The Israel Koschitzky Virtual Beit Midrash

Surf A Little Torah
Yeshivat Har Etzion

PARASHAT TETZAVEH

By Rav David Silverberg

Parashat Tetzaveh deals mainly with the topic of the kehuna (priesthood), outlining the various sacred vestments worn by the kohanim and the procedure for their consecration. God introduces this topic by instructing Moshe, "You shall bring forward your brother Aharon, with his sons, from among the Israelites, to serve me as priests" (28:1). The Midrash (Shemot Rabba 37:2) seems to have understood this command's formulation as suggesting Moshe's initial ambivalence in this regard. The Midrash tells that when Moshe descended from Mount Sinai and witnessed Benei Yisrael's worship of the golden calf, which Aharon himself had fashioned, he assumed that his brother had fully participated in this grievous sin. The Almighty, however, understood that Aharon acquiesced to the people's demand to make a graven image merely as a stalling tactic, in the hope that Moshe would return before the people began worshipping the idol. In this verse – "You shall bring forward your brother Aharon" – God reassures Aharon that despite his active participation in the tragic incident of the golden calf, "I appoint only you over the sacrifices of my children" – he will enjoy the exclusive privilege of serving as high priest.

(Incidentally, this passage is one of several Midrashic sources supporting the position of Rashi, which we discussed last week, that the incident of the calf occurred prior to God's command concerning the Mishkan.)

This Midrash takes a clear stance regarding the difficult issue of Aharon's involvement in the worship of the golden calf. Although the straightforward reading of the golden calf narrative (chapter 32) leaves little room for justifying Aharon's involvement, this Midrash clears his record, so-to-speak, by explaining that Aharon acted with the purist of intentions.

Later in Chumash, however, we find a much harsher divine response to Aharon's participation in the golden calf debacle. In Sefer Devarim, Moshe recounts to the people the incident of the calf, and recalls that "the Lord was angry enough at Aharon to have destroyed him; so I also interceded for Aharon at that time" (Devarim 9:20). Rashi, in his commentary to Devarim, writes that God had decreed death upon all of Aharon's sons on account of his involvement in the golden calf; Moshe's prayers on his behalf were effective enough to save but two of Aharon's four sons. From Sefer Devarim, then, a far less forgiving attitude towards Aharon emerges. As opposed to the Midrash in Sefer Shemot, which speaks of God's reassurance to Aharon due to his pure motives, in Sefer Devarim we read of God exacting harsh punishment on account of his misdeed.

Rav Eliyahu Meir Bloch (cited by Rav Yissachar Frand – www.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5764/tetzaveh.html) extracted from here the critical lesson of avoiding clear-cut, black-and-white assessments of people and their conduct. Not every decision a person makes or action he performs can be definitively categorized as positive or negative. Very often, people's conduct can best be described as some complex combination of the two. In Aharon's case, the Midrash tells us that although God clearly disapproved of his decision, and punished him severely as a result, He nevertheless recognized Aharon's sincere motives and the complexity of his situation, to the extent that He could still name him the nation's first kohen gadol. We need not approve of an individual's decisions to appreciate the motives underlying those decisions and the complex circumstances that could easily give rise to erroneous judgments.

Contemporary Jewry, much like Aharon at the foot of Mount Sinai, finds itself in a very complex situation on many levels, which presents many difficult issues requiring resolution, and many difficult decisions that need to be made. Naturally, different people and different factions will arrive at very different conclusions. We must remember, however, that disagreeing with a decision reached by a given individual, community, movement, or, for that matter, government, need not necessarily amount to complete rejection. Just as the Almighty recognizes and takes into account the sincere motives and complexities underlying erroneous judgments, so must we afford this same courtesy to those of different ideologies, and respect their sincerity and virtues to at least the same extent as we object to their practical conclusions.

*****

Parashat Tetzaveh tells of the bigdei kehuna – the garments worn by the kohanim while performing the service in the Mishkan. The Torah's description of these garments, just like its discussion of the Mishkan and its furnishings in the preceding chapters, is very specific and rich in detail. Surprisingly, however, the Torah provides no description at all for one particularly important component of the kohen gadol's wardrobe – the "Urim Ve-tumim." We are told only what to do with the Urim Ve-tumim, but given no information as to what it actually was: "Inside the breastplate you shall place the Urim Ve-tumim, so that they are over Aharon's heart when he comes before the Lord" (28:30).

Later in Chumash, we learn at least of the function served by the Urim Ve-tumim. Before Moshe's death, God bids him to name Yehoshua as his successor, and adds, "he shall present himself to Elazar the [high] priest, who shall on his behalf seek the decision of the Urim before the Lord. By such instruction they shall go out and by such instruction they shall come in" (27:21). In other words, despite Yehoshua's position of leadership, he must still consult Elazar, the kohen gadol, on matters of national concern, and Elazar will seek counsel from the Urim Ve-tumim. It clearly emerges, then, that the Urim Ve-tumim served as a kind of oracle by which Benei Yisrael could seek God's direct guidance on matters of national import. Indeed, we find numerous examples throughout Tanakh of queries submitted to God for guidance, and Chazal and the commentators explain that the consultation occurred through the Urim Ve-tumim. The Gemara (Yoma 73) explains the etymology of the term "Urim Ve-tumim" as referring to this function. "Urim," which evolves from the Hebrew word for "light," alludes to its ability to "illuminate," or clarify, and "tumim," which is related to the word for "wholeness" of "completeness," refers to the fact that the Urim Ve-tumim always "completes" its predictions, meaning, they can never be reversed.

Still, nowhere in Tanakh do we find any clarification as to how the Urim Ve-tumim were made, of what they consisted, or what they looked like. The most common approach, which appears in Targum Yonatan Ben Uziel and is adopted by Rashi, the Ramban, Abarbanel and others, is that "Urim Ve-tumim" refers to a script of the ineffable Name of God. The letters of the Name would protrude in response to the kohen's inquiry, and he would decipher them to arrive at an answer. The Ramban explains that the Torah felt no need to describe the Urim Ve-tumim because the instruction to insert them into the breastplate was given to Moshe alone, who was already familiar with the details. As the Ramban notes, in the Torah's narrative of the formal consecration of Aharon and his sons as kohanim (Vayikra 8:8), Moshe himself places the Urim Ve-tumim into the breastplate. Seemingly, the Urim Ve-tumim were not prepared by the team of artisans who fashioned the priestly vestments. Moshe himself made the Urim Ve-tumim and personally inserted them into the breastplate. For this reason, the Ramban explains, it was unnecessary for the Torah to present the details concerning the Urim Ve-tumim.

Astonishingly enough, the Rambam, in his thorough and comprehensive presentation of the laws concerning the priestly garments (Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash, chapter 9), makes no reference whatsoever to the Urim Ve-tumim. Elsewhere in his writings, he indeed discusses the process of consulting with the Urim Ve-tumim (Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira 4:1; Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash 10:10-11; Moreh Nevukhim 2:35), but nowhere does he provide any information as to what they were or how they were made. Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," concludes on this basis that according to the Rambam, the term "Urim Ve-tumim" is but a poetic reference to the twelve stones set into the kohen gadol's breastplate. In the preceding verses, the Torah describes the breastplate and specifies the twelve precious stones which were affixed to the breastplate, and upon which the names of the twelve tribes were engraved. According to the Rambam, Rav Mecklenberg suggests, these stones themselves were the Urim Ve-tumim, and the letters of the tribes' names would protrude in response to the kohen gadol's query. This easily explains why the Torah speaks of the Urim Ve-tumim as if they were something with which we already familiar – because they were the stones described just several verses earlier. Likewise, this explains why the Rambam makes no explicit reference to the Urim Ve-tumim in his description of the breastplate, in Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash. In truth, he does – when describing the arrangement of the breastplate's twelve stones.

As Rav Mecklenberg acknowledges, however, the Kesef Mishneh in several places (Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash 9:6, 10:10) appears to ascribe to the Rambam the more common view, that "Urim Ve-tumim" refers to a script with the divine Name. The Kesef Mishneh does not, however, explain why the Rambam would neglect to make reference to such an important part of the breastplate when describing how it was fashioned.

Tomorrow we will iy"H elaborate on this position of the Rambam, as understood by the "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," and bring additional sources that appear to corroborate this view.

*****

Yesterday, we noted that the Torah instructs in Parashat Tetzaveh to insert the "Urim Ve-tumim" into the kohen gadol's breastplate (28:30), but provides no information as to what exactly the "Urim Ve-tumim" were. Furthermore, the Rambam makes no reference at all to the Urim Ve-tumim in his description of the priestly garments, in Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash (chapter 9). Rav Yaakov Mecklenberg, in his "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," concluded on this basis that the Rambam understood the term "Urim Ve-tumim" as a reference to the stones that were affixed to the breastplate, as described in Parashat Tetzaveh (28:17-21) and in the Rambam's Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash (9:6). As opposed to the more common explanation, which identifies the Urim Ve-tumim as a sheet or tablet containing the ineffable Name of God, the Rambam understood the term as a poetic reference to the breastplate's stones.

Rav Mecklenberg draws support for his theory from the Rambam's ruling in Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira (4:1; see also Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash 10:10), requiring the Urim Ve-tumim even during the Second Temple period, when the kohanim could not consult with them. (As we discussed yesterday, the Urim Ve-tumim were a prophetic device, of sorts, that provided answers directly from God to pressing issues of national concern.) The Rambam tells that the high priests of the Second Temple did not have the prophetic powers necessary to decipher the letters protruding from the breastplate in response to inquiries. Nevertheless, the Rambam claims, they were required to wear the Urim Ve-tumim in their breastplate given the obligation to don all eight priestly garments while performing the Temple service. The Ra'avad challenges this ruling in light of the simple fact that the Urim Ve-tumim are not generally listed among the high priest's eight garments. Apparently, the Rambam viewed the Urim Ve-tumim as an integral part of the choshen (breastplate); without it, the choshen loses its formal status, thereby rendering the kohen's uniform incomplete and hence disqualifying the Temple service. Rav Mecklenberg contends that the Rambam's position far better accommodates the definition of "Urim Ve-tumim" as the breastplate's stones, which are clearly integral to its very definition and status. If the Urim Ve-tumim were a sheet containing the divine Name, it would be more difficult to consider it an integral feature of the breastplate.

This line of reasoning becomes particularly significant in light of the fact that Tosefot, in Masekhet Yoma (21b), follow the Rambam's position concerning the use of the Urim Ve-tumim in the Second Temple. They, too, argue that despite the kohanim's inability to consult the Urim Ve-tumim in the Second Temple, it was nevertheless required as part of the kohen gadol's eight garments. Hence, as Rav Chayim Hirschensohn comments in his "Nimukei Rashi," it would appear that Tosefot define "Urim Ve-tumim" to mean the breastplate's stones, rather than a script containing God's Name, in accordance with the Rambam's view, as understood by "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala."

It should be noted that the Kesef Mishneh (Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira, ibid.) interprets the Rambam's position concerning the Second Temple period much differently. He seems to accepts the Ra'avad's argument, that the Urim Ve-tumim are not required as part of the kohen gadol's uniform during the Temple service, and therefore suggests that the Rambam here employs the term "Urim Ve-tumim" as a euphemistic reference to the breastplate itself. According to his reading of the Rambam, the Rambam in fact did not require the Urim Ve-tumim during the Second Temple period, and in this ruling he refers not to the Urim Ve-tumim themselves, but rather to the choshen. Indeed, as we noted yesterday, the Kesef Mishneh understood the Rambam as defining "Urim Ve-tumim" as the script of the divine Name. Accordingly, the Ra'avad's argument, that the Urim Ve-tumim does not constitute an indispensable component of the kohen gadol's uniform, is indeed quite compelling. The Kesef Mishneh thus had no choice but to reinterpret the Rambam's comments to mean that the Second Temple kohanim were in fact not required to wear the Urim Ve-tumim.

Rav Menachem Kasher, in his Torah Sheleima (chapter 28, note 85, and appendices to Parashat Tetzaveh, 11), adopts Rav Mecklenberg's approach to the Rambam's position, and cites additional sources to this effect. For one thing, the Midrash Lekach Tov writes explicitly that "Urim Ve-tumim" refers to the breastplate's stones. In addition, Rav Kasher refers us to two responsa of the Geonim, one from Rav Sherira Gaon and Rav Hai Gaon, the other from Rav Nissim Gaon, which similarly follow this approach of the Midrash Lekach Tov. Perhaps even more interestingly, Rabbi Kasher notes that the Rambam's son, Rabbi Avraham ben Ha-Rambam, in his commentary, also interprets "Urim Ve-tumim" as a reference to the jewels on the breastplate. Quite possibly, Rabbi Avraham faithfully followed his father's position in this regard and explained the Urim Ve-tumim accordingly.

*****

Over the last two days we have discussed the ambiguity surrounding the "Urim Ve-tumim," which, as the Torah instructs in Parashat Tetzaveh (28:30), were placed in the kohen gadol's breastplate. We discussed the theory advanced by Rav Yaakov Mecklnberg, in his "Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala," claiming that the Rambam identified the Urim Ve-tumim as the precious stones affixed the breastplate. This easily explains why neither the Torah nor the Rambam ever provides any details as to what the Urim Ve-tumim were or how they looked. Once they presented the details of the twelve stones and how they were arranged, this itself amounts to an explanation of the Urim Ve-tumim. The more common view, however, adopted by Rashi and Ramban, among others, defines "Urim Ve-tumim" as a reference to a script of the ineffable divine Name that was placed in the breastplate.

Rav Yehuda Gershuni, in an article printed in the journal, "Or Ha-mizrach" (vol. 17, Nissan, 5728), traces these two views back to a much earlier source – the Talmud Yerushalmi. The Yerushalmi in Masekhet Shekalim (6:1) addresses the incident told in Sefer Shemuel I (14:18) where King Shaul decides (initially) to consult the Urim Ve-tumim on the battlefield, and he orders the high priest to bring the ark for this purpose. At first glance, this appears to indicate that the ark's presence is necessary when consulting the Urim Ve-tumim, and that the ark accompanied the Israelite army in battle. Indeed, the Yerushalmi cites one view that adopts this reading of the verse. A second view, however, claims that the ark did not join Benei Yisrael when they went to war, and King Shaul here refers not to the ark, but to a chest containing the priestly garments. According to this position, the ark's presence is not a prerequisite for the Urim Ve-tumim consultation.

Rav Gershuni notes that this debate in the Yerushalmi forms the basis of a dispute between Rashi and the Rambam concerning the proper procedure when consulting the Urim Ve-tumim. The Gemara (Yoma 73a) requires that the kohen gadol face "the Shekhina," which Rashi understands as a reference to the breastplate, which, in accordance with Rashi's own view in defining "Urim Ve-tumim," contained the Name of God. By facing the script of this Name, the kohen gadol is considered to be facing "the Shekhina." The Rambam, by contrast, in Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash (10:11), claims that the kohen must face towards the ark. Since the Rambam – according to Rav Mecklenberg – does not interpret "Urim Ve-tumim" as the divine Name, then he must require the kohen to face the ark in order to be considered as "facing the Shekhina." The Rambam and Rashi thus debate the same issue discussed in the Yerushalmi: the Rambam requires the ark's presence for the Urim Ve-tumim consultation, whereas Rashi does not. And, as we noted, this issue appears to hinge on the question as to whether or not the Urim Ve-tumim was a script with the Name of God. If we accept this interpretation of "Urim Ve-tumim," then we have no need to require the kohen to face the ark during the consultation; he can instead look towards the divine Name on the breastplate. If, however, the Urim Ve-tumim were something else entirely, then we would require the ark's presence.

According to this analysis, Rav Gershuni writes, it emerges that the debate between the Rambam and the others as to the definition of "Urim Ve-tumim" can be traced back to the Talmud Yerushalmi.

*****

Over the last several days we have discussed the "Urim Ve-tumim," which the Torah, in Parashat Tetzaveh, requires inserting into the kohen gadol's breastplate (28:30). As we saw, the most prevalent approach, adopted by Rashi and Ramban, among others, explains the term "Urim Ve-tumim" as a reference to a script containing various Names of God. The letters would illuminate in response to queries posed to the Urim Ve-tumim, and the kohen gadol, through his powers of "ru'ach ha-kodesh" (divine inspiration), would interpret the letters to arrive at a conclusive decision regarding the issue at hand.

The Ramban, in his commentary, suggests that these two words – "urim" and "tumim" – refer to the two distinct stages of the Urim Ve-tumim's response. As mentioned, although the letters spelling the response would illuminate, the response at this point was still far from clear. The kohen gadol had to employ his prophetic powers to decipher the illuminated letters and thereby determine the rendered decision. As the Ramban here mentions, though the kohen gadol's power in this regard did not qualify as actual prophecy, it did require a certain degree of "ru'ach ha-kodesh." The Rambam, in his "Moreh Nevukhim" (2:35), classifies the Urim Ve-tumim consultation under the second of the categories of prophecy he delineates. In any event, the Ramban explains that the word "urim," which evolves from the Hebrew word for "light," refers to the first stage, the illumination of the letters of the Urim Ve-tumim. "Tumim," which relates to the Hebrew word "temimut" – "wholeness" or "completeness," alludes to the second stage, at which point the kohen gadol has acquired a complete understanding of the response to the inquiry the he had posed.

The question, however, remains, why was it necessary for the name of this device to reflect the two distinct stages? Why did the Torah see fit to underscore the distinction between these two stages?

The "Beit Av" (cited by Rav Yissachar Frand – www.torah.org/learning/ravfrand/5760/tetzaveh.html) suggests that the Torah here seeks to convey a general message regarding the process of decision-making on matters of religious significance. The wedge implicitly drawn here between these two stages expresses the notion that "illumination" – knowledge and scholarship – does not independently suffice. Decisions must be reached not only based on book knowledge, the "urim," but also through the "tumim" – an intuitive sense developed over time through experience and training. Someone who studies the relevant chapters in the Shulchan Arukh concerning a given topic does not suddenly become a qualified decisor regarding that subject. He may have acquired the "urim," but this does not guarantee his power of "tumim," to assimilate the information, "decipher" the "illuminated letters" he has seen and studied, and employ an intuitive, halakhic sixth-sense to reach a decision.

For this reason, perhaps, the Torah found it necessary to describe the kohen gadol's prophetic device with two terms – "urim" and "tumim," to highlight the two-step process involved in this system. This distinction must remind us that we may not reach rash decisions on religious matters based merely on a few pieces of knowledge that we manage to accumulate. Decisions of this nature require not only "urim" – concrete knowledge, but also "tumim" – insight and intuition that is acquired only over the course of many years of intensive study and consultation with experienced scholars.

*****

In describing the kohen gadol's breastplate in Parashat Tetzaveh, the Torah instructs tying the breastplate to the kohen gadol's efod (apron): "The breastplate shall be held in place by a cord of blue from its rings to the rings of the efod, so that it will be attached to the belt of the efod and does not come loose from the efod" (28:28). The Gemara in Masekhet Yoma (72a) cites Rabbi Elazar as commenting that the Torah here introduces a prohibition against loosening the breastplate from its place on the apron. Accordingly, one who does so is punished for having transgressed a "lo ta'aseh" – a "negative" Torah prohibition. Another Amora, Rav Acha Bar Yaakov, challenges this reading of the verse, claiming that the Torah perhaps instructed fastening the breastplate to the efod "so that" it does not come loose. Meaning, the phrase, "does not come loose" should not, according to this reading, be interpreted as a specific prohibition, but merely as providing the reason behind the instruction: the breastplate must be fastened in order to ensure that it will not come loose. Rabbi Elazar, however, rejects this reading, arguing that since the Torah did not explicitly state "SO THAT it does not come loose," the phrase should be read as, "it shall not come loose," thus introducing a specific prohibition.

The Gemara there cites two other verses where we apply a similar reading. Several verses later, the Torah describes the kohen gadol's me'il (robe), and instructs, "the opening shall have a binding of woven work round about… it shall not tear" (28:32). Here, too, the phrase, "it shall not tear" can be interpreted either as a prohibition against tearing the opening of the robe, or as explaining the purpose of the binding around the opening – to prevent it from tearing. In this context, too, the Gemara appears to conclude that this verse introduces a prohibition, since the Torah did not explicitly state "SO THAT it should not tear," which would indicate that gives the reason for the binding, rather than an independent provision.

Finally, the Gemara addresses a verse in Parashat Teruma (which we discussed last week), which instructs inserting the ark's poles in their rings along the sides of the ark, "and they shall not be removed from it" (25:15). Once again, since the Torah does not say, "SO THAT they shall not be removed from it," the Gemara concludes that this verse forbids removing the poles from the ark.

In light of this discussion, Rashi's comments concerning the opening of the kohen gadol's robe appear very difficult to understand. Commenting on the words, "it shall not tear," Rashi writes, "so that it does not tear." Seemingly, Rashi ignores the Gemara's conclusion and adopts the alternate interpretation, which reads this clause as an explanation, rather than a prohibition. This in itself would perhaps be understandable; on numerous occasions, Rashi and other classic exegetes take the liberty of interpreting the straightforward meaning of the Biblical text differently from Chazal's explanations. However, Rashi then immediately adds, "and one who tears it transgresses a prohibition, for this is one of the negative prohibitions of the Torah. This same applies to 'the breastplate shall not come loose from the efod' and 'the [the ark's poles] shall not be removed from it'." Astonishingly, Rashi embraces both readings of the verse. On the one hand, he interprets it as an explanation for the purpose behind the binding around the robe's opening; but at the same time, he reads the verse as introducing a prohibition against tearing the robe's opening.

Rav Chayim Hirschensohn, in his "Nimukei Rashi," speculates that Rashi here establishes a principle relevant to the system of listing the 613 commandments. As the Rambam establishes in the fifth of the thirteen rules by which he listed the commandments, the reason underlying a given obligation or prohibition does not in itself constitute one of the 613 mitzvot. We count only the obligation or prohibition, not its underlying reason. Now in these instances, regarding the breastplate, the robe's opening, and the ark's poles, Rashi adopts the straightforward reading of the text, whereby these clauses simply explain the previously mentioned instruction, rather than introduce a new prohibition. Nevertheless, Rashi informs us, we count these verses as three of the 613 commandments because the Torah formulated them as prohibitions, rather than explanations. Although reasons behind commandments do not themselves qualify for inclusion within the list of 613 commandments, when the Torah formulates these reasons in an imperative form, as in these three instances, then they are, indeed, to be included as independent commandments.

Thus, Rashi's comments are not inherently self-contradictory. He understands the phrase "it shall not tear" as, "so that it shall not tear," as the reason for the requirement to weave a binding around the robe's opening. However, the Torah's omission of the words, "so that" from this clause indicates that this constitutes as well a prohibition against tearing the opening of the robe.

*****

The kohen gadol's priestly vestments, as outlined in Parashat Tetzaveh, included two articles worn on the head. The tzitz, or frontlet, was worn on the kohen gadol's forehead (28:36), and the mitznefet, or headdress, was placed on top of his head (28:39).

The Gemara comments in Masekhet Zevachim (19a) that the tzitz and mitznefet were positioned in such a way that a small area of hair appeared in between them, and it was there where the kohen gadol would place his tefillin shel rosh. Clearly, the Gemara here assumes that the kohen gadol was not permitted to place his tefillin on top of the mitznefet, and he thus had to wear it in the small area in between the tzitz and mitznefet. The Rosh (Hilkhot Tefillin, 18; teshuva, 3:4) explained that the mitznefet would constitutes a "hefsek," or interruption, in between the tefillin and the kohen gadol's head. On this basis, the Rosh concluded that one's tefillin must be placed directly upon his skin, and no garment may stand in between the body and the tefillin.

By contrast, the Rashba, in his chiddushim to Masekhet Megila (24b), argues that one may, in fact, wear the tefillin shel rosh on top of his head covering. Addressing the aforementioned comment in Masekhet Zevachim, which suggests that the kohen gadol could not wear his head tefillin on top of his headdress, the Rashba explains that this has nothing at all to do with the laws of tefillin. Rather, it was forbidden for the kohen gadol to wear another article on top of his mitznefet, given its unique stature and sanctity. Hence, when dealing with an ordinary hat, regarding which no such halakha applies, one may, indeed, wear the hat underneath the tefillin shel rosh.

The Beit Yosef, in his lengthy discussion of this issue (O.C. 27), cites a number of the Rashba's responsa where he likewise presents this lenient view, permitting wearing the tefillin shel rosh on top of a hat, but with far more ambivalence. In these responsa, the Rashba admits to entertaining doubts on the matter, and acknowledges that conventional practice has always forbade wearing anything in between one's tefillin shel rosh and his head. In conclusion, the Beit Yosef follows the ruling of the Rivash (137), that if one cannot expose his head due to health considerations, and he thus stands to forfeit the mitzva of tefillin shel rosh, he may wear the tefillin on top of his hat. Likewise, he writes in the Shulchan Arukh (O.C. 27:5), "A person who is susceptible to illness, and if he would be required to place his head tefillin on his flesh he will not wear it at all – we may permit him to place his head tefillin on a thin hat close to his head." The Shulchan Arukh adds that he must cover the tefillin so as not to give the mistaken impression that one may optimally wear tefillin on top of his head. Furthermore, the Rema, both in Darkhei Moshe and in his glosses to the Shulchan Arukh, rules that in such a case one does not recite the berakha over his tefillin shel rosh, given the ambiguity surrounding this halakha.

The Magen Avraham (27:7) emphasizes the restriction of this leniency to thin hats. The Shulchan Aruh explicitly permits one with a health condition to wear tefillin shel rosh only on top of a thin hat, but not a tall or thick hat that extends above his head. As the Magen Avraham explains, placing tefillin on top of a tall or thick hat does not qualify as placing the tefillin on one's head. Only if the hat is very thin can the tefillin placed on top of the hat be considered as placed on the head.

At first glance, one might question this limitation imposed by the Shulchan Arukh. After all, the Rashba, upon whose ruling this leniency is based, writes explicitly that as far as the laws of tefillin are concerned, the kohen gadol would be permitted to wear his tefillin shel rosh on top of his mitznefet. Only the specific rules regarding the mitznefet prevented him from doing so. Now most pictures of the kohen gadol's mitznefet depict the headdress as a tall turban extending far above the kohen's head. Seemingly, if the Rashba would have permitted the kohen gadol to wear his tefillin on top of his mitznefet (again, were it not for the extraordinary rules regarding the headdress), then in cases when we rely on his ruling, we should permit wearing tefillin even over tall hats. Why, then, does the Shulchan Arukh permit under these circumstances wearing only thin hats?

Interestingly enough, the Shulchan Arukh's ruling may have resulted from the Rambam's position concerning the mitznefet. The Torah distinguishes between the mitznefet worn by the kohen gadol and the headdress worn by standard kohanim, to which it refers as "migaba'at" (see 28:40). The Rambam (Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash 8:2) claims that the standard kohanim's migba'ot were tall hats, whereas the kohen gadol's mitznefet more closely resembled a bandage over a wound. Accordingly, the mitznefet was, indeed, a very thin dressing, and this, perhaps, led the Shulchan Arukh to restrict the Rashba's leniency to thin hats.

We should note that other commentators dispute the Rambam's position. Rashi (28:4) explicitly describes the mitznefet as a tall, meshed hat. The Ramban (28:28:31) argues, claiming that the mitznefet was a wrapped turban, but does not indicate how tall the turban extended. The Ra'avad, in his critique of the Rambam's Mishneh Torah (in Hilkhot Kelei Ha-mikdash, ibid.), describes the mitznefet as a very tall turban, which extended higher than the hats worn by the standard kohanim.

(Based in part on Menachem Shechter's "Magen Avraham, Mitznefes, and Me" – www.yu.edu./riets/torah/enayim/archives/issue23/articles23.htm)