Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT TETZAVEH

by Rav David Silverberg

            Among the most common questions asked concerning Parashat Tetzaveh involves its final section – the instructions for the building of the mizbach ha-zahav, the golden incense altar (30:1-10).  This section is conspicuously absent from Parashat Teruma, which describes the Mishkan and its various components – the ark, menorah, shulchan, courtyard and so on.  For some reason, the Torah omits the mizbach ha-zahav from this presentation, and discusses it instead at the end of Parashat Tetzaveh, after concluding its description of the bigdei kehuna (priestly garments) and the procedure for the formal consecration of the kohanim.  Why is the mizbach ha-zahav isolated from the rest of the Mishkan?  (See a survey of the answers suggested to this question in Torah Sheleima, beginning of chapter 30.)

            The Vilna Gaon, in his "Aderet Eliyahu," explained that the mizbach ha-zahav serves a fundamentally different function than the rest of the items in the Mishkan.  Everything else in the Mishkan was necessary for hashra'at ha-Shekhina – the resting of God's presence, so-to-speak, in the Mishkan.  For this reason, the Gaon explains, just prior to the Torah's description of the mizbach ha-zahav, it says, "There [in the Mishkan] I will meet with the Israelites, and it shall be sanctified by My presence… I will abide among the Israelites, and I will be their God" (29:43, 45).  Once Benei Yisrael follow all the guidelines presented in the previous chapters concerning the Mishkan, its keilim, and the kohanim, the Shekhina may reside among Benei Yisrael.  Only at this point does there arise a need for a mizbach ha-zahav, whose function it is to provide kappara (atonement) for Benei Yisrael.  We know from elsewhere in Chumash (Bamidbar 17:11-12) that the ketoret (incense), which the kohen would offer on the mizbach ha-zahav, possessed a unique power of atonement.  God's presence among Benei Yisrael necessitates a state of absolute purity, and thus Benei Yisrael must make expiation for the sins they commit.  Since this altar is in response to, rather than a prerequisite for, the resting of the Shekhina in the Mishkan, its description is not included with the rest of the Mishkan's components, and it is rather delayed until after the Torah completes its instructions for achieving hashra'at ha-Shekhina.

            Rav Amnon Bazak (a Ram in the yeshiva) developed the approach of the Gaon a bit further.  The final verse of Parashat Tetzaveh tells of the special ritual performed with the mizbach ha-zahav each year on Yom Kippur: "Once a year Aharon shall perform purification upon its horns with blood of the sin offering of purification; purification shall be performed upon it once a year throughout the ages."  This refers to the placement and sprinkling of sacrificial blood upon the mizbach ha-zahav as part of the Yom Kippur Temple service, as described in Sefer Vayikra (16:18-19).  There the Torah indicates that this blood ritual on the mizbach ha-zahav is intended to "cleanse it of the uncleanness of the Israelites and consecrate it."  The obvious question arises, who must undergo a process of "cleansing" on Yom Kippur – Benei Yisrael, or the altar?  Obviously, it is the people, rather than an altar made of gold, who God wishes to be cleansed on the annual Day of Atonement.  We might suggest, then, that the mizbach ha-zahav represents Benei Yisrael.  It serves as the nation's representative, as it were, in the House of the King.  The daily ketoret offering on this altar expresses our daily petition that the Almighty continues residing among us despite our imperfections.  And the cleansing of the altar symbolizes the process of repentance and purification the nation undergoes each year on Yom Kippur.

            The Torah therefore describes the mizbach ha-zahav only after it completes the instructions that must be followed to bring about the resting of the Shekhina.  Only at that point does it become necessary for Benei Yisrael's symbolic representative to enter the Mishkan and seek atonement, to ensure God's continued presence among us even if we are not entirely worthy.

*****

The Gemara in Masekhet Megila (12a) records that Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai's students asked him why the Jews were deserving of annihilation during the time of the Purim story.  Rather than answering, Rabbi Shimon asked the students to suggest an explanation.  They replied that Benei Yisrael perhaps deserved this punishment for having "participated in ['nehenu' – literally, 'enjoyed'] the feast of that evil man."  This refers to the lavish celebration conducted by Achashverosh, as described at the very beginning of Megilat Ester, in which Benei Yisrael took part.  But Rabbi Shimon did not accept this explanation, noting that if the decree resulted from this misdeed, then it should have affected only the Jews of Shushan, since only they participated in the royal feast.  Rabbi Shimon therefore gave a different reason, namely, that Benei Yisrael prostrated themselves before a Babylonian statue, and for this they were deserving destruction.  The students asked their rabbi, if this is the basis for the decree, why was it ultimately annulled?  If, indeed, the Jews were guilty of idolatry, then why did they earn salvation?  Rabbi Shimon answered that just as they bowed to the idol only externally, but in their hearts had no intention of pagan worship, so did God only make it appear that they would be destroyed, while in reality ensuring their salvation.

            The commentators have raised several questions concerning this dialogue, among them the seeming inconsistency in the students' responses.  They questioned Rabbi Shimon's explanation, that Benei Yisrael deserved destruction for worshipping an idol, in light of the fact that they ultimately earned deliverance from the decree.  But why did this problem not arise with regard to their suggestion, that Benei Yisrael deserved to be destroyed for having taken part in Achashverosh's feast?  How did they understand the reason for Benei Yisrael's ultimate salvation according to this explanation for the decree?

            Let us first examine the sin of participation in Achashverosh's feast.  Why would this transgression alone render Benei Yisrael worthy of annihilation?

            Chazal tell that this feast involved much more than merely an ostentatious display of wealth and grandeur.  Achashverosh had mistakenly calculated that the seventy years of Jewish exile prophesied by Yirmiyahu had passed without the reconstruction of the Temple, and thus concluded that the prophecy will no longer materialize.  To display his confidence in the permanence of the Temple's destruction and Jewish exile, he took the Temple's furnishings that Nevukhadnetzar had taken to Babylon, and which Achashverosh's predecessor, the Persian emperor Koresh, had captured, and put them on display.  In other words, this feast was a celebration of what Achashverosh perceived to be his most elusive and impressive victory: his triumph over the Almighty, the permanent dispersion of the Jews and destruction of God's Temple.  This explains the Gemara's description of Achashverosh's celebration: "the feast of that evil man."  This feast was intended to demonstrate the Persian king's prowess over not only one hundred and twenty seven nations, but over God Himself, as it were.

            By taking part in and "enjoying" ("nehenu") this feast, the Jews expressed their consent to Achashverosh's declaration of the Jewish exile's permanence.  They had reached the decision that they no longer needed a Mikdash or Jewish autonomy in their homeland.  As they now live freely under the protection of the benevolent Persian Empire, they figured, they, along with the keilim of the Beit Ha-mikdash, can remain in Shushan and build Jewish life there.

            If it is to this that Rabbi Shimon's students referred when they pointed to the feast as the reason for the decree of annihilation, then we can understand why they did not wonder how the Jews earned deliverance from Haman's decree.  For if they sinned in accepting exile as a permanent option for the Jewish people, the threat of destruction alone – without its actual occurrence – would suffice to correct their misconception of Diaspora life.  The sudden prospect of their annihilation at the hands of the Persian government reminded them of the need to return to Eretz Yisrael and build their Temple and country.  God did not have to destroy the Jewish people, but merely threaten them.

            But, as Rabbi Shimon responds to his students, this accepting attitude to exile was limited to the communities of Shushan, who lived at the center of Persian life and thus viewed the Persian capital as an adequate replacement for Jerusalem.  Elsewhere, the Jews did not participate in Achashverosh's celebration of the Jews' permanent loss of their Temple and homeland, and thus they were not deserving of destruction.  In his view, they committed what at first appears to be an even worse crime: they engaged in pagan worship.  The students therefore wondered, if Benei Yisrael completely renounced their faith, if they abandoned Judaism entirely and became pagan, then by what merit did they earn the great miracle of Purim?  To this Rabbi Shimon responds that their worship was only an external demonstration.  Internally, they remained steadfastly loyal to the Almighty, and in this merit they were saved from Haman's edict.

*****

            The Gemara in Masekhet Chulin (139b) searches for an allusion to Haman in the Torah, and locates it in a verse from Parashat Bereishit (3:11).  After Adam and Chava eat from the forbidden tree, God asks Adam, "Have you eaten from the tree from which I have commanded you not to eat?"  In Hebrew, this question reads, "Ha-min ha-etz asher tzivitikha le-vilta akhol mimena akhalta."  The Gemara notes that when punctuated differently, the first word of this clause – "ha-min" – can be read as "Haman."  Hence we have an allusion to Haman already early on in the Chumash.

            Clearly, however, we should assume that the Gemara here points to something more than a coincidental similarity between the word "ha-min" and the name "Haman."  Wherein lies the connection between this verse and the story of Haman?

            Rav Menachem Kasher, in his Torah Sheleima (Bereishit, chapter 3, notes 63-64), contends that this Gemara refers to a Midrash cited by Rabbotenu Ba'alei Ha-Tosefot (in their comments to this verse in Bereishit).  The Midrash writes that God told Adam after his sin, "I said you should be hung on a tree, but instead [this punishment] will be put aside and saved for Haman, who will be hung on it."  This verse alludes to Haman because it was Haman who received, so-to-speak, the punishment that Adam had deserved for violating God's command and partaking of the forbidden tree.

            In light of yesterday's discussion, however, we might suggest a different basis for associating Adam's sin with the story of Purim.  Yesterday we saw that Rabbi Shimon Bar Yochai's students initially suggest that the Jews during Ester's time deserved destruction for having taken part in Achashverosh's festive celebration in Shushan.  Many later writers have tried to explain why this participation rendered the Jews deserving of total annihilation.  Even assuming that they actually partook of non-kosher food and wine, why is this transgression punishable by such a harsh decree?  The "Sha'ar Bat Rabim" is cited (in Rav Shemuel Alter's "Likutei Batar Likutei" to Masekhet Megila) as pointing to the story of Adam and Chava as a precedent for such a punishment in response to eating forbidden food.  The Jews deserved destruction for participating in the Persian king's celebration just as Adam and Chava brought death upon humanity as punishment for their partaking of the forbidden fruit.  What is behind this parallel?

            As we discussed yesterday, Achashverosh's feast celebrated what he perceived to be the permanence of the Temple's destruction and Benei Yisrael's exile.  He mistakenly calculated that the seventy-year period prophesied by Yirmiyahu had terminated.  With the Mikdash yet to be rebuilt, Achashverosh assumed that the prophecy will never come true, and the Jews will remain forever under Persian rule and never return en masse to rebuild their Temple or homeland.  By participating in this feast, the Jews expressed their acceptance of this fate.  The Jews of Shushan no longer saw their situation as a temporary accommodation; they accepted exile as a permanent condition.  Under the benevolent rule of the Persians, they thought, they had no need to resettle Eretz Yisrael or rebuild the Temple.

            This may help explain the connection between the Jews' mistake in Shushan and Adam's sin in Gan Eden.  Last week, we saw that the Mishkan and Beit Ha-mikdash serve as the means of man's return to Gan Eden.  The "keruvim" that guard the entrance to the garden (see Bereishit 3:24) now symbolically stood inside the Mishkan inviting man inside, to enjoy a close, intimate relationship with the Almighty, similar to man's relationship to God in Gan Eden before the sin.  By willfully forfeiting the Beit Ha-mikdash, by accepting exile as a permanent solution, the Jews of Shushan in effect repeated the sin of Adam Ha-rishon, they drove themselves out from Gan Eden.  Just as Adam forfeited his unique relationship with God for the temporary enjoyment of the fruit of the forbidden tree, so did Benei Yisrael forego on the closeness to God made available by the Temple in order to enjoy the physical and material comforts of Shushan.

            Thus, the Torah alludes to Haman in the verse, "ha-min ha-etz… "  Haman threatened the Jews when they, like Adam, partook of the forbidden food, when rather than cultivating a close relationship with God in the "Gan Eden" of Yerushalayim, they preferred instead the fruits of Shushan, the lifestyle of food, drink and luxury that characterized the society in which they lived.

*****

            A number of years ago, a group of yeshiva students serving in active duty in the Israeli Defense Forces were scheduled to embark on a military mission on the night of Purim, which made it impossible for them to conduct the Megila reading at night.  Their only option was to read the Megila earlier, before sundown Erev Purim.  Does Halakha permit reading the Megila before the end of the 13^th of Adar, before nightfall?  Further complicating matters, Purim that year fell on Motza'ei Shabbat (as it does this year, 5764).  Assuming that we would generally permit Megila reading to take place before dark, would we allow reading the Megila on Shabbat?

            The Rosh Yeshiva, HaRav Yehuda Amital shlit"a, was asked to issue a halakhic ruling on the matter, and he printed his response in the yeshiva's publication, "Alon Shevut" (vol. 81).  The first point that must be made is the ruling of the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 688:7) concerning a person who must embark on a trip and will not have access to a Megila on Purim.  The Shulchan Arukh rules, based on the Yerushalmi, that in such a situation one may read the Megila anytime from Rosh Chodesh Adar.  However, due to the controversy surrounding this position of the Yerushalmi (many believe that the Talmud Bavli does not accept this ruling), the Shulchan Arukh requires omitting the berakhot normally recited before and after Megila reading.  Since we never recite a berakha if its obligation is questionable, we do not allow reciting the berakhot on Megila reading if one reads before Purim itself.

            Accordingly, in our situation, the soldiers may undoubtedly read the Megila.  The question, however, remains, is there any room to allow them to recite the berakhot, as well?  Since they read the Megila not a week or even a day before Purim, but just shortly before sundown, can we perhaps consider this reading as being conducted on Purim itself, thus allowing for the recitation of the berakhot?

            This question is subject to a debate among the authorities.  The Beit Yosef (in 687 and 692) cites from earlier sources – the Orchot Chayim (who cites this ruling from the Ra'avad) and Terumat Ha-deshen – that some communities had the custom of allowing the Megila to be read before sundown.  The concern in these communities was for those such as ill patients and pregnant women who have difficulty fasting.  Since we generally observe the day before Purim as Ta'anit Ester ("the Fast of Ester"), and one may not eat once Purim begins until after Megila reading, certain communities decided to read the Megila early, before sundown, to make it easier for those who have difficulty fasting.  The Terumat Ha-deshen bases this position on a ruling of Rabbenu Tam regarding the recitation of shema.  Towards the beginning of the fourth chapter of Masekhet Berakhot, the Tanna'im argue as to whether one may recite mincha until sundown, or only until "pelag ha-mincha" (one and one-quarter halakhic hours before sundown).  In other words, there is a debate as to whether the halakhic "day" ends at sundown or at pelag ha-mincha.  According to Rabbenu Tam, this dispute applies to the nighttime shema, as well.  Meaning, the position that views sundown as the end of the day and beginning of nighttime will allow reciting the nighttime shema only at that point; conversely, the view allowing the recitation of mincha only until pelag ha-mincha will permit one to recite shema already at pelag.  Since the Gemara does not reach a conclusive decision regarding this debate, and explicitly allows one to follow either view, Rabbenu Tam permits one to recite shema already at pelag ha-mincha.

            On the basis of this ruling, the Terumat Ha-deshen explains the practice of reading the Megila before sundown, after pelag ha-mincha.  Since we may consider nighttime as having begun at pelag ha-mincha, already at that point one may read the Megila with its berakhot.

            The Peri Chadash, however, vehemently rejects this view.  He claims that since most authorities do not accept Rabbenu Tam's position, we cannot use it as a basis for permitting Megila reading before sundown.  He writes that communities who follow this practice do not fulfill the requirement of Megila reading and recite berakhot le-vatala (wasted berakhot, a grave violation).

            The Bei'ur Halakha (692) cites both views and notes that despite the Peri Chadash's objections, many Acharonim defend the practice cited by the Beit Yosef.  He therefore concludes that although one should preferably read only after sundown, there is room to allow reading earlier under extenuating circumstances.  Rav Amital pointed out that when the city of Jerusalem was besieged during the War of Independence and congregations could not assemble after dark, the city's rabbis ruled that people should rely on this ruling and conduct Megila reading before sundown.

            In our case, then, soldiers who are assigned to a military operation which prevents them from reading after dark may rely in this position of the Orchot Chayim and Terumat Ha-deshen, and read the Megila with its berakhot before sundown, after pelag ha-mincha.  (If their only option is to read it before pelag ha-mincha, then they do not recite the berakhot.)  Tomorrow we will discuss whether or not this would apply in a similar situation when Purim falls on Shabbat.

*****

            The haftara for Shabbat Zakhor (the Shabbat immediately preceding Purim) is taken from the book of Shemuel I (chapter 15), and tells the story of King Shaul's failure to heed God's command to destroy the nation of Amalek.  The prophet Shemuel orders the king to destroy the entire nation, to "spare no one" (15:3).  Shaul immediately mobilizes an army and launches the offensive against Benei Yisrael's archenemy, but fails to complete the mission: "Shaul and the troops spared Agag and the best of the sheep, the oxen, the fatlings, the lambs, and all else that was of value" (15:9).  God immediately speaks to Shemuel and informs him that as a result of Shaul's non-compliance, he is to be denied the privilege of a dynasty.  He has forfeited the kingship, which is now to be transferred "to another who is worthier than you" (15:28).

            A review of this narrative reflects a certain tendency of Shaul, to overly concern himself with his image and reputation among the people.  In response to Shemuel's question as to why he hears "this bleating of sheep… and the lowing of oxen" (15:14), the king answers, "They were brought from the Amalekites, for the troops spared the choicest of the sheep and oxen… "  The prophet responds, "You may look small to yourself, but you are the head of tribes of Israel.  The Lord anointed you king over Israel… " (15:17-18).  Shaul excuses himself on the grounds that it was the people, the soldiers, who decided to bring back the sheep and cattle.  But Shemuel reminds him that the king's function as "head of the tribes of Israel" is to oppose the popular decision in order to uphold the truth.  Shaul failed in his role as king because rather than leading the people, he was led by them.  Later, Shaul again pleads his case, albeit with a slight admission of guilt: "I did wrong to transgress the Lord's command and your instructions; but I was afraid of the troops and I yielded to them" (15:24).  Shaul confesses that he did not have the courage to stand up against the people.

            After Shemuel informs Shaul of the grave consequences of his transgression, Shaul pleads, "Please, honor me in the presence of the elders of my people and in the presence of Israel, and come back with me until I have bowed low to the Lord your God" (15:30).  Afraid of the humiliation he would suffer if Shemuel would leave him, Shaul begs the prophet to remain for the celebration planned in honor of his victory.

            The Maggid of Duvna, in his work on the haftarot "Kokhav Mi-yaakov," writes (commenting on the haftara for Parashat Shemini) that this quality of Shaul helps explain an otherwise obscure conversation between the next king, David, and his wife – Shaul's daughter – Mikhal.  In Sefer Shemuel II (chapter 6), David, shortly after his conquest of Jerusalem, orders that the aron (ark) be brought to the newly captured city.  David leads the ark's transport with fervent celebration: "David whirled with all his might before the Lord" (6:14).  As David danced in celebration, "Mikhal, daughter of Shaul, looked out of the window and saw King David leaping and whirling before the Lord; and she despised him for it" (6:16).  When David comes home, "Mikhal daughter of Shaul came out to meet David" and berates him for his undignified conduct.  Why do the verses refer to Mikhal as "daughter of Shaul," rather than "David's wife"?  (Shaul had been killed a number of years before this incident.)  The Maggid of Duvna explains that Mikhal here displays her father's quality of excessive preoccupation with reputation and what others think.  Speaking with a "Shaul mindset," she, the "daughter of Shaul," scornfully asks her husband, "Didn't the king of Israel do himself honor today – exposing himself today in the sight of the slavegirls of his subjects, as one of the riffraff might expose himself!"  Mikhal criticizes David for not taking into account how people will perceive him.  True, he is sincerely overcome by joy over the relocation of the ark.  But, she felt, the king must moderate his conduct in order to retain the honor and respect of his subjects.

            To this David responds, "It was before the Lord who chose me instead of your father and all his family and appointed me ruler over the Lord's people Israel!  I will dance before the Lord and dishonor myself even more… " (6:21-22).  David emphasizes to Mikhal that he was specifically chosen over Shaul for this very reason – for unlike Shaul, David concerns himself with doing the right thing rather than appearing honorable before his people.  He will therefore dance as much and as enthusiastically as he can, regardless of what "the slavegirls of his subjects" think of him as a result.

*****

            As we discussed yesterday, the haftara for Shabbat Zakhor, taken from Sefer Shemuel I (chapter 15), tells of Shaul's violation of the prophet's command to completely destroy the nation of Amalek.  When the prophet, Shemuel, approaches Shaul and reprimands him for his disobedience, Shaul excuses himself by claiming that it was the people who decided to keep the cattle of Amalek and use it for sacrifices to God.

            In Shemuel's response to Shaul's attempted justification, he declares, "For rebellion is like the sin of divination, and 'haftzar' [to be defined later] is like the iniquity of 'terafim' [idolatry]" (15:23).  Different interpretations have been suggested for this verse.  According to Radak, the two clauses of the verse convey the same message in different words: defying God's word is tantamount to grave transgressions such as witchcraft and idolatry.  The Targum, by contrast, explains that Shemuel here speaks of two different wrongs.  Violating God's word is equal in gravity to sorcery, but "haftzar" – adding onto the words of the prophets, amounts to something even worse: idolatry.  The Targum here likely refers to the Gemara in Masekhet Yoma (22b) which describes Shaul's thought process as he entered this war.  Commenting on the verse, "he quarreled in the wadi" (15:5), the Gemara explains that Shaul "quarreled" with the Almighty regarding a mitzva involving a "wadi" – namely, egla arufa.  The Torah towards the end of Parashat Shoftim (Devarim 21:1-9) commands that when a murder victim is found in between two cities and the killer cannot be found, the elders of the nearer city perform a special ritual in an undeveloped wadi to atone for the crime.  Shaul argued that if for the death of a single individual a community bears collective responsibility, then how can Shaul lead a campaign to destroy an entire people?  He therefore stopped short of total destruction of Amalek, imposing his own intuition and reasoning onto the explicit command of the prophet.  Shemuel informs the king that this self-claimed power to override or alter the words of God's prophets amounts to nothing less than idolatry.

            The Malbim poses a third interpretation.  He claims that the verse here distinguishes between "meri" – disobedience itself, and "haftzar" – which he interprets to mean "persistence" (see Bereishit 19:3, for example).  Disobeying God's commands may be likened to sorcery in that the sinner places his trust in means other than the Almighty's word.  But even worse, explains the Malbim, is "haftzar" – insisting on one's piety and refusing to accept criticism and acknowledge wrongdoing, which the prophet equates with idolatry.  Shemuel indicates to Shaul that God could have perhaps forgiven him for his disobedience, but Shaul will not be forgiven for his denial of guilt and attempts to justify his conduct.

            This likely solves the mystery of the harsh punishment decreed upon Shaul – his family's loss of kingship – as opposed to the forgiveness granted to his successor, David.  Although David is severely punished for sleeping with Batsheva (see Shemuel II, chapters 11-12), he nevertheless retains the dynasty; God's promise of David's progeny's eternal kingship remains fully intact even after the sin.  Several explanations have been offered to distinguish between the sins committed by Shaul and David.  One simple approach, perhaps, is that David responds to the prophet's rebuke with but two words: "chatati la-Hashem" ("I have sinned to God" – Shemuel II 12:13).  He makes no attempts at justification, he is not guilty of what Shemuel terms "haftzar" – stubborn insistence on the correctness of one's actions.  Nor does David come up with any excuses for his misdeed.  Though his wholehearted admission of guilt in no way absolves David from punishment, it does allow him and his family to continue sitting upon the throne of Israel.  Though the Almighty does not demand perfection, He does demand that we acknowledge our imperfections make sincere efforts to correct them.

*****

            The second half of Parashat Tetzaveh (chapter 29) describes the process known as the "milu'im," the formal consecration of Aharon and his sons for the kehuna (priesthood).  This procedure involved mainly the offering of special sacrifices by Aharon and his sons.  In several places throughout his commentary to this section (e.g. to 29:22), Rashi writes that during this seven-day process, Moshe officiated as the kohen, while Aharon and his sons were the ba'alim (ones bringing the offering).  Thus, the milu'im offering, Rashi explains, was a shelamim – meaning, a korban whose meat is shared by the altar, the kohen and the ba'alim.  Moshe receives from milu'im offering the portion that goes to the kohanim, while Aharon and his sons eat the remainder of the meat (besides the fats that are placed on the altar), as the ba'alim do in regular korbanot.

            Towards the end of this section, the Torah instructs Aharon and his sons to partake of the meat of the milu'im offering: "They shall eat those [parts of the sacrifice] through which expiation is made, to be ordained and consecrated; they may not be eaten by a layman, for they are holy" (29:33).  Clearly, this verse refers to the kohanim, the ones for whom "expiation is made" through the milu'im process, preparing them to serve as kohanim.  In light of what we said above, then, this verse speaks of the consumption of the meat by the ba'alim – the ones bringing the korban, and not of the kohen's consumption of his share of the korban.

            In truth, however, this verse speaks of the meat's consumption by both the kohen and the ba'alim.  The Gemara in Masekhet Makkot (18a) cites the final clause of this verse – "they may not be eaten by a layman"- as the basis for the prohibition against the consumption by a layman of meat designated for the kohanim.  Clearly, then, according to the Gemara, Aharon and his sons partook of the meat of the milu'im not merely as ba'alim, but also as kohanim.  Otherwise, the Gemara could not have derived from this verse any halakhot concerning meat earmarked for kohanim.

            Now in several places in the Talmud (Yevamot 40a; Pesachim 59b; Yoma 68b), the Gemara understands this verse as introducing the mitzva of akhilat kodashim – to partake of sacrificial meat.  The imperative, "They shall eat" implies a mitzva, a command, which applies for all time.  The Gemara does not specify, however, to which consumption it refers when it speaks of this mitzva.  Is it a mitzva for the kohanim to partake of kodashim (sacrificial meat), or for the ba'alim, or both?

            We find different views on this issue in the Rishonim.  Rashi, in his commentary to the Gemara in Masekhet Pesachim, writes explicitly that the mitzva applies to the kohanim as well as to the ba'alim.  The Rambam, by contrast, in his Sefer Ha-mitzvot (asei 89), describes this obligation as a "mitzva for the kohanim to eat the meat of kodashei kodashim [sacrifices whose meat is eaten only by the kohanim]."  The Ramban, in his critique of the Rambam's listing of the mitzvot, agrees with the Rambam in principle that from this verse we derive only a mitzva for kohanim to partake of sacrificial meat.  However, he claims that another verse (Devarim 14:23) introduces a separate mitzva for ba'alim to eat kodashim, as well.

            At first glance, the view of the Rambam and Ramban appears difficult to understand.  If, as we have seen, the verse cited by the Gemara speaks of the kohanim partaking of the milu'im meat both as kohanim and as ba'alim, then how can we distinguish between the two?  If we derive the mitzva from this verse, why should it not apply to both kohanim and ba'alim?

            The likely answer emerges from the verse's emphasis on the "expiation" ("kapara") earned through the consumption of the sacrificial meat.  The Talmud in many places notes that the ba'alim earn expiation through the consumption of the kohanim ("kohanim okhelin u-ba'alim mitkaperim").  Evidently, according to the Rambam and Ramban, the Gemara felt that the imperative implied in this verse refers only to the special type of eating that yields atonement, and thus the mitzva of akhilat kodashim applies only to the kohanim, and not to the ba'alim.

(Taken from Rav Shemuel Barukh Deutch, "Birkat Kohen" on Parashat Tetzaveh)

David Silverberg

This shiur is provided courtesy of the Virtual Beit Midrash, the premier source of online courses on Torah and Judaism - 14 different courses on all levels, for all backgrounds.

Make Jewish learning part of your week on a regular basis - enroll in the
Virtual Beit Midrash

(c) Yeshivat Har Etzion2002 All rights reserved to Yeshivat Har Etzion

Yeshivat Har Etzion
Alon Shvut, Israel, 90433
office@etzion.org.il