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In Parashat Bo, Moshe instructs Benei Yisrael to prepare for the plague of the firstborn by taking a "sheep for every family" (12:3), which they were to slaughter and then eat on the night of the fourteenth of Nissan (12:6,8). This sheep had to be one-year old, male, and without blemish (12:5), and it was forbidden to leave any meat over until morning (12:10). In other words, this ritual has the qualities of a korban, a sacrifice, to which these laws similarly apply. Indeed, rabbinic literature refers to this ritual as "pesach Mitzrayim," the pesach offering brought by Benei Yisrael in Egypt, the model and precursor to the mitzva of korban pesach that applied every subsequent year, as described later in this parasha (chapter 13).

However, pesach Mitzrayim lacked one central, indispensable component of korbanot: a mizbei'ach (altar). Halakha very specifically requires that sacrifices be offered only on a mizbei'ach; it may not be slaughtered wherever one wishes. One must bring his korban specifically to the domain of God, so-to-speak, represented by the altar. How, then, can we consider this sheep slaughtered in Egypt a "korban"?

The answer perhaps emerges from one important detail of this ritual which we have yet to mention: "They shall take some of the blood and put it on the two door-posts and the lintel of the houses in which they are to eat it" (12:7). Generally, when korbanot are offered, their blood is sprinkled on the altar. Here, however, the blood in sprinkled on the front door to the house. In other words, the house has replaced the mizbei'ach. Benei Yisrael did not need an altar for the korban pesach ritual because their homes became altars. What does this mean? As we briefly noted, a mizbei'ach has the status of the Almighty's domain. We find, for example, that the Torah had to issue a special provision allowing the execution of someone convicted of a capital crime even if he grabs hold of the altar (Shemot 21:14). Indeed, this tactic was used twice towards the beginning of Sefer Melakhim I (chapters 1-2). Why would we have thought that someone hanging on to the mizbei'ach earns an exemption from punishment? The answer is that the altar is God's territory, and we therefore might have thought that a person could seek refuge by entering this inviolable domain. Similarly, in Egypt, God protected Benei Yisrael from the plague of the firstborn through His symbolic residence in their homes, so-to-speak. They thus came under His personal protection "so that no plague will destroy you when I strike the land of Egypt" (12:13).

It should be noted that two halakhot relevant to the korban pesach generally (not only to the offering brought that year in Egypt) might point to the application of this idea in all generations, as well. First and foremost, we must rid our homes of chametz before slaughtering the korban pesach. This likely corresponds to the prohibition mentioned in Parashat Vayikra (2:11) forbidding bringing any leaven on the mizbei'ach in the Beit Ha-mikdash. Once again, the moment our homes transform into a mizbei'ach of sorts, the same guidelines governing the mizbei'ach must be observed in the home. Additionally, the Torah forbids bringing any sacrificial meat from the korban pesach outside the house (Shemot 12:46), just as sacrificial meat may not be removed from the altar until it is burned.

(Taken from an article by Rav Amnon Bazak)

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Amidst the Torah's discussion of the laws of Pesach in Parashat Bo, it mentions the prohibition against doing melakha (work forbidden on Shabbat) on the first and seventh days of Pesach – which naturally applies as well to all days of Yom Tov. The verse states, "No melakha shall be performed on them" (12:16). Rashi, noting that the verse is written in the passive form ("shall not be performed," rather than "you shall not perform"), briefly comments, "even through others." Meaning, the Torah forbids not only the personal performance of melakha, but also having others perform melakha on one's behalf.

The Ramban and others express their difficulty in understanding Rashi's comment. Who are these "others" to whom Rashi refers, whom one may not instruct to perform melakha on his behalf on Yom Tov? If Rashi refers to other Jews, then the question arises why the Torah must inform us of this prohibition. Obviously, just as a Jew cannot perform melakha for himself on Yom Tov, he likewise may not perform melakha for anybody else. And if Rashi meant having someone else violate Yom Tov unknowingly on his behalf, this is already forbidden due to the prohibition known as "lifnei iver" – forbidding one from leading others to sin. Seemingly, then, Rashi refers to having melakha performed through a gentile, which, as we know, is prohibited on Shabbat and Yom Tov with certain exceptions. However, as the Ramban notes, the Talmud mentions in several places that this prohibition is rabbinic in origin. How, then, could Rashi extract this prohibition from a verse?

Ramban acknowledges that Rashi did not come up with this interpretation of this verse on his own; it is taken from the Mekhilta. However, the Ramban argues, clearly the Mekhilta meant this reading as but an "asmakhta," a subtle allusion in the Chumash to a later decree by Chazal, rather than a bona fide source for this prohibition. This reading of the Mekhilta was suggested in the Da'at Zekeinim Mi-Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot, as well. Additionally, the Vilna Gaon, in his notes on the Mekhilta, claims that a printing error occurred in the common editions of the Mekhilta, and according to the correct text, the Mekhilta does not seek to base this prohibition on this verse.

If Rashi indeed meant that the prohibition against instructing a gentile to perform melakha on Shabbat originates from the Torah, he is not alone. The Semag (lo ta'aseh 75) suggests (though remains inconclusive on the matter) that indeed this prohibition has Biblical origins. As mentioned, however, the Talmud clearly implies that this prohibition was legislated by Chazal. Rav Yosef Engel, in his classic work "Gilyonei Ha-Shas" (Shabbat 150a), suggests a distinction between a gentile performing the melakha with the property of the Jew, and one who performs the given activity with his own property. In the former case, perhaps, a Torah prohibition would apply, whereas the second case is forbidden by virtue of Chazal's decree.

Returning to Rashi, several attempts have been made at explaining Rashi's comment on this verse without ascribing to him the controversial view of the Semag. The Maharal of Prague, in his "Gur Aryeh," responds to the Ramban's objections, and claims that we can easily explain Rashi as referring to having one's melakha performed by other Jews. The fact that one would thereby violate "lifnei iver" in any event does not preclude the possibility that the Torah here establishes an intrinsic prohibition against instructing other Jews to perform melakha. Meaning, one who does so not only transgresses the prohibition against leading others to sin, but also violates the prohibition against the indirect performance of melakha on Yom Tov.

Rabbotenu Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot suggest a different approach to Rashi, namely, that he perhaps refers to one's own children. In the Ten Commandments, the Torah enjoins one to prevent even his small children from performing melakha on Shabbat. Conceivably, the Rabbotenu Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot claim, one might have limited this prohibition to Shabbat, where the mitzva forbidding the performance of melakha is more severe than on Yom Tov (as evidenced by the difference in punishment: Shabbat desecration carries with it capital punishment, whereas the punishment for violating Yom Tov is "malkot"). Therefore, according to Rashi, we require this verse to introduce the prohibition against performing melakha through one's small children on Yom Tov, to which we wouldotherwise not necessarily have applied this prohibition.

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Yesterday, we introduced the prohibition known as "amira le-nokhri" – asking a gentile to perform melakha on Shabbat. The Mekhilta and Rashi appear to extract this prohibition from a verse in Parashat Bo (12:16), but it is generally assumed that the prohibition was instituted by Chazal and does not originate from the Torah. The Mekhilta likely viewed this verse as but an "asmakhta" – an allusion to the prohibition, rather than its actual source.

Today we will discuss several halakhot associated with this prohibition. First, we must distinguish between two separate prohibitions instituted by Chazal: verbally requesting or instructing the performance of melakha on Shabbat; and deriving benefit from melakha performed on one's behalf on Shabbat. The first prohibition forbids asking a gentile to perform any sort of melakha on Shabbat. Since this prohibition relates to the actual request or instruction, certain forms of indirect requests, as we will see, are permitted (though not quite to the same extent as is commonly assumed). The second prohibition, however, has nothing at all to do with requesting or instructing. Even if a gentile performs melakha on a Jew's behalf on Shabbat unprompted, the Jew may still not derive direct benefit from that melakha. The most common example is turning on lights. If a gentile turns on a light specifically for a Jew, he may not read, for example, by that light. In fact, no other Jew may make use of that light, either. One may, however, read by the light if the gentile turned the light on for himself, rather than for the Jew, or if the room was already dimly lit and the gentile simply added more light for the Jew. If a Jew specifically instructed the gentile not to perform the given melakha, but he did so anyway, the Jew may derive benefit from the melakha.

Returning to the prohibition against telling a gentile to perform melakha, Halakha distinguishes between three different types of "telling": an explicit request; a hint formulated in an instruction-like manner ("remez be-lashon tzivuy"); and a hint involving no instruction or request, but simply a statement of fact. For example, "Do me a favor – there is not enough light in the room" falls under the second category, whereas "There is not enough light in the room" would come under the third group. Another example of the second category is, "Why didn't you open my mail for me last Shabbat." Since this statement is said in a command-like fashion, it is considered a "remez be-lashon tzivuy." According to Halakha, one may simply state the facts to hint to a gentile to perform the desired melakha, but it is forbidden to formulate the hint in a command-like way, except when a significant financial loss is at stake (or when instructing before Shabbat for Shabbat, or on Shabbat for after Shabbat).

Directly instructing a gentile to perform melakha is permitted under certain, very specific circumstances. Firstly, one may directly ask a gentile to perform melakha on behalf of someone who is ill. "Ill" for purposes of this halakha means a "choleh she-ein bo sakana" – that is, even someone whose life is not threatened by the illness, so long as his illness renders him at least partially dysfunctional (e.g. fever, severe headache, etc.). Needless to say, for a patient whose life is in danger one may personally violate Shabbat, and need not ask a gentile to do it for him. One may also ask a gentile to perform a melakha for purposes of saving "sifrei kodesh" – a Sefer Torah, tefillin, mezuzot, and sefarim. Other situations permitting amira le-nokhri include: tza'ar ba'alei chayim (to alleviate an animal's discomfort), a "mikhsol le-rabim" (widespread violation of Halakha; thus, one may instruct a gentile to fix an eruv on Shabbat), for purposes of public mitzva observance (such as bringing a Sefer Torah to the synagogue for reading), and when the given activity is forbidden by force of custom, rather than strict Halakha, or if its permissibility is subject to a dispute among the poskim.

If the given activity is forbidden only mi-de'rabbanan (by force of rabbinic enactment), then one may directly ask a gentile to perform the activity for the following purposes: for someone who doesn't feel well (but is not sick enough to permit telling a gentile to perform a melakha de-orayta), to avoid a substantial financial loss, for purposes of a mitzva, for some other dire need, and for hosting unexpected guests.

As we mentioned, Halakha permits performing a melakha through a gentile for a sick person. In this context, it should be noted that Chazal consider everybody "sick" when it comes to very cold temperatures – "ha-kol cholim heim eitzel tzina." Therefore, if a building is very cold, even if none of its occupants is sick, a gentile may be asked to turn on the heat. Rav Yitzchak Weiss, in his "Minchat Yitzchak" (3:23-24, cited in Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhata, chapter 30, note 29), applies this rule to severe heat, as well. On a very hot day, if people experience considerable discomfort, one may ask a gentile to turn on a fan or air conditioner. Rav Shemuel Eliezer Stern of Bnei-Brak, however, in his "Shevivei Eish" on Parashat Bo, considers it a "davar pashut" (simple and obvious fact) that this provision does not apply to heat. Although people might experience terrible discomfort as a result of hot conditions, this discomfort does not qualify as an "illness" the way very cold conditions do. Therefore, in his view, it is forbidden to ask a gentile to turn on an air conditioner on Shabbat.

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Over the last two days, we have discussed the prohibition of "amira le-nokhri," forbidding one to ask a gentile to perform for him on Shabbat or Yom Tov activities forbidden on these days. We saw that this prohibition may have origins, or at least an allusion, in a verse in Parashat Bo (Rashi, 12:16).

Yesterday, we briefly listed a number of situations in which it is permitted to ask a gentile – even directly and explicitly – to perform melakha on Shabbat and Yom Tov, one of them being "le-tzorekh mitzva de-rabbim" – for purposes of public mitzva performance. Thus, for example, one may ask a gentile to fix an eiruv on Shabbat, or to turn on the lights in the Bet Kenesset to enable the congregation to conduct services there on Shabbat or Yom Tov.

Rav Herschel Shachtar, in his work, "Be-ikvei Ha-tzon" (chapter 11), raises the issue of whether this halakha would permit submitting ads in Saturday editions of newspapers announcing mitzva-related events to be held later in the week. For example, can someone instruct the paper to publish in the Saturday edition an announcement of a Torah gathering, memorial service, or tzedaka appeal? At first glance, we should apply the aforementioned rule that amira le-nokhri is allowed for purposes of public mitzva performance.

However, as Rav Shachtar claims, this might depend on the precise nature of this halakha. In theory, we can define this halakha in one of two ways. The first approach would claim that when a public mitzva is prevented because of the need to perform melakha on Shabbat or Yom Tov, we confront a conflict of interests: the mitzva at hand is opposed, so-to-speak, by the prohibition of amira le-nokhri. In such a case, Halakha determines that the immense significance of public performance of mitzvot outweighs the rabbinically-ordained prohibition of amira le-nokhri. Alternatively, however, one might claim that no conflict of interest arises at all. Rather, when Chazal instituted the prohibition of amira le-nokhri, from the outset they never included within the scope of this law situations of tzorekh mitzva de-rabbim. It is not that we face a conflict requiring resolution; rather, Chazal initially left situations of public mitzva performance outside the range of amira le-nokhri.

The practical difference between these two understandings is whether or not we apply in these cases the guidelines of "dechiya" ("overriding") with which we are familiar from other areas of halakha. For example, Rav Yitzchak Eizik Chaver (cited in Pitchei Te, O.C. 276) argued that one may not instruct a gentile to perform a melakha to enable public Torah study. He bases his ruling on the fact that although we generally exempt someone involved in a mitzva from other mitzvot ("oseik be-mitzva patur min ha-mitzva"), this does not apply to Torah study: a person involved in Torah study is not exempt from other mitzvot. (This is not always the case, but a full discussion of this issue requires independent treatment.) The reason for this distinction is that one must study Torah with the intent of practically observing it; Torah learning therefore cannot excuse one from involving himself in other mitzvot. Hence, Rav Chaver argues, Torah learning does not have the capacity to override amira le-nokhri, either, and we therefore cannot instruct a gentile to perform a melakha to enable public Torah study. The Orchot Chayim, however, disagrees, and extends the public mitzva rule even to Torah study.

This argument likely results from the different perspectives presented earlier. Rav Yitzchak Eizik Chaver clearly held that a situation of a public mitzva involves a conflict of interests, with the public mitzva enjoying the upper hand over amira le-nokhri. This rule therefore does not apply to Torah learning, which does not have the ability to override other mitzvot. The Orchot Chayim, by contrast, presumably felt that Chazal never included situations of public mitzva performance under the prohibition of amira le-nokhri, and amira le-nokhri is therefore permitted even for purposes of public learning.

Similarly, Rav Shachtar contends, these two approaches will yield different rulings concerning our question. If we deal here with a conflict between a public mitzva and amira le-nokhri, then it stands to reason that the public mitzva overrides amira le-nokhri only on Shabbat itself. Rav Shachtar compares this case to the situation of a conflict between a mitzvat asei and a mitzvat lo ta'aseh. Halakha states that an asei overrides a lo ta'aseh, but only if the lo ta'aseh is to be violated at the time of the asei's performance. One may not, however, violate a lo ta'aseh in order to fulfill a mitzva asei at some later point. Here, too, one would not be permitted to violate the law of amira le-nokhri to enable a public mitzva performance at some point later on in the week. If, however, we adopt the Orchot Chayim's position, that amira le-nokhri was never meant to include situations of public mitzvot, then this limitation presumably does not apply, and it would therefore be permissible to instruct a paper to run the ad for purposes of a public mitzva to be performed later that week.

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Among the laws of the korban pesach outlined in Parashat Bo is the prohibition known as "notar." The Torah writes, "You shall not leave any of it [the sacrificial meat] over until morning; if any of it is left until morning, you shall burn it" (12:10). The Torah forbids leaving over meat of the korban pesach until the next morning, and should any meat be left over, it must be burned. The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (24b) cites "Tana De-bei Chizkiya" as noting the apparent redundancy in the second half of the verse. Once we are told, "You shall not leave any of it over until morning," the second clause of the verse could have easily said, "if any of it is left, you shall burn it." Why did the verse specify, "if any of it is left UNTIL MORNING"? Once the verse already established the following morning as the deadline for eating the korban pesach, obviously the obligation to burn the leftovers begins in the morning! Tana De-bei Chizkiya therefore explain that "ad boker" ("until morning") was added to indicate that the time for burning notar begins not the morning following the consumption of the korban pesach, meaning, the morning of the fifteenth of Nissan, but rather the morning of the next day – the sixteenth of Nissan. According to this view, it is here where the Torah informs us of the halakha, "Ein sorfin kodshim be-Yom Tov" – it is forbidden on Yom Tov to burn sacrificial meat requiring burning. Although burning notar constitutes a Torah obligation, it does not override the prohibition against burning on Yom Tov.

Rava, cited in the same Gemara, derives this halakha from a different verse in Parashat Bo: "no work at all shall be done on them [Yamim Tovim]; only what every person is to eat, that alone may be done for you." This verse establishes the famous halakha of "okhel nefesh," permitting melakha on Yom Tov for purposes of preparing food. But Rava observes that the word "levado" ("alone") seems superfluous. He therefore explains that this word alludes to the fact that certain mitzvot involving melakha cannot be performed on Yom Tov. Specifically, those mitzvot which do not have to be performed on that day may not be performed on Yom Tov. Thus, for example, although an eight-day old boy may have a berit on Yom Tov (despite the melakha involved), somebody requiring a berit mila after the eighth day may not have it performed on Yom Tov, since it need not be performed specifically that day. Similarly, Rava comments, the burning of notar need not be done on Yom Tov; it can wait until the following day. Thus, one may not burn kodshim on Yom Tov.

Both Tana De-bei Chizkiya and Rava agree, however, that in principle, the mitzva of burning notar should, in fact, override the prohibition of Yom Tov. According to both views, we would not have delayed the burning of notar until after Yom Tov if the Torah had not given us a special indication to this effect, either through the clause, "ad boker" or through the word "levado."

The question, however, arises as to the necessity of deriving this halakha in this manner. After all, as Rav Ashi, cited there in the Gemara, comments, a well-established principle in Halakha says that a mitzvat asei cannot override a combination of a mitzvat asei and lo ta'aseh. Meaning, if a given mitzvat asei entails the violation of both another mitzvat asei as well as a lo ta'aseh, it is suspended. Generally, a mitzvat asei has the capacity to override a lo ta'aseh. It does not, however, have the strength to override both another asei and a lo ta'aseh. Now when it comes to Yom Tov, there is both a mitzvat asei to observe Yom Tov, as well as a lo ta'aseh forbidding its violation. Clearly, then, one may not fulfill the mitzva of burning notar on Yom Tov at the expense of the asei and lo ta'aseh which forbid burning on Yom Tov. Why, then, do Tana De-bei Chizkiya and Rava derive this halakha from verses in the Torah? Does this not flow directly from this famous rule, that an asei does not override a combination of an asei and lo ta'aseh?

One simple explanation stems naturally from a theory posited by the Riva (one of the Rishonim) in his comments to Masekhet Pesachim (47). The Riva claimed that in a situation where an asei conflicts with both an asei and lo ta'aseh, the lone asei retains its power to override the conflicting lo ta'aseh. However, although the lo ta'aseh is neutralized, the conflicting asei prevents the first asei from taking effect. But, the Riva claims, if someone does not follow the halakha, and violates the conflicting asei and lo ta'aseh in order to fulfill the first asei, he does not receive malkot for having transgressed the lo ta'aseh. Since the lo ta'aseh was neutralized by the first asei, he is not considered as having violated the lo ta'aseh, despite the fact that he acted incorrectly.

Perhaps Tana De-bei Chizkiya and Rava followed this view of the Riva. Consequently, although it is understood that the mitzva of burning notar would not override the prohibitions of Yom Tov, we would have thought that one who nevertheless burns the notar on Yom Tov would not receive malkot. Since the asei of burning notar neutralizes the lo ta'aseh forbidding the performance of melakha on Yom Tov, why would the violator receive malkot? Tana De-vei Chizkiya and Rava therefore felt compelled to search for a textual basis for the prohibition against burning kodshim on Yom Tov, to establish that one even receives malkot should he burn the kodshim at the eof the asei and lo ta'aseh of Yom Tov.

(Rav Ashi, who does not base this prohibition on a verse, and feels content deriving it from the principle of "ein asei docheh lo ta'aseh va-asei," perhaps sides with the position of "Rav Yosef Mei-Eretz Yisrael," cited in Tosefot in Masekhet Kiddushin 34a, that in such a situation, the single asei has no effect on the conflicting lo ta'aseh.)

(Taken from Rav Hersh Ya'ar, "Chamudei Tzvi," Parashat Bo)

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In Parashat Bo, Moshe foresees the time when "your children will ask you: What is this service to you?" (12:26). As we know from the Haggada, Chazal interpreted this verse as referring to the wicked son who poses his question with derision and scorn, rather than out of a sincere desire for knowledge and instruction. But according to one view in the Mekhilta, the situation is even worse than that. This view reads the verse to mean that "Benei Yisrael were given terrible news at this moment – that the Torah will ultimately be forgotten from Israel." Latent within Moshe's prediction is a warning to Benei Yisrael that they will one day forget the Torah. But where in this verse did Chazal detect such a dreadful prognosis? To the contrary, this verse shows that even the wicked children among Benei Yisrael will express some interest in their tradition and heritage!

The corresponding passage in the Midrash Lekach Tov indicates that the children's withdrawal from the customs and traditions of their parents spells doom for the continued observance of the Torah. By asking, "What is this service to you," the wicked son expresses his exclusion from this service, he makes it clear that the service is only for the previous generation, and not at all for him. When this feeling becomes prevalent among the Jewish people, then indeed, the Torah will soon enough be forgotten, Heaven forbid.

Rav Simcha Bunim Sofer (son of the Ketav Sofer), however, in his "Sha'arei Simcha," suggests an entirely different understanding of this Midrash. He claims that the objection of the wicked son is expressed most clearly not through the word "lakhem" – "to you," but rather in the term "avoda." The simplest reading of this word is that it means "service," referring to the Pesach seder. But "avoda" also means arduous labor. The wicked son has lost all interest in the mitzvot and views it as nothing more than "avoda," as a burden on his shoulders. He feels no excitement or enthusiasm towards Torah and mitzvot. The Sha'arei Simcha thus explains this Mekhilta as warning that this kind of spiritless attitude towards Torah observance will naturally result in the ultimate disappearance, God forbid, of the mitzvot. Am Yisrael cannot possibly perpetuate its laws and traditions without the joy and enthusiasm that has traditionally characterized our people's approach to the mitzvot. Moshe thus warns Benei Yisrael that should they reach the point where the younger generation approaches the mitzvot as an "avoda," where the Torah is observed strictly out of a sense of obligation, without any excitement or feeling, then the seeds are sown for the eventual disappearance of Torah, God forbid, from the Jewish people.

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Yesterday, we discussed the verse in Parashat Bo foreseeing the question posed by Benei Yisrael's children concerning the Pesach rituals, "What is this service to you?" (12:26). As we know from the Pesach Haggada, Chazal understood this as referring specifically to the wicked son, who objects to, rather than inquires about, the rituals and laws observed by his parents.

A novel approach to understanding precisely what the wicked son asks is suggested by Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen, in his Meshekh Chokhma. He bases his explanation on the context of this verse. In the verses immediately preceding this question, Moshe instructs the people to slaughter the korban pesach on the night of the Exodus and place the blood on their door-posts and lintels, so that God will see the blood and pass over their homes as He kills the firstborn of Egypt. Moshe then adds, "You shall observe this as an institution for all time, for you and for your descendants…. " It is regarding this "institution" that the wicked son asks, "What is this service to you?" But we know that the "institution" of placing the blood on the door-posts does not apply for all generations; needless to say, we do not observe this practice today. It was intended only for the initial Pesach observed in Egypt, due to the particular need for Benei Yisrael to be saved from the "destroyer" during the plague of the firstborn. To what, then, does Moshe refer when he speaks of this "institution" observed "for all times," about which the wicked son poses his challenge?

According to Rav Meir Simcha, this blood ritual does, in fact, apply in future generations, in the form of "zerikat ha-dam" – the sprinkling of the blood on the altar after slaughtering the sacrifice. Rav Meir Simcha notes that nowhere throughout Chumash do we ever find explicit mention of zerikat ha-dam for the korban pesach, as we find regarding all other korbanot. The reason, he explains, is that the obligation of zerikat ha-dam is mentioned here, in Parashat Bo; it is to this that Moshe refers when he instructs, "You shall observe this as an institution for all time." The placing of the blood on the doorframe serves as the precursor, if you will, to the mitzva of zerikat ha-dam.

And it is to this institution the wicked son objects when he bellows, "What is this service to you?" He is not bothered by the celebration of Pesach, by the obligation to conduct a feast commemorating our release from slavery and emergence as a free nation. Every nation observes a holiday celebrating its independence. But the wicked son does not understand – or does not wish to understand – the obligation of zerikat ha-dam, the requirement that one sprinkle the animal's blood upon the altar before the meat becomes permissible for consumption. Why, he asks, must we delay our celebration? Why does our day of festivities begin with a solemn expression of sacrifice to God?

The answer, as the Torah formulates it, is, "It is the pesach sacrifice to the Lord, because He passed over the houses of the Israelites in Egypt when He smote the Egyptians, but saved our houses." We sprinkle the blood because we celebrate not our own triumph, but rather the Hand of God that brought us from bondage to freedom. Our celebrations may not resemble other peoples' commemoration of independence, because we celebrate not merely our freedom, but our close relationship with God manifest through the process of the Exodus. We therefore refrain from partaking of our celebration offering before we first symbolically pay homage to the Almighty for freeing us from bondage and taking us as His nation.

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