The Israel Koschitzky Virtual
Beit Midrash
Surf A Little
Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion
PARASHAT YITRO
Rav David Silverberg
Towards the end of Parashat Yitro, God presents to Moshe a number of
commands relevant to the altar upon which Benei Yisrael would
bring sacrificial offerings. In one
verse He declares, "And if you make for Me a stone altar, do not build them from
hewn stone" (20:22). Rashi comments that although God employs here the
conditional form "if you make for Me" He does not refer to an optional
construction of an altar. As we
read in Sefer Devarim (27:6), Benei Yisrael will be required to construct a stone altar at
The obvious question arises, if God indeed refers here to a mandatory construction of a stone altar, why does He speak as though it is voluntary? If He means "when," why does He employ the term "if"?
Rav Moshe Feinstein, in Derash Moshe, suggests that this formulation
alludes to the importance of observing this command as though it were optional,
with zeal and fervor, rather than strictly out of a sense of duty and
obligation. Stone often symbolizes
permanence and consistency, and thus the construction of a stone altar conveys
the message that the theme of "sacrifice" which is, of course, what an altar
embodies must be established as a permanent feature of our religious
lifestyle. Living a Torah life
means being prepared to forego on a degree of comfort, convenience and luxury;
it requires sacrificing a portion of one's time, energies and resources. By commanding Benei Yisrael to
construct a stone altar as they cross the
This verse in Parashat Yitro adds that Benei Yisrael should not look upon this need for "sacrifice" as purely an obligation, a necessity, a burden they are to bear. Rather, "if you make for Me a stone altar..." These sacrifices must be looked upon as a privilege, an opportunity to serve and draw closer to God. While we of course must see ourselves as bound by the Torah's laws, we must also approach them as a gift and privilege. This is particularly so, Rav Moshe claims, with regard to the element of "sacrifice," which is often met with begrudging acceptance, rather than joy and excitement. God therefore formulated this command as an option, to remind us to accept the sacrifices entailed by Torah observance lovingly and enthusiastically, and not as merely a burdensome load on our shoulders.
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Towards the beginning of Parashat Yitro, we read of Yitro's reaction upon
hearing from his son-in-law, Moshe, about the miracles God performed for Benei Yisrael: "Va-yichad Yitro" (18:9). Although the word va-yichad is generally understood as a reference to
joy, one view cited by the Gemara (Sanhedrin 94a)
associates it with the word chad, or "sharp." According to this reading, Yitro's
"flesh became pricked" when he heard of the catastrophes that God visited upon
the Egyptians. Although he had
rejected his pagan past and committed himself to the monotheistic beliefs of
Benei Yisrael, he had yet to overcome his emotional
identification with
From the perspective of syntax, this reading seems very difficult to
accept. Even if we concede that
va-yichad could refer to distress and sorrow, this
reading does not appear to accommodate the subsequent clause: "va-yichad Yitro al kol
ha-tova asher asa Hashem le-Yisrael." However one translates va-yichad, this reaction was triggered by Yitro's
hearing of "all the good that the Lord had done for
The work Yeshu'ot Molkho suggested that in truth, this view accepts
the straightforward interpretation of the word va-yichad, as a derivative of the word chedva, joy.
However, the Yeshu'ot Molkho explained, the different Hebrew terms for "joy"
(simcha, sasson,
and chedva) refer to different kinds of
experiences. Chedva, he claims, denotes a feeling of joy that
one must struggle to experience, given the sorrowful circumstances he
confronts. This understanding of
the term chedva emerges from a verse in Sefer Nechemya (8:10), which tells of the gathering held in
Here, too, va-yichad perhaps
refers to Yitro's inner struggle upon hearing of the Egyptians' defeat. He felt torn by his past loyalty to
Thus, although the Gemara speaks of va-yichad (according to this view) in reference to the word chad, sharp, this is but a secondary, homiletic reading. In truth, this view is based upon the precise meaning of the word chedva, which refers to a very specific experience of joy the joy that one experiences contrary to his instinctive, emotional response to the situation at hand.
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We read in Parashat Yitro of the establishment of a network of judges to assist Moshe in tending to the nation's judicial needs. Yitro, Moshe's father-in-law, initiated the plan and described his intention as follows: "They [the additional judges] shall judge the people at all times, and every major matter they shall bring to you [Moshe], whereas every minor matter they themselves shall judge" (18:22). Yitro's vision was for Moshe to preside over only the "major" cases, and allow the lower circuit judges to deal with the "minor" issues.
Several verses later, however, when the Torah tells of Moshe's implementation of Yitro's plan, we find a slight, but significant, shift in terminology: "They would judge the nation at all times; the difficult matter they would bring to Moshe, and every minor matter they would judge themselves" (18:26). In this verse, we are told that every "difficult" case would be brought to Moshe, as opposed to the previous verse, which speaks of every "major" case being referred to Moshe.
A number of writers, including the Torah Temima and Menachem Tziyon, commented that this shift reflects the difference between the Torah and other legal systems in terms of attitude towards the judiciary process. Yitro, who of course came from the pagan world, figured that the "major" cases, those involving larger sums of money or matters of national importance, should be reserved for Moshe. The less financially or communally consequential issues would be addressed by the lower judges, whose halakhic expertise was considerably less than Moshe's. In implementing the plan, however, Moshe chose a different approach. Whether he or a lower judge would preside over the case was determined solely by difficulty, and not by "consequence." According to Jewish law, cases involving small sums of money are treated with equal importance as those dealing with larger sums. Halakha recognizes the pursuit of truth and the arrival at an accurate decision as an intrinsic value, and thus the amount of money involved in a given case does not affect its importance. Cases that were "major" in the sense of involving large sums did not require Moshe's adjudication; these disputes could just as easily be settled by the lower judges, as they were deemed no more "important" than the cases involving lower sums. Moshe's expertise was required only for arbitrating the "difficult" cases, when the law was not immediately obvious, regardless of the sum of money involved.
TUESDAY
The opening section of Parashat Yitro tells of the arrival of Moshe's
father-in-law, Yitro, to the Israelite camp, and the warm reception he receives
from Moshe and the other leaders of Benei
Yisrael.
After describing the festivities held in honor of Yitro's arrival, the
Torah writes that on "the following day," Yitro observed Moshe presiding alone
over the nation's legal disputes, and advised that he appoint a judicial network
to assist him in judging the people.
The Mekhilta comments that by the term
"the following day" (mi-machorat), the Torah
refers to the day following Yom Kippur, after Moshe's final descent from
We find different approaches taken by the commentators in understanding this comment of the Mekhilta. Rashi (18:13) appears to adopt the straightforward reading of the Mekhilta, whereby it interprets the word "the following day" as referring to the day following Moshe's final descent from Mount Sinai on Yom Kippur. Even though neither the day of Yom Kippur nor Moshe's descent from the mountain is mentioned anywhere in this section, the Mekhilta felt compelled to explain "the following day" as a reference to Yom Kippur. The Ramban, by contrast, insists that the Mekhilta does not depart from the simple meaning of this verse, according to which the appointment of judges occurred on the day following the previously recorded event, namely, Yitro's arrival at the Israelite camp. The Mekhilta intends to clarify that this entire section both Yitro's arrival and the appointment of judges appears out of chronological sequence, and in fact took place after Yom Kippur, several months after Ma'amad Har Sinai.
A particularly novel reading of this passage in the Mekhilta is cited in the Peirush Ha-Tur. According to this approach, when the
Mekhilta mentions "Yom Ha-kippurim," it does not refer to the day of Yom Kippur at
all. Rather, the Mekhilta refers to Yitro's personal "day of kippurim," the day on which he offered the sacrifices
required of a new convert to Judaism.
(The term kippurim is often used in
reference to sacrifices, as in the halakhic term
"mechusar kippurim," which means a person who requires a sacrifice
to complete his process of purification.)
The preceding verse (18:12) tells that Yitro offered sacrifices upon his
arrival, which the Ramban understands as the
sacrifices required of a convert.
Hence, when the Mekhilta interprets the term "the following day" as
referring to
"the day following Yom Ha-kippurim,"
it means the day following Yitro's personal "day of atonement," the day on which
he offered sacrifices in completion of the conversion
process.
Of course, this approach is difficult to accept for a number of
reasons. Primarily, even if we
could accept the reading of the term "Yom Ha-kippurim"
as a reference to Yitro's sacrifices, we must question why the Mekhilta would make such a comment. As mentioned, the verse that tells of
Moshe's judging the nation on "the following day" appears immediately after the
verse that tells of Yitro's sacrifices.
What, then, might the Mekhilta seek to add by emphasizing that Moshe's
judging the nation took place on the day following Yitro's sacrifices, which in
any event is the straightforward implication of the verses? It is indeed quite difficult to explain
how exactly the Tur understood the intent of this comment of
the Mekhilta.
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The opening section of Parashat Yitro tells of Yitro's arrival in the Israelite camp and the warm reception given to him by Moshe and the other leaders of Benei Yisrael. Yitro's relationship with Am Yisrael yielded benefits many centuries for his descendants, who were known as the Keini. When King Shaul prepared to wage war against Amalek, as the prophet Shemuel had commanded, he delivered a message to the Keini, who resided near or among the Amalekites, asking them to evacuate and thereby be spared the effects of the imminent war: "Go, move away, go down from the Amalekites, lest I destroy you with them" (Shemuel I 15:6). Shaul then explained why he showed such concern for the Keini: "and you acted kindly towards all Benei Yisrael."
What kindness did the Keini or their ancestor, Yitro perform "towards all Benei Yisrael"?
Rashi there explains, "For Moshe, Aharon and
all the elders of
The Maharsha, commenting on Masekhet Berakhot, notes the
obvious difficulty with Rashi's interpretation,
namely, that from the verses it appears that Yitro was hosted by Moshe, Aharon
and the elders, and not that he hosted them. How did Yitro perform kindness with
Benei Yisrael
by sitting to eat with the nation's leaders? The Maharsha
therefore explains this verse differently, as referring to Yitro's invitation to
Moshe back in Midyan, when Moshe fled from
To explain Rashi's interpretation, Rav Kasher draws our attention to
a passage in the work Moshav Zekeinim (a compendium of commentaries from the
Tosafists) which comments that Yitro, who was a
wealthy man, brought a substantial amount of food with him when he joined
Benei Yisrael in the wilderness. As a foreigner, Yitro was not granted a
daily portion of manna together with Benei Yisrael, and he therefore brought food with him
when he left his home. (It should
be noted that other sources state explicitly that Yitro indeed received manna;
see Torah Sheleima to
18:5.) The Moshav Zekeinim adds that many people among Benei Yisrael, who at that point subsisted solely on
manna, desired regular food, and Yitro shared his supply of goods with the
people. Rav Kasher speculates that the
author of this passage perhaps based this theory on some Midrashic passage that has since been lost. If this is the case, then Rashi may have likewise seen this theory in an earlier
source, and on this basis understood that Yitro actually hosted Benei Yisrael,
contrary to the instinctive reading of the verse. Accordingly, he understood that it was
here, when Yitro visited Benei Yisrael, that he "acted kindly towards all Benei Yisrael."
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In Parashat Yitro, the Torah tells of Moshe's designation of judges to assist him in shouldering the burden of Benei Yisrael's judicial needs. The Torah describes the role of judges as, "Ve-shafetu et ha-am be-khol eit" "They shall judge the people at all times" (18:22,26). The Mekhilta De-Rashbi comments on this verse, "The verse speaks of monetary cases [as opposed to capital cases], for they are judged according to Torah on all days; according to the laws of the Rabbis, they are not judged on Erev Shabbat." The term be-khol eit, "at all times," emphasizes that courts may convene (at least for monetary cases) on every day of the week; Chazal, however, enacted that courts should not convene on Erev Shabbat. Presumably, as the Radbaz explains (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 11:3), this enactment was intended as a means of preserving the honor of Shabbat.
Rav Menachem Kasher, in his Torah Sheleima (to 18:22), raises the question of why the Mekhilta De-Rashbi found it necessary to cite a Biblical source to instruct that courts may convene on Erev Shabbat. After all, judging even on Shabbat itself is permissible on the level of Torah law. The Mishna in Masekhet Beitza (36b) lists judgment among other Shabbat prohibitions enacted by Chazal, and the Rambam (Hilkhot Shabbat 23:14) explains this enactment in light of the concern that the judges may come to write, in violation of Shabbat. Seemingly, if even on Shabbat the Torah permits courts to convene, it would certainly allow judging on all other days of the week, as well, and it therefore appears unnecessary to search for a subtle indication that judging is permitted all week long.
Rav Kasher answers
this question based on another passage in the Mekhilta De-Rashbi,
in Parashat Vayakhel. The Mekhilta De-Rashbi
there asserts that all legal proceedings conducted by a Beit Din fall
under the category of melakha (activity
forbidden on Shabbat). It cites as
proof a verse from Sefer Divrei Hayamim I (26:29), which refers to the work of the judges
and law enforcers of the Yitzhar family of Levi'im with the term melakha.
This passage strongly suggests that in the view of the Mekhilta De-Rashi, as opposed to the aforementioned Mishna in Masekhet Beitza, judging on Shabbat indeed constitutes a Torah
violation. This may help explain
why it searched for a proof-text for the permissibility of trying cases on all
other days of the week.
However, as Rav Kasher acknowledges, while the view of the Mekhilta De-Rashbi can be explained, the Rambam's comments on this issue remain difficult to understand. In Hilkhot Sanhedrin (11:3), the Rambam cites the passage from the Mekhilta De-Rashbi here in Parashat Yitro, pointing to the verse "They shall judge the people at all times" as the source for allowing a Beit Din to convene on all days of the week. Yet, in Hilkhot Shabbat (23:14), as mentioned earlier, the Rambam explicitly presents the prohibition against judging on Shabbat as a law enacted by the Sages to safeguard against writing. According to the Rambam, then, it seems difficult to understand why a verse is necessary to permit trying cases on all days of the week.
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The haftara for Parashat Yitro is taken
from the sixth chapter of Sefer Yeshayahu, which tells
of what appears to be Yeshayahu's inaugural prophecy,
in which he beheld the site of angelic beings declaring the sanctity of God
("Kadosh, kadosh,
kadosh
").
Yeshayahu responds to this awesome sight by
exclaiming, "Oy li
ki nidmeiti" (6:5). Rashi, citing
as a proof-text a verse from Sefer Tzefanya (1:11),
explains this phrase to mean, "Woe unto me, for I shall die," claiming that the
word nidmeiti refers to death. Metzudat Tziyon, who follows this translation, explains
that the word nidmeiti evolves from the root d.m.m., which means "silence." He contends that this word is poetically
used in reference to death because a deceased person is speechless and
inanimate.
The Radak cites a different understanding of
this verse in the name of his father, who claimed that Yeshayahu refers here to silence in the literal sense. Upon witnessing the angels' unified
declaration of "Kadosh, kadosh," the prophet lamented his inability to
participate, bemoaning, "Woe unto me, that I must be silent," adding "for I am a
man of impure lips, and I reside among a nation of impure lips." Yeshayahu
recognized that his personal shortcomings prevented him from participating in
the angels' declaration until, as we read in the next verse, one of the angels
placed a simmering coal upon his lips as a symbol of his
purification.
The Maggid of Dubno,
in his commentary to the haftarot entitled Kokhav Mi-Yaakov, suggests an entirely different reading of
the word nidmeiti, associating it with the Hebrew word for
imagination dimayon.
When Yeshayahu beheld the angels giving praise
to the Almighty with such sincerity and purity, untarnished by the distractions
and moral failings of human beings, he suddenly realized how delusional his
self-assessment had been all along.
He had felt fairly confident in his spiritual achievements and standing
until he witnessed the heavenly angels proclaiming God's sanctity. At that point, he acknowledged that "I
am a man of impure lips, and I reside among a nation of impure lips." Whatever accomplishments he and his
people had to their credit came nowhere near the holiness and purity of the
heavenly angels. The Dubno Maggid drew an analogy to
the rabbi of a small, village community who had little halakhic training, but knew enough to supervise the
synagogue services and answer basic questions of Jewish practice that would
occasionally arise. He felt proud
of his position of rabbinic leadership until he one day visited a major center
of Jewish life and met with the community's rabbis. His encounter with leading, first rate
Talmudic scholars and halakhic authorities humbled
this rabbi and forced him to acknowledge the limits of his own credentials. Similarly, Yeshayahu's prophecy brought him to the unsettling
realization of his shortcomings and of how much room there was for growth and
improvement.
We conclude with the comments of Rav Avraham Pam regarding the Dubno
Maggid's interpretation of this verse (cited in Rabbi
Shalom Smith's The Pleasant
Way):
The powerful message of the navi Yeshayah's words
need constant study. A person can
easily fool himself into thinking that the little knowledge that he has acquired
in his yeshivah years is enough to carry him through life
and there is no need to grow further.
This is a tragic mistake. A
person must constantly strive to grow higher and higher in Torah knowledge and
Divine service. In fact, the more
Torah one learns, the more he sees how little he really knows. He realizes that even after a lifetime
of learning, he has only scratched the surface of the infinite wisdom of Hashem contained in the Torah. This humbling thought, of being forced
to come to the bitter conclusion of oy li ki nidmeiti, should prod us on to more Torah
achievements and improvements in our mitzvah observance and service of Hashem.