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The fourth of the Ten Commandments involves the mitzva of Shabbat: "Remember the day of Shabbat to sanctify it" (Shemot 20:8). The Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim (106a) derives from this verse the obligation kiddush: "zokhrehu al ha-yayin" (remember it over wine). This would suggest that kiddush over wine on Shabbat constitutes a Biblical obligation. Indeed, Rashi in Masekhet Berakhot (20b) and the Ran there in Pesachim claim that the recitation of kiddush over wine on Friday night is obligated by Torah law. (Kiddush on Shabbat morning is clearly only rabbinic in origin.) By contrast, the Rambam, in Hilkhot Shabbat 29:6, distinguishes between the recitation of kiddush per se and the requirement of wine. The Torah obligation requires only the recitation of kiddush; by rabbinic enactment, one must conduct this recitation over wine. This follows the comment of the Mekhilta on our verse, which, unlike the Gemara in Pesachim, understands the verse to mean, "zakhrehu bi-vrakha" - recall Shabbat with a berakha. Whereas the Gemara in Pesachim derived from this verse a requirement of kiddush over wine, the Mekhilta interprets it as introducing merely the recitation itself. This is the accepted view, that kiddush itself is required by Torah law, while the requirement of wine is mi-derabbanan (Magen Avraham 271:1; Sha'agat Aryeh 60).

This halakha gives rise to an interesting (and quite famous) question raised by many Acharonim. In Jewish homes throughout the world, the husband returns home from arvit on Shabbat eve and recites kiddush on behalf of his wife and children. Now the arvit service on Leil Shabbat includes the berakha of "Mekadesh ha-Shabbat," which presumably fulfills the Biblical requirement of kiddush. As such, the husband fulfills his Torah requirement in the synagogue and must now observe only the rabbinic obligation of kiddush over wine. If, however, his wife has not recited arvit, she must fulfill her Torah obligation, as well. (When it comes to the halakhot of Shabbat, halakha does not distinguish between men and women.) Now the general principle is that one can fulfill an obligation on behalf of another only if they both share an equal level of obligation. Someone who is included in a given obligation as a result of rabbinic enactment cannot fulfill that obligation on behalf of someone else who is bound by Torah law. How, then, can the husband in our case fulfill his wife's obligation of kiddush on her behalf?

Perhaps the most straightforward answer would be to employ the halakhic principle of "yatza motzi." This means that a person can fulfill an obligation on behalf of another even if he himself had already executed his obligation. For example, a person can walk to a hospital on Rosh Hashanah to blow shofar on behalf of the Jewish patients (Rachamana li-tzlan) who could not attend services, even if he had already fulfilled his personal obligation. Here, too, the husband may recite kiddush on his wife's behalf and fulfill her Torah obligation even though he already fulfilled the Torah level of his requirement. However, the Dagul Mei-revava - siman 271 - questions the application of the "yatza motzi" provision to our case. (In short, he raises the possibility that this provision is based on the halakhic concept of "arvut," which may not apply to women. Rabbi Akiva Eiger, in responsum 7, argues that with regard to halakhot applicable to women, they are certainly included in "arvut," as well.)

One famous answer to this question is based on the ruling of Rabbi Akiva Eiger in his glosses on the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 271). He claims that one fulfills his Torah obligation of kiddush not only with the recitation of the berakha, "Mekadesh ha-Shabbat," but even with some casual mention of Shabbat. Even a "Shabbat Shalom" or "Good Shabbos" greeting fulfills the Torah requirement of verbal mention of Shabbat. Therefore, a woman who greets her husband "Shabbat Shalom" upon his return from the Beit Kenesset on Friday night, or who recites one of the several prayers traditionally recited after candle lighting, has fulfilled her Biblical requirement. Therefore, both she and her husband share the same level of obligation, and he may then recite kiddush on her behalf.

The Chatam Sofer (21; 143) suggests a much different answer, that when reciting arvit one does not have in mind to fulfill his Torah obligation of kiddush. Assuming that one cannot fulfill a mitzva if he specifically intends not to during the given activity (an assumption not necessarily agreed upon by all), his Torah obligation remains unfulfilled even after the arvit service.

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Yesterday, we discussed the mitzva of kiddush on Shabbat, which is derived from the fourth of the Ten Commandments: "Remember the day of Shabbat to sanctify it." As we saw, halakha follows the view that the recitation of kiddush constitutes a Biblical obligation, while the requirement for wine with kiddush was enacted by the Sages. Towards the end of yesterday's S.A.L.T., we cited the view that any verbal mention of Shabbat satisfies the Torah obligation. One fulfills this requirement even by extending a "Shabbat Shalom" greeting to another on Friday night.

Some readers may have wondered how this halakha accommodates the passage in the Mekhilta we cited as the source for the Biblical obligation. As opposed to the Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim, which interprets the verse, "Remember the day of Shabbat" as requiring a "mention over wine," the Mekhilta writes, "zokhrehu bi-vrakha" - mention Shabbat with a berakha. It would seem, therefore, that the Torah obligation of kiddush requires the recitation of a formal berakha, as opposed to any casual mention of Shabbat. This question was raised by the Minchat Yehuda (O.C. 1:31). He explains that despite the implication, the Mekhilta could not have referred to the recitation of a formal berakha. He draws a comparison between this mitzva and that of yovel, which requires the High Court to formally declare the fiftieth year as the jubilee year. Just as every individual must verbally "sanctify" Shabbat every week, so is the Court required to declare the fiftieth year "holy" (see Vayikra 25:10). Yet, the halakha requires the Court simply to declare, "Mekudash" ("It is holy"), without any need for the formal context of a berakha. The Minchat Yehuda thus claims that the same standard should apply to the weekly kiddush.

We may, however, raise a possible objection to this comparison. The High Court does not require a formal berakha because the very setting of a session of the Court itself lends formal, halakhic stature to their proclamation. We cannot compare this setting to the synagogue coatroom after services on Leil Shabbat when friends exchange "Shabbat Shalom" or "Good Shabbos" greetings.

The Minchat Yehuda cites more convincing proof from the Rambam's writings. In his Sefer Ha-mitzvot (asei 155), the Rambam lists the mitzva of kiddush and cites the aforementioned passage from the Mekhilta ("zokhrehu bi-vrakha"). Yet, in his Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Shabbat 29:1), he describes the Biblical requirement as an obligation "to sanctify the Shabbat verbally," and later writes, "mention on it matters of Shabbat and sanctity." As the Rambam makes no mention of a need for a formal berakha on the level of Torah obligation, he must have adopted a more liberal interpretation of the Mekhilta, that it did not intend to require specifically the recitation of a berakha. Thus, any verbal mention of Shabbat satisfies the Torah obligation of kiddush.

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As we've discussed over the last two days, Chazal derive the obligation of kiddush from the verse in Parashat Yitro that introduces the fourth of the Ten Commandments: "Remember the day of Shabbat to sanctify it." One issue we have not addressed is how Chazal understood this verse as a reference to verbal mention of Shabbat. (As we ein the previous two editions of S.A.L.T., accordto the accepted views the Torah obligation requires verbal mention of Shabbat; the requirement to recite kiddush specifically over a cup of wine was instituted later, by Chazal.) How can a verse calling upon us to "remember" be interpreted as introducing a requirement to speak about Shabbat?

Apparently, the Biblical verb "z.kh.r.," which we normally translate as "remember," at times denotes verbalization. Several verses appear to yield such a translation. Tehillim 137:6 reads, "Let my tongue stick to my palate - 'im lo ezkereikhi.'" The Psalmist here decrees silence upon his tongue "im lo ezkereikhi," presumably referring to his failure to speak of Jerusalem. It is also worth noting that the Akkadian word "zakaaru" means "to speak." This also explains the Gemara's derivation in Masekhet Megila (18a) of the obligation to verbally mention Amalek's attack on Benei Yisrael. The Gemara there interprets the word "zakhor" (generally, "remember") in the context of Amalek (Devarim 25:17) as referring to an obligation to read about their aggression.

Rav Soloveitchik zt"l suggested that this theory, that "z.kh.r." can denote verbal, rather than mental, recollection, may help explain an enigmatic passage in the Rambam's Mishneh Torah. In Hilkhot Chametz U-matza (beginning of chapter 7), the Rambam writes: "There is a positive mitzva from the Torah to tell of the miracles and wonders that were performed for our forefathers in Egypt on the night of the fifteenth of Nissan, as it says, 'Remember [zakhor] this day on which you left Egypt,' just as it says, 'Remember [zakhor] the Shabbat day.'" Why does the Rambam draw this association between the obligation of retelling the story of the Exodus on Pesach and the mitzva of kiddush? What does he add to his discussion of the laws of Pesach by invoking the mitzva of kiddush? Rav Meir Simcha ha-Kohen of Dvinsk, in his Or Samei'ach, suggests that the Rambam compares the two mitzvot for the purposes of a specific halakhic provision. Just as Chazal instituted the recitation of kiddush over wine, but nevertheless one who does not have wine recites kiddush over bread, so did they require the recitation of the Haggadah (in which we tell the story of the Exodus) over four cups of wine. However, one who does not have wine tells the story over the matza; in this sense, the two mitzvot are parallel to one another. In light of our discussion, however, a somewhat more straightforward answer may emerge. The Rambam invokes the verse of "Zakhor et Yom ha-Shabbat" in the context of Hilkhot Pesach because Chazal understood the word "zakhor" in that verse as referring to verbal recollection. He thus invokes this interpretation as a basis for his reading of the word "zakhor" in the context of the Exodus (Shemot 13:3) as introducing a requirement to verbally tell the story of yetzi'at Mitzrayim at the seder.

(Based on Rav Herschel Shachtar, Nefesh Ha-Rav, pp. 287-8; Rabbi Alan Yuter, "Iyun Be-shitat ha-Rambam be-Din Zekhirat Amalek, Beit Yitzchak - Yeshiva University, vol. 28, p.348.)

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This week we have been discussing the mitzva of kiddush on Shabbat, the Biblical source of which appears in Parashat Yitro (20:8). One well-known halakha relevant to kiddush is the requirement to cover the chalot (loaves of bread) during the recitation of kiddush. Though several reasons have been suggested for this practice (see She'iltot, Yitro 54; Or Zarua, Hilkhot Shabbat 2:22 citing Rav Sherira Gaon), the most famous is perhaps the one cited in the Tur (O.C. 271), which relates this custom to the manna in the wilderness. Placing a cover over the chalot, which sit on the tablecloth covering the table, commemorates the way the manna descended - with a protective layer of dew both above and beneath it. This explanation appears in several sources among the Rishonim. The Avudraham, however, raises what appears to be a convincing argument against this theory. If we are interested in commemorating the manna, why do we do so only on Shabbat? After all, the manna fell every day of the week - and specifically did not fall on Shabbat! Why would we conduct a ritual to commemorate the manna only on Shabbat?

Several Acharonim answer that according to this explanation of the practice to cover the chalot, Benei Yisrael would themselves cover the manna underneath and on top on Shabbat in order to commemorate the fall of the manna during the week. Our covering therefore does not commemorate the manna itself, but rather the ritual observed by Benei Yisrael on Shabbatot in the wilderness - a ritual intended to recall the manna. (Taken from an article by Rav Elyakim Dvorkes.)

The question, then, arises, why did Benei Yisrael feel compelled to institute this ritual on Shabbat? Why did they deem it necessary to recall on Shabbat the double-wrapping of the manna, which did not fall that day?

As the Torah describes in Parashat Beshalach (Shemot 16), any manna saved from one day to the next would spoil. This ensured that Benei Yisrael would attribute their source of nourishment to the Almighty alone. Not only could they not cultivate land and earn their own livelihood, but even that which was given to them could not be put in a savings plan for the future. No personal initiative whatsoever was involved in Benei Yisrael's sustenance in the wilderness (other than their having to trek outside the camp to collect the manna, as discussed last week). The one exception was Shabbat, when Benei Yisrael ate the leftovers from Friday, which they prepared before Shabbat. The Shabbat meals were thus the only food eaten by Benei Yisrael that they could possibly attribute to their own efforts. For this reason, perhaps, they felt it necessary to wrap their Shabbat manna in a manner resembling its original descent from the sky on Friday morning, to demonstrate their awareness of the fact that this food, too, came directly from God Himself.

Appropriately, then, we adopt this same practice with our food on Shabbat. Unlike our forefathers in the wilderness, we work all week for our livelihood. On Shabbat we make the crucial declaration that the true source of all we have is the Almighty. We therefore treat our food like manna, reflecting the fact that despite our initiative in earning a living, ultimately the food we eat comes as a great gift from the heavens - just like the miraculous food in the wilderness.

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Yesterday we discussed the widespread practice of covering the challot during the recitation of kiddush on Shabbat. An interesting question relevant to this custom commonly arises in situations of large Shabbat meals - such as in cafeterias, hotel dining halls, semachot (or "simchas"), Shabbatons, etc. - where every individual or couple has their own "lechem mishneh" (two challot), but only one person recites kiddush on behalf of everyone else. Must only the individual reciting kiddush cover his challot, or does everyone at the table need to cover their own bread, as well?

The halakha in this regard likely hinges on two important issues.

The first issue involves the reason behind this practice. Three reasons have been given for the requirement to cover one's challot during kiddush. As we saw yesterday, the Tur (O.C. 271) mentions that we cover the bread in commemoration of the manna, which would arrive in a double wrapping of dew underneath and on top. The Tur also cites another reason from the Yerushalmi: in order to avoid "embarrassing" the bread. Normally, one begins his meal by reciting the berakha of "ha-motzi" over bread. On Shabbat, however, we begin the meal with kiddush and only then proceed to recite "ha-motzi" and eat bread. We therefore cover the challot, so that the bread does not feel "slighted" by its demotion. (Obviously, bread does not experience humiliation; this halakha most likely seeks to reinforce our sensitivity towards the feeling of others, by requiring sensitivity even to inanimate objects.) Thirdly, the She'iltot (Yitro, 54) explains the practice as a way of showing that the meal is conducted specifically for the honor of Shabbat. By covering the challot, we show that the table is not yet ready for our meal until after we first rekiddush and thereby declare the sanctity of Shabbat.

These different reasons would have practical ramifications for our question. If the covering of the bread seeks to commemorate the manna or have the table look unprepared for the meal before kiddush, then we have no reason to distinguish between the challot of the one reciting kiddush and those of the other participants. All bread on the table would seemingly require covering. On the other hand, if our concern is only for the "humiliation" of the bread in that its berakha is delayed until after kiddush, then covering should be required only for the challot of the one reciting kiddush. As the other participants in the meal do not recite kiddush, their challot would not experience any "embarrassment."

However, another consideration must be taken into account, one which would perhaps require covering of all challot on the tables according to even this reason. When the entire group listens to the recitation of kiddush, they fulfill their obligation through the halakhic mechanism of "shomei'a ke-oneh" - that one who listens can be considered as having personally recited the given text. A classic debate surrounds the precise definition of this principle. One position maintains that halakha actually allows one to "recite" through listening. The listener is technically considered as having himself said the words, even though he has only listened. The more conservative approach holds that halakha grants one the opportunity to fulfill obligations of this sort by listening; we do not consider the listener as having himself recited, but rather allow him to fulfill his obligation by "riding on the back" of the one reciting. (The Bet ha-Levi and Chazon Ish debate this very issue.) If we adopt the first view, that the listener is considered as having personally recited, then we should require every listener to cover his challot, as he is halakhically considered personally reciting kiddush. Indeed, this is the ruling of Rav Chayim Kanievsky of Bnei-Brak, as cited by Rav Efrayim Greenblatt of Memphis, Tennessee (Rivevot Efrayim, 1:20). Other poskim, however, disagree ("Leket Yosher," vol. 1, p.50).

(Based on an article by Rav Elyakim Dvorkes)

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The first section of Parashat Yitro describes the arrival of Moshe's father-in-law after whom the parasha is named, Yitro. The Torah tells that "on the next day," Yitro observes Moshe spending the entire day adjudicating the court cases brought before him by the people. Yitro recommends that Moshe establish a judicial network so that he need not personally preside over every case, and Moshe accepts and implements his father-in-law's advice (18:13-26).

According to Rashi (18:13), this section appears out of chronological sequence. Whereas it appears to have taken place before Matan Torah, in truth it occurred much later. Specifically, Rashi claims, these court cases take place on the day following Yom Kippur, after Moshe had made his final descent from Mount Sinai informing the nation that God had forgiven the sin of the golden calf.

Why on specifically this day are there so many monetary disputes that required Moshe's arbitration? Why only now must Moshe sit "from morning to evening" resolving Benei Yisrael's conflicts?

Rav Yehonatan Eibshitz (in his "Nefesh Yehonatan") suggests that the construction of the mishkan, the orders for which are given that day, necessitate the resolution of all conflicts among the people. As Rashi explains in his opening comments to Parashat Vayakhel, on the day following Yom Kippur Moshe assembles the nation and issues God's instructions concerning the building of the mishkan. Reb Yehonatan explains that the mishkan could not tolerate disunity and strife. Before Benei Yisrael could begin work on the mishkan, the vehicle through which the Shekhina resides among the nation, they must resolve all disputes and settle all arguments. Moshe was therefore called upon to serve as arbiter to bring about peaceful resolutions to all conflicts.

In contemporary Jewish life, religious institutions such as synagogues and schools often become the source of controversy and contention. The ever present claim of sacred motivation when dealing with religious institutions gives rise to bitter disputes and "justified" hostility. This comment by Reb Yehonatan Eibshitz teaches us that precisely the opposite should occur. In order for a religious institution to successfully fill its role in Jewish life, it must be characterized by a sense of harmony and goodwill among all those involved. A sanctuary cannot be built amidst discord and friction; the Shekhina will reside only in a building constructed with genuine love and mutual respect among its builders.

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As we saw yesterday, the Torah towards the beginning of Parashat Yitro describes Moshe spending his entire day presiding over the legal disputes brought before him by the people. His father-in-law, Yitro, who, as we read in the very beginning of the parasha, had recently arrived, suggests that Moshe delegate judicial responsibilities rather than personally attending to each and every case. As discussed, the Torah writes that all this occurred "mi-mochorat," or "the following day" (18:13). According to the simple reading of the text, this incident occurred on the day following Yitro's arrival in the camp of Benei Yisrael. Indeed, this is how many commentators explain - see Ibn Ezra, Chizkuni and Ramban. Rashi, however, in the name of the Mekhilta, claims that this occurred on the day following Moshe's final descent from Mount Sinai on Yom Kippur. It was then that this entire incident took place, when Moshe sat to judge the people.

Many commentators - particularly the Ramban - take strong issue with this claim of Rashi. For a variety of reasons, the Ramban denies the plausibility of this having occurred on the day following Yom Kippur. He therefore claims that Rashi misunderstood the Mekhilta, which, according to the Ramban, meant only that this incident took place some time after Yom Kippur, though not necessarily on that day. The Mekhilta simply points out that practically speaking, this could not have occurred at any point earlier than Yom Kippur. (That period featured Matan Torah, the golden calf and the process of its atonement; Moshe could not have sat in judgment until after all this was completed.) A more basic question on Rashi and the Mekhilta (taking the Mekhilta at face value, that this event indeed occurred the day immediately following Yom Kippur) is, from where did Chazal derive this date? What in the verse gives any indication of this particular day?

Presumably prompted by this question, several writers argue for the emendation of the text of the Mekhilta and/or Rashi. The Peirush ha-Tur claims that the authentic text of the Mekhilta reads, "mochorat yom kappara" - the day following the day of atonement [with lower-case letters], referring to Yitro's personal day of atonement. The day Yitro arrived, he completed his conversion process; the sacrifices he brought, as described in the Torah (18:12; see Meshekh Chokhma there), were the sacrifices required of a convert for his conversion to be completed. ("Atonement" here refers not to atonement for sins, but rather a mandatory offering preparing one for his ascent to a higher level of sanctity. Nowadays, in the absence of the Temple, a convert's conversion process can be completed without bringing the required sacrifice; he must, however, bring this offering when the Mikdash is rebuilt.) Thus, the Mekhilta wished to emphasize that the incident recorded in the Torah of Moshe's judicial duties occurred on the day following Yitro's completion of his conversion process. Rabbi Yaakov of Vienna, in his commentary "Imrei Noam," claims that Rashi's original manuscript also read, "yom kappara," rather than "Yom Kippurim."

However, according to this emendation, the Mekhilta appears to add little, if anything, to the verse. If "the following day" refers to the day after the events judescribed in the Torah, then why must the Mekhilta write anything? Is this not the simple, obvious meaning of the verse? How may we understand this empon Yitro's sacrifices and its relevance to the story of Moshe's judging the people?

The Netziv, in his "He'amek Davar," accepts this reading of the Peirush ha-Tur and briefly explains the meaning of the Mekhilta according to this text. Through his offering of sacrifices, Yitro had hoped to achieve a deeper spiritual insight, particularly as regards God's attribute of justice. He thus sought to understand the Torah's approach to truth and justice. We can therefore readily understand how these offerings directly relate to the incident of Moshe's adjudication of the people. Only as a result of these offerings was Yitro capable of advising Moshe as to the management of the nation's legal system. The Mekhilta wishes to underscore this relationship between Yitro's sacrifices and his advice to Moshe, and therefore stresses, "mi-mochorat yom kappara." (In his commentary to 18:12, the Netziv elaborates more fully on the significance of "olot" and "shelamim" as they relate to the theme of justice; the reader is referred to his comments there for a clearer analysis.)

In any event, Rav Menachem Kasher, in his Torah Sheleima (vol. 15, appendix 4), strongly rejects this rereading of the Mekhilta, and maintains that indeed refers to Yom Kippur itself.

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