulty
posed by this verse.
David
Silverberg
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