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PARASHAT YITRO
By Rav David Silverberg
The Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (116a) cites a famous dispute as to the chronology of the opening section of Parashat Yitro. According to one view, this entire section, which tells of the arrival of Yitro Moshe's father-in-law and his suggestion that Moshe establish a broad-based judicial network, appears out of chronological sequence. In truth, all this occurred later, after the Torah was given. The other view maintains the chronological sequence suggested by the Torah's presentation, whereby Yitro joined Benei Yisrael already before Matan Torah. The Gemara notes that this debate affects a different issue, of whether shelamim sacrifices were offered prior to Matan Torah. The Torah here tells that Yitro offered "ola u-zvachim," which is understood as referring to the two general categories of voluntary sacrifices: the ola sacrifice, which is completely burnt on the altar, and the shelamim, which is shared by the altar, the ministering kohen, and the individual bringing the offering. If this narrative occurred already before Matan Torah, then clearly shelamim offerings were indeed brought before Benei Yisrael received the Torah. Those who maintain that Yitro came only after Matan Torah held that no shelamim offerings were brought before the Torah was given, and thus this incident must have occurred only after that point.
Rashi, in his commentary to this parasha (18:13), imposes a bold qualification onto this debate. He argues that according to both views cited in the Gemara, the latter part of this narrative (verses 13-27), which tells of Yitro's suggestion that Moshe appoint circuit judges, occurred after Matan Torah. Rashi draws proof to his theory from Moshe's comments to Yitro in explaining why he sat the entire day tending to the people's judicial needs: "I make known the laws and teachings of God" (18:16). Rashi contends that Moshe could not possibly speak of "the laws and teachings of God" before these laws were transmitted to him at Sinai. We must conclude, then, that this incident of Yitro's disapproval of Moshe's single-handed adjudication of the people took place after Matan Torah.
As Rashi himself realized, however, this bifurcation of the parasha's opening section appears untenable, in light of the seemingly explicit link drawn between the two alleged subsections. The verse which according to Rashi's reading opens the second subsection begins, "Next day, Moshe sat as magistrate among the people" (18:13). The narrative itself emphasizes that this occurred on the next day, immediately following the previously recorded events surrounding Yitro's arrival. How, then, could Rashi claim that the section beginning with this verse in fact occurred some time later, after Matan Torah?
For this reason, Rashi here cites the Mekhilta's comment that "the next day" refers to "the day following Yom Kippur." As Rashi proceeds to explain at length, once we assume as Rashi does that this subsection could have occurred only after Matan Torah, then the first opportunity Moshe would have had to deal with the people's civil disputes presented itself only after Yom Kippur. For Moshe spent the four months in between Matan Torah (which occurred on approximately the 6th of Sivan) and Yom Kippur (the 10th of Tishrei) atop Mount Sinai. During the first forty days he received the Torah, and during the ensuing eighty days he prayed to God and appealed for mercy on behalf of Benei Yisrael, who had worshipped the golden calf just prior to his initial descent from the mountain on the 17th of Tamuz. Therefore, when the Torah speaks of Moshe sitting to judge the people "the next day," it must refer to the day following his final descent from Mount Sinai, which took place on Yom Kippur. It was on this day, the 11th of Tishrei, that Moshe sat as magistrate and Yitro recommended that he appoint circuit judges to work under him.
At first glance, the Mekhilta's reading of this verse, that "the next day" refers to the day following Yom Kippur, seems very difficult to understand. Nowhere in this narrative does the Torah make any mention of Yom Kippur, or of Moshe's descent from Mount Sinai. How could "the next day" refer to a day which is never mentioned anywhere in the text?
This difficulty gave rise to some attempts at rereading this passage in the Mekhilta. The Peirush Ha-Tur claims that the Mekhilta does not actually mean that this incident occurred on the day following Yom Kippur. Rather, it refers to the day following Yitro's "yom kappara," his personal day of atonement. The previous verse tells of the sacrifices Yitro offered to God upon his arrival in the Israelite camp. According to the Tur, these were the sacrifices required of a convert as part of his conversion process. The Mekhilta here emphasizes that Moshe's judging of the people occurred on the day following Yitro's "day of atonement" when he completed his conversion process. The Tur contends that the original text of the Mekhilta indeed read "yom kappara," rather than "Yom Ha-kippurim," but an editor misread the reference as "Yom Ha-kippurim" and amended the text accordingly.
Rav Menachem Kasher (Torah Sheleima, vol. 15, appendix 4) cites a number of other sources that suggest this reading of the Mekhilta, but notes the obvious difficulty in accepting this theory. All available manuscripts of the Mekhilta, he claims, confirm the authenticity of the prevalent text, which reads "Yom Ha-kippurim," and it is highly doubtful that this term could refer to anything other than the day of Yom Kippur. We might add that the Tur provides no explanation as to why the Torah, according to his reading of the Mekhilta, found it necessary to emphasize that Moshe's judging took place on the day following Yitro's atonement.
Rav Kasher suggests that the Mekhilta's interpretation of the verse is perhaps based on a "gezeira shava" (exegetical comparison) between this verse and another instance of the same phrase, "va-yehi mi-machorat" ("the next day"). This phrase appears later in Sefer Shemot (32:30), in reference to the day following Moshe's initial descent from Mount Sinai (on the 17th of Tamuz), when he saw the people worshipping the calf. Chazal perhaps deduced based on the classic exegetical process of "gezeira shava" that just as there in chapter 32 "va-yehi mi-machorat" refers to the day following Moshe's descent from the mountain, so does the phrase have a similar denotation in our context. There, in chapter 32, the Torah refers to the day following Moshe's initial descent, whereas in our parasha, the Torah speaks of Moshe's final descent, on Yom Kippur.
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Parashat Yitro begins with the arrival of Yitro, Moshe's father-in-law, to the camp of Benei Yisrael. The Torah tells that Moshe and Yitro embraced and kissed upon seeing each other, and the verse adds, "va-yish'alu ish le-re'ehu le-shalom" (literally, "each asked after the other's welfare" 18:7). Rashi, citing from the Mekhilta, understands this verse to mean that one of the two men inquired as to the other's welfare; the person referred to as "ish" ("man") asked after the welfare of "re'ehu" his fellow. The question then arises, of course, as to which of the two men initiated the greeting. The Mekhilta solves the mystery by citing a famous verse from Sefer Bamidbar (12:3), which employs the word "ish" in reference to Moshe: "ve-ha-ish Moshe anav me'od" ("The man Moshe was very humble"). Apparently, Rashi writes, it was Moshe the "ish" who inquired as to the welfare of Yitro, and not vice-versa.
Chizkuni, in his commentary here in Parashat Yitro, cites Rashi's remarks and then notes that Yitro, too, is referred to with the description "ish." We read in Parashat Shemot that when Yitro first invites Moshe into his tent, "Moshe agreed to dwell with the 'ish'" referring, of course, to Yitro. On what basis, then, can Rashi conclude that it was Moshe who initiated the greeting to Yitro, and not vice-versa? Chizkuni answers that Rashi here is basing himself on more than the mere reference to Moshe with the term "ish." Rashi determines who initiated the greeting based on the Torah's description of Moshe in Parashat Bamidbar as the humblest man on earth. Moshe's unsurpassed humility led Rashi to conclude that he, rather than Yitro, initiated this greeting.
What is the connection between humility, and extending a greeting and inquiring as to the welfare of another?
Indeed, we find in the writings of the Maharal of Prague an explicit association between these two concepts humility, and extending greetings. The mishna in Pirkei Avot (4:14; in some editions, 4:20) bids us, "hevei makdim be-shalom kol adam" to extend a greeting to every person. The Maharal explains that by making a point to greet somebody, one demonstrates the respect he feels towards that person. In so doing, then, he displays his humility, he shows that he does not deem himself too important to express interest in the welfare of the other person. We might add that when a person extends a greeting to another, he automatically leaves his own, personal domain and involves himself at least to some extent in the needs and concerns of another. This, too, contains an element of humility. When the mishna urges us to greet other people, it in effect instructs us to express interest in people other than ourselves and get involved in the lives of those around us. One must never feel too important to express interest in the lives of others, and thus extending a greeting serves as an expression of humility and regard for other people.
Accordingly, Rashi concludes that it was Moshe, the humblest of all men, who initiated the greeting to Yitro. Moshe at this moment thought not of himself, but of his father-in-law. Rather than immediately informing Yitro of all that he had achieved since they had last seen one another (such as serving as God's prophet to release His nation from bondage), his first words to Yitro were about Yitro. We might speculate that Moshe asked him questions such as, "How are you; how have you been; how are the sheep; how is the weather back in Midyan " Indeed, the Mekhilta of Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai derives from this verse the importance of she'eilat shalom of extending greetings to other people. Moshe serves as the paradigm of moving outside of one's own personal context and expressing interest in the lives and welfare of others.
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Towards the beginning of Parashat Yitro, we read that Yitro, Moshe's father-in-law, observes Moshe sitting the entire day tending to the people's judicial needs. Yitro advises that "the thing you are doing is not right," because "you will surely wear yourself out, and these people as well" (18:18). Therefore, Yitro suggests that Moshe appoint additional judges to share the judicial burden with him.
However, before proceeding to urge Moshe to appoint a judicial network (in 18:21), he adds the following sentence: "You shall enjoin upon them the laws and the teachings, and make known to them the way they are to go and the practices they are to follow" (18:20). Why does Yitro "advise" Moshe to teach Benei Yisrael the laws, teachings and practices of the Torah? Is Moshe not already well aware that he has assumed this responsibility? Furthermore, what does this job of Moshe have to do with Yitro's suggestion of appointing circuit judges?
Rav Chayim Hirschenson, in his "Nimukei Rashi," explains by first taking a closer look at the previous verses. When Yitro first approaches Moshe and asks why the people stood in line all day to consult with him, Moshe explains, "It is because the people come to me to inquire of God. When they have a dispute, it comes before me, and I decide between one person and another, and I make known the laws and teachings of God" (18:16). Rav Hirschenson claims that Moshe here speaks of two different purposes for which people come to him: first, "to inquire of God," and, secondly, "when they have a dispute" they come to Moshe for arbitration. Rashi interprets "to inquire of God" (based on Onkelos' translation) as referring to inquiries of Halakha, questions concerning God's laws. (The Ramban, in his commentary to this verse, interprets this phrase differently.) Thus, Moshe tells his father-in-law that some people approach him with their halakhic inquiries, whereas others seek his assistance in settling their disputes with their neighbors.
Rav Hirschenson explains that Yitro's suggestion that Moshe appoint a judicial network applied only to the second of the two functions his judicial role. This job, Yitro felt, could be delegated to lower authorities. But Moshe's first role, of clarifying God's laws, could not be delegated. Yitro therefore begins his remarks by saying, "You shall enjoin upon them the laws and the teachings, and make known to them the way they are to go and the practices they are to follow." Meaning, Moshe will continue serving as the exclusive authority and address for Halakhic inquiry, however, "you shall seek out from among all the people capable men who fear God and you set these over them" (18:21). While continuing his role as sole transmitter of the Torah, Moshe should appoint circuit judges to help resolve the people's legal disputes.
The Chafetz Chayim (as we cited in our S.A.L.T. series to this parasha a number of years ago) suggests a different approach to Yitro's opening comments to Moshe. According to the Chafetz Chayim, Yitro here instructs Moshe to address the root of the problem that has presented itself the interminable stream of people coming to Moshe for arbitration. Before recommending that Moshe hire a staff of capable judges to assist him, Yitro first bids Moshe to "enjoin upon them the laws and the teachings, and make known to them the way they are to go and the practices they are to follow." Chazal (Mekhilta; Bava Metzia 30b) interpret this verse as referring to a number of different mitzvot involving gemilut chasadim (kindness towards others), such as burying the dead, visiting the sick, and even extra-judicial compromise to avoid legal conflict. In effect, the Chafetz Chayim explained, Yitro here urges Moshe to admonish the people to deal with one another compassionately and lovingly, and to accustom themselves to do for others beyond what the law strictly requires. This will naturally decrease the number of controversies requiring Moshe's arbitration. Once people grow accustomed to dealing with one another kindly, they will no longer be so exacting as to always demand what is rightfully theirs. In this verse, then, Yitro articulates the first of the two measures he believes Moshe should take to reduce the number of legal conflicts that require his attention: he should teach them the value and importance of kindness and compassion, which will gradually stem the tide of legal strife and contention.
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Yesterday, we discussed Yitro's suggestion that Moshe delegate judges to serve under him, rather than personally serving as magistrate for every civil suit that arises among Benei Yisrael. Yitro prefaces his remarks by saying, "You shall enjoin upon them the laws and the teachings, and make known to them the way they are to go and the practices they are to follow" (18:20). Chazal (Mekhilta; Bava Metzia 30b) interpret this verse as referring to numerous mitzvot involving kindness towards others, such as burying the dead and visiting the sick. The final words of this verse "they are to follow" is understood as an allusion to the concept of "lifnim mi-shurat ha-din," a willingness to accept extra-judicial compromise and forego on what one deserves according to the strict letter of the law.
The Shulchan Arukh (C.M. 12:2) codifies the obligation for a Bet-Din to recommend to the litigants to reach some compromise settlement rather than proceeding with the case: "It is a mitzva to first say to the litigants, 'Do you want a court case, or compromise?'" In fact, the Shulchan Arukh adds, "Any Bet-Din that always conducts a compromise settlement it is worthy of praise."
The Sema (one of the classic commentaries on the Choshen Mishpat section of the Shulchan Arukh) poses a very simple question regarding this halakha. Why does such a suggestion that the litigants try to arrange some compromise settlement not violate the prohibition of "mat'eh la-chaveiro," misleading one's fellow? Presumably, when two litigants are in dispute over money or property and come to Bet-Din, one of the two parties rightfully deserves the entire sum or property under dispute. Thus, by encouraging compromise, Bet-Din in effect advises to that party a course of action that will result in his financial loss. Seemingly, such advice should be forbidden by the famous prohibition of, "Do not place a stumbling block before a blind man" (Vayikra 19:14; see Rashi), which bans purposely giving unwise counsel. How, then, is Bet-Din permitted to encourage the two litigants to reach a compromise?
The Sema's brief answer is as enlightening as it is simple: "This does not constitute 'misleading one's fellow' because it is preferable for one's fellow to forego somewhat to his opposing litigant in order that peace will prevail among them." In other words, one actually comes out ahead by foregoing on what is rightfully his. By agreeing to a compromise settlement, the correct party loses money but retains good relations with the other litigant. They can still socialize together and be part of the same community. Had the correct litigant refused a settlement and insisted on proceeding with the case, he would have received all his money, but would have forfeited the opportunity of maintaining a positive relationship with the other party. Without a mutually satisfactory compromise, tension and hostility would remain between the two parties.
Thus, recommending compromise is never bad advice; Bet-Din merely encourages the litigant to make a relatively small investment of money, which will eventually yield dividends in the form of social harmony and goodwill.
(Based on Rav Yissachar Frand, "The Winner in a Court Case Also Loses," at http://torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5763/yisro.html)
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The Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (116a) cites three different views as to which event prompted Yitro to come and join Benei Yisrael. According to one position, this decision resulted from the news of Benei Yisrael's battle against Amalek. Apparently, the improbable victory of a nation of newly emancipated slaves, who came under surprise attack during travel, impressed and inspired Yitro, who then decided to join them. This view also appears in the Midrash (Shemot Rabba 27:8), which invokes a verse in Sefer Mishlei (19:25) to describe Yitro's decision: "Beat the scoffer and the fool will become clever." As a result of Benei Yisrael's "beating" of the "scoffer" Amalek, the "fool" Yitro became "clever," and decided to embrace monotheism.
What are we to make of the Midrash's contrasting descriptions of Amalek and Yitro as "scoffer" ("letz") and "fool" ("peti")?
Rav Tzadok Ha-kohen of Lublin, in his "Tzidkat Ha-tzadik," explains that the Midrash depicts the diametrically opposite religious attitudes of Amalek and Yitro as reflective of the two basic theological dangers that threaten to undermine Jewish belief. Amalek is the "scoffer," the nihilist, the cynic. After the splitting of the sea, when "the people hear, they tremble; agony grips the dwellers of Philistia Terror and dread descend upon them" (15:14,16), Amalek disdainfully deny Benei Yisrael's divine protection and power. They cynically and arrogantly dismiss the rapidly spreading word of a nation of God, and seek to prove their vulnerability and weakness.
Yitro, by contrast, is the "peti," the "fool," who is best described by a verse earlier in Sefer Mishlei (14:15): "A fool believes everything." Whereas the "letz" responds cynically to ideals and beliefs with skepticism and denial, the "peti" is willing to accept anything, even the absurd. As Rashi brings from the Midrash (in his commentary to 18:11), Yitro had worshipped every form of idolatry in the world before finally concluding that "the Lord is greater than all gods." He was easily lured by the misleading attractions of pagan beliefs and was quick to embrace their creeds. He failed to carefully scrutinize the claims of these faiths before blindly accepting them.
Judaism advocates a delicate balance between cynical skepticism and foolish naivete. On the one hand, a Jew is urged to steadfastly resist the superficial lures of primitive superstitions and the like; but at the same time, he mustn't become too cynical to accept the creeds of Jewish religion and acknowledge the beauty and spiritual value of Torah life.
(Based on a recent article by Professor Shalom Rosenberg)
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Towards the beginning of Parashat Yitro, we read of the reunion between Moshe and his father-in-law, Yitro, during which Moshe tells Yitro about the Exodus and the miracles performed for Benei Yisrael since their departure from Egypt (18:8). The Torah then describes Yitro's response to these wonders: "Va-yichad Yitro." The Gemara in Masekhet Sanhedrin (94a) cites a dispute between Rav and Shemuel as to the meaning of the word "va-yichad." Rav associates this term with the word "chad," or "sharp," and explains that Yitro "passed a sharp knife over his flesh" meaning, he performed circumcision as part of his process of conversion. Shemuel, on the other hand, interprets the word as a reference to "chidudin," or goose bumps, which Yitro experienced upon hearing of the pain and suffering inflicted upon the Egyptians.
The Maharsha notes an interesting halakhic difficulty that arises from Rav's opinion, that Yitro here undergoes circumcision. Elsewhere in the Talmud (Shabbat 132a), the Gemara addresses the situation of a gentile who had previously undergone circumcision and now converts to Judaism. According to one view, although such a convert obviously cannot undergo circumcision, he must nevertheless undergo the procedure of "hatafat dam berit" an incision in the area of the circumcision, symbolizing his entry into the Abrahamic covenant. Rav, however, maintains that no such procedure is necessary; a prospective convert who had previously been circumcised does not require any symbolic act of entry into the covenant. Now the Rambam famously holds (10:8) that the descendants of Ketura the woman whom Avraham married after Sara's death (Bereishit 25:1) are included in the obligation of berit mila. Hence, Yitro, who belonged to the nation of Midyan, which descended from Ketura (see Bereishit 25:2), presumably had been circumcised as a child. The question thus arises, why, according to Rav, was Yitro required to "pass a sharp knife over his flesh" as part of his conversion process? According to the Rambam, he had already been circumcised, in which case Rav does not require any further incision!
The Maharsha suggests that although Yitro had already undergone the basic ritual of circumcision, he had not undergone the second stage of circumcision, known as "peri'a" (uncovering the corona after the actual circumcision). The Gemara (Yevamot 71b) cites Rav himself as commenting that this second stage was not included in the basic obligation of berit mila charged upon Avraham Avinu. It was established only later, at the time of Matan Torah. Therefore, although Yitro was indeed circumcised, as a descendant of Avraham, he had not performed peri'a; it was thus necessary for him to complete the entire process of circumcision at the time of his conversion, even according to Rav.
However, Rav Meir of Warsaw, in his "Imrei Kohen" (Warsaw, 5695), notes that the Maharsha's approach does not appear to be satisfactory according to the view (discussed earlier this week) that Yitro's arrival at Benei Yisrael's camp occurred before Matan Torah. For Tosfot (there in Yevamot) explains that if, as Rav asserts, the obligation of peri'a was not included in the mitzva of mila presented to Avraham, it was conveyed to Moshe as a "halakha le-Moshe mi-Sinai" (a tradition transmitted to Moshe orally at Sinai). Clearly, then, the mitzva was not introduced until Moshe's ascent to Sinai. Thus, if the story of Yitro's arrival took place before Matan Torah, then the obligation of peri'a had yet to be conveyed to Moshe, and there was therefore no reason for Yitro to perform peri'a. The question thus returns, why was Yitro required to "pass a sharp knife over his flesh" according to Rav? The "Imrei Kohen" suggests, quite simply, that Yitro perhaps neglected the obligation of mila incumbent upon Midyanites, and he therefore had to perform circumcision as part of his process of conversion to Judaism.
Rav Menachem Kasher, in his "Torah Sheleima" (chapter 18, footnote 54), notes that in the Midrash Ha-gadol, the interpretation of "va-yichad" as a reference to circumcision is cited in the name of Rav Papa, rather than Rav. Needless to say, this easily resolves the Maharsha's question. Rav Papa does not necessarily subscribe to Rav's view, that a circumcised gentile does not require an incision as part of his conversion process. Quite conceivably, Rav Papa indeed does demand this procedure in such a case, and understandably, then, Yitro had to "pass a sharp knife over his flesh" once he decided to convert to Judaism.
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Parashat Yitro tells of God's Revelation to Benei Yisrael at Mount Sinai, during which they heard the declaration of the Ten Commandments. We read that the people were frightened by the "voice of God" that they heard, and begged Moshe to serve as their intermediary, so that they would not continue hearing the laws directly from God. Moshe agrees and steps forward to hear the rest of the laws God would convey (see 20:15-18).
The first series of laws, recorded in the final verses of Parashat Yitro, involves the proper mode of sacrificial worship: "Make for Me an altar of earth and sacrifice on it your burnt offerings and your sacrifices of well-being And if you make for Me an altar of stones, do not build it of hewn stones, for by wielding your tool upon them you have profaned them" (20:21-22). At first glance, the Torah here requires constructing an altar to God for purposes of sacrificial worship, and it demands that this altar be built from earth. In addition, the Torah commands that should Benei Yisrael, at some point, build an altar from stones, those stones must be whole, rather than hewn.
In light of our knowledge of the various altars constructed in Tanakh, the first of these two commands appears difficult to understand. The second command, prohibiting the use of hewn stones for the construction of a stone altar, applied, as Rashi explains, to the altar constructed at Mount Gerizim and Mount Eval as part of the "blessing and curse" ceremony conducted there, as described in Sefer Devarim (chapter 27). Furthermore, it emerges from numerous sources that when King Shelomo constructed the Bet Ha-mikdash, he discarded the copper altar that had been in use in the Mishkan since Moshe's time, and built a stone altar in its place. (See Rashi, Melakhim II 16:14; Metzudat David, Divrei Hayamim II 4:1; Rambam, Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira, chapter 1.) The first command, however, requires explanation. Nowhere do we find that Benei Yisrael built an earthen altar. To what altar, then, does the Torah refer when it requires constructing a "mizbach adama" ("earthen altar")?
Rashi, based on Chazal, suggests two approaches. Firstly, Rashi writes, "mizbach adama" perhaps means not an altar made from earth, but rather an altar stationed directly upon the earth, as opposed to upon pillars or a tall platform. This verse requires that the altar be positioned on ground level, rather than at an elevation. Secondly, Rashi suggests, the Torah here refers to the fact that when Benei Yisrael transported the Mishkan and its appurtenances during travel, they would fill the hollow interior of the copper altar with earth. It is in this sense, Rashi suggests (based on the Mekhilta), that the Torah speaks of a "mizbach adama." (See also Zevachim 61b.)
Ibn Ezra (in Peirush Ha-arokh) suggests a different approach, namely, that God here refers to the altar constructed at Mount Sinai. Several chapters later, in Parashat Mishpatim (24:4), we read that Moshe constructs an altar at the foot of Mount Sinai, upon which the people offered the two categories of sacrifices mentioned here olot and shelamim. Thus, Ibn Ezra claims, God here refers not to a permanent place of sacrifice, but rather to the altar built at Sinai and used only in that single instance, when Moshe returned to the people and transmitted to them God's laws.
Seforno, in his commentary, writes that God here tells the people that indeed, there is no need for any lavish sanctuaries laden with gold and silver for the purpose of serving God. Matan Torah showed Benei Yisrael that they could encounter the Almighty directly, without any need for external furnishings to facilitate this experience. Seforno here does not explain why ultimately God in fact demands the construction of a Mishkan from gold and silver. He develops his approach more fully elsewhere in his writings, most thoroughly in his treatise entitled "Kavanot Ha-Torah," which is printed at the beginning of the first volume of the "Mikraot Gedolot" edition of the Chumash. Seforno there explains that before the sin of the golden calf, God had no intention of requiring Benei Yisrael to construct a Mishkan. To the contrary, in these verses towards the end of Parashat Yitro, God specifically emphasizes the point that Benei Yisrael can encounter God directly: "in every place where I cause My Name to be mentioned I will come to you and bless you" (20:21). According to Seforno, this means that in "any place that will truly be called a 'House of God,' such as Houses of Study and the like," God will come and bless the people. It was only after the sin of the calf, which demonstrated the people's need for some form of physical representation of God's presence, that God commanded them to construct an elaborate Mishkan to facilitate their encounter with Him.
According to Seforno, then, the command to construct a "mizbach adama" represents the state of affairs at this point, before the sin of the calf. After that tragic incident, it became necessary for Benei Yisrael to build a far more lavish Sanctuary and altars, as outlined in Parshiyot Teruma-Tetzaveh.