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Surf A Little Torah PARASHAT BO by Rav David Silverberg
When instructing Benei Yisrael regarding the laws of the korban Pesach, Moshe admonishes, "You shall observe the matzot" (12:17). The straightforward reading of the verse would interpret it as referring to the mitzva of eating matzot. Moshe here emphasizes to the people that they should properly observe this mitzva. Chazal, however (Mekhilta, Pesachim 38b), understand the word "u-shamartem" here as "you shall guard," rather than "you shall observe." This mitzva requires what we call "shimur," an attentive, watchful eye to ensure that the matza to be eaten at the seder does not come in contact with any leavening agents. Only this matza may be used for the fulfillment of the mitzva of eating matza on Pesach eve. Chazal derive yet another, unrelated principle from this verse, as well. The Mekhilta suggests that we read the word "matzot" in this verse as "mitzvot," thus requiring that we avoid allowing mitzvot to "leaven," just as we must regarding matza. Meaning, we may not pass up an opportunity to perform a mitzva; we are not to give it a chance to become sour. Once the opportunity arises, we may not let it pass. The Radbaz (Shut Ha-chadashot, 589) maintains that this prohibition against passing up an opportunity to perform a mitzva constitutes a rabbinic, rather than Biblical, obligation. Clearly, the verse here refers to "matzot," rather than "mitzvot." Chazal merely found a subtle allusion in the text for a rabbinically ordained halakha. As the Torah Temima notes, however, at least one other source indicates otherwise. As we know from the "korbanot" section of shacharit, after the blood of certain sacrifices has been sprinkled upon the altar, the remaining blood is poured onto the base of the outer altar, on the altar's west side. The Gemara (Zevachim 51a) derives the requirement of the west side in particular from a verse. Tosafot in Masekhet Megila 6b, however, question the need for a textual source in light of our halakha. Since when leaving the Sanctuary - which stood to the west of the altar - the kohen first encounters the western side of the altar, then naturally he must fulfill the mitzva of pouring the leftover blood at this side of the altar, which marks his first opportunity to do so. This question reflects an approach to the prohibition contrary to that of the Radbaz. Tosafot sought to obviate the need for a textual derivation for the halakha by reaching the same conclusion in light of the prohibition against passing up an opportunity to perform a mitzva. Clearly, Tosafot afforded this prohibition the same stature as a full-fledged Biblical commandment, in contrast to the position of the Radbaz. We will discuss this halakha further iy""H tomorrow. ****** Yesterday we introduced the halakha of "ein ma'avirin al ha-mitzvot" - one may not pass up an opportunity to fulfill a mitzva, a prohibition derived by the Mekhilta from a verse in Parashat Bo (12:17). The Terumat Ha-deshen (35) raises an interesting question concerning whether this principle would apply when conflicted by a different requirement: "hiddur mitzva," the beautification of mitzvot. Namely, what should one do if he can either perform a mitzva immediately at a lower standard or wait and perform it at a higher standard? The Terumat Ha-deshen suggests resolving this issue in light of the halakha concerning a case a married, childless man who dies, leaving behind two brothers, the eldest of which lives in some distant country. The obligation of "yibum" requires the marriage of the brother of a deceased childless man to the widow. Though the obligation applies to all brothers, a higher level of obligation exists regarding the oldest of the surviving brothers. In such a case, then, the mitzva may be performed either immediately on a lower level - through the marriage of the younger brother - or later, upon the return of the older brother, at the optimum level. The halakha calls upon the younger brother to marry the widow, rather than waiting for the older brother to return. The Terumat Ha-deshen thus suggests that in all such cases, the prohibition against delaying the performance of a mitzva takes precedence over the concern for achieving the highest level of performance. The Sedei Chemed (Ma'arekhet Zayin, 1), however, rejects this proof. The case of the two surviving brothers involves two different individuals, one with a higher level of obligation and the other with a lower level. We cannot tell the younger brother to delay the performance of his obligation while we wait for the older brother to fulfill his stronger level of obligation. This has no bearing, however, on a case of a single individual who must personally choose between these two conflicting values. An interesting manifestation of this prohibition arises in the writings of the Radbaz. He addresses a situation of an imprisoned Jew whom the authorities permitted to leave to pray with a minyan one day a year, to be selected by the inmate himself. The Radbaz ruled that the inmate should not wait until Yom Kippur or Purim (for Megila reading) to attend public prayer services. He should rather take advantage of the soonest opportunity to pray with a minyan, and should ask that his one-day release occur as soon as possible. Does this ruling relate to the issue raised by the Radbaz? This we leave to the reader's consideration. ***** Today we will continue yesterday's discussion of the principle, "ein ma'avirin al ha-mitzvot," that one may not pass up or delay the opportunity to perform a mitzva, a halakha derived by Chazal from a pasuk in Parashat Bo (12:17). Yesterday we raised the question of whether or not this rule takes precedence over a different obligation, that of "hiddur mitzva" - performing mitzvot at the optimum level. What does one do when faced with the option of either performing a mitzva immediately at an average level or waiting for the opportunity to fulfill the obligation at its optimum level? Today we will look at another possible ramification of this issue. The Shulchan Arukh (25:1) rules that one first places his tzitzit before proceeding to put on tefillin, a sequence mandated by the principle, "ma'alin ba-kodesh ve-ein moridin" - we always seek to ascend, rather than descend, in sanctity. Whereas tefillin is of a higher sacred quality than tzitzit, halakha requires we put on the tzitzit first in order that we proceed "on an incline," from the lower to the higher levels of sanctity, rather than the reverse. What happens, however, if one must wait before putting on tzitzit, such as if he does not have tzitzit with him and must wait for someone to bring them? Should he delay the fulfillment of the mitzva of tefillin in order to follow the optimal sequence of placing tzitzit before tefillin? The Rema rules that one does not delay the mitzva of tefillin in this instance. One rather places tefillin without tzitzit, and then when the tzitzit arrive he wears them, as well. The Magen Avraham invokes yesterday's issue as a basis for the Rema's halakha: we do not delay a mitzva, even at the expense of a higher standard of quality of performance. (The Magen Avraham cites as a source the discussion from the laws of "yibum" addressed yesterday.) It should be noted, however, that one may easily distinguish between the issue raised yesterday and the case at hand regarding tefillin. Wearing tefillin after having already put on tzitzit does not seem to involve a higher level of performance as far as the mitzva is concerned. In other words, the mitzva of tefillin itself is not enhanced by waiting until after placing the tzitzit. Rather, the halakha requires that we schedule our performance of these two mitzvot in a sequence that reflects "ascent" in sanctity. As it turns out, then, the halakha of the Rema does not necessarily indicate that the rule of "ein ma'avirin" overrides the interest of "hiddurmitzva." Rather, it points to the fact that "ein ma'avirin" overrides the halakha of "ma'alin ba-kodesh." Namely, we must perform a mitzva at the first opportunity even if it means having to later perform a mitzva of a lower level of sanctity. This would not, it would seem, affect our discussion of a conflict between the requirement of immediate performance and that of highest quality performance. ***** This week we have discussed Chazal's somewhat startling interpretation of a seemingly straightforward verse in Parashat Bo, "You shall observe [or 'guard'] the matzot" (12:17). Rabbi Yoshia in the Mekhilta rereads the verse as, "You shall guard the mitzvot," thus teaching the prohibition against delaying the performance of a mitzva. This halakha parallels the requirement that the dough used for matza on Pesach eve not be allowed to sit and hence run the risk of fermentation. So far this week we have addressed some of the technical, legal aspects of this halakha. Today we turn our attention to the derivation of this law. The obvious question arises, does Rabbi Yoshia's bold rereading of the verse imply a connection between the prohibition against "chametz" and that of delaying the performance of mitzvot, or is it just by coincidence that the two laws emerge from different readings of the same verse? Perhaps one indication of the first possibility is Rashi's citation of Rabbi Yoshia as his second reading of this verse. Generally, Rashi cites Midrashim only when they help us better understand the text. We would therefore expect a Midrash found in Rashi's commentary to closely relate to the literal context at hand. It would seem, then, that the requirement of prompt fulfillment of mitzvot somehow relates to the prohibition of "chametz" on Pesach. The Maharal of Prague, in his "Gur Aryeh" on Rashi's commentary to the Chumash, provides an insightful basis for such an association. The Torah forbids the consumption of leavened goods on Pesach in commemoration of the suddenness and immediacy of the Exodus. The redemption occurred so fast that the emancipated slaves could not adequately prepare baked goods for their journey to freedom, and were forced to instead eat strictly unleavened food. The Maharal explains that this immediacy reflects a fundamental distinction between the Almighty's execution of His will and that of humans. God exists above time; as such, He carries out His will the moment He determines the time has arrived. No passage of time is necessary whatsoever. Humans, by contrast, need time for whatever they do. We commemorate this distinction through the exclusive consumption of unleavened goods on Pesach. The Maharal suggests that herein lies the connection to the prohibition against delaying the performance of mitzvot. To demonstrate the Godliness of mitzvot, that they lie on an entirely different plane than the rest of our activity, we must strive to lift the performance of mitzvot above the constraints of time. Needless to say, we must work within the given confines of the human condition. However, we reflect the spiritual quality of mitzvot by allowing the minimum amount of time to pass before their performance. In this way, we establish that if only on the theoretical level, our involvement of mitzvot exists beyond the confines of time. In light of this association, we readily understand why both these halakhot are derived from the same verse in the Torah. ***** Today we will continue our discussion of the verse in Parashat Bo, "You shall observe [or, 'guard'] the matzot" (12:17). Rabbi Yoshia in the Mekhilta reads the word "matzot" in this verse as "mitzvot," and thus understands the clause as proscribing the delay of mitzva of observance. Just as the matza eaten at the seder must have been properly guarded from any chance of fermentation ("chimutz"), so must we protect mitzvot from "going spoiled." We do this by performing them at the first opportunity presented, rather than waiting until a later time. Today we will further explore the issue raised yesterday, that of the relationship between these two halakhot: protecting matza-dough from fermentation, and not allowing mitzvot to wait. If one verse teaches both halakhot, then presumably some connection exists between them. The Ketav Sofer identifies this relationship as based on a specific understanding of the law forbidding delay in mitzva performance. While it is commonly assumed that this prohibition involves respect for mitzvot, which may be undermined by unnecessary delay, the Ketav Sofer explains otherwise. He maintains that this halakha helps ensure that one does not lose the opportunity to perform a mitzva. One may not pass up such an opportunity because he cannot rest assured that this opportunity will remain until later. In this sense, this prohibition follows the example set by the Exodus. Chazal say that were Benei Yisrael to have remained in Egypt even a single moment longer, the potential for redemption would have vanished. So entrenched they were in the corrupt Egyptian culture that any further assimilation would have brought them to the point beyond return. As we commemorate through the consumption of matza and ban against leaven, the Almighty wasted no time in taking the nation to freedom. If he would have waited even a moment longer, the Egyptian bondage would have continued for eternity. It is with this same sense of urgency that we must approach every mitzva opportunity that arises. We never know which moments will return and which will not. Just as God could not delay the Exodus, so must we ensure never to "pass over" the opportunity to fulfill mitzvot. ***** We have devoted this week's S.A.L.T.'s to the halakha of "ein ma'avirin al ha-mitzvot," that one may not pass up or delay an opportunity to perform a mitzva, a prohibition derived by Chazal from a verse in Parashat Bo (12:17). Yesterday we presented the analysis of Rav Avraham Sofer, known as the "Ketav Sofer." Today, we turn our attention to the writings of Rav Avraham's father, the renowned "Chatam Sofer." As we have seen, Chazal found the origin of this halakha in the verse, "You shall guard the matzot." The Mekhilta changes the vowel scheme of the word "matzot" to render it, "mitzvot," thus establishing the obligation to prevent mitzvot from the "spoilage" that would result from their delay or neglect. The "Shela," however, questions the linguistic basis of such an extrapolation. Even if we can reread the word "matzot" as "mitzvot," the first word in the verse, "u-shmartem," does not necessarily accommodate such an interpretation. We have been assuming all along that in this context, "u-shmartem" means guard, or protect, requiring that we protect mitzvot from becoming lost. However, the Shela notes that in at least one instance in the Torah, the word actually connotes waiting, or intentional passage of time. After Yosef's dreams of leadership, we are told, Yaakov "guarded ['shamar'] the matter" (Bereishit 37:11). Here, the term "shemira" means calculated inaction, a conscious decision to wait and see how things develop rather than take proactive measures. How, then, can "u-shmartem" teach the direct opposite - enthusiastic promptness and zeal when performing mitzvot? The Chatam Sofer suggests that this meaning of the term "shemira" comes into play in an aspect of the halakha that applies specifically before the time the mitzva's obligation has arrived. That is, one must eagerly await and anticipate the arrival of the opportunity to perform a mitzva. Rather than dreading the moment at which the given obligation sets in, one must sit in waiting, anxious and excited over the opportunity soon to be presented him. This requirement parallels the usage of the term "shemira" in the context of Yaakov: just as Yaakov waited attentively to see what will come of his son's dreams, so must we sit back and wait eagerly for the opportunity to perform mitzvot. This explanation adds an entirely new - and surprising - dimension to this halakha. This law not only forbids the delay of mitzvot once their time has arrived, but demands a certain attitubefore that time sets in. Both these elements, however, reflect the very same ideal: a perspective on mitzvot that views them as a remarkable privilege, rather than an unfortunate hardship and ordeal. ***** As a fitting conclusion to our S.A.L.T. series for Parashat Bo, we present the following thought cited in the name of Rav Pinchas of Kuritz. We have discussed this week the verse in 12:17, "You shall guard the matzot," which the Mekhilta, in the name of Rabbi Yoshia, reads as, "You shall guard the mitzvot." The Mekhilta explains that just as one must protect the grain used for matza from fermentation, which would render it "chametz," so must one guard mitzvot from being "spoiled." Meaning, one must ensure not to allow an opportunity for a mitzva pass by. Rav Pinchas suggests a deeper level of comparison between this admonition regarding mitzva performance and the issue of chametz on Pesach. If one fails to properly guard the grain against fermentation, then eating the matza manufactured therefrom not only falls short of fulfilling the mitzva, but also violates the severe prohibition of eating chametz on Pesach. This violation is punishable by the harsh sentence of "karet." Through this analogy, explains Rav Pinchas, Chazal wish to convey the message that passivity with regard to mitzvot is less than neutral. When unnecessarily delaying the performance of a mitzva, one has not only forfeited the higher standard, but he has in fact violated a prohibition. The message here is perhaps that the Torah demands of us more than refraining from wrongdoing; it requires active involvement in Torah and mitzvot. In this context, we cite the following passage from Masekhet Avoda Zara: "'Who is the man who desires life… Guard your tongue from evil, and your lips from speaking deceit' (Tehillim 34). Perhaps a person may say, I have guarded my tongue from evil and my lips from speaking deceit - let me go and indulge in sleep!? The verse therefore says, 'Turn away from evil and do goodness,' and 'goodness' means Torah." Living one's life as a good, upright person is just the beginning. The next step involves an active pursuit of Godliness. I haven’t conducted a thorough search through the S.A.L.T. archives, but I believe this week we have set a new VBM record: seven S.A.L.T.'s all on the same verse. Even if we learn nothing else, we have caught a glimpse this week of the depth and profundity of the Torah, how much wisdom and insight can emerge from every sentence in the Chumash.
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This shiur is provided courtesy of the Virtual Beit Midrash, the premier source of online courses on Torah and Judaism 14 different courses on all levels, for all backgrounds. MakeJewish learning partof your week on a regular basis - enroll in the (c) YeshivHar EtzioAll rights reserved to Yeshivat Har Etzion Yeshivat Har Et | ||||||||||||||||||||