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PARASHAT VAYAKHEL

By Rav David Silverberg

In Parashat Vayakhel, Moshe assembles Benei Yisrael and instructs them with regard to Shabbat observance, before presenting them the laws concerning the construction of the Mishkan. Rashi, commenting on the parasha's second verse, writes, "He issued to them a warning regarding Shabbat before the command to construct the Mishkan, to indicate that it [the construction of the Mishkan] does not override Shabbat."

Rashi's comment implies that whenever we find two unrelated laws juxtaposed in the Torah, we are to infer that the first law takes precedence over the second. In our case, then, the instruction regarding Shabbat observance is presented before the rules concerning the Mishkan to indicate that the construction of the Mishkan is suspended on Shabbat.

Several later writers questioned this principle in light of Rashi's own remarks in his commentary to the verse in Parashat Kedoshim, "You shall each revere his mother and his father, and keep My sabbaths; I am the Lord your God" (Vayikra 19:3). Rashi, based on the Gemara's comment in Masekhet Yevamot, writes that the juxtaposition between Shabbat observance and the obligation to revere one's parents alludes to an important limitation on the latter obligation. Namely, one must observe Shabbat even if his parents ask him to desecrate it. Reverence towards parents does not take precedence over the reverence required towards the Almighty, and thus one may not obey his parent's wish to violate Shabbat. This verse, as Rashi adds, establishes a general principle that one must not violate Torah law to obey his parents. Now in this instance, of course, the second commandment presented takes precedence over the first. How, then, can Rashi infer from the sequence in Parashat Vayakhel that the construction of the Mishkan - which the Torah presents second – does not override the observance of Shabbat – which the Torah presents first?

Rav Eliyahu Mizrachi suggests that in truth, as Rashi implies here in Parashat Vayakhel, the first law mentioned takes precedence over the second. In Parashat Kedoshim, Rashi derives the precedence given to Shabbat observance over reverence towards parents not from the sequence of their presentation in the verse, but rather from the verse's concluding phrase – "I am the Lord your God." Indeed, Rashi, in his commentary to this phrase in Parashat Kedoshim, writes, "I am the Lord your God – both you and your parent are obligated with regard to My honor; therefore, do not listen to him to undermine My honor." Thus, the limit on the obligation to obey parents emerges not from the sequence of presentation, but rather from the otherwise superfluous phrase, "I am the Lord your God."

However, as the Maharal of Prague notes in his "Gur Aryeh," Rashi there also bases his conclusion on the juxtaposition between these two laws. Commenting on that verse in Parashat Kedoshim, Rashi writes, "Shabbat is juxtaposed to the reverence towards parents to say: Although I have warned you with regard to reverence towards your parent, if he says to you, 'Desecrate the Shabbat' do not listen to him." The question thus returns, according to Rashi's comments in Parashat Vayakhel, why doesn't this juxtaposition yield the exact opposite conclusion, that the obligation to obey parents – which is presented first – overrides Shabbat observance, which is presented last?

The Maharal therefore suggests a different explanation, namely, that the critical factor is not sequence of presentation, but rather the subjects' respective statuses as primary and secondary within the context in question. Here, in Parashat Vayakhel, Moshe assembles the nation primarily to convey to them the rules and guidelines regarding the construction of the Mishkan. The fact that he interjects a brief reminder concerning Shabbat observance thus expresses his emphasis on the inviolability of this obligation with respect to the topic at hand. Rashi therefore concludes on the basis of this presentation that the construction of the Mishkan does not override the strictures of Shabbat. In Parashat Kedoshim, the verse speaks primarily of the obligation to revere one's parents, and merely adds as an afterthought the obligation to observe Shabbat. Naturally, then, Rashi (based on the Gemara) understood that the Torah here seeks to underscore the unique importance of Shabbat in this context, namely, that it is not superseded by the wishes of one's parent.

Rav Chayim Hirschensohn, in his "Nimukei Rashi," suggests an entirely different approach to resolve this seeming contradiction. Here in Vayakhel, Rashi does not establish a general principle granting precedence to the law appearing first in the text. Rather, Rashi here refers specifically to Moshe's words to Benei Yisrael in this limited context, when he instructs them to build a Mishkan and thereby earn atonement for the sin of the golden calf. (In several places throughout his commentary to the final parshiyot of Sefer Shemot, Rashi indicates that in his view, the Mishkan served to atone for this sin.) Moshe tells Benei Yisrael that they can earn atonement through the construction of the Mishkan on condition that it proceeds precisely in accordance with God's rules. Consequently, it was necessary for him to remind them that they may perform this work only at times when God allows constructive activity – to the exclusion of Shabbat.

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Towards the beginning of Parashat Vayakhel, Moshe warns the people with regard to Shabbat observance, and specifies in particular the prohibition against making fire on Shabbat: "You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements on the day of Shabbat" (35:3). The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (20a) cites two views as to the halakhic significance of the phrase, "be-khol moshevoteikhem" ("throughout your settlements") in this verse. These views, presented by Rav Huna and Rav Chisda, arise over the course of a debate between these two Amora'im regarding the final mishna of the first chapter in Masekhet Shabbat. The mishna permits the kohanim serving in the Temple to kindle the flame in the "beit ha-mokeid" (we will define this term later) just prior to the onset of Shabbat. Generally speaking, one may not light a bonfire just prior to Shabbat unless there is enough time before the onset of Shabbat for the majority of the wood to catch fire. Chazal enacted this prohibition out of concern that one may stir the firewood after Shabbat begins in an attempt to spread the flame throughout the firewood. This prohibition, for some reason, was not applied to the "beit ha-mokeid" in the Temple. Rav Huna explains this halakha by citing our verse – "You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements on the day of Shabbat." The phrase "throughout your settlements" indicates that on the Temple grounds, one may, indeed, light a fire on Shabbat, and hence kindling the flame of the "beit ha-mokeid" is permitted.

Rav Chisda raises an obvious objection to this explanation. If the Torah prohibition against kindling a flame on Shabbat does not apply to the "beit ha-mokeid," then why does the mishna permit the kohanim to do so only before the onset of Shabbat? Clearly, Rav Chisda claims, the special permission granted to the kohanim the light the bonfire before Shabbat implicitly forbids them from lighting the fire on Shabbat itself. (Presumably, Rav Huna would respond that although Torah law allows lighting the fire of the "beit ha-mokeid" even on Shabbat itself, Chazal forbade the kohanim from doing so. However, since for them kindling the flame on Shabbat constitutes but a rabbinic violation, Chazal would not have also forbade lighting the fire just prior to Shabbat to safeguard the rabbinic prohibition against lighting on Shabbat itself.) Rav Chisda therefore argues that the halakha presented in the mishna has nothing at all to do with this verse in Parashat Vayakhel. The phrase "throughout your settlements" excludes not the fire of the "beit ha-mokeid" – which, according to Rav Chisda, may not be kindled on Shabbat – but rather the fire of the altar. The Torah here subtly permits placing upon the altar on Shabbat eve the fats from the animal sacrifices brought during the day on Erev Shabbat. Although placing the animal fats feeds the flame on the altar, it is nevertheless permitted because the prohibition against kindling a flame applies only "throughout your settlements," to the exclusion of the altar. The mishna's ruling, Rav Chisda explains, relates to a different point entirely, namely, the particular vigilance of the kohanim in the Temple. Given their meticulous observance of all halakhic minutia, Chazal allowed them to light the fire in the "beit ha-mokeid" even just minutes before Shabbat, as there was no concern that they would violate Shabbat by stirring the wood after Shabbat begins.

In summary, then, Rav Huna and Rav Chisda argue as to what the verse excludes by limiting the prohibition against kindling a flame on Shabbat to our "settlements." Rav Huna claims that it excludes the bonfire in the "beit ha-mokeid," whereas Rav Chisda holds that it permits only the placement of sacrificial fats upon the altar.

What was the "beit ha-mokeid"?

Rashi, both here and in Masekhet Yoma (15b), defines "beit ha-mokeid" as a room off the Temple courtyard where the kohanim would go to warm themselves. Given that the kohanim were forbidden from wearing shoes while performing the Temple service, during the winter months they naturally became very cold. A special room was therefore designated for the lighting of a large bonfire, where the kohanim could come for warmth. The Rambam, however, in his commentary to the mishna in Masekhet Shabbat, as well as Rabbenu Chananel (cited by Tosefot in Yoma 15b), explain "beit ha-mokeid" differently, as a bonfire that was maintained as a constant source of fire for the altar.

This debate as to the definition of "beit ha-mokeid" will affect Rav Huna's understanding of the phrase in our verse, "throughout your settlements." Recall that Rav Huna interpreted this phrase as excluding the fire of the "beit ha-mokeid." At first glance, as Tosefot note in Masekhet Yoma, this position appears to accommodate the view of the Rambam and Rabbenu Chananel, defining "beit ha-mokeid" as a bonfire used to supply fire for the altar. Since this fire is needed for the Temple service, and the Temple service itself overrides the prohibitions of Shabbat, it stands to reason that the Torah would permit lighting fire for purposes of the altar. The Torah forbids lighting fires "throughout your settlements," meaning, for one's own purposes, but not for the purpose of the divine service. According to Rashi's interpretation, however, the fire of the "beit ha-mokeid" was used not for the service of the Almighty, but rather for the comfort of the kohanim. Why, then, would Rashi allow – according to Rav Huna's view – lighting a fire in the Temple purely for physical comfort?

Apparently, Rashi understood Rav Huna as interpreting "throughout your settlements" as a geographic restriction. Kindling fires is prohibited only in Benei Yisrael's territories, but not in the territory, so-to-speak, of the Almighty. Therefore, even flames kindled for the kohanim's warmth may be lit on Shabbat in the Temple grounds, since they are not considered situated in the "settlements" of Benei Yisrael.

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The Torah tells in Parashat Vayakhel of Benei Yisrael's enthusiastic response to the appeal for donations of materials for the construction of the Mishkan, to the point where they had donated too many materials. Moshe therefore proclaimed, "Let no man or woman perform more work… " (36:6). The Gemara in Masekhet Shabbat (96b) cites this verse as the source for the prohibition against carrying from one domain to another on Shabbat. According to many Rishonim, the Gemara interpreted the word "melakha" ("work") in Moshe's proclamation as a reference to bringing materials for the Mishkan. On this basis, the Gemara concluded that even carrying qualifies as constructive activity worthy of being forbidden on Shabbat. (This Talmudic passage is subject to considerable debate among the Rishonim; see Rav Menachem Kasher's discussion in his Torah Sheleima, Parashat Vayakhel, appendix 5.) Implicit in this discussion is an explanation as to why the Gemara demands a source for this prohibition in the first place, something it does not do with regard to the other thirty-eight categories of activity forbidden on Shabbat. Since carrying does not, at first glance, appear to qualify as "melakha" – a creative activity, the Gemara searched for a Biblical source for its formal classification as such.

Rav Yaakov Kaminetzky zt"l, in his "Emet Le-yaakov," extends this point one step further, boldly asserting that hotza'a (carrying) was not initially included under the prohibitions of Shabbat. Only with the construction of the Mishkan, when Moshe issued this proclamation, did carrying earn the status of a "melakha" forbidden on Shabbat. We must emphasize that the Gemara's discussion itself does not necessarily yield such a conclusion. One may understand the Gemara as simply extracting from Moshe's proclamation the principle that carrying qualifies as "melakha" and is thus included under the prohibitions of Shabbat as initially conveyed to Moshe at Sinai. Rav Yaakov, however, understood the Gemara to mean that carrying became a "melakha" only once Moshe issued this proclamation.

Rav Yaakov then proceeds to provide the conceptual basis for this theory. As mentioned, the Gemara required a source for the classification of hotza'a as a "melakha" because it does not appear to involve any constructive or creative activity. Rav Yaakov contends that indeed, before God ordered the construction of a Mishkan, this was very true: moving an item from one domain to another did not and could not cause any significant transformation in the item's essence, and hence could not be viewed as a "melakha." The command to build the Mishkan, however, introduced an entirely new conceptual approach to space. The moment God ordered, "They shall make for Me a Sanctuary, and I shall dwell among them," a given space could now take on a fundamentally different essential quality than the territory to its right or left. At this point, then, hotza'a can, indeed, qualify as a "melakha." Once God established the concept of a Mishkan, we may indeed afford transformational significance to an item's relocation from one domain to another. Understandably, then, only now, as Benei Yisrael begin building the Mishkan, does "hotza'a" become a category of activity forbidden on Shabbat.

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Parashat Vayakhel tells of Benei Yisrael's enthusiastic donation of materials towards the construction of the Mishkan. The Torah in this section specifies the particular contribution made by the nesi'im (tribal leaders), who provided the precious jewels for the kohen gadol's vestments, as well as the oil and spices (35:27). Rashi famously comments, based on the Midrash, that the nesi'im, underestimating Benei Yisrael's willingness to participate in this project, assumed that the people's donations would hardly be sufficient to supply all the materials needed for the Mishkan. They therefore decided that rather than responding immediately to the appeal for materials, they would wait to see what the people would bring, and they would supply whatever was still needed. In the end, all that remained for them to donate was the small list of materials mentioned here – the stones, oil and spices. Rashi adds that the nesi'im were criticized for delaying their contribution: "Since they were initially lax, a letter was dropped from their title." Meaning, the Torah here writes the word "nesi'im" without the letter "yud" which would normally appear in this title, as a subtle indication of their laxity.

At first glance, Rashi's use of the term, "nit'atzlu" ("they were lax") appears inaccurate. Generally, "atzlut" denotes laziness, refraining from performing a given action due to disinterest or sloth. In this instance, however, the nesi'im's initial passivity resulted not from laziness, but rather from a miscalculation. In fact, they should perhaps be commended for assuming the responsibility to complete whatever would be missing from the materials collected from the people. Why does Rashi accuse them of "laxity"?

Rav Simcha Ziskind Broyde, as cited in "Sam Derekh," suggests a very simple answer based on one of the major themes in the philosophy of "musar": miscalculations are not always honest mistakes. People will often arrive at various rationales for inaction, while in truth their motivation is sheer indolence. The rationales are merely excuses. Rashi perhaps describes the nesi'im's attitude as "laxity" because in truth, it was their laxity that led them to sit back and wait for the people to donate first. Their reasoning that they would provide whatever was missing was merely an attempt to lend some justification for their inaction.

For good reason, then, Rashi describes the nesi'im as "lax." Although they appeared to have acted with noble intentions, those noble intentions in truth concealed their slothful attitude towards the collection of materials to the Mishkan.

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Towards the beginning of Parashat Vayakhel Moshe speaks to Benei Yisrael about the obligation of Shabbat observance, and singles out in particular the prohibition against lighting fires on Shabbat: "You shall kindle no fire throughout your settlements on the day of Shabbat" (35:3). The Talmud (Shabbat 70b) records a famous debate between Rabbi Natan and Rabbi Yossi as to why the Torah here specifies one of the thirty-nine "melakhot" – categories of activity forbidden on Shabbat. Rabbi Natan claims that the Torah thereby establishes the concept of "chiluk melakhot," meaning, that one is considered to have violated Shabbat by performing even one of the thirty-nine melakhot. Had the Torah not emphasized the severity of performing one of the categories of melakhot, we might have thought that one violates Shabbat and thereby incurs capital punishment only by performing all thirty-nine melakhot. Rabbi Yossi, by contrast, derives the principle of "chiluk melakhot" from a different source, and advances a different reason for the Torah's singling out the prohibition against kindling a flame. In his view, the Torah here draws a fundamental distinction between this violation and the other thirty-eight melakhot. Namely, kindling a flame constitutes merely a "lav," a standard Torah prohibition, and does not have the unique status of severity associated with Shabbat violation in general. Thus, one who kindles a flame on Shabbat has transgressed "only" a standard "mitzvat lo ta'aseh," for which one is punished through flogging, as opposed to other Shabbat violations, for which one receives capital punishment.

Rav Meir Simcha Ha-kohen of Dvinsk, in his "Or Samei'ach" (Hilkhot Sanhedrin 18:2), writes that he has always wondered why we never find it explicitly mentioned in any Mishna that one who kindles a flame on Shabbat does not receive the death penalty. Although the Talmud does, as mentioned, record Rabbi Yossi's view that "hav'ara le-lav yatzat" – this prohibition was singled out because it constitutes only a standard prohibition, the Mishnayot always speak of Shabbat desecration as a capital offense, without ever drawing any distinctions in this regard. In light of this, the Or Samei'ach posits a revolutionary theory, namely, that even Rabbi Yossi believes that kindling a flame on Shabbat incurs capital punishment. He explains that according to Rabbi Yossi, kindling a flame does not belong to the formal category of "melakha." Therefore, whenever the Torah speaks of Shabbat violations in general terms, it includes kindling a flame; when, however, it speaks specifically of performing "melakha," it does not include kindling a flame. Now in Parashat Ki-Tisa, the Torah writes, "He who profanes it [Shabbat] shall be put to death; whoever performs 'melakha' on it – that person shall be cut off from among his kin" (Shemot 31:14). The death penalty for Shabbat violators, which is administered by the Bet-Din, applies anytime a person intentionally "profanes it" – regardless of whether this desecration entailed the performance of a melakha. Hence, the death penalty is incurred even when one kindles a flame on Shabbat, even according to Rabbi Yossi. The final clause of this verse, however, establishes the punishment of "karet" – the eternal "cutting off" of one's soul from the Israelite people – specifically for one who "performs melakha" on Shabbat. Therefore, according to Rabbi Yossi, one does not incur the punishment of "karet" for kindling a flame on Shabbat. By the same token, one who violates this prohibition mistakenly, such as if he was unaware that it was Shabbat or that Halakha forbids kindling fire on Shabbat, he is not required to bring a korban chatat (sin offering). Since a korban chatat is brought when one mistakenly transgresses a prohibition which carries a "karet" punishment when transgressed intentionally, Rabbi Yossi would not require a chatat when one mistakenly violates the prohibition against kindling a flame on Shabbat.

In summary, then, the Or Samei'ach contends that capital punishment for Shabbat violations applies to all categories of forbidden activity on Shabbat, including kindling a flame, even according to Rabbi Yossi, who relegates kindling to the status of standard Torah violations. This lower status affects only those provisions that depend on a given violation's classification as a "melakha," namely, the "karet" punishment and the obligation to bring a korban chatat for unintentional violations.

The Or Samei'ach himself cites two passages in the Gemara that appear to contradict this theory, and attempts to resolve them. He concludes this discussion by writing, "Although this is novel, I wrote that which I believe." We should also note that, as Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Har Tzvi, O.C. 1:149) observes, Rashi, in his commentary to Masekhet Pesachim (5b), writes explicitly that Rabbi Yossi absolves one who kindles a fire on Shabbat from the death penalty.

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Towards the end of Parashat Vayakhel, we read of the preparation of the ketoret (incense): "He prepared the sacred anointing oil and the pure aromatic incense" (37:39). The Midrash Ha-gadol notes that the use of the adjective "pure" in reference to the ketoret seems difficult to understand. "Tahor" ("pure") generally describes a state of halakhic purity, as opposed to "tamei" – a state of halakhic impurity. However, the concept of halakhic purity and impurity applies only to people, functional utensils and foods. How, then, can the Torah speak of the ketoret – raw spices – as "pure"? The Midrash Ha-gadol explains that the Torah here introduces the concept of "chibat ha-kodesh" – the unique standards of purity that applied in the Temple. Although generally spices cannot contract halakhic impurity, the ketoret, which was placed on the altar in the Temple, was indeed susceptible to tum'a. This interpretation of the verse appears in several commentaries, as well, including the "Moshav Zekeinim," which cites this approach in the name of the Rosh. The Peirush Ha-Tur, which was written by the Rosh's son (Rabbenu Yaakov Ba'al Ha-turim), brings this explanation, as well.

The Gemara discusses the halakha of chibat ha-kodesh in several contexts, but derives it from a different verse, in Sefer Vayikra (7:19): "[Sacrificial] meat that touches anything impure shall not be eaten." As the Gemara (Zevachim 34a) notes, the Torah elsewhere establishes the prohibition against eating sacrificial meat that had become ritually impure. Therefore, this verse, which appears to simply repeat this prohibition, must in fact be referring to a different halakha. The Gemara asserts that this verse refers to the concept of "chibat ha-kodesh," establishing that even non-food items used in the Temple service, such as firewood placed on the altar and the levona (frankincense) used with meal offerings, can contract tum'a.

Tosefot (there in Zevachim, and in Chulin 36b) raise a question concerning the Gemara's interpretation of that verse in Sefer Vayikra. Granted, the Gemara felt compelled to interpret this verse out of context, given that elsewhere the Torah establishes the prohibition against partaking of sacrificial meat that had become tamei. It therefore interpreted the verse as referring to the extraordinary halakha of "chibat ha-kodesh." However, as Tosefot argue, the Gemara could have nevertheless interpreted the verse in a manner that far better accommodates its literal reading. For the concept of "chibat ha-kodesh" expresses itself not only in the possibility for non-food items to contract halakhic impurity, but also in the susceptibility of food-items in the Temple to contract tum'a without having first undergone "hekhsher." Generally, food can become tamei only after it has first come in contact with liquid, a process known as "hekhsher"; in the Temple, however, due to the concept of "chibat ha-kodesh," food items become tamei even without having undergone "hekhsher." Accordingly, Tosefot ask, why didn’t the Gemara interpret the verse, "[Sacrificial] meat that touches anything impure shall not be eaten" as referring to meat that came in contact with tum'a without having undergone "hekhsher"? Surely this interpretation would better accommodate the verse's literal reading than the interpretation given by the Gemara, by which the verse refers to non-food items, such as firewood and spices! Tosefot provide no answer for this question.

Rav Menachem Kasher zt"l, in his "Torah Sheleima" (Shemot, chapter 37, note19), suggests that we might resolve Tosefot's difficulty in light of the aforementioned passage in the Midrash Ha-gadol. If we accept both the Gemara's derivation of the "chibat ha-kodesh" principle from the verse in Vayikra, and the Midrash Ha-gadol's extrapolation here in Shemot, then we indeed have two different sources for this concept. Quite reasonably, the verse here in Shemot, which speaks of the ketoret, provides the source for the possibility of the ketoret and other non-food items becoming tamei. And the verse in Vayikra, which mentions sacrificial meat, introduces the halakha allowing for tum'a even without the process of "hekhsher." We might therefore suggest, Rav Kasher claims, that when the Gemara extracts the halakha concerning non-food items from the verse in Vayikra, it also has in mind the verse here in Parashat Vayakhel, as the two verses together combine to establish the halakha of "chibat ha-kodesh." Although the Gemara does not make explicit reference to this verse in Vayakhel, we might speculate that it employs this verse, as well, in establishing the source for the concept of "chibat ha-kodesh."

We should note that the Rambam, in his codification of this halakha (Hilkhot Issurei Mizbei'ach 6:8), appears to view this halakha as rabbinic in origin. Apparently, he considered the Gemara's derivation of this law from the verse in Vayikra as an "asmakhta" – a secondary reading of the verse alluding to a rabbinically ordained rule, rather than an actual source. Rashi (Zevachim 46b; Pesachim 34b)), too, understood "chibat ha-kodesh" as a rule instituted by Chazal. According to this view, what does the Torah mean here in Parashat Vayakhel, when it describes the ketoret as "pure"? If, indeed, the possibility of the ketoret becoming impure was introduced only later, by Chazal, then what does the Torah mean by this description? Presumably, Rashi and the Rambam follow the interpretation of Chzikuni and Seforno to this verse, that "tahor" here refers not to halakhic purity, but rather to physical purity. The Torah here tells that the ketoret was prepared with the very choicest spices, free from all impurities and filth. Accordingly, this verse has nothing at all to do with the halakhic status of tum'a or tahara.

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Parashat Vayakhel tells of Benei Yisrael's enthusiastic response to the appeal for materials for the building of the Mishkan. The Torah emphasizes the participation of the women, who brought materials and even performed work needed for the project: "And all the skilled women spun with their own hands, and brought what they had spun, in blue, purple and crimson yarns…" (35:25). The Kesef Mishneh (Hilkhot Beit Ha-bechira 1:12) cites this verse as the Biblical source for the Rambam's ruling that the obligation to build the Beit Ha-mikdash – which the Rambam derives from the construction of the Mishkan – includes women. They, too, are obligated to participate in the construction of the Beit Ha-mikdash, just as they involved themselves in the building of the Mishkan.

Many later writers noted that this ruling appears to contradict the cardinal rule exempting women from mitzvot that are limited to a specific timeframe. After all, in this very same paragraph, the Rambam rules that the building of the Temple does not occur during the nighttime hours. Seemingly, then, this mitzva should resemble other mitzvot which do not apply at nighttime – such as tzitzit – and are therefore classified as time-bound mitzvot, from which women are exempt.

Instinctively, we might answer that this mitzva is different because, as the Kesef Mishneh claims, the Rambam has a clear Biblical source for the inclusion of women in the obligation. However, as some writers have noted, this source is hardly convincing. The fact that the women eagerly participated in the construction of the Mishkan does not necessarily prove that they were included in the obligation; their participation might have been purely voluntary. Seemingly, then, we should resort to the general principle exempting women from time-bound obligations.

Rav Yosef Kapah, in his notes to the Rambam's Mishneh Torah, cites two of the answers that have been suggested to resolve this difficulty. Rav Chayim Falagi, in his "Chayim Va-melekh," suggests that only the final phase of the Temple's construction must take place during the daytime. He points out that the Rambam derives this halakha, restricting the Temple's construction to the daytime, from a verse in Sefer Bamidbar (7:1) – "On the day that Moshe set up the Tabernacle" – implying that the Temple may be "set up" only by day. This verse refers to Moshe's final assembly of the Mishkan; presumably, then, the restriction applies only to the final stage of construction.

The "Zera Barukh" suggests a different answer, claiming that although, indeed, the construction of the Beit Ha-mikdash should take place only by day, nevertheless, work done at night is not deemed invalid after the fact. Only when the given mitzva has no relevance at all during certain timeframes, the "Zera Barukh" claims, do we consider that mitzva "time-bound" with respect to women's exemption. He brings an example from Tosefot in Masekhet Kiddushin (29a), who discuss the status of berit mila (circumcision) in this regard. According to Tosefot, if one accepts the view permitting a berit mila at nighttime if the child's eighth day has already passed, this mitzva is not considered a time-bound mitzva. (Tosefot make this point to explain why the Gemara requires a Biblical source to exempt women from the obligation to circumcise their sons.) However, as the "Zera Barukh" notes, a circumcision performed after the child's eighth day does not override Shabbat; perhaps, then, we should, indeed, consider this mitzva a "time-bound" obligation, given that it is restricted to weekdays. The answer, of course, is that since post facto a mila performed on Shabbat is valid, and no further measures are necessary (such as letting some blood from the area of the circumcision, as is required if a mila was performed at nighttime), we consider the mitzva to apply on Shabbat, as well.

Similarly, the "Zera Barukh" suggests, since work done towards the Mikdash's construction at night need not be dismantled, we consider the mitzva to apply, in principle, even during the nighttime hours. Hence, it is not classified as a "time-bound" obligation, and it therefore includes women as well as men.

Clearly, however, one might dispute this equation drawn by the "Zera Barukh" between these two halakhot. The mitzva of mila itself is not limited to weekdays; the external factor of the Shabbat prohibitions precludes the possibility of performing a mila on Shabbat. Understandably, then, after the eighth day we would not classify mila as a "time-bound" obligation. The mitzva to build the Temple, however, according to the Rambam, is inherently restricted to the daytime hours. Even if work performed at nighttime need not be undone, nevertheless, the mitzva's application is inherently limited to the daytime, seemingly warranting its classification as a "time-bound" obligation.