The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
MidrashThe Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit
Midrash
Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion
PARASHAT YITRO
By Rav David Silverberg
Towards the beginning of Parashat Yitro, we read of the enthusiastic greeting Moshe extends to his father-in-law, Yitro, who arrives in the Israelite camp: "Moshe went out to greet his father-in-law, he bowed and he kissed him" (18:7). The Mekhilta, commenting on this verse, writes, "On this basis they said that a person should be diligent with regard to the honor of his father-in-law." This passage thus suggests that one is obligated to show respect and honor to his father-in-law; this halakha is indeed codified in the Shulchan Arukh (Y.D. 240:24; it is unclear whether this applies to one's mother-in-law, as well; for argument's sake, we will speak only in terms of fathers-in-law).
Nevertheless, there is some discussion concerning the precise nature of this obligation, to respect one's father-in-law. As Rav Menachem Kasher notes (Torah Sheleima, Parashat Yitro, chapter 18, note 41), the Mekhilta does not speak in terms of an outright obligation; it rather states, "Yehei adam mukhan li-khvod chamiv" – a person should "be diligent" (or "be prepared") with respect to his father-in-law's honor. The Mekhilta does not use the word "chayav," which is generally used in reference to a bona fide halakhic requirement. Thus, if this passage would represent the only source for the obligation, one might argue that we deal here with a general issue of derekh eretz, rather than a specific halakhic imperative.
As it turns out, however, there is yet another source for this obligation to honor one's father-in-law, which indeed employs the word chayav in this context. The Midrash Tehillim (7) discusses a verse in Sefer Shemuel I (24:11) where David addresses his father-in-law, Shaul, as avi ("my father"), and it concludes, "From here [we deduce] that one is obligation to act respectfully towards his father-in-law." This formulation indeed indicates that one bears an outright halakhic obligation to respect his father-in-law; the Tur (Y.D. 240) cites this Midrashic passage as the source for this obligation.
The Bach, however, notes that the Tur cited only one of two opinions in the Midrash regarding this verse. According to the majority view in the Midrash, David uses the respectful term avi not in reference to Shaul, but rather to Shaul's general, Avner. According to this view, there is no basis for such an obligation. The Bach maintains that Halakha follows this position, and therefore the respect and honor due to one's father-in-law is the same as he owes to any older person; there is no specific obligation of honoring one's father-in-law. The Shakh (Y.D. 240:22) follows this ruling of the Bach. The Vilna Gaon, however, in his commentary to the Shulchan Arukh, disputes the Bach's reading of the Midrash. The Gaon claims that the two views in the Midrash debate only the meaning of the verse; even the majority view, however, agrees that there indeed exists an obligation honor one's father-in-law.
In summary, then, three views exist on the issue of whether one must respect his father-in-law. According to the Bach and Shakh, one must respect his father-in-law only to the same extent to which he must show honor to older people generally. The Mekhilta's formulation suggests that one must, indeed, show honor to his father-in-law, but only as a matter of derekh eretz and common decency, rather than due to an outright halakhic imperative. Finally, the Shulchan Arukh and Gaon of Vilan seem to maintain that there indeed exists a specific obligation to honor one's father-in-law, similar to the obligation to honor one's own parents.
******
Parashat Yitro tells of Yitro's suggestion to his son-in-law, Moshe, that he establish a broad judicial network to assist him in tending to the people's legal needs, rather than presiding over each case personally. Yitro introduces his remarks to Moshe by stressing that he would still retain his exclusive position as the intermediary between the people and God: "You shall represent the nation before God… And you shall admonish them with regard to the statutes and procedures and inform them of the path they shall follow and the acts they shall perform" (18:19-20).
The Gemara in Masekhet Bava Metzia (30b) comments that when Yitro speaks of Moshe informing the people "of the path they shall follow," he refers to "beit chayeihem" (literally, "the home of their lives"). Rashi, in his commentary to Bava Metzia, explains this to mean sustenance and livelihood; Moshe was to train the people professionally so that they may earn a proper living. Commenting on the corresponding passage in Masekhet Bava Kama (100a), Rashi explains much differently, claiming that beit chayeihem refers to the obligation of Torah study. Meaning, Moshe would exhort the people to devote themselves to Torah learning.
These different interpretations might reflect different attitudes towards the halakhic status of working for one's livelihood. If, as Rashi writes in Bava Metzia, professional training was part of Moshe's responsibility towards the people, then it stands to reason that this involves some sort of mitzva, or, more generally, an important religious value. This question was indeed debated by the Rishonim, in a specific halakhic context. The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (19a) introduces the prohibition against embarking on a nautical trip within three days of Shabbat. (Various reasons are given for this halakha by the Rishonim; this issue is beyond the purview of our discussion.) However, this prohibition applies only to a devar reshut – a trip taken for non-obligatory purposes. If one must sail for a devar mitzva – a purpose involving a mitzva – he may embark on his journey even within three days of Shabbat. The Mordekhai (Shabbat, chapter 1, 258) cites Rabbenu Tam as including business trips under the category of devar mitzva, and he makes reference to the Gemara's comment in Bava Metzia regarding Moshe's responsibility to prepare the people vocationally. Rabbenu Tam (who himself was a fabulously wealthy wine merchant) quite clearly looked upon professional work as a mitzva. From the comments of the Mishna Berura (O.C. 248:34) it emerges that Rabbenu Tam applies this theory even to one who already has enough for his basic needs and works to earn additional profit.
The Beit Yosef, in discussing the issue of embarking on business trips within three days of Shabbat (O.C. 248), notes that some authorities argue with Rabbenu Tam's position. The Beit Yosef does not specify, but the opposing view can be found in the Ra'avan (60), who explicitly denies the mitzva status of business trips. The Rama (O.C. 248:4) cites Rabbenu Tam's position and comments that on this basis some have the practice of embarking on business trips within three days of Shabbat. He adds that one should not object to those following this practice, since they have authorities on whom to rely. This clearly suggests that the Rama does not advise following this view optimally; the Mishna Berura writes this explicitly.
******
After Benei Yisrael's encampment at
Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky, in his Emet Le-Yaakov, suggests an
explanation based on the famous Talmudic passage (Shabbat 88a) that tells of
God's "suspension" of
At this stage, immediately upon the nation's encampment at Sinai, God wants Benei Yisrael to first accept the Torah mei-ahava, voluntarily, rather than through coercion. Rav Yaakov suggests that for this reason God insisted that Moshe speak to the nation exactly what God had told him. He did not want Moshe to try persuading the people, to employ homiletical or pedagogic tactics in persuading them to accept the Torah. Such efforts would undermine the mei-ahava quality of their acceptance. Later He would want them to accept the Torah mi-yir'a, out of a sense that they have no alternative, but now they had to come to this decision independently, without even the slightest degree of persuasion. Moshe therefore was barred from enlisting any rhetorical devices in attempting to win the nation's consent; the desire and interest had to come through purely natural means, and not through any sort of persuasion or external pressure.
******
We read in Parashat Yitro that before Matan Torah, God informs
Moshe as to what will transpire during the Revelation: "Behold, I am coming to
you in the thickness of a cloud in order that the people hear when I speak with
you, and also they will believe in you forever.." (19:10). The Rambam discusses this verse in
Hilkhot Yesodei Ha-Torah (8:1), citing it as proof that Benei Yisrael
came to fully believe in Moshe as the Almighty's prophet only after the event of
Matan Torah, when they personally heard God speak to him. According to the Rambam, faith through
miracles – such as those which Moshe performed in
Many writers have questioned the Rambam's theory based on the famous verse in Parashat Beshalach that describes Benei Yisrael's reaction to the miracle of the splitting of the sea and the Egyptians' demise: "Va-ya'aminu b-Hashem u-ve-Moshe avdo" ("They believed in the Lord and in Moshe, His servant"). Does this not indicate that the people firmly and unwaveringly believed in Moshe already after this miraculous event, a full six weeks before the experience of Ma'amad Har Sinai?
The simplest answer, perhaps, emerges from the Rambam's concluding remarks in the aforementioned passage: "Before this matter [the Revelation], they did not believe him with belief that is eternally enduring, but rather with a belief that is followed by questions and doubts" ("ne'emanut she-yeish achareha hirhur u-machashava"). The Rambam acknowledges that Benei Yisrael believed in Moshe as their prophet already prior to the Revelation at Sinai. However, this belief was of a fundamentally different quality than the belief they achieved as a result of Ma'amad Har Sinai, as it lent itself to some questioning and doubts once the initial impact of the miracle begins to wane. The nation indeed attained belief as a result of the splitting of the sea, but this belief would not have withstood the test of time.
The Or Ha-chayim, in this verse (19:10), suggests a different explanation for the Rambam, distinguishing between the two different roles of a Jewish prophet. According to the Or Ha-chayim, there were ancient people who accepted the notion that God hears the pleas and cries of human beings, that people's service and worship could indeed impact upon the Divine Being's governance of the world, but denied that He would take enough interest to initiate communication with mankind. God listens to man, this theological approach contended, but He does not speak to man. The miracle of the sea demonstrated very clearly that Moshe was an effective representative before the Almighty, that God accepted and responded favorably to his prayers. Whereas until this point they may have entertained some doubts as to whether they could rely on Moshe's leadership, the experience of keri'at Yam Suf proved to Benei Yisrael that he could be trusted because God listens to him.
This belief, however, does not suffice. It was still necessary to dispel the misconception that God does not speak to man to establish laws and provide instruction. This could be achieved only through the experience of Matan Torah, where, as the Rambam describes, the people beheld Moshe's designation as lawgiver firsthand. Only then did they truly believe that God conveys laws and instruction through a human prophet – a concept regarding which they had remained skeptical up until this point.
******
The opening verses of Parashat Yitro tell of the arrival of Yitro, Moshe's father-in-law, at the Israelite camp in the wilderness, his conversation his Moshe and the offerings he sacrificed to God. The Torah then writes, "On the following day, Moshe sat to judge the people…" (18:13). This verse introduces the second section of the narrative dealing with Yitro's visit, which tells of Yitro's suggestion that Moshe establish a judicial network rather than handling all cases independently.
Commenting on the words, "On the following day," the Mekhilta
writes that this incident occurred on the day following Yom Kippur, meaning, the
day following Moshe's final descent from
The Ramban, in his commentary to this verse, asserts that the
Mekhilta does not mean to say that Moshe sat to judge the people on the
day immediately following his descent from
This argument of the Ramban reflects a certain assumption he made concerning the Mekhilta's general approach to this verse, an assumption that becomes clear when we contrast his comments with those of Rashi. An examination of Rashi's comments to this verse, in which he likewise cites the Mekhilta, reveals that he interpreted the phrase "on the following day" as introducing an entirely new chronological unit within the narrative. Meaning, "on the following day" is not said at all in reference to the preceding verses; what is about to transpire did not occur on the day following the events previously recorded, but rather on the day following Yom Kippur. According to Rashi's reading of the Mekhilta, there is no chronological contiguity at all between this verse and those that immediately precede it, because "on the following day" refers to the day following Yom Kippur, and not the day following the previously recorded events. Thus, the fact that Moshe's judgment of the people took place on the day following Yom Kippur does not necessarily mean that the immediately preceding narrative – the feast with Yitro – took place on Yom Kippur; these two narratives have no chronological association with one another whatsoever.
The Ramban, however, could not even entertain such a reading. He was not prepared to detach the words "on the following day" from the preceding narrative and see them as introducing a new chronological unit. If the Torah described the ensuing events – Moshe's judgment of the people – as occurring "on the following day," it must mean that it took place immediately following the previously recorded events. Therefore, the Ramban argues, if we would explain the Mekhilta to mean that the events in the following verses occurred immediately after Yom Kippur, we would be compelled to explain that the previous events occurred on Yom Kippur.
******
Yesterday, we discussed the Ramban's comments regarding a verse in
Parashat Yitro (18:13) that introduces the story of Moshe's adjudication of the
nation's legal cases. The Torah
tells that this occurred "on the next day," which the Mekhilta interprets
to mean the day following Yom Kippur, when Moshe made his final descent from
Mount Sinai with the second set of tablets. The Ramban claims that this cannot mean
that the immediately preceding events – Yitro's arrival in the Israelite camp –
occurred on Yom Kippur. Among the
arguments he advances in proving this point is the fact that Aharon and the
elders of
However, the Ramban expresses some uncertainty as to whether the laws of Yom Kippur indeed applied that year: "For they did not eat on Yom Ha-kippurim if they had Yom Ha-kippurim on the first year, before they were commanded with regard to it." The Ramban here is unsure whether or not Benei Yisrael were obligated to fast on Yom Kippur that year, "before they were commanded with regard to it."
Rav Chayim Dov Chavel, in his annotation to the Ramban's commentary, cites an explanation from the work Kur Ha-zahav for the Ramban's ambivalence. According to the Kur Ha-zahav, this hinges on the broader question of whether all the Torah's laws were transmitted to Moshe in their entirety and became binding already during Moshe's stay atop Mount Sinai, or if they were transmitted only at the point at which they appear in the Torah. The obligation to fast on Yom Kippur is recorded in the Torah for the first time in Sefer Vayikra (16:29), and the sequence of the Torah's presentation indicates that this was said after the Mishkan's construction and consecration. The question alluded to here by the Ramban is whether Moshe received the instruction with regard to this law only that point, or if he received this law atop Mount Sinai, and it was recorded in the Torah at a later point. (The Ramban discusses this issue more explicitly elsewhere in his commentary – Vayikra 7:38 and 16:1.) The answer to this question will determine whether or not Benei Yisrael were required to fast that first Yom Kippur, when Moshe made his final descent from Mount Sinai.
Rav Mordechai Gifter, in his work Pirkei Torah, suggests two other
issues that might affect the question to which the Ramban here alludes. Firstly, even if, in principle, all
Torah obligations became binding immediately when Moshe studied them during his
stay on the mountaintop, the fact remains that he returned to the people in the
middle of the day of Yom Kippur.
The question thus becomes whether the obligation to fast on Yom Kippur
could initially take effect in the middle of the day. Conceivably, since Benei Yisrael
did not fast until Moshe arrived and advised them regarding Yom Kippur,
there would be no meaning to observing a fast from that point henceforth. Secondly, Rav Gifter suggests, this
issue might touch upon a question concerning Benei Yisrael's experience
at Mara, several weeks before they encamped at
******
We read in Parashat Yitro of Yitro's reaction upon hearing of all the
wonders and miracles that God had performed for Benei Yisrael:
"Va-yichad Yitro."
The Gemara (Sanhedrin 94a) records a debate between Rav and Shemuel in
interpreting the word va-yichad, with both Amora'im explaining it
as a derivative of the word chad, which means "sharp." According to one view, Yitro felt as
though his body was "pricked" as he heard of the suffering of the Egyptians,
whereas the other view explains that Yitro "cast a sharp sword on his flesh,"
referring to circumcision. Moshe's
description of God's kindness towards
The Maharsha raises the question of why Yitro had to perform circumcision. He was, after all, from the nation of Midyan, which descended from Avraham's wife Ketura (see Bereishit 25:2), and according to the Rambam (Hilkhot Melakhim 10:8), male descendents of Ketura are obligated to undergo circumcision. Presumably, then, Yitro had already undergone circumcision, and it is therefore unclear why he circumcised himself again at this point. The Maharsha suggests that Yitro was required to perform peri'a – the uncovering of the area of the foreskin generally performed as part of the circumcision ritual. This component of the mitzva was not included in the obligation binding upon Ketura's descendants, but is required as part of berit mila among the Jewish people. Therefore, Yitro had to perform peri'a as part of his conversion process. Rav Menachem Kasher, in Torah Sheleima, suggests that when the Gemara speaks of Yitro "casting a sharp sword on his flesh," it refers to hatafat dam berit – letting some blood from the area of the circumcision. Halakha requires that a convert who had previously been circumcised as a gentile must perform hatafat dam berit as part of the process of his conversion into the Jewish people, and so the Gemara likely refers to this act, rather than to complete circumcision.
Either way, this discussion would likely help resolve a different question, raised by the Panim Yafot commentary to this parasha. The Gemara in Masekhet Yevamot (72a) tells that Benei Yisrael could not perform circumcision during their stay in the wilderness because the "north wind" – which brings refreshing, cool air into the otherwise searing desert – did not blow throughout this period, creating conditions too dangerous for circumcision. How, then, could Yitro have performed circumcision at this point? The Panim Yafot suggests that the north wind indeed blew in the wilderness, but not within the ananei ha-kavod (clouds of glory) that encircled Benei Yisrael as they traveled, and Yitro, who as yet was a gentile, was not allowed entry into the confines of the ananei ha-kavod. He was therefore able to undergo circumcision before completing his conversion process and entering the camp.
According to what we have seen, however, Yitro did not undergo
circumcision; he required only the far less complex and risky procedure of
either peri'a or hatafat dam berit, which, presumably, could be
performed even in the intense heat of the
It should be noted that the Panim Yafot's question in any event seems difficult to understand. One of the reasons given in the Gemara for why the north wind did not blow for Benei Yisrael is because they were nizofin, chided by the Almighty. According to Tosefot, Benei Yisrael attained this status as a result of the sin of the spies. Thus, before the sin of the spies, the north wind indeed blew and circumcision was possible. Yitro's arrival at the Israelite camp took place many months prior to the sin of the spies, and thus the conditions at this time still allowed for circumcision. And even according to Rashi's understanding of the Gemara, that Benei Yisrael became nizofin in the wake of the sin of the golden calf, Yitro still may have been able to perform circumcision when he arrived at the Israelite camp. The Gemara in Masekhet Zevachim (116a) cites a famous debate as to whether Yitro arrived at the camp before or after Matan Torah. If he arrived after Matan Torah, then presumably he arrived after the sin of the golden calf (as Moshe spent the forty days after Matan Torah atop Mount Sinai, and descended as the sin of the calf was in progress), and thus it would indeed have been impossible for him to perform circumcision. According to the other view, however, Yitro arrived earlier, while Benei Yisrael still enjoyed the benefits of the north breeze, and he was thus able to perform circumcision.